A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE
NETHERLANDS
By PETRUS JOHANNES BLOK, Ph.D.
PROFESSOR OP DUTCH HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OP LBYDBN
TO BE COMPLETED IN FIVE PARTS.
8vO, WITH MAPS, EACH $2.50
Parts I, II, and III translated by Ruth Putnam and Parts
IV and V by Oscar A. Bierstadt.
Part I. From the Earliest Times to the Beginning of
the 15th Century.
Part II. The Gradual Centralization of Power, and
the Burgundian Period.
Part III. The War of Independence, 1568-1621.
Part IV. Frederick Henry, John de Witt, William III.
Part V. To be announced later.
HISTORY OF
THE PEOPLE OF THE
NETHERLANDS
BY
PETRUS JOHANNES BLOK
Professor of Dutch History in the University of Leyden
PART IV.
FREDERICK HENRY JOHN DE WITT WILLIAM III.
TRANSLATED BY OSCAR A. BIERSTADT
G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS
NEW YORK AND LONDON
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Copyright, 1907
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PREFACE
THE historian of the "golden age" of the Nether-
lands has a pleasant task to perform, because the
glory of posterity has never risen higher than in this
time, especially in the second half of the century.
But this task is difficult, for great is the number of the
works that have appeared on this attractive epoch, and
hard it is to hold fast the thread of the narrative amid
the many important events occurring in every depart-
ment of the national life. The author hopes he has over-
come this difficulty without allowing too ample a space
to any portion of the history of the people, so far as
possible without being swayed by his personal preference
for persons and systems.
It would not greatly surprise him, however, if the crit-
ics, as has previously happened, were again to complain
that in this volume also of the history of the people of the
Netherlands too much place has perhaps been given to
the political history of the people. That poor political
history ! Formerly it was everything, the everywhere
recognised mistress; now it is put under a ban and
thrown into an obscure corner, and unjustly. It may
not be denied that the interest of the public at present is
directed more to other expressions of the life of the peo-
ple, but this does not signify that those other expressions
of old took a so much more considerable place in the
popular life itself, in the daily thoughts of the nation.
Any one acquainted with the most-read pamphlets of
iii
iv Preface
the seventeenth century will readily acknowledge that
the political events at home and abroad occupied a very
notable space in the life and thought of the people, in
close connection with their hope and fear, with differ-
ences of opinion in religious matters, and with the
changes of material prosperity. It would be wrong to
attribute too great an influence to a temporary phenom-
enon, to interest in material questions, in treating the
history of the people in general, just as it would be a
wrong view to pay attention chiefly to the vicissitudes
of working men who now rejoice in great importance.
The author believes he has been faithful to the principles
developed by him in the introduction to his first volume,
according to which he assigns to the political history the
eminent place belonging to it in the life of the people,
without forgetting that it does not alone constitute the
history of the people, but that a larger space must be
granted to other utterances of the popular life than was
formerly the case in general historical works. Opinions
may differ as to how ample this space should be. The ex-
tent of its demands depends often upon personal political
views. No difference of ideas can exist with regard to
the subject itself, if one is only guided by the require-
ments of a purely scientific consideration, not by the
political or social opinion of the day.
The author hopes some years longer to continue work-
ing upon the task set for himself and to bring it to an
end, encouraged by the great interest and cooperation
which he has so far encountered with gratitude.
P. J. B.
Leyden, September 26, 1901.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. — The First Years after the Truce i
II. — Frederick Henry's Beginning 20
III. — The Prince at the Height of his Power . . 60
IV. — The United Netherlands in 1640 .... 74
V. — The French Alliance 103
VI. — Last Years of the War. Peace of Munster . . 123
VII. — First Years of Peace 151
VIII. — First English War 186
IX. — The Council Pensionary at the Head of the State 220
X. — Land and People about 1660 244
XI. — Years of Peace 290
XII.— Second English War . 317
XIII. — Summit of the Republic's Power .... 339
XIV.— De Witt's Fall 366
XV.— The Great War 399
XVI. — Preparation of the Great Coalition . . . 443
XVII. —The Coalition War 473
XVIII. — William III.'s Last Years 493
XIX. — The Netherlands at the End of the Seventeenth
Century 506
Appendix : Sources of Netherland History . . 543
Index 555
V
HISTORY OF THE DUTCH PEOPLE
CHAPTER I
THE FIRST YEARS AFTER THE TRUCE
HOW little power the new government possessed was
manifest both in foreign and domestic affairs during
the first years after the renewal of the war. Relations
with France, England, Sweden, Denmark, the German
princes, and the Hanse towns were anything but satis-
factory. The United Netherlands, honoured and feared
under Oldenbarnevelt's sway by all Europe, were still
desired as an ally and respected as an enemy on account
of their 50,000 disciplined troops and 100 war ships,
but these advantages were not boldly used. The prince
and his advisers did not show themselves equal to their
task.
The Huguenots of La Rochelle begged the help of the
States against their government, but although Maurice
and the preachers sympathised with them, their emis-
saries were not publicly received in the States-General*
and assistance was neither given nor positively refused
them. The tone of Maurice and Du Maurier in their
interviews on the relation of the States to France re-
mained sharp and unfriendly, and the remembrance of
Oldenbarnevelt raised an insuperable barrier between
them, but hostility did not go beyond bitter words and
VOL. IV. — I
2 History of the Dutch People
mutual complaints. Cause enough for such complaints
was given by the French government, particularly on the
occasion of De Groot's escape from Loevestein. The
brave and faithful wife of the imprisoned pensionary
neglected nothing in order to obtain from the States the
liberation of her husband. Failing in this, she had
recourse to another way, and on March 22, 1621, suc-
ceeded in getting her husband out of his prison, as is
well known, in a chest used for conveying books. The
one woman was a match for a thousand men. The
escaped prisoner did not stop in the Southern Nether-
lands, where he would have been received with open
arms, but hastened to Paris. Here he met with a cordial
reception, and was entertained by the best society as a
man of uncommon importance and a celebrated scholar.
The king granted him a yearly pension of 3600 livres
and took him under his patronage, when the Estates of
Holland, indignant at the publication "with privilege of
the king" of the masterly Justification of tJie Lawful
Government of Holland and West Friesland, strictly pro-
hibited this book and proscribed its author. The work,
translated into Latin, French, and German, placed in
the clearest light before all Europe the culpable action
taken against the fallen party. It was an arraignment of
the victors of 1618 and 1619, and did more than any
other writing to confirm an unfavourable opinion of their
conduct towards Oldenbarnevelt and his followers. On
this account it imbittered De Groot's enemies and made
his return to the fatherland impossible. This book and
his letters found their way into the United Netherlands
with the help of Du Maurier, but the States did not
venture to complain of this any more than of the protec-
tion bestowed in France on many other fugitive Remon-
strants, as Uyttenbogaert and Episcopius. The fear of
the enmity of France kept them also from complaining
of their merchants' troubles in France and of the plans
The First Years after the Truce 3
there formed against the interests of the East India
Company.
Weak was the attitude towards England, which took
a high stand on account of Coen's treatment of the Eng-
lish in India, and repeatedly threatened to capture the
returning East Indiamen. An effort was made not to
anger Sweden by too close an alliance with Denmark,
and at the same time Denmark was kept as friendly as
possible. The same feeble policy was adopted towards
the German cities and princes. There was giving and
promising on one side, taking and refusing on the other,
and so nobody was really satisfied.
The war was waged also in listless fashion. When
Spinola laid siege to Jiilich, relief was so slow in coming
that its commander, Pithan, had to surrender in Febru-
ary, 1622. Prince Maurice took the field but remained
inactive. It seemed as if there was a disposition to
prolong the Truce upon any favourable terms, in accord-
ance with Oldenbarnevelt's policy, and the partisans of
peace took heart in south and north. The death of
both the king of Spain and Archduke Albert in 162 1
impeded the enemy's plans.
Unconquerable energy was shown by the merchants,
however, who went on developing the world's commerce,
although the war now compelled them again to arm
themselves against the enemy and to send their ships to
sea well equipped for action. Beside the East India
Company a West India Company came into existence by
charter of June 3, 162 1. Both corporations were not
simply commercial associations, but political institutions
as well, designed not alone for gain, but also to injure
the enemy and to stop the source of his power.1
Such an institution was the West India Company from
its beginning. The indefatigable Usselincx, himself a
stern Calvinist and enemy of all "heretics and erring
1 Van Rees, Staathuishoudkunde in Arederland, ii,, p. 122.
4 History of the Dutch People
spirits," saw more chance for his projects after Olden-
barnevelt's fall, and in the autumn of 1618 he returned
from Zealand, whither he had fled to escape his creditors,
to Holland in order to act as adviser to the Estates of
that province and the States-General in the matter of the
new company and its charter. He could not even now
carry out all his ideas. He desired a limitation of the
power of the directors over the shareholders, better and
more complete accounts, the planting of colonies of free-
men closely bound to the mother country, the promotion
of civilisation and Christianity among the natives, and
especially a regular supervision by the state of the doings
of the merchants "who have gain for their north star and
greed for a compass, and who would believe the ship was
keeping to its right course, if it were almost wrecked by
profit." Little heed was given his grievances, and the
company was modelled after the East India Company,
though indeed the "participants" in the new association
had rather more to say, and the state possessed more in-
fluence through its deputies in the governing board of
the Nineteen and through its approval required for war-
like operations. The company obtained a monopoly for
the western coast of Africa as far as the Cape, and for
America and the islands east of New Guinea during a
period of twenty-four years.
It is plain from the entire organisation of the company
that it was formed for spoils and privateering. At first
subscriptions, open to any one within or without the
United Netherlands, did not come in very fast, since the
shareholders of the East India Company, the model for
the new company, were far from satisfied with the work-
ing of their charter. The States-General made every
effort to promote subscriptions and changed the charter
so as to give more influence to the stockholders; the
East India Company, about to have its patent renewed,
was compelled to subscribe one million guilders; pam-
The First Years after the Truce 5
phlets were put out in support of the affair. By the
summer of 1623 seven millions were at last raised.
Disapproving of the scheme as settled upon, Usselincx
would have nothing more to do with the business, to
which he had devoted his life and fortune, and he now
entered the service of Sweden in the hope of realising
there his great plans. He secured from Gustavus Adol-
phus the charter for a company constituted according to
his notions, but it never came into being owing to want
of funds and the circumstances of Sweden after the king's
death in 1632. Discouraged, he returned finally to his
fatherland, where, at over eighty years of age, he died
poor and forgotten about the middle of the century,
persisting until his last days in writing and speaking for
his cherished ideas, the accomplishment of which was
contrary to the spirit of his time.
The formation of the new company was viewed with
displeasure in England, as the scene of its activity was to
be in the very regions recommended by Raleigh and his
friends to the English merchants and already visited by
them. King James was always complaining of the harm
done to English interests in the East Indies by Coen and
his followers who, despite the treaty of union, continued
as much as possible to keep the English out of affairs in
the Archipelago. There was mutual distrust, quarrelling
everywhere between officials on both sides, a seemingly
endless strife. Meanwhile Coen went energetically to
work. Energy was necessary in the Indies of those days.
The uncivilised natives of the Indian isles, exasperated
by the unbridled avarice of the Netherlanders, English,
Portuguese, and Spaniards, hunted down like wild beasts,
robbed of their possessions, and driven from their homes,
revenged themselves upon their oppressors whenever
they could. How Coen and his men considered and
treated the natives is horribly evident from his relation >
1 Tiele, Bouwstoffen, i., p. 272.
6 History of the Dutch People
of the conquest of the Banda Islands in 1621, a story
of death and destruction surpassing in cold-blooded
cruelty anything of the kind. With the exception of
the small Pularoon, on account of the disputes with the
English about its possession, all of the inhabited islands
were laid waste ; thousands of the population were killed
or starved to death; and the survivors — some eight
hundred men, women, and children — were transported to
Batavia, where the poor unfortunates perished in misery.
This group of islands had to be repeopled — a fearful
testimony to the methods of the Netherlanders in secur-
ing commerce and supremacy in the Indies.
The picture Coen himself gives of the "bad life" of the
Netherlanders around him, of their drunkenness, immo-
rality, and greed, shows us how great was the need of an
iron hand like his to rule over these rough men. And
the women sent out to the Indies by the company in the
beginning, the "scum of the land," were not much better
than the men. Unquestionably many noble deeds were
done by the Netherlanders in India during these years;
heroic was often the conduct of those carrying the com-
pany's flag over the Indian lands and seas; admirable
talent was exhibited in managing the affairs of the com-
pany; but the dark side of it all must be indicated, and
it should not be forgotten that, in accomplishing so much
worthy of praise, much occurred which cannot bear the
light of to-day. Coen's own doings prove that a great
man in a time of blood and iron may go beyond what is
allowable. No brave acts, no ability in governing and
waging war, no brilliant success can quite atone for the
cruelty inflicted upon the unfortunate natives of the
Banda Islands. Where the governor-general acted thus,
his subordinates naturally followed his example. The
English did likewise upon occasion, and it is not surpris-
ing that the differences between the two nations often
assumed in these remote regions a character recalling the
The First Years after the Truce 7
most barbarous times, when the question of right was
simply one of might, when the worst sides of human
nature were openly displayed.
These things were differently regarded in Europe than
in India, particularly by the weaker party, in this case
the English. At the request of King James a new
embassy from the Netherlands appeared in England at
the end of 162 1. Sommelsdijk against his wishes was
appointed head of it. The tone of the discussions was
anything but mild. The king in the earliest interviews
made the most odious remarks about the Dutch mer-
chants and fishermen, "bloodsuckers of my kingdom," as
he called them. There was negotiation and wrangling
for more than a year, until an agreement was reached
concerning Indian affairs. Peace was now hoped for in
these quarters, and a considerable indemnity was granted
to the English for their losses.
The war with Spain became more serious in the second
year. With the support of the States the expelled Bo-
hemian king kept one army in the Palatinate under the
Count of Mansfeld and another in Westphalia under
Duke Christian of Brunswick. The king soon went to
the Palatinate for a last attempt to recover his hereditary
land. But this attempt failed also, and the unfortunate
prince disbanded all his troops. The armies of Mansfeld
and Brunswick, thus made independent and still num-
bering 25 poo men, threatened to move into France to aid
the Huguenots. The States and the prince succeeded
by the promise of subsidies in persuading Mansfeld to
turn to the Netherlands and to act with their army in
opposing Spinola's designs.
The plans of the Spanish general had begun to excite
alarm in the border provinces of the States. These plans
resulted from the changed condition of the Spanish mon-
archy and the southern provinces after the deaths of
Philip III. and the archduke. The world-monarchy of
8 History of the Dutch People
Spain, no longer what it was in the early time of Philip
II. and having constantly fallen lower under Philip III.,
appeared once more under the latter's son, Philip IV.,
with the pretensions of the greatest of European powers,
and, as leader of the Catholic reaction, it exerted all its
strength in the European complications. In place of
the insignificant Lerma the young king had confided the
management of affairs to Don Gaspar de Guzman, Count
de Olivares, an able statesman, whose dearest wish was
to bring Spain back to the policy of Philip II., and to
have her closely allied with the German Hapsburgs and
the papal see. Although weaker than formerly, Spain
could still give her antagonists enough to do. This policy
required a more intimate union between Spain and the
different portions of the monarchy, including the loyal
Netherlands. Archduchess Isabella, now a childless
widow, showed no inclination to make her territory into
a separate realm ; she contented herself with the office of
governess of the land ; and she consented to have the
States of the various provinces take the oath of allegiance
to her nephew, Philip IV., as duke and count, this actu-
ally occurring in 1623. ' The war was now to be con-
tinued from Spain. Spinola received his orders and the
financial means to execute them.
A short raid by Prince Frederick Henry, who with his
cavalry laid the Brabant country as far as the gates of
Brussels, Mechlin, and Louvain under contribution in
the spring, excited dismay in the south, but Drenthe,
Overyssel, and Gelderland were so open to the enemy
that tribute had to be paid him in various districts, and
on all sides reports were rife of a secret understanding of
some Catholic noblemen and peasants with the Spaniard.
There were also complaints of excessive taxation, of
Holland's predominance, and harmony in the north left
1 Waddington, La Kepublique des Provinces Unies (Paris, 1895), i., p.
94.
The First Years after the Truce 9
much to be desired, all the more so because the prince,
suffering from a severe disease of the liver, could display-
but slight vigour.
Suddenly Spinola laid siege in July to the important
fortress of Bergen op Zoom, but it held out well and
blocked the "Spanish hosts." Fortunately Mansfeld's
army, early in September, had penetrated to Tilburg,
and the prince was able to approach the endangered
fortress, so that Spinola had to raise the siege, which
had lasted three months, and to quit the neighbour-
hood of the city so valiantly defended by its governor,
Ryhove, to the great joy of the whole country. This
success was of benefit to Zealand and Holland and in-
spired a song of triumph by Starter. It was now hoped
that King James would earnestly adopt his son-in-law's
cause and take Mansfeld into his service, but this did
not happen. The States also were not anxious to keep
the German general's force through the winter and sent
it into East Friesland, whose count urged the evacuation
of his fortresses, but now saw his land overrun by Mans-
feld's wild bands. For more than half a year Mansfeld's
troops levied tribute upon the little country and Olden-
burg, and the count of East Friesland, almost a prisoner
in one of his castles,1 considered it lucky that the garri-
sons of the States protected his chief fortified places.
Mansfeld refused to leave until 300,000 guilders had been
given him to pay his debts. In the autumn the States
loaned this sum to the Estates of East Friesland in return
for a bond signed by the latter and making the country
dependent upon the United Netherlands.
An attempt by Maurice in December to capture Ant-
werp by surprise failed on account of the weather. The
Netherlanders were little satisfied with the weak attitude
of the prince, who was known to be secretly negotiating
with the enemy, Juffer Tserclaes constantly travelling
1 Aitzema, i.f p. 131.
io History of the Dutch People
between The Hague and Brussels and hoping that Span-
ish offers would win him over to favour peace. Abroad
also there were complaints of his inactivity and of the
slight vigour displayed in foreign affairs by the United
Netherlands since Oldenbarnevelt's fall. This general
discontent with Maurice was somewhat allayed by the
discovery of a shameful plot against his life. Some per-
secuted Remonstrant preachers, rural functionaries, and
private individuals with the financial aid of Oldenbarne-
velt's sons and his nephew, Van der Dussen, formed a
plan to put the prince out of the way by hiring unscrupu-
lous sailors to murder him during one of his regular
visits to his mistress at Ryswick. These seamen, mis-
trusting the business which had only been obscurely
proposed to them as something for the welfare of the
country, went to the prince for further information and
thus revealed the plot in January. Search was at once
made for the conspirators. Most of them were arrested.
A few, including Stoutenburg and Van der Dussen,
escaped and sought the protection of the archduchess.
Fifteen, among whom were Reinier van Groenevelt,
Oldenbarnevelt's eldest son, and Slatius, the Remon-
strant pamphleteer, lost their lives upon the scaffold,
suffering a righteous punishment for their criminal
attempt. Groenevelt could not be saved, though he
showed repentance and his proud mother begged for his
life.
Maurice seems to have felt increasing dejection at the
slow course of affairs, and he longed for rest and peace.
The efforts made anew from the southern provinces to
bring him to serious negotiations for a truce found him
less unwilling than before, partly because Holland also
was complaining loudly of the burdens of the war. In
the spring of 1623 a secret emissary from Brabant, Van
Petersom, appeared repeatedly at The Hague with the
commission to open negotiations, and he was not immedi-
The First Years after the Truce n
ately repulsed. It was plain enough that without allies
the war would, in the long run, be too much of an under-
taking for the States, an old truth confirmed again by-
facts and calling attention — as in the days of Prince
William — to France and England, the only allies worthy
of earnest consideration, and yet offering scanty hopes.
England was less than ever to be depended upon, now
the old king seemed about to attain his long-cherished
purpose, and his son Charles, having departed for Mad-
rid, was received so cordially at the Spanish court that
his marriage to a Spanish infanta looked settled. The
attitude of England towards the Netherlands, moreover,
had always been so ambiguous that no close alliance was
thought of between them. This was rather to be
expected with France. The possibility that England, by
a league with Spain, might either obtain the Netherlands
or help put the hereditary enemy in possession of them
appeared so threatening to France that the French gov-
ernment, immediately after the report of Charles's
success1 at Madrid, reverted to the policy of Henry IV.
and promised a renewal of subsidies to the States, if they
would cease negotiating with Spain for a new truce and
would not support the Huguenots or rebellious noblemen
in France.
It was resolved in the Netherlands to send an embassy
to France. A better understanding thus prepared with
France caused a renewal of the old alliance to be expected
shortly, although the friend of the States for many years,
Jeannin, had died in 1622. It was apparent that the
French administration was inspired with a new spirit.
Cardinal de Richelieu, the greatest political genius of the
seventeenth century, entered the royal council in April,
1624, and soon ruled the course of affairs in France.
His domestic policy sought to uphold the king's power,
his foreign policy aimed at the humiliation of the house
1 Ranke, Franz, Gesch., ii., p. 200.
1 2 History of the Dutch People
of Austria, of Spain. A more vigorous policy was now
to be looked for from France towards the United Neth-
erlands. The renewal of the former friendly relations
between the two governments had to be arranged. This
task could scarcely be intrusted to Du Maurier, for he
was not on good terms with Prince Maurice and the
statesmen surrounding him. The ambassador under-
stood this himself, and before he was "thrown out of the
window," he sent in his resignation which was at once
accepted. In April, 1624, he left the provinces never to
return. He was replaced by the Catholic d'Espesse, an
agent of the new policy that was to make France under
Richelieu's guidance play so great a part in Europe.
The condition of the United Provinces was still far
from brilliant in 1624. The eastern sections, menaced
on one side by the Spanish garrisons and Tilly's victori-
ous troops, ravaged on the other by the fierce bands of
Brunswick and Mansfeld and by undisciplined Italian
deserters from the Spaniards, were unfortunate enough.
The Veluwe, Drenthe, and Overyssel were laid under
contribution in February by Spanish forces. Floods,
snow, and frost did uncommon damage in the country.
Few were the gleams of light also in European politics.
Although the English marriage at Madrid was broken off
before the autumn, England continued unfriendly towards
the States, which did their best to keep James in good
humour by acceding to his demands. Coen's return
from India to the fatherland offered some opportunity
for a better understanding.
The disappointment of the English government at the
failure of the Spanish matrimonial plans was so great
that it soon showed a more friendly countenance to the
Netherlanders. Carleton, still representing his govern-
ment in the Netherlands, had a very serious talk with the
prince about the causes of the mutual estrangement
during recent years. Shortly afterwards Sommelsdijk and
The First Years after the Truce 13
Joachimi went to England ' at the request of the English
administration, and in July, 1624, a treaty was arranged,
by which England agreed, as in 1585, to assist the
United Netherlands with 6000 men, while the money
expended was to be paid back on the conclusion of
peace or a long truce, although no cautionary towns
were to be placed in English hands. About the same
time an embassy to France made a treaty of subsidy for
three years at Compiegne with Louis XIII., the treaty
like that of 1608 promising reciprocal aid in case of war,
and the States agreeing to conclude no peace or truce
without the king's intervention. The subsidy was to be
1,200,000 livres for the first year, 1,000,000 for the two
following years, and the provinces were to repay the
money within three years after the making of peace or
truce. The States in case of war were to help France
with the half of this amount or with troops and war-
ships, whenever their situation allowed. Commercial
dissensions were settled as well as possible. This was
a plain indication of the course France intended to
follow.
The summer of 1624 thus brought a fine chance of
improving matters. France and England again stood
towards the States in the same relation as before the
Truce, and the friendship between these two powers
seemed lastingly confirmed, when the Prince of Wales,
the later Charles I., married Henrietta Maria, the French
king's sister. So close appeared the bond connecting
the two powers and the United Netherlands that even
the quarrels between English and Netherlander in
India, the news of which just reached Europe before the
conclusion of the treaties of alliance, could not disturb
the harmony for the time being. There was hope of a
renewal of the Triple Alliance of 1596. If this came
about, Spain's misfortune was boundless, the freedom of
1 Arend, Van Rees, and Brill, iii., 4, 10.
14 History of the Dutch People
the United Netherlands an accomplished fact, the con-
quest of the south probable.
The dissensions with England were serious enough.
In February, 1623, there was discovered upon Ambon a
conspiracy of the English settled there and some Japan-
ese to take possession of the fort. The governor of the
Moluccas, Henry van Speult, by means of torture, ob-
tained first from a few Japanese, then from some of the
Englishmen, confessions which appeared to place the
affair beyond doubt, although objection might well be
made to the regularity of his method of procedure.
Governor and council condemned the guilty men to
death, and the sentence was immediately carried out
upon twenty, half of them being Englishmen and includ-
ing Towerson, the agent at Ambon, and several mer-
chants and officials of the English company. Only two
of the condemned Englishmen were spared to look after
the property of their company, and later received pardon
at Batavia.1 This trial, as soon as it was heard of in
England, aroused the most violent indignation, and the
governor-general and directors of the Dutch East India
Company also regarded Van Speult's action, though not
illegal, as very imprudent on account of his harshness
and irregularities. Carleton protested strenuously in
August against the treatment inflicted upon English
subjects and opposed the sending out again of Coen, the
mortal enemy of the English, as governor-general. He
demanded an investigation by the States-General, pun-
ishment of the Dutch officials, compensation for the
damages done the English company, and permission in
accordance with the treaty of 1619 to build forts in the
Moluccas. His tone was so sharp that the States-Gen-
eral requested him to moderate it. A vehement pam-
phlet against the English on the affair awakened more
bad feelings on both sides. There was again talk of
*De Jonge, Opkomsi, v., p. v.
The First Years after the Truce 1 5
England making reprisals on the returning East India-
men. At last the States-General were obliged to summon
Van Speult and the other judges home to give an
account of their conduct. Furthermore they did their
best to meet the wishes of the English with regard to the
general situation in India.
Coen was meanwhile engaged in persuading the direc-
tors to adopt the measures recommended by him for
India. He wanted economy and better government,
encouragement of the immigration of Europeans, devel-
opment of commerce with China, promotion of free
trade and free cultivation of land and products. These
principles conflicted with the monopoly hitherto enjoyed
by the company, but Coen's knowledge of Indian affairs
and his persuasive eloquence so influenced the directors
that before the end of 1623 a beginning was made with
the introduction of a system which was to establish
Indian commerce upon other foundations. Naturally
Coen was desired to execute his own ideas, and the office
of governor-general was again offered to him in October,
1624. He wished for delay in order to be married, then
sickness detained him further, giving Carleton an oppor-
tunity to protest against his appointment, so that the
directors held him back, when he was ready to embark
in the spring of 1625, and the States-General forbade his
departure from fear of complications with England. The
champions of monopoly seized the chance to thwart
Coen's plans. Supported by the States-General and
Carleton, they succeeded in winning over the not very
zealous directors to let the scheme rest for a time, and
when Coen in 1627 finally set out, he was half a year
later prohibited from doing anything about free trade as
proposed. This deprived the energetic governor of the
opportunity of reforming the management in the Indies
according to his ideas and therefore played into the
hands of the English.
1 6 History of the Dutch People
In the summer of 1624 the chance of success in war
seemed not unfavourable for the United Netherlands.
With England and France in close friendship, with
Venice and Savoy, Denmark and Prince Bethlen Gabor
of Transylvania in alliance, themselves equipped with a
large army and fleet, while Mansfeld with French and
English help prepared to renew the war in Bohemia and
the Palatinate and Christian of Brunswick was ready to
try his luck again, the States-General appeared in a
condition not only to defend their own territory but also
to act offensively as in Maurice's best years. The news
from the West Indies, where Admiral Willekens and his
valiant vice-admiral, Piet Heyn, in the service of the
new company took possession of San Salvador in Brazil,
sounded promising. From the East Indies came reports
of the increasing power of the Netherlanders in the
Archipelago.
But Spain also was strongly armed and in good spirits
after the discomfiture of the armies of the Protestant
princes in Germany. Spinola was stationed with a con-
siderable force in Brabant and menaced the frontiers of
the States. Moreover, the prince was not the same man
as of old and was now more averse than ever to offensive
operations in the open field, this feeling being shared by
the army. There began to be doubts of the courage of
the commanders, and they were suspected of an inclina-
tion quietly to enjoy their good pay, of a distaste for
war after the delights of the Truce, which had indeed
caused the soldiery to degenerate not a little. The
troops of the States remained inactive, until Spinola in
August, with 18,000 men, laid siege to Breda, which had
been strongly fortified by Maurice and was regarded as a
model fortress and a sort of military academy.1 The old
and experienced Justin of Nassau was governor there
at the head of a garrison of nearly 3000 men with 1800
1 Aitzema, i., p. 324.
The First Years after the Truce 1 7
armed citizens. The prince really took the field at this
report, but now also not much was accomplished,
although he had almost 30,000 men and 200 pieces of
ordnance.1 The army, gathered near Nimwegen, soon
moved across the rivers apparently to relieve Breda, but
in fact to support a new attack upon Antwerp, where
there was only a small garrison. Repeated attempts to
surprise the place failed, and the prince finally confined
himself to harassing Spinola in the neighbourhood of
Breda in order to force him to break off the siege. The
city itself seemed well enough supplied with troops,
artillery, and provisions to resist the enemy for a long
time. But Spinola drew close around Breda, could not
be enticed from his positions, and so strengthened himself
by inundations and earthworks or forts that the prince's
measures to drive him away had little result. Then
the prince in the middle of November returned to The
Hague, peevish and discouraged, suffering severely from
the disease of the liver which had so long been undermin-
ing his constitution, leaving the command of the troops
to his brother and Count Ernest Casimir. So came the
spring of 1625. The troops of the States had much
sickness on account of the continuous rains and were
impeded by storms in their efforts at relief. Mansfeld's
arrival from England with nearly 20,000 men brought no
change, for the prince's illness gradually grew worse and
paralysed all action on the side of the States.
At the end of March, 1625, this sickness became so
serious that the prince, more and more emaciated and
feeble, feeling his end approach, and wishing to assure
the future of the state, summoned his brother from the
camp to The Hague. He advised this brother, who was
over forty years old and still unmarried, in the interest
of the country and his family, to marry as speedily as
1 Van der Capellen, i., p. 312.
1 8 History of the Dutch People
possible. Before the end of the month Frederick Henry-
yielded to the desire of his dying brother and offered his
hand to his cousin, Countess Amalia of Solms-Braunfels,
twenty-eight years of age and a lady of the court of the
queen of Bohemia. The marriage took place in great
haste on April 4th. Frederick Henry, made captain-general
by Maurice with the authorisation of the States, departed
for the camp again a week later, leaving his brother in
a deplorable condition, but unable to tarry longer on
account of the circumstances.
The sick man died on the 23d, attended in his last days
by the preacher Bogerman.1 His deathbed was sur-
rounded by only a few persons, among them being his
beloved sister Emilia, the wife of Prince Emanuel of Por-
tugal, some members of the States-General, the councillor
Vosbergen, and the chief officers of his court. He died,
as he had lived, a simple, courageous, honest, faithful,
Christian soldier, not fearing death, but preparing to pass
away, and until his last hours looking after the interests of
the state, whose head he was, and of the war, which he
had directed during forty years. His body was not
laid to rest at Delft until September 20th.
The last years of the great general had not been fortu-
nate. The victory, won in 1618 and 1619 under his guid-
ance by a strong party over its political opponents, had
unquestionably brought him almost monarchical power in
the state, but his clear understanding must quickly have
seen that this great power was of importance to one so
averse to affairs of state as he was only so far as he was
aided by capable servants, and that there was a sad want
of them. As long as peace continued, this was not so ap-
parent; but when the war broke out again in 1621, the
unsatisfactory state of things became evident. Disap-
pointed now that matters did not go to his liking, unlucky
1 Aitzema, i., p. 376.
The First Years after the Truce 19
in his enterprises, worn out by illness, he saw finally
his popularity decline and his star setting amid general
uncertainty.
During years he had a liaison with Margaret of Mechlin,
a former lady of the court of Princess Louise, and by her
he had two sons, William and Louis, whose names became
favourably known and were mentioned in his will. Two
other sons and three daughters he regarded as illegitimate.
The irregular life1 of the great general is not the darkest
stain upon his memory. Far more injurious to his repu-
tation was his cruelty towards Oldenbarnevelt, a moral
and political mistake which had the most fearful conse-
quences for his house and country. Even his inestimable
services to the land and the fame of his military operations
cannot efface this stain, cannot stop " the springs of this
murder," as Vondel sings, and posterity remembers
mournfully how two great minds, whose cooperation had
once wrought so much good, were separated at the end of
life by bitter enmity. But posterity at the same time
honours in Maurice the great soldier, the excellent mathe-
matician, the talented creator of the army which became
in his and his brother's hands the efficient instrument
for assuring the independence of the Netherlands first
achieved by their father.
1 Van de Kemp, Maurits van Nassau, iv., p. 165, 171, 394, 400.
CHAPTER II
FREDERICK HENRY'S BEGINNING
THE way in which Prince Maurice had ruled the
country of late years and the great power allowed
him without opposition by the States had disaffected many
and made them fear for the permanence of the existing
government. This feeling was not improved by the slight
successes of the war, and we find traces of a desire to
limit the might of his successor and thus to find a remedy
for the threatening greatness of the Oranges.1 It was
done neither in Holland, nor in the other provinces, where
Prince Frederick Henry became stadtholder. Holland
immediately chose the prince in his brother's place and
soon persuaded Zealand to do the same. The commis-
sion of Holland to the prince, dated May 24, 1625, is sim-
ply a copy of that of 1585 to Maurice, but it speaks of
the " Lords States," by whose opinion or by the advice of
whose committees he was now to be bound. Of any fur-
ther limiting instruction, such as Maurice had had, there
is no mention in the appointment of Frederick Henry
owing to the extension of the stadtholder's influence in
recent years. In Groningen and Drenthe the Frisian
stadtholder, Ernest Casimir, was elected in the place of
Maurice, probably by previous arrangement between him
and Frederick Henry. The States-General, in accordance
with their promise to the dying Maurice, had made his
1 Van der Capellen, i., p. 349 ; Aitzema, i., p. 384.
20
Frederick Henry's Beginning 21
brother captain and admiral-general at once, and without
first consulting the separate provinces, which rightly
caused some dissatisfaction ; but the arbitrary action
was accepted under the circumstances and with the army
in the field.
The new " dominant personage " differed in many re-
spects from his predecessor. Frederick Henry, inheriting
diplomatic talent from his father, and courteous manners
from both mother and father, had learned much about war
from his brother, of whom he was a great admirer. From
the campaign of 1600 he was fully initiated into the great
general's military plans and ideas, and had been formed
entirely in his school. Carefully educated under his ex-
cellent mother's guidance and by the intelligent Uytten-
bogaert, he had broader views than his brother, and an
eye for other than military affairs. His intellectual cult-
ure was not so exceptional as some of his panegyrists
would have us believe, but he manifested interest in art
and literature, so far as the camp and politics allowed him
time. We possess military memoirs planned and revised
by him, if not written by his hand. Cautious and slow in
carrying out his projects — " I must sleep over it," he was
accustomed to say — he was mild in his judgment of others,
without the passion of party, noble toward his enemies,
generous toward those he deemed worthy of his friendship
and confidence. His diplomatic utterances and art of
concealing his true meaning sometimes conveyed the im-
pression of hypocrisy. His wife was a gifted woman,
although she cannot be exonerated from a love of power
and pelf, from a certain inclination to intrigue. The birth,
on May 26, 1626, of their son, who was to bear the name
of William, was celebrated as an event of national im-
portance, and Vondel's Geboortclock of the young prince
seemed to ring out over the cradle of a royal child. Both
had a taste for outward splendour, for a brilliant court.
Their environment showed a great difference from the
22 History of the Dutch People
simple state maintained by Maurice. Visited by young
French noblemen and by the sons of German princes, their
court was soon Vune des plus polies of the time, and the
palaces built or beautified by them could bear compari-
son with the abodes of sovereigns elsewhere. But this
princely pomp, unusual in Holland, was not openly dis-
played until some years later, after the prince had
won fame and wealth by his glorious campaigns and
sieges.
The beginning of his stadtholdership was not so brilliant.
The large army designed for the relief of besieged Breda
failed to drive the strongly intrenched Spinola away and
had soon to withdraw, while Mansfeld's weakened forces
encamped in the territory of Jiilich. Breda was forced to
capitulate in May, 1625, its garrison marching out with the
honours of war. The sensation produced by the loss of the
important fortress was profound, as is manifest in contem-
porary pamphlets and other writings. There was some
thought of an agreement with Spain, and the prince ap-
peared not averse to it.
Hope for the future was raised by the death of King
James, who expired some days before Maurice and was
succeeded by Spain's bitter enemy, Charles I. An extra-
ordinary embassy on the occasion of the departure of the
ambassador of the States, Joachimi, Caron's successor, was
intended to induce England to engage in a common war.
Sommelsdijk, still at the head of foreign affairs, managed
negotiations and with Buckingham brought about before
autumn an offensive and defensive alliance, the commer-
cial dissensions being thrust aside. Buckingham soon
appeared at The Hague to broaden the alliance into a
great European league against Spain and the emperor,
in which France, Denmark, Sweden, Venice, Savoy, the
German Protestant princes, and Bethlen Gabor of Transyl-
vania were to take part. A beginning was made in these
plans with Denmark, which was supported in its war
Frederick Henry's Beginning 23
against the emperor by subsidies from England and the
States and by a fleet. But Charles's want of money, his
trouble with Parliament and the nation, and the unre-
liability of his advisers turned great expectations into
disappointment.
More was to be looked for from France under the power-
ful Richelieu, now inclined to help the Netherlands against
Spain. Frederick Henry and Sommelsdijk set their hopes
on this country. During 1625 a close alliance with France
was prepared by aiding the contest of its government
against the Huguenots of La Rochelle. Maurice had re-
luctantly agreed to France's desire to borrow or buy
twelve Dutch ships, while twenty others under Haultain,
destined to fight the Spaniards in the Mediterranean,
might first be employed against La Rochelle. Haultain
was actually left before the harbour of the Huguenots, and
in November Sommelsdijk himself went to Paris to bring
this delicate matter to a happy ending. Just then Haul-
tain received orders to return to the Flemish coast on
account of the condition of his ships. The States were
rejoiced to find a reason for stopping the unpopular action
of the fleet against the Huguenots. Besides arranging
affairs with the Huguenots, Sommelsdijk had also to per-
suade France to join the great alliance. Richelieu seemed
not unwilling, if the Huguenots would submit. The medi-
ation of Sommelsdijk and the English envoys aided not a
little to induce the Huguenots of La Rochelle in February,
1626, to conclude a disadvantageous treaty with their king.
Now the way was open for France to enter the league
against the house of Hapsburg. But Richelieu showed
slight desire to engage in a great European war and ne-
gotiated secretly with Spain until a pacific agreement was
speedily reached. An alliance between France and the
Netherlands soon appeared impossible, and Sommelsdijk
left Paris in April without attaining his object. The
Huguenots had been sacrificed without receiving the price
24 History of the Dutch People
hoped for, and Sommelsdijk had been overreached by the
crafty cardinal.
The alliance with England also did not answer expec-
tation. The king of England had formed it more from
personal enmity to Spain than from political considera-
tions, and Parliament was not disposed by strong financial
support to make the war really possible. Money could
only be secured for it with difficulty, not even by pledg-
ing the jewels of the royal family, upon which Bucking-
ham was unable to get a loan at Amsterdam. Under
the circumstances, England's part in the war was limited
chiefly to privateering upon not very extensive a scale.
All efforts to obtain money failed. The English people
would have nothing to do with the frivolous Buckingham
and his policy. A combined expedition of English and
Dutch ships to the Spanish coast, undertaken in the fall
to intercept the Spanish silver fleet from the West Indies,
did not accomplish its purpose ; an attack upon Cadiz
was a complete failure ; and a new Netherlandish fleet
was very slowly equipped in the spring of 1626 owing to
lack of money, bad management, and domestic discord.
In Friesland dissensions prevented the regular collection
of the taxes, and Zealand declared its inability to pay
the excessive imposts. The suspension of revenue from
these two provinces naturally had a bad effect upon the
progress of the war both by sea and by land.
In 1626, as in 1625, little of importance was accom-
plished on either side. Spain and the archduchess also
had to contend with want of money, and the war in
Germany so held their attention that there was no thought
of great operations in the Netherlands after the siege of
Breda. The enemy was content with laying the Betuwe
under contribution. In the summer the army of the
States took the field, and Count Ernest Casimir got pos-
session of Oldenzaal after a short siege. The prince
failed in an attack on the district of Waes, and later some
Frederick Henry's Beginning 25
marching to and fro on the Rhine ended the campaign in
anything but a brilliant fashion.
There was much talk of secret negotiations, of a possi-
ble renewal of the Truce. The prince was supposed to
desire peace, while it was known that the archduchess
would not be in the least averse to it, and that only
Spain's refusal to recognise the independence of the
north remained the great obstacle. Nothing was effected
beyond a liberal exchange of prisoners, which gave oppor-
tunity for mutual courtesies.
The successes won by the imperial arms against Den-
mark made the States fear for their eastern frontiers,
when the Protestant cause seemed lost after the defeats
of Mansfeld at Dessau and of King Christian IV. at
Lutter, and after the death of Prince Christian of Bruns-
wick. Northern Germany lay open to the imperial
forces, and at any moment Tilly or Wallenstein was
expected to move towards the Netherlands. Friesland
and Groningen urgently demanded protection by more
troops. Spinola's activity in Flanders, where he began
threatening Sluis, and the boldness of the Dunkirk pri-
vateers caused uneasiness also in Zealand. This made
the border provinces more than ever disposed to keep
their engagements and regularly to pay up their contri-
butions, which brought some improvement in the pros-
pect for the following year.
While foreign affairs thus took a critical turn, it was
anything but quiet in the country itself. The Remon-
strants placed all their hopes upon Frederick Henry.
Knowing his slight sympathy for the other party, they
expected everything from him after his advancement,
while their opponents were far from assured about his
intentions with regard to religion. But the cautious
prince was too much of a statesman to lend himself to
thorough measures in favour of the weaker party, knowing
well that he would thereby rouse the opposition of the
26 History of the Dutch People
preachers and people, and would make the recently
ended contest break out again. The discord, which had
torn the state so terribly during the Truce, would in time
of war do more than anything else to favour the enemy's
plans. His policy was to gain time, slowly to secure
acceptance for the idea of mutual toleration, and mean-
while not to change existing conditions. Of course the
Remonstrants were disappointed by this attitude of the
prince. Their chiefs, including still Uyttenbogaert and
De Groot, sharply expressed themselves concerning his
"politic" reserve and " fair words."
The prince, however, advanced slowly but surely to-
wards his object. Everywhere he supported the moder-
ate elements, suppressed the zealots, and promoted con-
ciliation, undisturbed by reproaches from one side or the
other. Through his friend Van der Myle he kept in touch
with the leaders of the Remonstrants and often calmed
and moderated them. The fate of the Remonstrants
quickly improved after his accession. At Rotterdam,
Gouda, Alkmaar, and Hoorn, where they were still
numerous, and at other places also the edicts against their
conventicles, though not abrogated, were regarded as
antiquated and treated as a dead letter. Even in Amster-
dam this course was adopted to the great vexation of
some of the ministers who thundered from the pulpits
against the cursed adherents of Arminius and complained
in pamphlets about the " exorbitancies " of their adver-
saries. The policy of the States toward the Huguenots
came in for reprehension. Was it not a shame to help
put down these poor fellow-believers by force of arms ?
Were they not bringing down the anger of heaven upon
themselves by aiding the "papist" in the destruction of
the " true religion " ? The French minister Doucher at
Amsterdam preached a violent sermon against the moder-
ate magistrates of the city, several editions of it reaching
the people. The synods of North and South Holland sent
Frederick Henry's Beginning 27
to the States a remonstrance " concerning the great in-
solence of the Arminians." Grevinchoven, Uyttenbogaert,
Paschier de Fijne, and other Remonstrants did not lag
behind with answers to these attacks. Joost van Vondel's
Palamedes, in which political allusions to circumstances of
the time were rightly discovered, excited violent indigna-
tion and led to persecution of the poet. Coster's Iphigenia
with its sharp assault upon " foolish popery " awakened
new interest. Vondel's satires angered the opposite
party more than ever. The tumult against the Remon-
strants at Amsterdam in 1626 showed how serious the
movement threatened to become, how the populace might
be stirred up by vehement words from the preachers and
by the growing boldness of the Remonstrants. But
Frederick Henry adhered firmly to his conciliatory policy,
and the municipal governments supported him and each
other in making ready for an " amnesty " and in oppos-
ing such popular movements.
Although the majority of the Estates of Holland was
still called Contra-remonstrant, its words and deeds
showed that it was far from the ardour of 161 8. Nothing
was done beyond preparing for a new publication of the
ordinances relating to religion, but there was some hesita-
tion about this, and in the summer of 1627 it was merely
resolved to urge the municipal governments and judges
to observe them as perpetual edicts, a course of action
which did not content the zealots and was not pleasing to
the Remonstrants. In Utrecht the edicts were enforced,
but in Holland the magistrates of some cities refused
more or less roundly to proceed against the disobedient.
The third year of Frederick Henry's administration had
begun, and very little was as yet accomplished in the war.
Now, however, the prince seemed to have something
great in mind. At the end of July he laid siege to Grol,
from which place the Spaniards had for years ravaged
the district of Zutphen, and which Maurice had twice at-
28 History of the Dutch People
tempted in vain to capture. Notwithstanding the enemy's
approach, the prince succeeded within a month in conquer-
ing the strong fortress, and his fame as a besieger was
immediately established. Such was the enthusiasm of the
country at this news, that all doubt about the future gave
way before the thought of the great general, who, as
" Holland's pilot," would now steer the ship of state "to
safe havens." The fear of secret negotiations with Spain
vanished, now that the States had once more taken the
offensive, now that ''William's valiant son " had in his
turn avenged his father's blood. The bells, which the
year before had announced the birth of his heir, now
saluted the victor, and for many as for the poet there was
henceforth in the darkness of the great war and of internal
disturbance " no guiding star but the light that glittered
from his helmet's crest."1
Self-reliance was encouraged. This was quite necessary,
because England and France could be depended upon less
than ever, now that the capricious policy of Charles I. and
his favourites had brought about a war between these two
powers, which lasted over two years and only ended after
the cause of the Huguenots in France had been lost by the
conquest of La Rochelle and when Buckingham's death
seemed about to release England from his unprincipled
statecraft. The States suffered some injuries from this war
coming so close to them. The condition of affairs in the
Baltic was anything but favourable to Netherlandish inter-
ests, especially when Wallenstein, the emperor's successful
general, after his victories over Denmark, set about form-
ing an imperial navy to the great uneasiness of Sweden as
well as of the States. The war between Sweden and Poland
still continued. Tilly's troops approached the eastern
frontiers and moved into East Friesland before the end
of 1627.
Thus the winter of 1627-1628 brought many perils.
1 Vondel's V erovering van Grol.
Frederick Henry's Beginning 29
The States made efforts to reconcile both France and Eng-
land and Sweden and Poland. The latter was finally
successful in 1629, having been undertaken by a brilliant
embassy, the soul of which was Andries Bicker, burgomas-
ter of Amsterdam. Earlier peace between Denmark and
the emperor enabled the latter to concentrate his forces
in the west. The ambassadors, Randwijk and Pauw sent
to England, Sommelsdijk and Vosbergen to France, were
less fortunate, and friendly relations were not promoted
by the departure first of d'Espesses, who had had person-
ally disagreeable experiences at The Hague, later of Carle-
ton, who returned to his home after a sojourn of fourteen
years.
Carleton's departure furnished an opportunity of mak-
ing one desired change. Although the cautionary towns
were restored and the money advanced had been paid off,
the English ambassador still had a seat in the council of
state. Now it was intimated to the English government
that Carleton's successor would not be admitted to the
council. This seemed to the council of state a favourable
time to increase its influence in the government. Asked
by the States-General how a new levy of 10,000 men was
to be raised, it resolved in March of 1628 to appeal to the
provinces in a missive complaining of the course of affairs.
The confusion in the finances, causing an unsatisfactory
condition of army, fortifications, and fleet, was rightly as-
cribed to a lack of cooperation in the government. The
council saw a remedy for the evils in the enlargement of
its own power over against that of the States-General.
The prince advised against sending this communication,
but the council carried out its plan after a month's delay.
A serious contest was threatened, but the States-General
quickly settled it by denying the competence of the coun-
cil in the matter, although a willingness was expressed to
consider the points in question. The ecclesiastical troubles
in Amsterdam waxed so violent that the prince thought it
So History of the Dutch People
necessary in April to go there. The city government had
invited him, as it seemed no longer able to assert its au-
thority over the people excited by turbulent ministers.
Received joyfully by the Remonstrants and their friends,
as appears from Vondel's jubilant "welcome," the prince
promised to prevent Remonstrant meetings, provided the
Contra-remonstrants would stop their agitation and peti-
tions. Scarcely had he departed, when the municipal
government again connived at the assemblies of the Re-
monstrants, and the prince, approving of this attitude, sent
towards the end of the year a garrison of six companies
to the city. Some of the agitators were soon banished
and fined, but the ministers were not yet molested. This
all led to a sharp war of pamphlets — " it snows blue
booklets," wrote Uyttenbogaert — to numerous satires,
even to popular tumults. Amsterdam was continually
disturbed. A " massacre or some other dire peril " seemed
not impossible, but the Amsterdam government remained
firm. There were now and then violent disputes in the
Estates of Holland, and the Calvinistic majority threat-
ened to withhold their votes, if their friends were perse-
cuted, but the prince managed finally to moderate affairs,
although the zealots had the council pensionary Duyck
on their side. The latter's temporary substitute, who
succeeded him at his death in September, 1629, Jacob
Cats, pensionary of Dordrecht, stood on the side of the
Contra-remonstrants, but he was not a strong character,
and the prince easily persuaded him of the necessity of
moderation. The ministers continued to agitate, and even
spoke of the return of their exiled partisans and of the
strict enforcement of the edicts. Then at last the Amster-
dam magistrates determined to expel from the city the
most turbulent of the preachers, Smout, and to demand
that the council of the church should thenceforth admit
representatives of the municipality to its meetings (Janu-
ary, 1630). Smout's colleague, Kloppenburg, was after-
Frederick Henry's Beginning 31
wards led out of the city. The Amsterdam affair was
debated in the Estates of Holland during the entire
spring, and finally the majority resolved to refer it to the
synod of North Holland. But Amsterdam refused to have
this " political " matter settled by an ecclesiastical au-
thority. Then the prince intervened and had the resolu-
tion repealed, but not until the end of the year was the
decision intrusted to him by the Estates, when he ar-
ranged that the church council was not to be troubled by
municipal representatives for a year and Smout was to
remain out of Amsterdam and keep his salary. The
prince's garrison made it possible for the government of
Amsterdam to preserve order amid these disturbances.1
The result of these dissensions had a great influence
upon the condition of the Remonstrants here and else-
where. Two seditious Contra-remonstrant ministers were
expelled from Rotterdam in 1630. So matters went in
other places. Favoured by the magistrates, the Remon-
strants were soon holding meetings everywhere, no atten-
tion being paid to the prohibitory edicts. Hundreds of
them came together without fear of the murmuring mul-
titude or of the Calvinistic town councils, which even at
The Hague dared not prevent these meetings. " Modera-
tion, moderation ! " was the prince's usual reply, when he
was requested to use his military power to enforce the
ecclesiastical laws. " Go gently ! " was his constant admo-
nition to the magistrates. When in September, 1630, an
appeal was made to the States-General by the violent
Contra-remonstrants, their cause seemed lost. Of the
seven provinces, Friesland and Gelderland alone favoured
prompt execution of the edicts, and by the influence of
the prince and of Holland the appeal was buried without
debate.
With the beginning of 163 1 it may be said that an end
came to agitation about ecclesiastical affairs. Pamphlets
1 Wagenaar, xi., p. 86.
32 History of the Dutch People
on church matters diminish in number and in vehemence,
although they do not yet disappear entirely from the
literature of those days. The appointment of the ortho-
dox but "politic" Adriaan Pauw, Reinier's son, to be
council pensionary in April of that year could not pro-
mote the revival of the edicts. Freedom for the Remon-
strants proved advantageous to other Protestant dissenters,
such as the Mennonites and Lutherans. With the ad-
herents of Arminius they had suffered under persecution ;
with them they now enjoyed greater liberty. This result
was due to the prince, to fear in the city governments of
ecclesiastical domination, to the calm attitude of most
Remonstrants, to the moderate disposition of the great
majority of the population. The seven Remonstrant
preachers still imprisoned at Loevestein were allowed to
escape, removing this memory of the persecutions after
1618. Many exiles, with the connivance of the authori-
ties, returned to their fatherland.
De Groot and Uyttenbogaert had also hoped for this
privilege. Ten years De Groot had spent in Paris or at a
castle near Senlis, studying and writing, living often in
straitened circumstances upon his French pension.1 There
were produced some of the works, with which he enriched
science, and there he brought out new editions of his
earlier writings. Before Maurice's death his spirited wife
had succeeded in getting back the half of his confiscated
property coming to her. During a trip to Holland she
saw signs of a better future, and flattered herself and her
husband with the possibility of return to their country,
of restoration to honour and office, whenever Frederick
Henry should be at the head of affairs. And this seemed
about to happen. After Maurice's death, De Groot's own
brother-in-law became a member of the high council. But
the disturbances of the following years soon made Fred-
erick Henry more cautious, and the author of the formid-
1 See Fruin, Hugo de Groot en Maria van Reigersbergh,
Frederick Henry's Beginning 33
able Justificatio7i learned this to his sorrow. Episcopius
and Uyttenbogaert ventured in 1626, Grevinchoven in the
following year, to return secretly to Rotterdam, still the
chief seat of the Remonstrants. At first they had to hide
from their enemies, but circumstances improved a few years
later. The exiles showed themselves in public, preached
to their fellow-believers, wrote pamphlets, and led in the
struggle for freedom of conscience. Their work was the
organisation of the seminary for Remonstrant preachers*
which was finally established at Amsterdam in 1634.
Episcopius became its first professor.
For De Groot there was no place in his fatherland so long
as he proudly demanded to be rehabilitated in honour and
in his office of pensionary. At last he determined to go
openly to Holland, whence his wife had brought him en-
couraging reports. In the autumn of 163 1 he arrived at
Rotterdam far from secretly, making indeed some display.
This indiscreet attitude had evil consequences. His ene-
mies bestirred themselves, his friends supported him only
lukewarmly, and the majority in the States offered a re-
ward of 2000 guilders for his arrest. He concealed him-
self at Amsterdam, but steadfastly refused to sue for
pardon, " neither the half, nor the fourth, nor the eighth
part of a pardon ; he wanted to forgive those who had
done him harm." Whatever Hooft, Vossius, and other
friends said or did, he declined it all, and in April of 1632
he angrily quitted his country, migrating now to Ham-
burg. Two years later Oxenstierna, chancellor of Sweden,
took him into Swedish service. While Episcopius quietly
devoted his last years to study, while Uyttenbogaert
looked after the interests of his church at The Hague
until his death in 1644, De Groot as Swedish ambassador
at Paris spent ten years full of honours and political busi-
ness, a life not suited to his nature, and ending with an
undesired honourable discharge. His demise at Rostock,
in 1645, during a journey from Sweden, has caused discus-
VOL. IV. 3.
34 History of the Dutch People
sion down to our time as to whether he died a Protestant
or a Catholic, a question occasioned by his wavering
ideals of a church that should combine both opinions so
far as possible, but, undoubtedly, this remarkable man is
not to be considered a Catholic, not even as a secret
Catholic. His "pious and good" mind, which, under the
motto hora ruit, was always seeking truth and peace,
could never forget his fatherland, that honoured him as
one of her most talented sons, when the memory of the
wicked dissensions ruining his life had grown dim.
Amid turmoil and rumours of war the material prosperity
of the population in all the provinces had increased greatly.
The two companies, pillars of Dutch commerce in east
and west, were uncommonly flourishing. In the struggle
with the English for supremacy in East Indian waters, the
victory had been won under the strong guidance of Coen,
who in 1627 again took over the post of governor-general
from his weaker substitute De Carpentier. The league
formed in 1619 between the English and Dutch East In-
dia Companies had given rise to so much " dispute and
question," as " with a shrewish woman," ' that both par-
ties regarded its disruption as a relief. The English were
soon settled and doing business on their separate account
in Bantam, and they removed their offices from Batavia,
where Coen made all trade impossible for them. Co-
operation with the English company was at an end.
De Carpentier had prudently managed the delicate
Ambon affair, had organised education, finance, and justice,
and had endeavoured to settle the difficulties with the
native princes. Relations became so strained with the
kingdom of Mataram that an attack upon Batavia was
expected. Before a year Coen had to oppose a great
Javanese fleet, soon supported by forces on the land. He
beat off the enemy, but in August, 1629, a new Javanese
army appeared before the town, in which the greatest
1 De Jonge, Opkotnst, v., p. xli.
Frederick Henry's Beginning 35
general, statesman, and merchant ever known in the In-
dies died unexpectedly from an intestinal malady ( Sep-
tember 21 ). The council of India chose for his successor
Jacques Specx, and he repulsed the enemy again. Thus
the position of the Netherlandersin Java was permanently
settled, and when in 1632 Hendrik Brouwer was sent out
as a new governor-general, under whom the excellent di-
rector-general Anthony van Diemen was to manage affairs,
attention could be devoted to the improvement of the
government. Much needed to be improved. A large
number of " useless servants " did the company more hurt
than good and sought in every way to make their fortunes.
The officials were more assiduous for their personal profit
than for that of the company, and the chambers in the
fatherland were much to blame for this, because they sent
out all sorts of people to India, either to get rid of them
or to give them a chance to acquire wealth. The connec-
tion between the different offices left considerable to be
desired. Brouwer's instructions directed him to look after
these matters, but the company's niggardliness in the pay-
ment of its officials, the eagerness to receive the richest
possible returns with the least possible outlay, and the
pressure of patria upon the Indian government impeded
the reform of the administration.
The dividends paid to the stockholders were extraordi-
nary, and one readily understands that complaints of too
low dividends ceased after 1625, when it is considered that
in that year 20^ was paid, in the following \2\ %, in 1628
double, in 1630 17%%, in 1632 as the normal dividend for
the future 12^ %, the latter figure being generally ex-
ceeded in the following years, and sometimes doubled.1
The shares stood far above 300 per cent, and were specu-
lated in at Amsterdam. Great wealth was thus accumula-
ted in Holland and Zealand. The prize money also, the
1 See list of dividends in Klerk de Reus, Geschichtlicher Uebcrblick,
Beil. vi.
36 History of the Dutch People
share of the state and of the crews of the ships in the cap-
tures, ran up to large amounts. Some idea of the pros-
perity diffused by the great commercial corporation may
be formed by recalling the huge sums acquired by direc-
tors and officials of the company, the millions spent in
fitting out about 40 large East Indiamen1 every year, the
pay of thousands of sailors and soldiers sent out by the
company.
Less important were the results, of which its sister, the
West India Company, could boast, yet it saw prosperous
days. Its first fleets sailed under Lhermite and Willekens
in 1623 towards South America. The second fleet, 26
ships with 500 cannon, 1600 sailors, and 1700 soldiers,
achieved a great success in the conquest of Bahia or San
Salvador in Brazil, the seat of the Portuguese government,
where the vice-admiral, Pieter Pieterszoon Heyn, dis-
tinguished himself uncommonly.3 Similar expeditions
went out annually and brought great profit in the spoils
of the Spanish and Portuguese merchantmen and of the
African and American coasts and in the money expended
in the harbours of the fatherland on the equipment of the
fleets. In two years 80 ships with 1500 cannon and above
9000 soldiers and sailors were sent into the Atlantic Ocean.
Bahia was conquered again in 1625 by a Spanish-Portu-
guese armada, and the fleets sailing out in this and the
following year did not succeed in recapturing it or in
gaining permanent possession of other places, although
Pernambuco and Porto Rico were occupied for a time and
many a richly laden galleon was taken. Sugar, wine, fine
woods were thus brought to the fatherland in large quan-
tities. In 1627 alone 55 large and small vessels were
captured from the enemy, and in the next year three great
squadrons steered toward the west.
One of them, under command of Piet Heyn, was
1 See Luzac, Holl. rijkdom, i., p. 299.
8 Netscher, Les hollandais au Br/sil, p. 12.
Frederick Henry's Beginning 37
specially destined to intercept the " silver fleet," sailing
every year from Cuba to Spain. This had long been the
dream of many a mariner, excited by tales of the fabulous
wealth conveyed by the galleons from the Spanish pos-
sessions of America and Asia. Piet Heyn had 31 ships
with 700 cannon and nearly 4000 soldiers and sailors.
Cruising along the northern coast of Cuba he met on Sep-
tember 8th the coveted fleet, consisting of 1 5 large vessels,
of which a part was immediately seized by his shallops
while another part, fleeing into the bay of Matanzas, fell
into his hands with slight loss. Fabulous indeed were the
captured treasures of silver, gold, pearls, indigo, sugar,
Campeachy wood, and costly furs, which sold in the Neth-
erlands for no less than fifteen million guilders. The
rejoicing over the news was boundless, and Heyn himself
showed some vexation at the excessive praises bestowed
upon him for this easy victory, after his previous and more
important exploits had been greeted with much less en-
thusiasm. But the capture of the "silver fleet "is what
keeps his name alive with posterity. The company was
enabled by this rich booty to distribute to its stockholders
the unprecedented dividend of fifty per cent., double what it
had ever before paid. Brazil was not forgotten, and in 1630
Admiral Loncq succeeeded in conquering Olinda and the
Recife of Pernambuco, the former being evacuated after a
defeat.
The settlement on the Hudson River in North America,
taken over from some merchants by the company, began to
yield considerable profits, especially by its trade in timber
beaver and otter skins, which in 1630 brought in over 68,-
000 guilders,1 not a very important figure in itself but grow-
ing in significance when it is remembered how small an
amount of money had to be invested in the wilderness.
The management of the colony of New Netherland by the
1 De Laet, Kort verhaal van de diensten en nutiigheden, etc., p. 26 ; Van
Rees, Staathuishoudkunde, ii., p. 332.
38 History of the Dutch People
Amsterdam chamber of the West India Company had this
commerce particularly in view. A small colony of Wal-
loons quickly settled near the factory, which after the pur-
chase of Manhattan Island in 1626 by the first director,
Peter Minuit or Minnewit, became the foundation of the
little town of New Amsterdam. Later the settlement of
other colonists was allowed there, although under restric-
tions with regard to trade in their own products even and
under the close supervision of the company, so that in the
beginning very few availed themselves of the permission.
Small trading colonies were established by the company
on the "wild coast" of Guiana, first in Essequibo, in 1627 on
the Wiapoco and the Berbice.1 The settlements on the
coasts of Guinea and Sierra Leone were limited to a few
little factories and a fort.
The chief concern of the company remained the spoils to
be taken from the enemy by privateers and costly expe-
ditions. Colonisation stood quite in the background, since
neither stockholders nor directors saw so much immediate
profit in it as in privateering or military expeditions against
the enemy. This immediate profit was converted into divi-
dends without the formation of a reserve. Such poor
financial management had fatal consequences. In 1630
the company was struggling with a lack of money, so that
it had to resort to loans, while aid from the States consisted
more of promises than of actual payments, although the
company had advanced large sums to various provinces in
the difficult situation of 1629. Notwithstanding all this
the dividends and great expeditions of this company en-
riched many in the country.
Less considerable were the profits of the Northern
Company. At first the prices secured for its wares had
brought "golden days" to the shareholders,2 but they
1 Netscher, Geschiedenis van de kolonien Essequebo, Deinerary en Berbice-
's Gravenhage, 1888, p. 61.
8 Muller, Geschiedenis der Noordsche Compagnie, p. 127.
Frederick Henry's Beginning 39
soon dropped. The whale fishery was a lottery. In the
long run the failure of this company was to be expected.
The student of conditions in the Netherlands about 1630
should give attention not so much to the gains of the great
companies as to the progress of commerce and industry in
general. The chief source of prosperity lay in the activity
prevailing everywhere, in the rich returns from commerce
which made of the Netherlander the merchantmen for all
Europe. It was calculated that the navigation on the Bal-
tic, on the Mediterranean Sea, and the great fishery, each
in itself, brought several times more profit than the com-
merce of the East Indies. The competition of neighbours,
of France, England, and Hamburg, was already felt, but
fortunately the trade was kept. This carrying trade in
Dutch ships went on even between foreign ports. An
effort was made to have the United Netherlands become
more and more a " free warehouse " for goods imported
from abroad and to be sold abroad, a sort of " canal" for the
transportation of merchandise. So it was necessary to
have the burdens upon commerce as light as possible.
There was always fear of the rivalry of Antwerp or the
Flemish cities, which carried on a trade by land with north-
ern France, of such neutral places as Hamburg and Bremen,
which profited by the exclusion of the Dutch from Spain
and Portugal and traded also with Calais, Rouen, and
Muscovy. Freedom of trade was the watchword of most
Dutch merchants, and they opposed the formation of
monopolistic companies for commerce with Muscovy,
Africa, Australia, and the Levant.
It is almost impracticable to give reliable statistics of the
Netherlandish commerce of those days. We are restricted
to general accounts of the prosperity of commercial cities
and merchants by contemporaries, sometimes guilty of ex-
aggeration. These testimonies, unanimous from native and
foreigner, friend and foe, leave no doubt that the last years
of the long war mark the highest point in the development
4o History of the Dutch People
of commerce and industry, wealth and prosperity. A
flourishing state of affairs is shown by the numerous de-
scriptions of cities put forth by proud citizens. Thus
Orlers for Leyden, Ampzing for Haarlem, Pontanus for
Amsterdam and Nimwegen, Velius for Hoorn are all un-
wearied in recounting the splendours of their cities. The
rapidly increasing population and the necessity of expand-
ing the walls of the cities were further proofs of this
prosperity.
Much depended upon the course of the war. The
safety of the sea was a question of existence for com-
merce and the fishery, and this was conditioned not only
by the sea-power of the Netherlands, but by the relations
between other countries where the Dutch merchants
traded, between France and England as became manifest
during their war from 1627 to 1630, and between Sweden
and Denmark, watching one another with growing jeal-
ousy. Difficulties with England and France in their war,
concerning the search of Dutch ships for contraband,
furnished all sorts of grievances, although domestic
and foreign dangers prevented the English government in
these years from asserting its old claim to the Dominium
Maris.1
The greatest damage was inflicted by the ships of Dun-
kirk. After the end of the Truce the Dunkirk pirates ap-
peared in the North Sea with new strength, zealously
supported by Spinola. War ships and privateers were fitted
out in the Flemish ports, while the harbour of Dunkirk was
protected by Fort Mardijkand a " wooden jacket," a pali-
sade in the sea.a The idea speedily arose of making Dun-
kirk a centre of commerce as well as of naval action. The
" twelve apostles," as the twelve large war vessels fitted
out there were called, had to form the nucleus of a new
navy. Philip IV., in conjunction with the infanta, estab-
1 Muller, Mare C/ausum, p. 224.
2 De Jonge, Zeervezen, I., p. 234.
Frederick Henry's Beginning 41
lished a Company of Commerce there in October, 1624,
which with twenty-four ships was to revive the trade
between the "obedient provinces" of the Netherlands
and the Spanish ports, while in 1625 all intercourse be-
tween these provinces and the " rebels " was prohibited.
The States took measures to protect commerce and fishery
by war ships and privateers, and merchantmen faring to
the Mediterranean were commanded to go only in regular
fleets of from thirty to forty sail.
In the following years both sides fought bravely on the
sea, and their hostility was embittered by the custom of
" foot-washing," the barbarous cruelty of throwing over-
board the beaten enemy without any form of trial. The
names of Mooi Lambert and Houtebeen, Swartenhondt
and Alteras, Joost de Moor, and Marinus de Hollare are
enrolled in the history of the contest against the men of
Dunkirk and the Spaniards in these years of the appren-
ticeship of Tromp, Van Galen, De Ruyter, Jan and Cor-
nells Evertsen, and many another hero of the sea, who
acquired in this fierce piratical war the seamanship, with
which they later astonished the world. The fast ships
of Dunkirk robbed the richly laden merchantmen, plun-
dered and murdered the fishermen on the Scottish coasts,
and sailed into the rivers for booty. Their spoils were
ten times as great as those of the Zealanders and Hol-
landers. Even war ships were captured by them, hundreds
of ordinary merchant vessels fell into their hands, and
Enkhuizen lost a hundred fishing boats in one year.
The reason of such unfavourable results for the States
lay in the speed of the Dunkirk " frigates " and in the
much greater number of Dutch merchantmen. It was
not to be denied also that the management of naval
affairs was far less vigorous with the States than with the
enemy. Another cause of the decline of the Dutch sea-
power was the heavy expenses of the war by land, to
which more attention was given in Frederick Henry's first
42 History of the Dutch People
years than to the war on the sea. There was further
ground for complaining of the lack of good captains, of
poor discipline, of abuses in the command of ships. The
conduct of the highest naval authorities left much to be
desired.
At last it began to be understood that naval matters
needed vigorous direction. After some advance had been
made in the standard of the captains, Piet Heyn, covered
with glory in the service of the West India Company, was
appointed lieutenant-admiral of Holland in 1629. This
was starting on the right course. The new commander
of the Dutch fleet began at once to introduce important
improvements. The " Delfshaven terror of the sea"
unfortunately did not long rule over the fleet. Two
months after his promotion he perished in an encounter
with Dunkirk ships on the Flemish coast. The fearless
mariner, whose reforms laid the foundation for the great
sea-power of the States, was entombed with honours at
Rotterdam. His death was a severe loss to the father-
land, and in that same year the Dunkirk men captured
sixty ships.
All sorts of plans were formed for increasing the naval
strength. In 163 1 Amsterdam, Hoorn, Enkhuizen, Edam,
Medemblik, and Harlingen proposed a new way of pro-
tecting the Baltic commerce. The maintenance of safety
on the sea by means of a private fleet had been consid-
ered in 1629. Some Amsterdam merchants had devised
a great insurance company which was to fit out at least
sixty war ships for the protection of commerce, all the
merchantmen having to pay a certain insurance premium.
This ingenious plan was never carried out, because the
merchants objected to the tax it would impose upon
commerce. The cities mentioned now offered to equip
ships, provided a portion of the convoy money should be
granted them. These vessels were really of great service
against those of Dunkirk. In order to strengthen the unity
Frederick Henry's Beginning 43
of the fleet, the prince's power as admiral-general was con-
siderably extended. Though this all brought some im-
provement, the damage done by the Dunkirk privateers
remained very great, and complaints continued of the in-
sufficiency of the sea-power despite its brave deeds. Maas-
sluis alone, from 163 1 to 1637, mourned the loss of two
hundred fishing vessels, and hundreds of fishermen and
sailors met death in the North Sea or languished in Flemish
prisons. Not a village by the sea but had to complain of
heavy losses, and Dunkirk flourished by its millions in
spoils. The long-dreaded attack of the Spanish-Dunkirk
fleet on Zealand, in September, 163 1, when this province
was assailed by a new armada of about one hundred ships
and a large army, showed plainly how much the enemy's
strength had increased. But Hollare's brilliant victory
over this fleet proved that Zealand's water-wolves were
still able to defend their inheritance against a superior
force. A satisfactory regulation of naval matters could
not, however, be indefinitely postponed.
Military affairs during these years were in a much better
condition. That Prince Frederick Henry saw his first
duty in carrying on the war by land was not surprising
in his brother's pupil amid the great dangers still threaten-
ing the United Netherlands from the Spanish side. Peo-
ple living forty years later experienced what neglect of
defence on land meant. Spinola at first had charge of
matters in the south, but at the end of 1627 he was recalled
to Spain on account of the loss of Grol, as was thought, and
he served the Spanish cause afterwards in the war against
France in Italy, where in 1630 after the unsuccessful siege
of Casale he died insane. The great general's departure
caused uneasiness in the southern provinces, because no
one could fill his place there, neither the brave but frivolous
Count Henry van den Bergh, his successor in the army, nor
the unskilful cardinal-diplomat, Alfonso de la Cueva, mar-
quis de Bedmar, Spanish ambassador at the Brussels court,
44 History of the Dutch People
who was now to be the actual head of the government un-
der the infanta.
This government was again organised in the Spanish
fashion. The old council of state after existing a hundred
years was replaced by two juntas, one composed entirely of
Spaniards, the other under the cardinal's guidance, and
both dependent upon the council of Flanders and Bur-
gundy at Madrid, which consisted almost wholly of noble
Spaniards. The able Pieter Roose, later president of the
privy council of Brussels, now first councillor of Neth-
erlandish affairs at Madrid, formed an exception to the
rule of governing the Netherlands by Spaniards, but he
was quite ready to help carry out the king's plans. This
Spanish administration aroused discontent in the Nether-
lands, and the unpopular Bedmar was succeeded in 1629 by
the Marquis d' Aytona, an abler man. He acquainted the
king with the possibility that such an internal policy,
which in Granvelle's time had been one of the chief causes
of the uprising, might again make the faithful provinces
disloyal and inclined to side with the " rebels." This was
not inconceivable in the wretched material condition of
these provinces, and some among the nobles of the south
might have been willing to put themselves at the head of
the malcontents and, while apparently faithful to the king,
to remove the Spaniards and take the government into
their own hands. Some would not have been averse to
friendly relations with the insurgents of the north. A
plan for the general defence of all the Spanish lands was
not favourably received at Brussels in 1627, and little incli-
nation was shown to help the monarchy so long as it did
not act more energetically for the interests of the Nether-
lands. The insignificant attacks upon Bergen op Zoom and
South Beveland in 1628 could scarcely be regarded as
serious efforts.
A whole year passed without anything being done. The
armies of both sides did not take the field, which was un-
Frederick Henry's Beginning 45
doubtedly due to the prevailing want of money.1 In the
spring of 1629 Frederick Henry collected a large force for
an assault on Bois-le-Duc. This important fortress, strong
by its situation amidst marshes, had, besides about 5000
citizens, a garrison of 3000 foot soldiers and some hun-
dreds of horsemen under the lord of Grobbendonck, while
the Spanish army under Van den Bergh was stationed near
Wesel and threatened Gelderland. The prince's army
was equal to the task. No less than 24,000 infantry under
Ernest Casimir, Wolfert van Brederode, the two Veres, the
count of Chatillon, Coligny 's grandson, and others, and 4000
cavalry under Stakenbroek and the young duke of Bouil-
lon, brother of the later famous Turenne, were gathered in
April upon the heath of Mook and started before the end
of the month for Bois-le-Duc* Hundreds of peasants
aided the soldiers in quickly throwing up intrenchments.
These were about all the troops at the prince's disposal,
and the eastern frontier lay open to the enemy's attack.
The money and supplies required by so large a force could
only be procured with great difficulty, and Holland was
above all importuned for advances.
Soon it was reported that preparations must be made
against an attack by the enemy. The prince raised 6000
mercenaries in Holland, who with a few thousand newly
arrived Scotchmen and what could be recruited or spared
from before Bois-le-Duc formed an army of observation
numbering perhaps 20,000 men. The enemy made desper-
ate efforts to take the field, but week after week went by,
while the prince remained before Bois-le-Duc, drawing off
the rivers, the Dommel and the Aa, into new channels, con-
structing great works of attack and defence, and ever ap-
proaching nearer to the beleaguered city. By the end of
June Van den Bergh with 30,000 men and over 6000 cav-
alry endeavoured without success to relieve the place. His
1 Memoir es de Fre'diric- Henri (Amsterdam, 1733), p. 50.
* De Bordes, De verdediging van Nederland in i62g (Utrecht, 1856).
46 History of the Dutch People
attacks upon the prince's positions and the simultaneous
sorties of the garrison were repulsed. News came in July
that an imperial army, disengaged by the peace between
the emperor and Denmark, was nearing the eastern fron-
tiers. Van den Bergh moved off to join the imperial
forces, hoping by a vigorous diversion elsewhere to prevent
the fall of the city.
The prince had to detach some of his men to cover Gel-
derland. First Count William Frederick of Nassau was
sent with some thousands of soldiers to the Bommeler-
waard, then Count Van Styrum with about 10,000 men to-
wards Nimwegen and Arnhem. The Spanish governor
of Lingen, Cairo, crossed the Ysseland fortified himself at
Westervoort after repelling the Arnhem militia and a band
of Englishmen. Van Styrum's attempt to dislodge Cairo
failed completely in consequence of his bad management.
A panic was caused by this news. Gelderland used
Van Styrum's troops to reinforce its garrisons. Utrecht
opened sluices and put the country under water as far as
Amersfoort. Treason was mentioned in some provinces.
But the prince and the States did not lose their heads.
The former remained undisturbed before Bois-le-Duc, and
the latter would not hear of giving up the siege. Regi-
ments were taken from Denmark and Sweden ; new
English and Scotch battalions were recruited ; money,
stores, and troops were borrowed from the companies,
especially from the West India Company ; mercenaries
and militia were sent from Holland's cities to threatened
points ; and thousands of peasants were armed for the
defence of Utrecht. Soon Count Ernest Casimir was near
Arnhem at the head of over 20,000 infantry and cavalry.
The defence of the endangered provinces was directed by
the prince and the deputies of the States-General in his
camp. Meanwhile the enemy ravaged the Veluwe, but
dared not quit his strong position on the Yssel for fear of
being flanked by Ernest Casimir's army. The people of
Frederick Henry's Beginning 47
Gelderland fled from country to town ; many families
departed from the towns to Holland ; some villages were
burned by the Spaniards ; others offered the enemy sub-
stantial contributions. The days of Parma seemed to
have returned.
At length, early in August, came from the Rhine the
expected imperial army, over 14,000 infantry and about
3000 cavalry, under Count Montecuculi ; later 10,000
men more under Count John of Nassau.1 Van den
Bergh moved over the Veluwe towards Amersfoort, a
weak town with a weak government, and so poorly
garrisoned that it could not or would not offer a long
resistance. The Estates of Utrecht, like those of Gelder-
land intent upon their own salvation, now began to waver.
Then the States-General, with the council of state, moved
their sittings to the post of danger and settled down at
Utrecht on August 1 5th. But the prince did not stir from
Bois-le-Duc, even when Amersfoort surrendered on the
14th, after being surrounded for one day, which led to
the arrest of the commander and two burgomasters of the
town. By its brave attitude the town of Hattem warded
off an attack of the enemy.
Almost all Utrecht was inundated, and it resembled a
lake, where " salt and fresh waves foam and dash over
cattle and stable " ; the smaller towns were provided with
earthworks ; all the troops obtainable were dispatched to
threatened points. Not for an instant did the States-
General and the Estates of Holland lose heart. It was
otherwise in the now endangered Utrecht, where Johan
Wolfert van Brederode had command. The panic there
was not to be calmed ; people took to flight, concealed or
sent away their money and valuables ; and the measures
1 This was a grandson of Count John, Prince William's brother. He
had formerly been in the service of the States, but, fancying himself
wronged, he had become a Catholic on his marriage with a princess of
Ligne and entered the emperor's service. Later he joined the Spanish
army. John Maurice (the Brazilian) was his brother.
48 History of the Dutch People
adopted by the magistrates showed slight wisdom. In
the country and the more easterly provinces there was
fear of the Catholic peasants, who formed the great
majority. The behaviour of some noblemen also caused
anxiety. And to all was to be added the cramping lack
of money. Things looked worse, when Van den Bergh
with friendly letters sought to kindle disloyal feelings in
some towns of Gelderland and Utrecht, while Monte-
cuculi awakened terror everywhere by his devastations.
Suddenly came the rescue. The governor of Emme-
rich, Otto van Gent, lord of Dieden, had long fixed his
eye upon Wesel, the important fortress on the lower
Rhine, supporting the enemy's rear, commanding his
communications with Brabant, and well stocked with
supplies. On August 19th Van Gent, with some of Count
Ernest's troops and with the help of citizens of the town,
succeeded in surprising it, an event which revived the
sinking spirits of many and greatly dismayed the enemy.
The chance that Holland would bow its proud head and
consent to negotiate now disappeared utterly. This
chance, with which Van den Bergh had flattered himself,
had been very slight, for Holland was determined to
resist to the last and, if needs be, to put the whole
province under water. The army before Bois-le-Duc was
furthermore relied upon, since in case of extremity — only
then was the siege to be raised — it could hasten to repulse
the enemy, A few days later Montecuculi evacuated
Amersfoort, and before the end of the month retired with
Van den Bergh behind the Yssel. John of Nassau, with
twelve to thirteen thousand men, remained to guard the
bridge of boats over the Yssel at Dieren, across which
the poor peasants of the Veluwe could be continually
harassed and the raiding troops could retreat.
Meanwhile Count Van den Bergh, who with the bulk
of his army had withdrawn into Westphalia, opened nego-
tiations in the name of the infanta for a new truce, mani-
Frederick Henry's Beginning 49
festly the best expedient for the southern provinces in
the impossibility of conquering the northern provinces or
of persuading Spain to a real peace based upon the in-
dependence of the north. Relations had existed since
1628 between the States and the Brussels government
concerning the exchange of prisoners, and the prince
was free to use the services of the well-known Juffer
Tserclaes. Her going and coming excited suspicion in
the spring of 1629. The fear was apparent that the
prince might be induced by personal advantages to work
for a truce. Offers were then actually made of a truce for
twenty-four years. They were repeated in September
by Van Marquette, who was negotiating for the exchange
at Rozendaal on behalf of the infanta. The States-
General resolved to hold these offers until the fall of
Bois-le-Duc should be decided.
Cautiously but with increasing success the prince had
continued the arduous work of the siege, by means of
water mills draining the marshy ground for his trenches
and dikes. When the moat of the city was at length
reached and a great breach had been made in the wall by
the explosion of the mines laid by the prince, Grobben-
donck began to negotiate. At this joyful news the
States-General moved from Utrecht to Bommel and from
there to the camp at Vucht in order to deliberate with
the prince about the terms of the capitulation which was
signed September 14th. Stipulations favourable to the
clergy were due to the prince, who sought to temper the
zeal of the Calvinists, and thus gave another proof of his
moderation in ecclesiastical matters, even with regard to
the Catholics.
The fall of Bois-le-Duc and the surprise of Wesel,
celebrated in a day of thanksgiving appointed by the
States-General, gave a breathing time after the anxiety of
the summer. Further military preparations were discon-
tinued, and only a watch was kept on the enemy in the
vol. iv. — 4.
50 History of the Dutch People
Veluwe. Van den Bergh had quickly moved from West-
phalia to the Meuse in order to guard against an inva-
sion of Brabant by Frederick Henry, but John of Nassau
remained on the Yssel. The prince seemed inclined to
an honourable peace, if this were possible, or otherwise
to a truce for a long period, unless support could be given
him in conquering the south, which now appeared not
entirely unattainable.1 He answered to this effect an
inquiry of the States as to his views, and they then
determined to get the opinions of the provinces in the
matter, and to do something more in the spring of 1630.
In October, John of Nassau, fearful of being surrounded
by Ernest Casimir, withdrew to winter quarters in Jiilich.
The danger was now over, and the army of the States
was broken up before the end of the month. Great and
well deserved were the honours, with which the prince
and his cousin, the leaders of the brilliant defence, were
received on November 3d at The Hague "seated upon the
chariot of victory." But the States-General, the Estates
of Holland, and a considerable portion of the population
had helped to save the country by brave conduct amid
the greatest dangers, and the prince gratefully recognised
this.2 The rejoicing was universal, and Vondel sang:
"Here is, here is the war's end," because "Frederick has
completed the work."
This year's trials made it impracticable to take the
field during the next year. The enemy also attempted
little, and the only fact of importance was the capture
of Count John of Nassau in a skirmish before Wesel.
Negotiations for peace resulted in nothing. The power-
ful West India Company desired not to lose its profits
from the spoils of the enemy; Amsterdam sided with it;
and the northern provinces and Zealand showed slight
inclination to consent to a suspension of hostilities. Old
'Aitzema, i., p. goo.
2 Mimoires de Frederic Henri, p. 90.
Frederick Henry's Beginning 51
objections were raised again, and although the prince was
not unfavourable to the affair ' and thus incurred much
suspicion, it became manifest that the States did not
seriously consider it. A treaty of exchange was con-
cluded in April, 1630, but the talk of a truce ceased. War
was once more to decide, and the prince insisted that it
should be vigorously and offensively waged. He re-
mained true to his old principles: a lasting peace, if
necessary a long truce, or otherwise war for the destruc-
tion of the enemy, if possible with the help of France,
which seemed ready to join the States in the contest
against the Hapsburg monarchies.
For 163 1 the States planned something great: the con-
quest of Dunkirk, an undertaking similar to that of
Maurice in 1600. Frederick Henry was aware of the
difficulties of such an expedition, but resolved to venture
upon it. The army was brought together at Emmerich
from the eastern garrisons, and 10,000 infantry and 3000
cavalry took ship for Ijzendijke, whence they moved
towards Ghent and Bruges. The approach of a Spanish
army so alarmed the deputies of the States-General, who
were with the prince, that they represented to him how
dangerous a farther advance would be, and begged him
to give up the expedition, which he reluctantly did. The
army returned to Brabant.
Scarcely had it arrived there when rumours became rife
of great preparations of the enemy at Antwerp. A fleet
was gathering for an attack upon Zealand, which had
seen no enemy within its borders for more than half a
century. Some twelve or fifteen war ships were hastily
collected in Zealand's waters, but they had to retreat when
the hostile armada finally appeared, September 8th. Great
v/ere the expectations of the Spaniards and Netherlanders
of the south from this last effort. There were 35 large
vessels and about 50 smaller ones, all armed and carrying
1 Wagenaar, xi., p. in ; Aitzema, i., p. 899 ; Res. ffoll., Dec. 11, 1629.
52 History of the Dutch People
6000 troops under command of the ransomed Count
John of Nassau and the prince of Barbancon, while the
marquis of Aytona with Admiral Boy of Dunkirk was at
the head of the fleet, and the deserters Stoutenburg and
Wissekerke acted as guides. The armada sailed by
Bergen op Zoom, where the prince was stationed with a
considerable force, towards Tholen, probably with the
design of assailing Briel. The ships began to run
aground, just as the fleet of Zealand, under Marinus de
Hollare, came upon the scene with the flood towards the
evening of September 12th, reinforced by vessels with
soldiers sent out from Bergen op Zoom after the foe. A
naval battle followed on the Slaak, continued during the
night by the light of the moon, until an autumnal fog
came up — another romantic page in the history of
Zealand. The enemy was totally routed ; his ships were
mostly destroyed or run ashore, and hundreds of his
men perished miserably in the dark water, while 4000
prisoners, including many officers of high rank, and the
entire fleet of transports were captured. This was the
last time that Spanish troops appeared in the northern
provinces.
The general state of affairs in Europe had meanwhile
changed to the advantage of the Netherlands. King
Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden took up the task of
Denmark in Germany and landed in Pomerania early in
1630. Brilliantly led by their great king, the Swedes
advanced ever farther into Germany, defeated the
imperial army at Leipsic, and prepared to conquer the
Palatinate and Bavaria. The king of Bohemia once more
cherished hope of his restoration, at least as elector of
the Palatinate, and In the spring of 1632 he betook himself
to the Swedish camp with a subsidy from the States of
150,000 guilders. Under these circumstances there was
no fear of the imperial forces on the eastern borders.
France, in consequence of the victory of Bois-le-Duc,
Frederick Henry's Beginning 53
agreed, in the summer of 1630, to a new treaty of
subsidy, promising one million livres annually, provided
the States, within seven years, would conclude no peace
or truce with Spain without asking the advice of the king,
quite different from the requirement of his consent as a
condition. The States could not depend so much upon
England as upon the closer relations with France. Even
the failure of Richelieu's secret attempts to bring the
principality of Orange under French influence by bribing
the prince's governor there, the lord of Valkenburg, who
was killed on the occasion of his forcible displacement by
Johan de Knuyt, the prince's councillor, — even this very
doubtful attitude of the French government could not
disturb the joint opposition to Spain. Together France
and the States supported the Swedish king with sub-
sidies. The interests of both were directed against the
Spanish Netherlands, whence Richelieu's numerous foes
thwarted his plans at court, and where his greatest
enemy, the queen-mother, Marie de Medicis, had found
a refuge. In 163 1 there was much consultation between
the French ambassador Beaugy, the prince, and the
States-General.
The condition of the Spanish provinces was especially
favourable to united action there. The loss of Bois-le-Duc
had augmented the misery in the south, and the longing
for a cessation of hostilities was ardent after the defeat on
the Slaak. In December, 163 1, the artist Rubens visited
The Hague on a secret mission from the infanta without
success. Discontent in the south waxed greater, particu-
larly among the nobility, angered by the Spanish
influence, by the preference shown the government's
favourites, by the appointment of the marquis de Santa
Cruz as commander of the army instead of Count Henry
van den Bergh. About the latter were grouped many
noblemen: the princes of Espinoy and Barbancon, the
duke of Bournonville, the count of Egmont, and others.
54 History of the Dutch People
Most of them were inclined to cooperate in secret with
Spain's deadly enemies ' ; others, as Philip of Aremberg,
duke of Aerschot, refused to participate in the conspiracy
against the Spanish rule. This conspiracy received a
large development in the course of 163 1. It was pro-
posed, with the help of France and the States, to throw
off the Spanish yoke. Some thought of renewing the
Pacification of Ghent, others of the establishment of
a Catholic republic, corresponding to the Protestant
republic of the north and allied with it or entirely
independent.
Richelieu was interested in these plans and hoped
for some profit to France. He had the old claims
of France to Flanders and Artois investigated, and
secretly communicated with the heads of the con-
spiracy through Frangois Carondelet, dean of Cam-
brai, whom he had bribed. He was alarmed by the
growth of the flourishing northern republic, which was
becoming a great power and ranking with France and
England, and he did not want to put it in possession of
the southern provinces or have them too closely allied
with it. About England's plans he was also uneasy,
when he heard that Gerbier, the English agent at
Brussels, had long been intimate with the conspirators.
In February, 1632, one of the leading conspirators,
Rene de Renesse, count of Warfusee, who, though
president of the council of finance, was often embarrassed
for money, and now sought to mend his fortune by
treason, went to Bokhoven near Bois-le-Duc, and later
visited his friend, Count Henry van den Bergh, at Venloo.
Afterwards he sojourned at Ryswick in Holland, accom-
panied perhaps by others, some say by Van den Bergh him-
self. These mysterious journeys concerned a plan for
persuading the States and France to join in an invasion
of the Belgian provinces, which would be regarded by the
1 Waddington, La rtlpublique des Provinces -Unies, etc., i,, p. 147 et seq.
Frederick Henry's Beginning 55
conspirators as the signal for insurrection. Warfus6e
negotiated at Ryswick and The Hague with the prince,
the council pensionary Pauw, and the French ambassador
Beaugy. The plan was for Frederick Henry from the
north and a French army from the south to make a
simultaneous attack. Operating with the nobles, the
Spaniards were to be driven out, and the country was to
be divided. The two noblemen and their friends were to
be rewarded with money, estates, and offices. Richelieu
was hardly prepared to proceed so far. The States-
General and the prince were more eager to engage in the
enterprise. They made their army ready to march in the
spring, ostensibly directing it against Antwerp, and sent
the council pensionary with 100,000 guilders for each of
the two counts to Venloo, where he delivered the money
to them. Everything had been done so secretly that the
Brussels government had no suspicions. The chance of
conquering the southern provinces seemed better than
ever before.
At the end of May the prince assembled his army at
Nimwegen,1 from where he moved on June 1st along the
Meuse towards Venloo with over 20,000 men, while his
cousin, Count William of Nassau, with a small division
descended the Meuse and fell upon Flanders, capturing
some forts near Antwerp. A manifesto of the States-
General called upon the people of the south to expel the
Spaniards, promising help and maintenance of privileges
and of the old religion. Venloo, deserted by Bergh on
the prince's approach, capitulated on these conditions
after two days. The vanguard under Count Ernest
Casimir pushed on to Roermond which surrendered on
the 6th. The loss of Ernest Casimir was here mourned,
'See concerning the campaign : De Boer, Het verraad van Hendrik van
den Bergh en de veldtocht langs de A/aas, in Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis,
xiii., pp. 17, 88, 145 ; De Boer, Die Friedensunterhandlungen zwischen
Spanien und den JVieder/anden, p. 21.
56 History of the Dutch People
for he was killed during a reconnoissance of the place.
Four days later the prince laid siege to Maestricht.
Great was the terror of Brussels at this rapid and vic-
torious march. The treason of Bergh and Warfusee now
became evident. The former went to Liege and issued a
number of manifestoes justifying his conduct and inciting
to revolt against Spain. The Spanish commanders with-
out an army, their troops having been mostly sent to act
against Gustavus Adolphus, resolved to watch the course
of affairs. There was yet time to throw some reinforce-
ments into Maestricht.
Little or nothing came of the insurrection in the
southern provinces. Aerschot refused his cooperation,
and the others dared do nothing without him. Some of
the conspirators, including Egmont and Carondelet, fled
to France. The people were quiet in general, although
excitement prevailed here and there, and seditious cries
were uttered. Nothing was heard from France. A new
rebellion of the French nobles against the government,
supported by Spanish money and Spanish troops, made
Richelieu have his hands full. The army returned from
the upper Rhine to the Netherlands, and the Brussels
administration preserved order, threatening and promis-
ing according to circumstances, and using the infanta's
popularity.
Meanwhile the siege of Maestricht went on, although
disappointment was felt also by the besiegers, and the
efforts of Bergh to gather an army at Liege completely
failed, so that in fear of his life he left the city early in
July and withdrew to Aix-la-Chapelle. Here, too, he
found no support, whereupon he moved northwards in
search of troops, but his career was over. The Spanish
army under Santa Cruz appeared for the relief of the
place at the end of the month, but by that time the
prince had strengthened his camp and in his customary
manner was drawing nearer with trenches and mines to
Frederick Henry's Beginning 57
the beleaguered fortress, which valiantly defended itself.
Frederick Henry renewed before Maestricht the works
by which he had captured Bois-le-Duc. The labyrinth
of earthen ramparts, lines and sconces, redoubts and
moats, traverses and hornworks, approaches and galleries
of mines in and about the prince's camp awakened the
admiration of contemporaries. He succeeded in holding
Santa Cruz on the left bank of the Meuse and thus in
separating him from the approaching imperial army under
the celebrated Pappenheim, which really excited great
uneasiness in the Dutch camp, where there was fear of
being cut off from the fatherland. The prince continued
his works calmly, called back Count William from
Flanders, and fortified himself. Early in August Pap-
penheim reached the neighbourhood of Maestricht and
soon joined Santa Cruz, so that the enemy had 40,000
men, and on the 18th made an attack in force, aided by
a sortie of the garrison from Maestricht. Both combats
resulted in favour of the Dutch, though they suffered
severe losses, Robert de Vere, earl of Oxford, being
among the killed. Two days later the prince had the
city stormed through the breach made by his mines.
Attack followed attack, but the brave garrison held its
own and repulsed the Dutch. The citizens, afraid of
being conquered and plundered by storm, now insisted
upon surrender, so the governor, De Lede, consented on
the 22d to a capitulation. Honourable withdrawal for
the garrison, freedom for the Catholic religion, and
retention of ecclesiastical property by the possessors,
were the principal conditions. Some days later Pappen-
heim with his army returned to Cologne, Santa Cruz with
his to Brabant. The Dutch army remained for a time in
and near Maestricht, smaller forts and castles being
captured without much trouble, and the neighbouring
rich coal-mines being seized by the prince for the States-
General.
58 History of the Dutch People
Before the fall of the city, during the approach of the
Dutch army along the Meuse, the discontent in the
south had grown so great, the misery in all the provinces
had become so unbearable, that Isabella no longer dared
to resist the universal wish for a calling together of the
States-General as had occurred in 1600 under similar
circumstances.1 The Spanish king had earnestly warned
her against this, but the panic was so intense that she
listened to Aerschot's counsels and resolved to apply this
most heroic remedy. Early in September the States-
General assembled at Brussels amid the immense alarm
caused by the loss of Maestricht.
All sorts of efforts were in the meantime made to
induce the prince to suspend his operations and enter
into new negotiations for a treaty. The intriguing
Gerbier had come to Liege and Maestricht to offer Eng-
lish mediation; Rubens appeared again in the infanta's
name, and later Philip Le Roy. But the prince did not
seriously consider these secret advances until the States-
General of Brussels, with the infanta's consent, sent
three representatives to discuss the terms of a treaty of
peace. These negotiations seemed for a moment to
promise some results. The Brussels States-General were
ready to renew the Truce upon the basis of withdrawal
of the Spanish troops, even with a surrender or neutralisa-
tion of several cities near the borders to the northern
States, which would have the Flemish ports under their
observation, while an offensive and defensive alliance was
to be concluded for upholding this truce contre tous et
chascun, sans exception de personne, thus, if necessary,
against Spain.
So far the people of the south were willing to go from
fear of the army at Maestricht, although these conditions
were deemed very hard ; even Isabella agreed to negoti-
ate, anxious as she was about the impending rebellion.
1 See Gachard, Actes des £tats G/n/raux de 1632.
Frederick Henry's Beginning 59
At the end of September the prince communicated in
writing to the States-General at The Hague the terms
discussed with the southern gentlemen. The matter was
referred to the provincial Estates of the north, and thus
several precious weeks were lost, while later in the
general deliberation there was opposition encountered
from Zealand, Friesland, and Groningen, and from the
preachers and merchants who had disapproved also of
the Truce in 1609. The prince waxed impatient, because
peace could no longer be compelled under terror of arms,
now that his army had suffered much from sickness and
was growing weaker. The southern deputies urged
patience upon him and concessions upon the infanta.
They declared to the latter that peace was necessary at
any price and entreated her to yield to the demands
of the northerners. Finally came the report that the
general body by a majority of votes had determined to
take up the negotiations, but it was desired to conduct
them not at Maestricht but in The Hague.
This decision displeased the prince, who was con-
tinually incited by the noble conspirators to risk an
invasion on his own authority. It was obviously due to
the antagonism of the war party, backed up by the
French and Swedish ambassadors, and partly perhaps to
bribery. The opportunity for an invasion of Brabant
was lost by all this postponement, and early in November
the prince marched northwards with his army, capturing
Orsoy on the way. November 24th he reached the
Binnenhof, greeted on his victorious return with great
marks of respect and rejoicing, with ringing of bells and
booming of cannon — a well-deserved honour after the
brilliant campaign.
CHAPTER III
THE PRINCE AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER
THE glorious victories of the Orange prince had the
greatest influence upon his position in the country
and upon his authority in affairs of state and society.
Frederick Henry, decorated with the "municipal crown"
of the conquered fortresses, occupied thenceforth in the
United Netherlands the place of the prince, whose power,
maintained according to existing political forms, all
acknowledged, whose will nobody dared oppose. More
and more his high dignity acquired a monarchical, even a
dvnastic character, far more so than had been the case in
Maurice's last years. His son at three years of age
received in 1630 the honorary appointment of general of
the cavalry, as a compliment to the prince who had held
the post years before his stadtholdership. A year later
the "survivance" was bestowed upon young "Prince'
William, the right of succession to the offices of his
father. The prince showed great satisfaction at this.
"His Excellency," already often addressed as "His
Highness" and entitled by the States "Serene Highborn
Prince," had for a New Year's present, in January, 1637.
the honour from the French king of being thereafter
called Son Altesse, "His Highness," after the manner of
the lesser sovereigns and of the princes of the blood at
the French and Spanish courts. The States-General
approved, though sensitive at this foreign interference and
affirming that the title used by them signified about the
60 '
At the Height of his Power 61
same, and in 1639 they fixed officially their own designa-
tion— "High Mightinesses," previously in use. The title
of "Noble and Mighty Lords" was reserved for the
council of state and the provincial Estates; inferior titles
were devised for other governing boards. The nobility
of Holland offered the prince the dignity of "First
Nobleman," the presidency of their body, which gave
him great influence in the States, where he had a seat
since 1612 as lord of Naaldwijk, hereditary marshal of
Holland, and where he won further consideration by the
purchase of the lordship of 'sGravenzande. The same year,
in which the prince began wearing his title of Highness,
Prince William, aged eleven, was solemnly named for
captain and admiral-general in case of his father's death,
and shortly afterwards the young prince was granted a
seat in the council of state.
With all these honours the princely house of Orange
rose high above all other families in the state, above
also their Nassau relatives in Friesland. Count Ernest
Casimir had obtained the survivance there for his son,
Henry Casimir, who succeeded him at his death before
Roermond. Groningen and Drenthe also elected the
young Nassau count their stadtholder, evidently in order
"to divide the authority somewhat." In both provinces
Count Henry had to accept restrictions, because Frederick
Henry's attitude showed his willingness to receive the
stadtholderships of his cousin even under limitations.
When Count Henry Casimir died in 1640, the prince again
did his best to secure the succession to these stadtholder-
ships. The rapidity, with which Count William Frederick
of Nassau, younger brother of the deceased, went to
work in Friesland, rescued this stadtholdership at least
for the Frisian branch. In Groningen and Drenthe the
prince succeeded better, and after some discussion the
succession here was given to the young prince. William
Frederick and his people were greatly displeased, and the
62 History of the Dutch People
feeling between the two families left much to be desired.
There was a better understanding when William Frederick
with the Estates of his province bestowed the reversion
in Friesland upon his young cousin of Orange.
Still higher rose the house of Orange in repute when a
great marriage was arranged for the young William with
the oldest daughter of the king of England. Marie de
M6dicis, mother of the English queen, helped bring this
about from gratitude for the honourable treatment which
she, an exile from her country, had received in 1638 in
the United Netherlands, and particularly at the court of
The Hague. A confidant of the prince, Johan van der
Kerkhoven, lord of Heenvliet, prepared the affair, and
while at first the king's second daughter was considered,
news soon came that the proud but financially and
politically involved Stuart did not account his eldest
daughter too high for the young prince, the heir of the
wealth and power of the Oranges. An embassy from
the States-General came to ask officially for the hand of
the princess and to fix the conditions of the marriage.
Shortly afterwards the young prince, escorted by a fleet
of twenty Dutch war ships, appeared in England on a visit
to his betrothed who was scarcely ten years old ; two years
later she arrived for good in Holland. This brilliant
marriage, which put the house of Orange on an equality
with the royal families of Europe, was in part a con-
sequence of the English crown's difficulties, making it
desire the support of the States and the prince, but it
could also be regarded as a recognition of the height
attained by the house of Orange.
A proposed marriage of the prince's youngest daughter
to the young count of East Friesland did not take place;
the princess married later the prince of Anhalt. The
eldest daughter, Louise Henrietta, married in 1646 the
elector of Brandenburg, the most powerful of the German
princes after the electoral house of the Palatinate, which
At the Height of his Power 63
was already related to the Orange family. This house
of Orange, springing from a German countship, now
ranked with the electoral families; the English marriage
gave it even higher claims ; and the splendour of the state,
at whose head it stood, placed it with the most power-
ful princely houses of Europe. The taste displayed in
adorning the princely palaces at the Binnenhof and else-
where enhanced the brilliancy of the prince's environ-
ment. The literary taste there was of a lower standard.
None of the geniuses of the time saw themselves
particularly distinguished at court, although Frederick
Henry was pleased to have literary men do him honour.
The sometimes witty, always clever verses, with which
the prince's secretary, Constantijn Huygens, amused the
court, and the erotic, moralising effusions of the council
pensionary Cats, which found access there, were un-
questionably not the noblest Dutch poetry of those
days.
The princely court of The Hague was, about 1640, one
of the most brilliant in Europe, a school for courtiers and
young princes, as the army of the States had been from
the commencement of the century a school for generals
and officers of high and low rank. German, French,
English, Swedish, and Danish noblemen sent their sons
here to learn what a nobleman ought to know. The
number of officers frequenting the court en equipage
gnerrier was once estimated at no less than two
thousand. Despite the etiquette maintained by Amalia
of Solms, the tone amid such military surroundings was
freer and rougher than at the French or English court.
The soldatesque airs of the officers, the frivolity of the
young nobles and aristocratic dames, the lavish display,
the sumptuous banquets, gave to everything a dazzling
but not always spotless splendour. Well known are
the brilliant festivals, theatrical performances, con-
certs, masquerades, tournaments, balls, hunts, games, and
64 History of the Dutch People
races that entertained the court circles. This joyous and
stirring life differed not a little from the simplicity of
former times, from the sober gravity of the Dutch people
who often viewed these things with anger. Sometimes
their anger mounted so high that the ministers and
churches meddled in the matter. This happened in
1642, when a magnificent ball was to be given in the
great hall of the Binnenhof in honour of the queen of
England. The church-council of The Hague went to the
prince to complain and to prevent it, but was dismissed
by him with the observation "that one could not forbid
all honest recreations; that even clergymen attended
banquets; that dancing was an affair of no consequence,
against which there was no ecclesiastical prohibition."
The prince and his wife and daughters kept their good
name unstained in the midst of all this festivity, but the
same cannot be said of the young heir to his power.
The Hague had two other courts besides that of the
prince. One was the court of the States-General, where
could be met Dutch respectability "clad in black velvet
with the broad ruff and the square beard, marching
gravely in public places," the world of deputies and high
officials assembled around the most influential members
of the States. The other was the court of the queen of
Bohemia in the Voorhout, where the four daughters
formed a cour des Graces, doing honour to literature and
science. But both these circles only served to heighten
the glory of the prince's surroundings.
His power was constantly increasing after 1632. In
war affairs the prince exercised the functions of captain
and admiral-general without the intervention of the
States-General. The deputies from the States accom-
panying him in the field were little more than advisers.
So it was also in diplomacy. He had, in fact, the
conduct of foreign relations in his own hands and could
carry through his project of cooperation with France.
At the Height of his Power 65
This was effected by making the council pensionary in
charge of foreign affairs dependent upon him. The old
and friendly Duyck and after him submissive and care-
less Jacob Cats were easily won. It was not so with the
able and independent Adriaan Pauw, in whom some
feared a new Oldenbarnevelt. So troublesome was he to
the prince that the latter temporarily took him from his
important post in 1634 by sending him in the embassy to
France for the conclusion of a close alliance. Only after
his resignation (March, 1636) could he return, when his
successor, Jacob Cats, was fully established as council
pensionary. Cats was a conscientious man, a not un-
deserving poet, a sober, practical, and moderate character,
but not very independent; furthermore timid and far
from disinterested, a willing tool in the hand of the
prince, whom he greatly admired. A more dangerous
intriguer was his son-in-law, Cornelis Musch, from 1628
successor of the elder Aerssens as clerk of the States-
General and consequently one of the most influential
statesmen in the United Provinces. He, too, was the
prince's willing servant, and he was much attached to his
office on account of the financial advantages it brought
him. Musch was undoubtedly one of the most avaricious
officials of the States at this time, when it was the
custom to accept presents for favours. Opposition to
him became general at the end of the prince's rule, as his
actions drew attention too openly. The two other
"ministers" of state, the treasurer-general, Johan van
Goch, later Govert Brasser, and the secretary of the
council of state, Maurits Huygens, brother of the prince's
secretary, were known as faithful and able functionaries
who would throw no serious obstacles in the prince's way.
Foreign affairs came still more into the prince's hands
through the institution of the "Secret Work." After
Oldenbarnevelt's death they were managed by Maurice
in conjunction with influential members of the States-
VOL. IV. — 5.
66 History of the Dutch People
General. This committee of advisers was called the
cabinet. About 1630 the custom arose of allowing
Frederick Henry by resolution to choose some members of
the States-General as deputies to consult with him about
certain negotiations requiring secrecy, and to make de-
cisions in the name of the full States-General. Notes
of these private deliberations were soon kept by the clerk
and entered in the "secret register" of the States-General
existing since 1593. The prince thus secured the direc-
tion of foreign relations, as the members of the "Secret
Work " were naturally among his most intimate con-
fidants. In each province the prince always had influen-
tial friends who took care that affairs were managed
according to his wishes. Johan de Knuyt of Zealand
occupied a prominent place among them. The council
of state also, in which Sommelsdijk still had a seat,
showed itself submissive to the prince's proposals.
The "quasi monarchical" government of the United
Provinces, of which Aitzema and others repeatedly speak,
was more than appearance about 1640. There was talk
also of the secret desire of the prince and of his ambitious
son to see a royal title conferred upon them. In 1644
a plan was broached of making the prince duke of
Guelders. Spain often sought to induce the prince to
conclude a peace or truce by offering help in procuring
the dignity of sovereign in the northern provinces, but
there is not a shadow of proof that he yielded to
temptation. He understood the great opposition that
would have to be overcome in bringing the States to
convert their servant legally into their master, although
they practically acquiesced in his predominant influence.
So he contented himself, like his brother, with the supreme
power in fact, the splendour of which was great enough to
place him and his in the circle of the sovereign princes of
Europe.
There could be no thought of any extensive change in
At the Height of his Power 67
the form of government so long as the war lasted. When
that was ended, it might seem desirable to make some
alteration, if not in the position of the prince of Orange,
at least in the mutual relations of the provinces politically
and financially, and perhaps in their governments. In
these years the prince and the States had to contend with
many a domestic difficulty, like those of former days,
the consequence of unsatisfactory relations between the
various political powers. Financial troubles were numer-
ous. The finances of Holland were in the best condition,
for in 1632, after years of investigation, it had revised its
antiquated land tax and adopted a new assessment pro-
portioned to the rental of houses and lands. Now it
could justly demand that the other provinces should do
their duty, so that the receiver-general, Doubleth, on
account of arrears, would not always be compelled to ask
Holland for money, or to make the purveyors of the
army and fortifications wait for their pay. Millions were
appropriated annually from 1626 for the ordinary expenses
of the war, but Holland alone duly met its obligations,
paying most of the interest on the general debt as well as
for the army. The other provinces could only be brought
with great difficulty to tax their inhabitants as heavily as
were those of Holland. They remained always slow in
paying the sums agreed upon, so that the council of state
more than once declared it saw no way of avoiding the
total ruin of the finances and of the country but to
decree "execution" of the recalcitrant provinces, either
by arrest of the inhabitants, or by quartering of troops,
because "extreme disorders and confusion can only be
remedied by extreme and hard means."
The disputes between Groningen and the Ommelands
were repeatedly submitted to the States-General, but no
matter how fair their decision might be, both parties
would not accept it. Gelderland was also menaced with
differences between the quarters of the province concern-
68 History of the Dutch People
ing the payment of the taxes. But Friesland especially
suffered from dissensions in these years. During the
stadtholdership of Count Ernest the three rural quarters
and the cities had trouble about the distribution of the
war taxes and the oligarchic abuses by the nobility in the
country. The great power of the lords of the manor
awakened indignation, because all the provincial and
municipal offices and unrestricted control of the finances
threatened to fall into the hands of a few eminent
families. In 1634 there was an uprising against the
farmers of the revenue and some hated magistrates. The
States-General sent soldiers to Friesland to support the
government. It was demanded that the cities should be
allowed to appoint their own officials. This reform was
carried through, and Friesland now obtained town
councils. Not until 1637 did a deputation of six
members of the council of state succeed in restoring order
in Friesland, and the provincial finances were also
regulated. In 1640, a new system of election was intro-
duced in the country districts, but abuses could not be
abolished, as the lords continued powerful and their union
made a dead letter of the best arrangements. Municipal
patriciate and rural nobility aided one another more and
more in defending their authority against the efforts of
the common people to secure the old influence on the
government, and to throw off the selfish dominion of the
united city and country aristocracy. The limited power
of the provincial stadtholder could not serve as a counter-
poise. Nowhere was the aristocracy stronger than here
and in Groningen, burgher and peasant being subject to
the arbitrary will of the great mercantile families in the
cities and of the ancient Frisian and Groningen nobility.
The intervention of the council of state at the instance
of the prince of Orange showed that Frederick Henry's
strong arm could reach out to the provinces where he
was not stadtholder. His authority even in Friesland
At the Height of his Power 69
appeared sufficient to bring order. This action of the
council of state, upon whose members the prince could
rely, allowed him to do what he pleased, and was not
agreeable to the States-General. The relation between
the States-General and the council of state became some-
what strained at times. Holland, in 1643, insisted that
the provinces should give sharper instructions to their
representatives in the States-General. This was evidently
directed against the prince, who managed usually to
gain great influence over the gentlemen long resident at
The Hague and active in various governing bodies. The
prince opposed this move successfully in several
provinces.
Restrictions proved of slight avail so long as the prince
kept a vigorous hold upon the reins of government. As
he grew older and became more of a sufferer from the
gout superinduced by years of service in the field, his
influence declined. About 1643 it was apparent that he
was no longer as strong as formerly. Holland, under
Pauw's lead, raised its proud head higher and struggled
free from the grasp of the powerful stadtholder. Fearful
of the rapidly approaching future, when the old prince
should have passed away, and the young one should rule
in his stead, it resolved upon measures for supporting the
authority of the States against the tendency to monarchy.
The movement of 1643 for fixing the instructions was a
notable sign of the times. And this sign stood not alone.
Holland, and in Holland Amsterdam, had long watched
the dangerous increase of the prince's power and looked
with suspicion upon every step that seemed to bring the
state nearer to the dreaded monarchical government,
which would deprive the States of authority and its
advantages. Moreover, a monarchical government meant
a foreign policy devoted not so much to the promotion of
commerce as to dynastic interests and to the whims of
princes; it was risking a repetition of what had caused
70 History of the Dutch People
the great revolt against Spain. In France and England
the troubles of monarchy were to be seen. Fear of
encroachment upon existing liberties, of loss of influence,
of personal injury, of general material decline, all com-
bined to form a party becoming bolder as the prince
grew older and weaker, and as the time neared for a
younger and more ambitious ruler to take his place.
The supreme authority of the prince appeared especially
in the power he exercised over war matters on land and
sea. He had long kept the army in good condition and
usually had at his disposal a force of about 25,000 men,
nearly twice as large as that of Maurice around 1600.
Mercenaries were often enlisted to garrison the frontier
towns. The fortresses were not so well provided as the
army in the field, notwithstanding the urgency of the
prince and the council of state, but the enemy was
fortunately not in a condition to make serious efforts for
the conquest of fortified places within the borders of the
United Provinces.
Vigorous measures were at last taken to improve
affairs on the sea. Premiums for the capture of Dunkirk
ships had contributed somewhat to the safety of
commerce. The "new beggars" of Zealand, privateers
fitted out chiefly at Flushing by the Lampsins brothers,
were for some years the terror of the Dunkirk mariners.
The power so liberally bestowed upon the prince and his
"cabinet" in maritime matters had not yet produced the
expected effect. The prince lamented the "miserable
condition" of the admiral and captains, whose "reputa-
tion depends on the lowest fishwife" who complains of
her husband's captivity. Hundreds of sailors and fisher-
men became victims of the Dunkirk pirates, and although
the barbarous custom of "foot-washing" was gradually
renounced by both sides, imprisonment in the dungeons
of Dunkirk was a grievous trial to many. The establish-
ment of an insurance company was again considered in
At the Height of his Power 71
1634, but the merchants opposed it tooth and nail on
account of the expense, and the project was postponed
from year to year and given up in 1640. General
dissatisfaction forced Admiral van Dorp and Vice-
admiral Liefhebber to resign. The prince now deter-
mined to put no noblemen but experienced "tars" at
the head of the fleet and appointed Marten Harpertszoon
Tromp as lieutenant-admiral and Witte Corneliszoon de
With as vice-admiral. Complaints, however, did not
cease. Whenever Tromp took his fleet into port for re-
pairs or provisions, thirty or forty Dunkirk ships appeared
on the coasts of Holland and Zealand. The prince and
his deputies were constantly reminded of the sad state of
affairs on the sea. Holland threatened to withhold its
payments for troops, if maritime matters were not better
managed. The great companies had to provide strong
convoys, and the rates of marine insurance rose.
At last recourse was had again to the promise of pre-
miums for privateers from a fund of 200,000 guilders a
year. Private parties in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, the
small cities of North Holland and Zealand undertook
with a government subsidy to send out privateers, but
they were too few to suppress altogether the pirates.
Despite Tromp's alertness and bravery, displayed year
after year on the Flemish coast and in the English
Channel, many a ship fell into the hands of the men of
Dunkirk, and many were the fights with the bold enemy.
The new resources, with which the equipment of priva-
teers was encouraged in 1645, made them increase in
number, so that safety upon the sea could be attained to
some extent. But the circumstance, that private enter-
prise accomplished what the fleet of the state could not
do, caused serious complaints of the prince's conduct of
naval affairs and corroborated the assertion that the war
on the land was and remained the chief concern of the
prince.
72 History of the Dutch People
About 1640 no real antistadtholder party existed in the
United Netherlands, but the elements of such a party-
were present among those who were dissatisfied with the
course of affairs and feared worse things in the future,
when young Prince William, known to be ardently
military and attached to the French alliance, should have
succeeded to his father's dignities. These elements
stood towards the Prince of Orange in the attitude char,
acterised by Aitzema in the words, "that people could
not do without him but would rather not have had
him." They joined hands with the survivors of the
old party of the States of Oldenbarnevelt's days, who
of late years had come again into the government
here and there, and in whom bitterness over the
events of 161 8 and 1619 was far from extinguished.
Limitation of the power of the princes of Orange was
the main purpose of these statesmen. There was slight
chance of this so long as the war on land lasted,
because the power of the princes of Orange was never
greater, their presence was never more indispensable
than in a time of war. As soon as Spain should give an
opportunity for the conclusion of an honourable peace,
it would find support in these desires of some very in-
fluential leaders of Holland. There was also hope of
advantage for Spain in the unmistakable striving of the
house of Orange for the actual supremacy in the United
Provinces, and Spain used the allurement of this su-
premacy in endeavouring to persuade the Oranges to
conclude an acceptable treaty.
Under these circumstances the possibility of an honour-
able peace gradually dawned upon many people. Spain's
evident exhaustion caused the expectation that it would
make efforts to bring about this peace. The only
question was which of the two parties was to get the
upper hand : that which desired in alliance with France to
wage vigorous war in order to force Spain to a general
At the Height of his Power
73
peace as advantageous as possible to both allies ; or that
which sought to use Spain's discouragement in winning
it over to a separate peace, which in any case would secure
the independence of the northern provinces, actually
existing for a long time, with the possession of the con-
quests thus far made in Europe, Asia, and America.
CHAPTER IV
THE UNITED NETHERLANDS IN 1640
TESTIMONY as to the condition of the United
Netherlands about 1640 is universally favourable,
and in the history of the Dutch people this time is called
' ' the golden age. ' ' A petition of the council of state said
the country had become so flourishing that "the report
of it had gone over the entire world. ' ' Commerce was the
chief source of the prosperity of these provinces, ever
flowing more abundantly both in Europe and in the three
other parts of the world then known, to which the famous
voyages of Abel Tasman in 1642 and 1644 added the
"South Land," as a newly discovered part, with a great
continent and a number of large and small islands
hitherto unknown. The names of New Holland, New
Zealand, Van Diemen's Land, and others recall the brave
enterprises of this celebrated native of Groningen, whose
simple journal is among the most fascinating stories of
travel at this period. Like Tasman in warm Australia,
the Dutch whalers penetrated the barren north and
diffused more knowledge concerning Spitzbergen and
thereabouts, while other merchants visited the remote
coasts of North and South America.
The chief purpose of these expeditions was the search
of new routes for commerce, while the old ones were
followed with increasing energy, and the competition of
other seafaring nations, especially of England, was vic-
toriously overcome. Fear of rivals caused the new
74
The United Netherlands in 1640 75
discoveries to be held back, so that the finds in Australia
remained for years the secret of the company. Com-
merce with Japan, established by Jacob Specx and
Francois Caron and about 1634 successfully carried on
at the factory of Hirado, was in 1641 confined by the
disaffected Japanese to the small island of Deshima and
surrounded with humiliating restrictions, but with the
complete exclusion of the Portuguese, the last European
competitors, the coveted monopoly of Japanese trade
was secured for the East India Company. In 1635 the
profit of this trade, silver being the chief article of
export, amounted to over one million guilders,1 but the
year 1640 showed no profit. Commerce with China and
Farther India also did not furnish the expected gains.
The company settled down upon Formosa, where a Dutch
colony was planted about 1640. This became an impor-
tant point for trade with China in silk, lacquer work,
precious metals, carpets, etc., just as Ceylon did for
Indian wares. The latter large and rich island, still
under Portuguese rule and so valuable for commerce
with Hither India, received more attention under the
governor-general, Anthony van Diemen. From 1636
the company's fleets often called there, and the Dutch
factories increased in number, until two years later a
small fleet commanded by the energetic Westerwolt with
the co-operation of Rajah Singha, the ruler of Kandy,
attacked the Portuguese and after a struggle of two years
got possession of their principal settlements. The most
consideration was bestowed upon the Indian Archipelago.
After the short administration of Jacques Specx, arrived
Hendrik Brouwer at Batavia in September, 1632, as
governor-general of the company. Brouwer endeav-
oured to please the directors by reducing expenditures in
India and by furnishing as rich a revenue as possible to the
1 See Nachod , Die Beziehungen der Niederl. Ostind. Kompagnie zu
Japan (Berlin, 1897), p. 226.
76 History of the Dutch People
fatherland. His weak rule was followed in 1636 by the
government of Anthony van Diemen, who extended
the company's possessions very much and may be com-
pared with the great Coen. In the Moluccas the com-
pany's authority was firmly established and strictly
maintained by him, especially by favouring the terrible
annual hongi-expeditions for the systematic destruction
of the superfluous clove-trees and for wreaking vengeance
on rebellious natives. His power was chiefly directed
against Malacca, the Portuguese capital, for centuries the
centre of East Asiatic commerce, where Arabs, Persians,
Indians, Siamese, Chinese brought their wares to market.
Since Matelief's attack in 1606 repeated attempts had
been made to conquer or at least to blockade the city, until
in the spring of 1640 a regular siege was undertaken,
which resulted in its fall after a valiant defence on January
14, 1641. This brilliant victory expelled the Portuguese
from the Archipelago and enhanced the prestige of the
company. The Netherlanders were now indisputably the
rulers of India.
Van Diemen, who desired, like Coen, that the affairs of
India should be intrusted to the governor-general and
his council, and who objected to the interference of the
directors in Indian politics, demanding vigorous action
and dwelling upon the necessity that "whoever will
mow, must first sow," was no such cheap governor as his
predecessor. His vigorous administration brought un-
common advantages to the company, although the ten
years' truce concluded in June, 1641, with Portugal,
which had thrown off the Spanish yoke after sixty years
of slavery, put an end to the contest with that power.
Van Diemen, under whom the able Johan Maetsuycker
managed affairs in Ceylon, died in April, 1645, the
illustrious head of a grand commerce reaching all over
the southern and eastern coasts of Asia and to the newly
discovered Australia. Batavia was the centre of this
The United Netherlands in 1640 77
commercial realm, and its splendour attracted all eyes,
thanks to the two great governors who had resided there
and established an impressive tradition of power. The
circumstances of Van Diemen's rule were less favourable
than those Coen had contended with, but he had
vanquished them as fortunately. Batavia was better
fortified and built, and with every year it resembled more
a European city transported to the tropics. But the
population, chiefly Javanese and Chinese, with some
European officials and soldiers and a small number of
freemen, was still of the same character. The freemen
had come out for the sole purpose of making their
fortune, to earn much money in a short time and then
to return with their wealth to Europe. There was a lack
of good European colonists, and so long as the condition
of the motherland remained so flourishing, little improve-
ment could be expected. No inclination to permanent
emigration was shown in the United Netherlands. Free
emigrants could not sustain the competition of the com-
pany and the Chinese. The slender pay of the officials
did not better the European population in India, a
mixture of rough and energetic or physically and morally
degenerate elements, which could hardly inspire respect
for the name of the Netherlanders, although it might
make that name feared.
Rich revenues and large dividends with small expendi-
tures in India and Europe — that was and continued to be
the watchword of the directors. They could well be satis-
fied with Van Diemen in this respect. The anxiously
awaited return of the richly freighted East Indiamen
seldom occasioned disappointment in his days. He sent
back millions. The dividends amounted generally to 25,
in 1642 even to 50 per cent., the latter being paid with an
eye to the approaching expiration, for the second time, of
the company's charter. Prosperity was manifested by the
rise of the shares to 500 per cent. It was desired to make
78 History of the Dutch People
new terms for the charter, allowing more people to profit
by this gold mine. During years the subject was de-
bated in a flood of pamphlets concerning free trade and
monopoly, abuses and reforms. Meanwhile the charter
was prolonged for a year at a time, once for only six
weeks, until in the summer of 1647 a new charter for
twenty-five years was agreed upon. It gave the directors
a fixed salary and granted to the stockholders some
supervision of the administration with the promise of an
accounting every four years to the States-General. For
this the company paid 1^ million guilders for the benefit
of the West India Company.
Far less favourable was the condition of the West India
Company, which saw its prosperity speedily end in the
sharp contest with the Portuguese for Brazil. The
conquest of Olinda by Loncq in 1630, later of other
sections of the Brazilian coast, with the fortified Recife
and Pernambuco as the chief points, had cost much
money and trouble, especially under the management of
Colonel Artischowsky, a Pole in the service of the States
and the real founder of the Dutch possessions in Brazil.
Count John Maurice of Nassau, one of John of Nassau's
many grandsons, and covered with laurels as a military
commander, was appointed head of the new colony in
1637 for five years.1 He went out with a small force of
nearly 3000 men and 12 ships and began to establish the
government upon a firm foundation, showing himself in
all respects an excellent governor. The conquest in 1637
of St. George del Mina on the coast of Guinea, the
fortification of Curacao taken three years earlier, and the
seizing of Angola and St. Thomas in 1641 were his work.
Africa was to furnish negroes for the cultivation of the
Brazilian plantations. A new India seemed to rise up
here under the Dutch flag.
At first the work of civilising natives and immigrants
1 Netscher, Les hollandais au Bre'sil, p. 83.
The United Netherlands in 1640 79
progressed along with the extension of the company's
authority, so that the governor ventured to undertake the
siege of San Salvador, the Portuguese capital. By his
advice free trade was allowed between Brazil and the
United Netherlands, while the company kept its monop-
oly only for slaves, munitions of war, and Brazil wood.
The intolerance of the Calvinistic ministers towards the
Catholic and Jewish inhabitants of Portuguese descent
excited among them great dissatisfaction with the Dutch
rule. The company supported feebly the governor's
plans, and the Portuguese strained every nerve to defend
the last of their possessions. The failure of the siege of
San Salvador, the dissensions between John Maurice
and the Nineteen and between the governor and his
lieutenant Artischowsky, the lax way in which the
financially embarrassed company carried on the war
against the enemy's large fleets, all made this new colony
totter and finally fall. Bravely did the governor fight
against fate. In January, 1640, his little fleet won a
brilliant victory over twice as large an armada before the
Rio Grande, and this was followed by another attack
upon San Salvador.
Portugal's rising against Spain at the end of 1640
influenced greatly affairs in Brazil, but not in favour of
the authority of the West India Company. The libera-
tion of the motherland inspired the Brazilian Portuguese
with hope. Negotiations with free Portugal led in June,
164 1, to peace. A truce of ten years was agreed upon
for the colonies, each party retaining the possessions then
held by it, and in Europe joint war was to be waged
against Spain. The company's stock dropped immedi-
ately from 128 to 114 per cent, and could not long be
maintained at that height. Hostilities in Brazil between
Portuguese and Dutch ceased for a time, but the uneasi-
ness among the Portuguese population of territory
possessed by the Dutch so increased that the 5000 men
80 History of the Dutch People
and the few ships at the governor's disposal were insuffi-
cient to keep order. He repeatedly threatened to resign,
if he were not better supported; but the company, eager
to retrench expenses, heeded little his warnings, and
even cut down the number of his troops and left him to
his fate amid a mutinous and faithless population. The
company plainly showed that it wished to be rid of this
"dear" governor, hoping to bring up again its depreciat-
ing shares by resorting to its former privateering opera-
tions against the Spanish fleets from America. John
Maurice would not cooperate in this. With the con-
sent of the States-General he returned in July, 1644,
bitterly complaining of the opposition encountered, to
the fatherland with a rich fleet — the last from these
regions.
His departure from Brazil, mourned by Dutch,
Portuguese, and Indians, was the beginning of a period
of confusion, soon leading to open insurrection against
the company, by which from 1645 considerable territory
reverted to the Portuguese sway. The long discussion
of a consolidation of the two great companies was not
conducive to progress, and the state's help finally
appeared indispensable to the company which, in 1647, saw
its charter renewed for twenty-five years. The States-
General assisted the company with a fleet of 12 war ships
and 6000 men under Witte Corneliszoon de With, seeking
to rescue everything possible of the Brazilian possessions,
now reduced to Recife with three forts on the coast.
De With arrived before Recife in March, 1648, but it was
too late to recover what was lost, and the Dutch troops
suffered defeat after defeat. The time was coming when
the Dutch flag would disappear from all Brazil.
The company's lack of money prevented its doing any-
thing for its other colonies and possessions. Berbice
advanced little under the management of Abraham van
Pere. to whom it was really given in fief, and Essequibo
The United Netherlands in 1640 81
was not much better off. The trade there in salt,
tobacco, cotton, sugar, and logwood afforded some
profit, but this was of no more importance than that in
New Netherland, where the number of colonists grad-
ually increased, partly by immigration from neighbouring
English colonies, but where the colony's development
was impeded by outbreaks of war with the Indians.
Success attended at first the introduction here of the
patroon system (1629), providing an opportunity for
wealthy patroons to improve some regions as fiefs of the
company, but dissensions between the patroons and the
company and Indian wars interfered with these enter-
prises.1 The opening of free trade with New Netherland
in 1639, which greatly promoted the settlement of
emigrants there, and the succession in 1646 of the
vigorous governor, Peter Stuyvesant, brought better
times. There was slight profit from the African con-
quests, now that the company was losing Brazil and its
slave-market. The decline of Spanish commerce with
the Antilles almost put an end to the privateering which
had been in former years the company's greatest source
of revenue. So this commercial corporation could only
prolong its existence with difficulty. The dividends and
stock of the company dropped, the former to about 5 per
cent., the latter to far below par — an eloquent proof of
its decline, a sure omen of its fall.
The Northern Company was no more profitable than
the West India Company. Convulsively it held fast to
its monopoly of the whale fishery, and in 1633 secured
its renewal for eight years to the end of 1642. But
heavy expenses, the uncertainty of the catch, foreign
and domestic competition, and disputes within the com-
pany itself did it great injury. The Estates of Holland
! See O'Callaghan, History of New Netherland (New York, 1846); de
Roever, Kiliaan van Rensselaer en zijne kolonie Rensselaer sivijk, in Olid-
Holland, viii., p. 32 it seq.
vol. iv.-6.
82 History of the Dutch People
could not ogree about the renewal of the charter, and the
States-General without discussion abolished it. The
whale fishery was thenceforth free, but it was still too
hazardous t j be enumerated among the causes of the
great prosperity of the United Netherlands about 1640,
although this excellent school of seamen, forming them
amid ice and snow in the north, continued to be of great
importance to Dutch navigation in general.
The Baltic trade was more flourishing than ever before.
The hundreds of Dutch ships, which three or four times
in the year passed through the Sound to sell or take on
cargo in the Baltic ports, numbered in 1645 twenty times
as many as the vessels of other nations traversing the
Sound.1 Enterprising merchants, like Lodewijk de Geer,
Gabriel Marcelis, Elias Trip, exploited upon a large scale
the mines of Sweden and the Danish grazing lands,
furnished the Swedish and Danish governments with sup-
plies of all kinds, and became their importers and
exporters, bankers, and agents. Thus the two northern
powers were quite dependent on the Netherlanders.
Favourable results for the Dutch merchant proceeded
from the close political alliance between the States and
Sweden in the time of Gustavus Adolphus and, after his
death in 1632, during the minority of his daughter
Christina under the chancellor Oxenstierna. Relations
with Denmark, which possessed in the Sound dues the
means of annoying the Dutch, were often strained, partly
on account of the evasion of the toll by Nether-
landish captains, partly on account of the extortions of the
Danish officials and the unnecessary delay caused by
them. Denmark must be kept as a friend, or it might
side with Spain and expose Dutch commerce to even
greater dangers. A treaty made with Sweden in 1640 to
assure freedom of commerce in the Baltic and North
Seas, if necessary by a joint recourse to arms, proved
1 Kernkamp, De sleutels van de Sont, pp. 3, 5 .
The United Netherlands in 1640 83
that the Dutch were ready to show their teeth to the
Danes. Negotiations at Copenhagen, The Hague, and
elsewhere, a prominent part in them being taken by the
representative of the States at Elsinore, Vbn Cracauw,
could not end the threatening complications, when Sweden
in 1644 entered upon the long-prepared war against
Denmark.
The government of the States tried to mediate between
the two powers, while Frederick Henry felt slight inclina-
tion for Sweden's sake to go to war with Denmark, whose
king, Christian IV., was the relative and ally of Charles
of England, young Prince William's father-in-law. In
accordance with the treaty of 1640 Sweden desired the
help of the States against the proud Dane, who on his
side used all means to convince the States of the impor-
tance of a free passage through the Sound and con-
sequently of a friendly attitude towards Denmark. The
spring of 1644 was spent in negotiations. Not until July
could the Baltic fleet of 700 vessels leave the Vlie under
the protection of 40 war ships commanded by Admiral
Witte de With. The merchants complained that the
year was advancing, their cargoes were spoiling, and
estimated their loss at 100,000 guilders a day, while now
on account of the lateness of the season they could only
make two voyages out and back. These figures show
how important the Baltic trade was and how necessary
to Dutch commerce was the restoration of peace in the
north.
At first more sympathy towards Sweden was shown by
the people of the Netherlands, who had long regarded the
Danes as enemies. Both parties provided themselves in
the Dutch ports with ships, troops, and munitions of
war, the Danes with the help of Marcelis, the Swedes
with the cooperation of De Geer and Trip, who sent out
to the Danish coast a whole fleet of 30 ships manned by
Dutch sailors under the Dutch admiral, Maarten Thijssen.
84 History of the Dutch People
This "Swedish Dutch fleet" was twice defeated on the
Schleswig coast by the stronger Danish fleet under
Christian IV. himself and had to return to the Vlie in
June, but the Danes suffered severe losses on land.
Holstein and Jutland were conquered by the Swedes
under Torstenson, the greatest general of the school of
Gustavus Adolphus, and so also was Schonen by Horn
only a little less celebrated. Menaced by imperial troops,
Torstenson had to evacuate Jutland, but Thijssen sailed
again out of the Vlie at the end of July with 22 large
ships, passed through the Sound in the face of the
Danish fleet, united with the naval force of Sweden, and
under command of the Swedish admiral, Wrangel, won a
victory over the Danes near the island of Femern.
Thijssen was raised to the Swedish nobility under the
name of Anckarhjelm, entered the service of Sweden,
and did much to reform the Swedish navy. The convoy
fleet of the States under De With was meanwhile cruis-
ing in the Skager-Rack, while their ambassadors were
endeavouring to mediate in Sweden and Denmark. The
Danes in their distress were ready to accept mediation,
but the Swedes demanded joint action against Denmark,
as provided by treaty, and threatened otherwise to settle
the matter alone.
Now thecommercial interests of Holland, of Amsterdam,
came into conflict with Frederick Henry's policy. Hol-
land saw a chance of doing away with the injury to its
commerce from the Sound toll. The prince was unwill-
ing by a new war in the north to divert the impaired
financial resources of the state from the great national
undertaking of the struggle with Spain. While he
sought his leading motive in alliance with France against
Spain, Holland, and in Holland Amsterdam, desired
nothing more ardently than vigorous action in the north
in behalf of commerce. Holland wished to aid Sweden
with the fleet in bringing Denmark to reason ; the prince
The United Netherlands in 1640 85
proposed to let the fleet cruise in the Sound only as a
threat. The contest between the two views lasted in the
provincial assemblies and in the States-General until
the spring of 1645. Finally a sort of compromise was
concluded, by which Holland promised to keep the
engagements with France, while the prince no longer
opposed a strong naval demonstration in the Baltic.
On April 19, 1645, the States-General resolved in com-
pliance with Sweden's request to send a fleet of 50
ships with 5,000 men to the Baltic "for the protection of
commerce." Even in Holland actual war with Denmark
was not desired, but it was hoped that this demonstra-
tion would force it to yield before the country was too
deeply committed with Sweden.
At the head of the "armada" the fight-loving De With
sailed in the middle of June, 1645, towards the Sound,
escorting 300 merchantmen and intending, in case of war,
to unite with the Swedish fleet against the Danes. The
weaker Danish naval force at Copenhagen did not pre-
vent his entrance into the Baltic, and amid the salutes of
the rejoicing Swedes the entire fleet of 350 vessels sailed
majestically in order of battle through the Sound, while
there was no thought of paying toll, and the Danes
looked on from their forts, armed to the teeth and
enraged at this unprecedented violation of Danish rights,
but not daring to attack the powerful enemy. On reach-
ing the Baltic De With allowed the merchantmen to
go their way. He remained in the Sound and cruised
threateningly before Copenhagen, possessing "the keys"
of the strait. Under his protection the Dutch ships
sailed unmolested to and fro through the Sound during
the whole season.
The aggressive but cautious action of De With and the
Dutch envoys accomplished their purpose. Soon the
Danes showed themselves ready to yield, and concluded
on August 23d with the ambassadors of the States the
86 History of the Dutch People
treaty of Christianopel (not far from Kalmar), which
did not put the Sound toll at the low figure of the Speyer
treaty of 1544, but fixed the toll lists at a moderate height
for a period of forty years. After those forty years the
Speyer provisions were again to come into effect.
Supplementary tolls were abolished ; the time-consuming
visitation in the Sound was restricted; Dutch goods in
the Danish kingdom were not to pay a higher duty than
domestic wares; the passage through the Sound was not
to be obstructed; and Dutch goods in foreign ships were
to be taxed as if in Dutch ships. The purpose of Amster-
dam and Holland was in large part, but not wholly,
attained. That complete freedom of navigation could
not be secured was due to differences in the States, to
fear of the growing pretensions of Sweden, to the
venality of some officials of the States, who were in-
duced by money to inform the Danish government how
far the Netherlands would go, so that in negotiating the
Danes were accurately acquainted with the instructions of
the ambassadors of the States.
Peace in the north was restored by the treaty of
Bromsebro concluded on the same 23d of August between
Sweden and Denmark through the mediation of the
emissaries of the States. Denmark was able to rescue a
large part of its Swedish possessions with the support of
the States. It had to cede only Halland with Gothland
and Oesel to its adversary, but both shores of the Sound
remained Danish. The Swedes attributed this less fa-
vourable result of the war to the States which, by more
vigorous aid, might have procured better terms for their
ally. It was not desired to make Sweden too powerful,
and there was satisfaction with the fact that the "wooden
keys of the Sound" could really be considered as lying
"before the piles of Amsterdam." In this feeling of and
against Sweden was the germ of later difficulties with this
power, hitherto the ally of the States in the Baltic, as
The United Netherlands in 1640 87
Denmark had been their enemy. De With did not
return to the fatherland until the Baltic merchantmen
had finished their voyages for the year. Thus he pre-
vented all imposition of the toll to the vexation of the
Danes, to whom he did not make his presence especially
agreeable, annoying them by his sarcasm and referring in
his letter of farewell to "the services" which he had
rendered the Danes "in this season," although they had
been "very uneasy over his sojourn." His tone showed
what the United Netherlands might do in the Baltic and
how their "steel blade" could dominate everything there.
The commercial interests in the Baltic were out of
danger, and the Dutch merchants could contemplate
with pride the results obtained.
The Levant commerce about 1640 was less important
than the "mother commerce" on the Baltic, but it was
growing, thanks to the efforts of the able "orator" at the
Turkish court, Cornelis Haga, who defended Dutch in-
terests there with great talent during 28 years, until
1639. No ambassador stood in such high estimation
with the Porte as Haga.1 He procured all sorts of privi-
leges in the east for Christians in general and for the Prot-
estants in particular, and even persuaded the sultan to
grant his Greek subjects a certain liberty of worship.
The studies in the oriental languages of Erpenius, Golius,
Warner, and others were favoured by the Turks. This
good understanding between the States and Turkey was
of more help to commerce than that with declining Venice
which could not hold the Barbary pirates in check and
paid badly the subsidies for the war against Spain stipu-
lated by the treaty of 1619 with the States. There were
relations with Morocco, and a Moroccan agent resided at
The Hague. Occasionally negotiations took place with
Algiers and Tunis, usually concerning the release of
captured seamen and sometimes under the influence of
1 Vreede, Geschied, der tied. Diplomatie, ii., I., p. 401.
88 History of the Dutch People
one or more war ships sent thither. The great develop-
ment of the Levant commerce dates from Haga's time,
and he laid the foundation for it in the "capitulation" of
1612 with Turkey. He established Dutch consulates in
the chief ports of Italy, Dalmatia, Greece, Turkey, Asia
Minor, Syria, Egypt, Algiers, and Tunis. The opera-
tions of individual merchants were strengthened through
the formation by Amsterdam (1625) of a "Board of
Directors of the Levant commerce and navigation in the
Mediterranean Sea," followed by similar "chambers" in
other Dutch cities. Never was there a Levant Company
equipped with a monopoly, for it was not desired to
shackle private commerce, now that the East and West
Indies were really closed to it. The States-General al-
lowed the salaried directors to have a supervision over
commerce, to pay the ambassador at Constantinople and
the consuls and agents, to judge commercial disputes, etc.
So the Levant commerce was not left entirely to private
enterprise, but was subject to fixed rules. The "strait
navigation " increased in these years. From Hoorn
alone we are told that in 1627 from fifty to seventy ships
sailed regularly past Gibraltar. Piracy in the Mediter-
ranean between 1641 and 1650 inflicted damages every
year to the amount of nearly one million guilders, and
important must have been the commerce that could
endure such losses.
With this commerce extending over Europe and Asia
the carrying trade to neighbouring coasts, to England,
Scotland, France, Germany, Denmark, Norway, was ever
being developed. In 1625 half of the ships hailing from
Hamburg sailed to the Netherlands. The number of
vessels in 1642 plying between Hamburg and the Nether-
lands was estimated at 3000, without allowing probably
for the many ships making the voyage three or four
times. From 161 3 there was a weekly service between
Hamburg and Amsterdam, and similar service with
The United Netherlands in 1640 89
Bremen was established in 1647. The once important
commerce with Spain and Portugal and the southern
Netherlands gradually declined. The liberation of
Portugal from 1641 allowed this country again to be in-
cluded in the Dutch carrying trade. The river commerce
along the Meuse, Rhine, and Scheldt, likewise transacted
with licenses, brought great profits and employed hun-
dreds of small vessels.
It is difficult to determine how much advantage the in-
habitants derived from all this commerce, equipment
and sailing of ships. Among the few figures extant those
concerning the increase of revenue from the convoys and
licenses attract our attention. In 1628 this revenue
amounted to over lyi, in 1642 to over 2^ million
guilders, while in Amsterdam alone the amount rose
from 800,000 to 1,200,000 guilders.1 As the convoys and
licenses produced usually 2 per cent, of the value of the
goods, this would bring the imports and exports around
1640 to about 100 millions, which assuredly is much too
little. When we learn that at Hoorn in the winter of
1618 no less than 200 ships were lying in the harbour,
mostly belonging to the town and employed only for
foreign commerce, while 100 ships of Hoorn were win-
tering elsewhere, we do not wonder at hearing com-
merce praised as the chief source of prosperity in the
Netherlands.
That industry was likewise flourishing needs no demon-
stration. The fisheries, however, experienced hard times
on account of the depredations of the Dunkirk rovers in
the North Sea. For weeks in succession the fishermen
dared not leave the coasts of Holland and Zealand, or, if
they did, they were exposed to severe losses, to imprison-
ment in the dungeons of Dunkirk, or to heavy ransoms.
The herring and haberdine fishery, estimated to feed
1 Pringsheim, Bcitrdge zur wirtsch. Entwickelungsgeschichte (Leipzig,
1890), p. 12 et seq.
90 History of the Dutch People
100,000 families, the cod and haddock fishery, employ-
ing thousands of others, suffered exceedingly, and the
greatest misery often prevailed in the villages by the sea.
Not until after 1645 could this branch of industry attain
its former height, when security became greater, and fear
of the Dunkirk pirates less.
The cloth, linen, and other textile industries, flourish-
ing from about 1580 in various towns of Holland through
the settlement of many exiled families of artisans from
Flanders, Artois, Hainaut, and Brabant, were long
maintained at the high point reached with the aid also of
the municipal governments. Some branches gave place
to others, and the cloths and serges of Leyden and the
linens of Haarlem temporarily eclipsed other industries.
Competition caused recourse to doubtful expedients, as
when goods were manufactured in other places and sent
to Holland to be dyed and sold as Holland fabrics. The
guilds with their strict regulations sometimes did much
harm by shackling freedom, and the supremacy of
commerce often made the interests of industry subor-
dinate. In general it may be said that the cloth,
woollen, and linen industry was very prosperous about
1640, though not yet carried on in large factories. The
vigorous development of industry is shown by the increase
of population in the industrial centres of Holland despite
the pestilences that swept away thousands of inhabitants.
One of the most important sources of information on the
textile industry of these days is the Deduction (of 1647) of
all the Dutch "cloth-drapers," who asserted that their
business was the most considerable of manufactures
with respect to the workers necessary in it, the washers,
weavers, pickers, spinners, carders, fullers, dyers, etc.,
as well as with respect to the taxes imposed on it
by the state, and who asked for protection by the
enactment of a duty on exportations of Baltic and
Spanish wool, or by prevention of the importation of
The United Netherlands in 1640 91
foreign fabrics, which was opposed by Amsterdam as
harmful to the cloth and woollen commerce — a proof of
the favour always shown in the United Netherlands to
commerce above industry.
About 1630 it was especially the fine cloth and woollen
industries, the passementerie, and Gobelin work that
began to develop with the general increase of wealth and
luxury. The same cause helped the progress of the
diamond industry in Amsterdam, of the goldsmith's and
silversmith's art in many cities, and of the manufacture
of tiles at Delft and other places. The memory of the
great Amsterdam jewellers, the Rensselaers, the Van
Welys, and others, who furnished the courts, the richest
noblemen and merchants of Europe with jewelry, pearls,
diamonds, and other precious stones, the description of
the brilliant productions of the Amsterdam diamond-pol-
ishers of this period may testify to the perfection of these
branches of industry, as the beautiful gold and silver
plate preserved from the melting pot in some old families
and museums offers striking proof of former artistic skill.
Best known are the tiles from this flourishing epoch of
pottery, made chiefly at Delft, but speedily imitated in
other cities.1 Thus industry collaborated with commerce
in throwing great wealth into the lap of the Netherlanders.
This wealth gave occasion to terrible abuses. The
success of the great companies brought out many a com-
mercial undertaking which resulted in heavy losses to the
shareholders. The impulse to risk much in order to gain
much, the pernicious spirit of speculation, claimed many
victims in these times. After long dealing with the com-
merce in grain, oil and whalebone, Indian spices, and
other articles subject to great fluctuations in price, specula-
tion in Holland found in the autumn of 1636 a new field
in the tulip trade. It took advantage of the fashion of
raising bulbs and blossoms for the gardens of town and
1 See Havard, Les faiences de Delft.
92 History of the Dutch People
country, where in some regions almost no more fruit
trees and shrubs were to be seen, everything having been
rooted up so that coloured flowers, tulips especially,
could be grown. The meetings of the florists, where
they came together in the cities of Holland to dispose of
their bulbs, were soon centres of the rage for speculation,
at first among the florists themselves, then among other
citizens. These "chambers" were besieged by rich and
poor, hoping rapidly to become wealthy from the colossal
prices attained by the bulbs, sold for delivery in the
following summer but hardly yet standing in the field.
Hundreds, thousands of guilders were paid for some
growing bulbs, plants of the future In a single city
transactions amounted to over ten millions. Large sums
of money were made upon paper, and, when there
suddenly came a decline early in February, 1637, lost by
people of all ranks, men and women, magistrates and
citizens, peasants and tradesmen, seamen and carters,
who had deserted their work to get rich quickly by the
traffic in bulbs. At Leyden, Haarlem, Alkmaar, Hoorn,
Enkhuizen, and Amsterdam much was won and lost, and
finally many a household was broken up, and many a life
was ruined, more than figures can tell us. On the
sudden fall an effort was made to save matters by provid-
ing that upon delivery only 10 per cent, of all prices
agreed upon after November should actually be paid.
But this afforded no relief, since many had bought for
large amounts and were without sufficient means. All
had counted upon great profits, and many men of prop-
erty saw themselves robbed of everything — a "brainless
business " that reduced thousands to beggary. The
Estates of Holland and various town-councils did all
possible by the suspension of payments to avert the
severest injury, but they could not prevent countless
financial failures, as sale and purchase had taken place
in the customary form and with written engagements.
The United Netherlands in 1640 93
Thus ended miserably in April, 1637, the tulipomania
amid the curses of hundreds who were bitterly disap.
pointed or had anticipated their great expectations of
wealth after the manner of the milkmaid in La Fontaine's
fable.
This excrescence on Dutch commercial genius was not
the only bad result of the great development of com-
merce and industry in the "golden age" of the United
Netherlands. The evils of a society so eager for money,
of such a mercantile state as the United Netherlands,
became manifest in the predominant influence of material
over spiritual interests, in bribery among the rulers and
the ruled, in shameless smuggling, in the close limitation
of the circle of governing families with an eye to the
advantages to be obtained from the administration. The
mercator sapiens was not particular as to how he accumu-
lated wealth, did not scruple to sell ships to the enemy,
and would have ventured "into hell" until "his sails
caught fire," if any money was to be made there. The
venality of the Dutch diplomatists was proverbial abroad,
and people at home knew the best way of securing atten-
tion to their interests, so that fraud and thievery were
the order of the day. Shameful irregularities in the
management of naval affairs could not be averted by the
punishment of the most prominent offenders; many
captains of war ships were no less guilty of financial
abuses than many captains and higher officers in the
army. As to their illegal gains, the directors of the com-
panies were in as bad odour as the officers of justice in city
and country charged with the enforcement of the laws.
Indifference under the mantle of toleration coined money
from the lax execution of the placards against the Roman
Catholics.
With the increasing prosperity of the richer citizens
there is to be noted a relatively great poverty among the
tradesmen, more inequality in the distribution of wealth
94 History of the Dutch People
than before the Truce. Drenthe in 1621 had a famine,
so that men died of starvation and the thatch from the
roofs of houses was used as fodder for the cattle, while the
cattle plague swept away 2500 horses, 10,000 cattle,
and 50,000 sheep. Pestilences raged repeatedly in the
cities of Holland, especially about 1625 and 1635, and
carried off thousands of the inhabitants. The difficulty of
aiding the poor made "heavy subventions" necessary.
There were complaints of the growing mendicancy in the
country. The treasuries of the guilds paid out large
sums for the benefit of their numerous poor brethren. It
is estimated that charity was bestowed upon about one-
seventh of Amsterdam's population, one-third of that of
Leyden. Facts like these show that by the side of the
great wealth of many the abject poverty of a far larger
number was characteristic of the time.
Although the material life in this portion of Holland's
"golden age" thus left something to be desired, in art
and science it was a period of the highest development.
Painting was undoubtedly foremost among the arts in the
days of the great "prince of painters," whose equal the
world has not yet seen, whose fame eclipses that of all other
Dutch geniuses. About 1648 Rembrandt reached the
zenith of his talent, and posterity looks with admiration
upon the radiant light of the "Night Watch," upon the
charming picture of beautiful Saskia, upon the proud
faces of the "Syndics of the Cloth Guild," upon the
masterly group of the "Anatomy Lesson," upon many
a striking portrait and artistic creation worthy of the
master. With this greatest of the great, this wizard of
light, the history of the time mentions a series, more con-
siderable than any other nation can show, of other great
painters, all excellent in one or more directions, all
characterised by the union of strong reality in representa-
tion with almost perfect technical skill. Who can number
the masterpieces produced by these remarkable artists
The United Netherlands in 1640 95
and giving utterance to the thoughts that haunted the
souls of simple burghers, struck by the beauty in their
environment or drawing from the fulness of their
fancy?
In what a small territory they flourished ! A circle, of
which Dordrecht, Delft, Haarlem, Amsterdam, and
Utrecht are the chief points, embraces the region where
most of them lived. They were not divided into local
schools, although now and then the influence of a great
genius made itself felt in one place. Jan Lievens and
Gerard Dou, Rembrandt's contemporaries and under his
influence the founders of the celebrated guild of St. Luke
at Leyden, settled in Rembrandt's native city which had
not entirely lost the tradition of its Lucas van Leyden.
The elder Frans Hals, next to Rembrandt the first of the
portrait painters, formed at Haarlem an Adriaan van
Ostade and an Adriaan Brouwer, the inimitable depicters
of Holland's joyous peasant life. Men of independent
talent like Bartholomeus van der Heist, the famous
painter of regent-pieces, worked at Amsterdam besides the
great master and the numerous pupils, whom he devel-
oped there from 163 1 and who continued his renown and
tradition until the end of the century. At Haarlem lived
the excellent landscape painters, Jan van Goyen and
Salomon van Ruysdael, experts in the colours and
shadows of Holland's dunes and fields. Aelbert Cuyp
settled in Dordrecht and immortalised the broad river,
the canals and houses of the picturesque town as
Cornelis Saftleven of Rotterdam did the pastures of
South Holland abounding in cattle. The skilful portrait
painter, Michiel van Mierevelt, resided in Delft ;
Johannes van Ravesteyn was active in the same branch
at The Hague; Utrecht had Abraham Bloemaert, the
landscape and historical painter under Italian influence,
the head of a large school of imitators of Caravaggio.
There were, in addition, painters of still life like
96 History of the Dutch People
Abraham van Beyeren and David de Heem, painters of
churches like Gerard Houckgeest, animal painters like
Paulus Potter. Many other names might be mentioned,
often little less notable, some of them forgotten until
the present, when pride in the past glory of art has
caused them to be exhumed from the archives and cellars
of museums to testify to the feeling for art that then
pervaded Holland's cities and made its influence strongly
felt as far as Groningen and Leeuwarden, Deventer and
Middelburg.
Many of these painters were also draughtsmen, etchers,
and engravers, and their work belongs to the best of its
kind. The medallic art, the art of the goldsmith and
silversmith, was approaching its best days. Architecture
found in Jacob van Campen, Pieter de Keyser, Daniel
Stalpert, Pieter Post, worthy successors to the great
architects of about 1600. Sculpture had at Amsterdam
besides Artus Quellinus, the younger, an eminent repre-
sentative in Pieter de Keyser.
The love of art existed in the whole people. The
handsome gables and carpentry of the houses of
magistrates and merchants, the beautiful towers and gates
of cities, numberless drawings, sculptures in churches,
elegant patterns for silversmiths and goldsmiths, for
weavers and embroiderers, and for tasteful tapestries give
evidence even now of the ripe development of the Dutch
Renaissance. Art had penetrated deep into the popular
life and formed an indispensable element of society more
than was the case in any other country. In the massive
furniture of the simply arranged dwelling of the mer-
chant with its marble steps and handsome railings, in the
ornamented bindings of books, in the song of young
women in the household, art showed itself in its every-
day dress, living and flourishing amid a living and
flourishing society. No difference of faith or ancestry
prevailed in it: the Catholic priest Ban, the Protestant
The United Netherlands in 1640 97
Sweelinck, were alike distinguished in music, many artists
belonged to the old church or rose from the lowest ranks
of the people.
There was also vigorous life in literature at this time.
Vondel reigned as first of the poets and enriched Dutch
literature with the mature works of his powerful genius.
Besides the strictly classical drama and epic he cultivated
the lyric art of daily life, the elegy, the cutting satire; he
used historical motives from his own time and did not
disdain occasional poems for weddings or family feasts.
Successful in all branches of literature, he was a sorcerer
of language as Rembrandt was with the brush. After his
conversion to Catholicism in 1641, "wearied with vain
wandering," and some years earlier, in the days of doubt
and hesitation, he delighted in biblical and theological
subjects and drew inspiration from them for new
masterpieces. His change of religion estranged him
temporarily from many of his earlier friends and hurt his
popularity. Hooft, Cats, and Huygens, all three higher
in rank than the dealer in hosiery, but his inferiors in
talent, appealed better to the Protestant majority.
Hooft, the learned bailiff of Muiden, whose later life did
not fulfil the poetical promise of his youth, was not
generally successful in hitting the popular taste, although
the prose of his Historien proves him an artist in words.
More popular was Huygens who, even in jest, handled
the language like a perfect virtuoso, but his many-sided
mind and extensive learning, his keen reason and merry
satire could not, as a rule, atone for his poverty in
genuine poetic feeling. Cats, the erotic-moralising coun-
cil pensionary, the popular poet of the fatherland, was
the most successful, and he put into rhyme the happen-
ings of daily life, the lyrics, epics, and dramas of the
domestic hearth, of rural life, of the coach of matrimony,
being a poet only in form, without elevation or passion,
abounding in commonplace morality and didactic respect-
VOL. IV. 7.
98 History of the Dutch People
ability. Around these men were a number of ' ' planets, ' ' *
small copies of Vondel, Cats, Huygens, looking up to
them with admiration and equalling them only in the
mania for making books. There were the Fleming Van
Zevecote, poet of the "Siege" and "Relief of Leyden" ;
Westerbaen of The Hague, reminding one of Huygens;
the Amsterdam grocer, Jeremias de Decker, whose
"elegant neatness" was praised by Vondel; Jan Her-
manszoon Crul, a follower of Cats; the young poets of
Vondel's school — Anslo, Brandt, and Oudaen ; the class,
ical Jonctys and Broekhuizen. Among the more inde-
pendent minds, with Coster and Rodenburgh, must be
reckoned Pels and the young glass-maker, Jan Vos, who
in opposition to the classical tendency of the drama gave
the impulse to a new romantic school by his Aran en
Titus in 1641.
In 1622 Coster had been obliged to sell his Academy
building and seemed to yield to the hostility of the
orthodox preachers, while the Brabanters had to give up
their separate Chamber and the Old Chamber languished.
Coster survived for many years the triumph of the rhetori-
cians over their bitter enemies. After the arduous time of
Smout and Trigland the rhetoricians went on undisturbed
in the performance of their dramas until in 1634 they
united in one "Amsterdam Chamber." The erection in
1637 of a great "temple of art" by the city government
itself was very important to the drama which found a
centre in the "city theatre" dedicated on January 3,
1638, with Vondel's Gijsbrecht van Aemstel. This was
really the end of the old rhetoricians, because profes-
sional actors now took more the place of the amateurs of
the rhetorical chambers, and this was promoted by the
performances of English and French companies, visiting
the United Netherlands and giving the example of a
1 Jonckbloet, Geschiedenis der Nederlandsche Letterkunde , ii., p. 107 et
seg.
The United Netherlands in 1640 99
more modern conception of art than could be developed
in the chambers of the rhetoricians so attached to ancient
forms.
Prose, hitherto cultivated solely as a means of edifica-
tion or pastime, now began to develop into an artistic
form upon the foundation laid by Marnix and Coornhert.1
Such popular books as Amadis de Gauwele, the Vier
Heemskinderen, and the old collections of anecdotes were
now superseded by romances patterned after those of for-
eign lands, like the Batavische Arcadia of 1637, the work
of Johan van Heemskerk. Greater, more original, and
more national was Hooft's work, Nederlandsche Historien,
the production of his maturity inspired by the glory of
the fatherland and by Tacitus's classical writings, whose
concise style was imitated after long years of study and
preparation, to which the Life of Henry the Great and
the translation of the whole of Tacitus give evidence.
Until Hooft's death in 1647, the centre of literary life was
his castle of Muiden, where the bailiff received with
courtly hospitality his numerous visitors of all ranks,
where first Roemer Visscher and his friends, representa-
tives of the old Holland, later the finest Dutch intellects
of the newer time showed themselves : the learned Casper
van Baerle, the cultivated Laurens Reael, clever Gerard
Vossius, many-sided Van der Burgh, the even more
versatile Constantijn Huygens, the prince's adviser in
artistic and literary affairs, his brother-in-law De Wil-
helm, the daughters of the "round Roemer," their
song-loving friend Francisca Duarte, De Groot's brother-
in-law Nicolaas van Reigersbergen, the Doubleths,
Plemp, Daniel Mostert, Brosterhuyzen, Hooft's brother-
in-law Joost Baeck, Vondel, Cats, Coster, Sweelinck, all
welcome guests in this circle. Even the princes of
Orange visited there the bailiff. Like Hooft's residence
to the neighbouring Amsterdam, Huygens's beautiful
1 Kalff, Litter atuur en tonee I te Amsterdam, p. 14.
ioo History of the Dutch People
dwelling at The Hague was a place of meeting for Hol-
land's lovers of literature, although the" Muiden circle"
remained unequalled. Thus reigned in the Holland of
this period a vigorous intellectual life among the higher
ranks, where art and science went hand in hand.
In science Leyden unquestionably was foremost in "the
new Attica," as the Netherlands were sometimes called.
There flourished the celebrated family of Vossius,
whose most brilliant representative, Gerard Vossius, the
father of Dionysius, Matthaeus, Isaac, and Cornelia, all
renowned in the republic of letters, moved to Amster-
dam in 163 1 to increase the reputation with Barlaeus
and Episcopius of the newly established "illustrious
school." Salmasius, coming from France and continu-
ing the traditions of his countryman Scaliger, took his
place at Leyden with the friend of De Groot's youth, the
famous philologist, Daniel Heinsius, who made good in
part the absence of the most celebrated of the Dutch
scholars, an exile from his fatherland. Scriverius and
Boxhornius with the German Hornius represented there
the study of history; Jan de Laet that of geography;
F Empereur and Golius developed the study of oriental
languages; the many-sided Frederik Spanheim from
Germany, the mathematician Van Schooten, the naturalist
Burgersdijck, the theologian Trigland, the philosopher
Heereboort, and many other distinguished professors
attracted there numerous students. The Elzevirs pub-
lished works there which carried their name over the
entire learned world; their Leyden house was a centre
for the erudition of all nations; branches of this noted
firm flourished in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The
Hague. In Groningen also, where lived the historian
Emmius, the philosopher Schoockius, the jurist Mat-
thaeus; in Utrecht, where a university was established in
1636 and with the Cartesian Regius the famous orthodox
theologian Gisbertus Voetius lectured ; in Deventer,
The United Netherlands in 1640 101
where Gronovius taught ; in Harderwijk, in Franeker at
the Frisian university celebrated for its excellent jurists,
learned studies flourished, and hundreds of foreigners —
French, English, Scotch, Germans, Swedes — sat with the
sons of the land at the feet of the Dutch scholars in all
these institutions of higher education. Outside of them
men like the rector Beeckman and the philosopher Van
Beverwijck at Dordrecht, like the versatile Catholic priest
Marius and the rabbi Menasseh ben Israel at Amsterdam
augmented the reputation of the country.
A great influence upon scientific life in Holland pro-
ceeded from the sojourn of Rene Descartes, who from
1629 to 1649 sought refuge there from the persecutions of
his orthodox Catholic enemies in France and rest for his
philosophical work. Soon he became the centre of a
philosophical and scientific movement which was widely
extended among the leading Dutch circles. The erudite
Palatine Princess Elizabeth, eldest daughter of the
"winter-king," the learned and artistic Anna Maria
Schuerman, Constantijn Huygens, and the prince's coun-
cillor De Wilhem, both very potent at court, numbers of
scholarly men at the universities of the Netherlands,
theologians, physicians, mathematicians, naturalists, were
subject to the powerful influence of the famous works
which he wrote here, the most notable being the Discours
de la me'thode. He wandered from Amsterdam to
Utrecht, from Franeker to Leyden, from Deventer to
the little Egmont, diffusing his ideas. Here also he had
to wage a sharp war on the orthodox who feared his philo-
sophical propositions, his doctrines concerning the rela-
tion between soul and body, concerning God and the world,
and who contended against him as a Romanist Vorstius
or Arminius, his ideas in their eyes being pernicious to
religious life. Voetius and Schoockius were vehement
opponents of Descartes, of the mendax Gallus, whose
studies in mathematics and natural history meanwhile
102 History of the Dutch People
gave new life to science in Holland, not the least by the
communications which he and his Dutch friends main-
tained with Gassendi and Mersenne, celebrated French
mathematicians and naturalists of the epoch.
Frederick Henry's time, if not in all respects a "golden
age," was yet a period of great material and intellectual
development, and merits consideration as the brilliant
beginning of a flourishing state which assured to the
people of the United Netherlands a large share in deter-
mining the fate of the world and the evolution of political
and social conditions. The United Netherlands about
1640 were not only admired by all Europe but had
become in many ways a model for imitation. "What
other place," writes Descartes from Amsterdam in one of
his letters to Balzac, "could one choose in the world
where all the comforts of life and all the curiosities to be
desired may be so easily found as here? What other
country where one may enjoy such perfect liberty, where
one may sleep with less uneasiness, where there are
always armies commissioned expressly to guard us, where
poisoners, treasons, calumnies, are less known, and where
more of the innocence of our forefathers still abides? '
Besides the prosperity it was ever this liberty which
astonished the foreigner, this personal liberty of thinking,
under certain conditions of writing and doing also what-
ever one pleased. The unprecedented prosperity, the
brilliant results of warlike and commercial enterprise, the
splendour of learning and art, the power developed by
this little, somewhat rude and awkward but in its very
simplicity original and freedom-loving nation upon its
small territory, made other peoples look up to it with a
sense of inferiority, which awakened perhaps jealousy
but indubitably respect. With interest men waited to
see what part this little nation would play in the political
circumstances that then threatened to bring Europe to
the verge of ruin or at least to lead to great changes.
CHAPTER V
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE
THE prince's campaign along the Meuse was inti-
mately connected with the movement among the
nobility in the southern provinces and indicated the
importance of a closer alliance with France. If France
could be persuaded to join in vigorous action, Spanish au-
thority in the southern provinces would be seriously men-
aced. If these provinces themselves actively cooperated,
independence might be given them. In the contrary case
a joint conquest and proportional division would be con-
sidered. Richelieu, embarrassed by his difficulties with
the seditious French nobles and the party of the queen-
mother now in Brussels, continued secret relations with
some of the southern leaders, even aided them privately
with money, and had his ambassador at The Hague, de
Beaugy, attentively watch the doings of the States in the
matter. But he was not yet ready to gather in "the
harvest which was offered in Flanders"1 and endeavoured
to gain time in order to strike his blow under more
favourable circumstances. He was unwilling to leave to
the Dutch their opportunity of acquiring all the spoils
expected. His plans were assisted by the fear of the
Belgian clergy for the Catholic religion in case of union
with or dependence upon the northern States. The
position of the southern malcontents was weakened by
the slight eagerness manifested in the north for strong
action in the southern provinces. People were afraid of
1 Waddington, i., pp. 161, 171.
103
104 History of the Dutch People
a reenforcement of the Catholic elements, of the rivalry
of Antwerp with Amsterdam, of the growing power of
the house of Orange. The States-General by their new
proclamation of August II, 1633, inciting the south to
rebellion, showed they had by no means given up the idea
of resuming the plans of 1632.
The conspirators, thus left to themselves, without
energy, money, troops, or real influence upon the people,
and surrounded by traitors, were greatly embarrassed by
the attitude of France and the States. The Brussels
government ventured to arrest Carondelet and to surprise
the governor of Bouchain who wished to deliver this place
to France. Warfus£e was condemned in the spring,
and his property was declared confiscated. The shame-
ful treason of the English agent Gerbier did the
rest, acquainted as he was with everything. The
Brussels government was thoroughly informed in Novem-
ber, 1633, consulted with that of Madrid, and directed
its attention chiefly to the weak duke of Aerschot com-
missioned to go to Spain by the States-General still
sitting in Brussels. He was made a prisoner in Spain in
April, 1634. His confessions showed that he had
remained outside of the affair, but he was kept under a
sharp supervision in Madrid and died there in 1640.
The death of Archduchess Isabella on December 1,
1633, delivered the compromised noblemen to Spain's ven-
geance, and Aytona's vigorous action at the head of the
Brussels government prevented all thought of actual
revolt. The count van den Bergh on account of treason
was condemned in default to death by the court of
Mechlin; the prince of Barbancon was arrested at
Antwerp; Epinoy and Bournonville escaped the same
fate by a hasty flight to France, where Egmont was
already. Barbancon long remained a prisoner; the three
others were later sentenced to death by default. A general
amnesty wisely threw a veil over what had occurred in
The French Alliance 105
order not to bring discredit to the recently restored
Spanish sovereignty by too great severity.
Meanwhile the negotiations1 concerning peace between
the States-General of the south and those of the north
resulted in nothing. Aytona and his faithful helper,
Roose, the president of the privy council, tried to
thwart the "in all times and for all monarchies perni-
cious" States-General and wanted no peace concluded by
them. But the Brussels States laboured under illusions
for a long time. From the end of September, 1632,
their deputies negotiated in the camp before Maestricht
with the prince of Orange for a new Truce with an alliance
of the two Netherlands, an arrangement not advantageous
to Spain's interests and made more unacceptable when
the north proudly appointed The Hague for the scene of
further deliberations. The negotiations at The Hague
from early December seemed in good faith, and the
powers interested were officially informed of them. The
Dutch were represented by sixteen delegates, prominent
among them being Adriaan Pauw and Johan de Knuyt
with some influential members of the States-General;
from the other side came Jacob Boonen, archbishop of
Mechlin, seven others, and Aerschot.
It had cost much trouble to overcome the opposition to
negotiating of Zealand prospering by privateering, and of
Friesland and Groningen jealous of Holland and suspi-
cious of Spain. But there was a strong peace party in Hol-
land, led by the council pensionary Pauw himself, aiming
at the renewal of the Truce and following the policy of
Oldenbarnevelt. This party pushed matters energetically
and was helped by the land provinces in fear of the
enemy's invasions and by the peaceful disposition of the
'See Gachard, Actes des £tats G/n/raux de 1632, passim ; De Boer, Die
Friedensunterhandlungen zwischen Spanien und den Niederlanden ; Wad-
dington, La Re"publique des Provinces- Unies, la France & les Pays-Bas
espagnols i., p. 18b.
106 History of the Dutch People
prince who held fast to his old alternative — an acceptable
peace or a war waged vigorously in alliance with
France.
Difficulties seemed to grow greater. Prospects were
not improved by Spain's unwillingness, now that the
dreaded king of Sweden had fallen at Lutzen in Novem-
ber, 1632, to consent to an unfavourable peace proceed-
ing not from the Spanish government but from the
States-General of all the provinces, as in the Pacification
of Ghent. It soon appeared that the southern deputies
had really no authority to negotiate in the name of their
States-General or of Spain, but that they came only in
the name of their provincial Estates. They objected to
continuing on the basis discussed at Maestricht and to
binding themselves to maintain a treaty against their
sovereign. This attitude nearly caused a rupture. The
prince managed to calm the perturbed minds and had the
demands of the north incorporated in twenty articles.
Five of the deputies, including Aerschot and Boonen,
took these articles to Brussels. Although the States-
General of Brussels declared themselves ready for conces-
sions, the infanta's Spanish advisers would not go so far,
and the new instructions of the southern deputies con-
sequently gave slight hope of a happy ending of the
negotiations, while the plan of sending Rubens, the
former secret emissary, as a check upon the other
deputies was not pleasing to Aerschot and his friends.
Direct authority from the king could not be shown at
The Hague on the return of the deputies in February,
1633, unless that of 1629 given to the infanta and by her
transferred to the deputies might be so regarded. The
prince and the States were angered because this was not
in proper form and by the rumoured attempts of the
southern gentlemen to bribe members of the peace com-
mission. As the negotiations made little progress, Hol-
land urged a reduction of the demands. By a vote of
The French Alliance 107
four to three the States-General of The Hague determined
early in March not to end the parleying, and this result
was due to the prince's intervention. Zealand, Friesland,
and Groningen formed the minority. Zealand was
especially vehement, and Friesland and Groningen pre-
sented a strong remonstrance against all negotiation with
these "masked Spaniards," as they called the States of
the south.
The continuation of the negotiations began to make
Richelieu uneasy about the result. Peace or truce in
the Netherlands would not at all suit his policy. In
February, 1633, therefore, he sent to the aid of the old
and not very vigorous Beaugy at The Hague the able
Hercule de Charnace, who was to offer the prince larger
subsidies, even a corps of auxiliary troops under a French
marshal, or, provided the war was actively prosecuted, a
treaty of cooperation for the conquest of the south, thus
preventing any peace unless France were included in it.
This attitude of France and similar pressure from Sweden
naturally influenced the war party and the prince. Char-
nace held back his offers cleverly as long as possible in order
not unnecessarily to bind France. So the States at The
Hague early in April offered an ultimatum of eighteen
articles somewhat milder than thepreceding. One addition
was that the war in the East and West Indies should be
continued unless Spain granted free trade in its colonies
to the Dutch. It was not to be expected that Spain
would consent to this. Furthermore, the States de-
manded a reply within fourteen days, impossible to obtain
on account of the distance from Spain, which of course
had to be consulted. To avoid a prolongation of the
negotiations the States declared their purpose to open a
campaign towards the end of the month.
The southern delegates again asked for instructions in
Brussels, but the deliberations there lasted so long that
the prince took the field before they returned from the
108 History of the Dutch People
south, and encamped before Rijnberk, which fell into his
hands early in June. Not until the middle of May could
negotiations be resumed at The Hague, but the instruc-
tions of the southern gentlemen once more appeared
unsatisfactory. Judging the time ripe, Charnac6 now
came out with more liberal offers than he had previously
made. In private interviews with the prince and influen-
tial members of the States-General he had already inti-
mated that France would be found ready to engage in a
joint war against Spain, provided negotiations were
immediately ended. These general declarations were
incorporated in the draft of a treaty proposing a division
of the southern provinces to be conquered. France
demanded for its share Luxemburg, French Flanders,
Artois, Namur, Hainaut, Tournay, and Cambrai with
surrounding territory, while the Catholic religion must
be allowed in the other provinces and they were to go to
the north — a proposal that had a great effect upon the
representatives of the States. The ultimatum of June
5th consequently adhered to these conditions: continua-
tion of the war outside of Europe, full power from Spain
to conclude peace in Europe on the terms proposed,
closing of the Scheldt, cession of Breda and Gelder and
one other city.
This ultimatum was not promising. Even the most
zealous partisans of peace cherished few illusions more,
and Charnace did not regard the actual offer of auxiliary
troops as necessary in order to attain his end — the break-
ing off of negotiations, although he feared the intrigues
of those favouring a truce and sought to strengthen the
war party by giving lavish presents in money to De
Knuyt and others. Thus little more was done at The
Hague than to beat about the bush. In August the
prince of Orange, now determined upon war, moved
across the Rhine into Brabant and menaced Breda and
the heart of the hostile provinces. The measures of
The French Alliance 109
Aytona, who had assembled a considerable army, pre-
vented his further advance, and the attitude of the south-
ern nobility, already betrayed by Gerbier, roused the
infanta's suspicion. The disposition of the people also
in the south was untrustworthy, to judge from the deep
impression made by the pamphlet of Puteanus, the
Louvain professor, Statera Belli ac Pads, the Scales of
War and Peace, favouring peace and the States. The
Anti-Puteanus of Barlaeus, on the contrary, did not meet
the popular taste.
The southern deputies still remained at The Hague,
but negotiations were at a stand for want of the neces-
sary powers from Spain. Meanwhile the uneasiness was
increasing in the south, though the prince of Orange's
campaign ended in a retreat to the Meuse. The admoni-
tions and promises of the adroit Charnac6 now secured
their immediate purpose. The prince himself, Charnac£
constantly offering him French aid, saw the uselessness
of further negotiation, while the king's authority was
waited for, and Aerschot, going to Spain for it, did not
set out until the middle of November. A fortnight later
the conspiracy in the south was completely discovered and
the infanta died, the authorisation of 1629 thus lapsing.
Although the peace-loving provinces of Holland and
Overyssel were unwilling to stop negotiations at once,
the States-General, at the instance of Charnace, resolved,
by a majority of the five other provinces to these two,
upon the dismissal of the representatives of the south.
On December 16th this resolution was made known to
them, and they received permission to remain ten days
longer to put their affairs in order. Before the end of
the year they had left the territory of the United Nether-
lands and all negotiations ceased.
The States-General of Brussels now lost their impor-
tance. They continued in session for a time after the
infanta's death, still hoping for the king's warrant and
no History of the Dutch People
for peace. When this appeared unattainable, they dis-
solved at the king's command July 10, 1634, to the relief
of their own government. Thus failed the last serious
attempt of the south to restore peace by negotiation
between the two separated divisions of the old Burgundian
lands. Spain could not possibly consent to a treaty
which would have placed all the Netherlands outside of
its influence and would have caused the loss of rich Brazil.
Aytona was now alone at the head of the Netherlandish
provinces, awaiting the new Spanish governor of the
blood royal, the cardinal infante Ferdinand of Austria,
the king's brother, who was still carrying on war in
southern Germany. From both Aytona and Ferdinand
a government in Brussels might be expected that would
continue the traditions of ancient Spanish policy, and
with Roose's help all remembrance speedily disappeared
of the apparent independence which the south had
possessed in Isabella's last years. The failure of the
negotiations at The Hague and of the conspiracy of the
nobility rendered the Spanish authority stronger than
ever, and "reliable" Spanish and Italian officers again
saw themselves intrusted with the highest positions.
The provinces under Spanish rule came back once more
to the sceptre, from which thirty-five years earlier they had
hoped to withdraw. The south's destiny was accomplished
further, and the unhappy country sank ever deeper in the
slough of social and political misery.
A closer alliance between France and the United
Netherlands was now at hand, though Charnace's offers
shrank as the chance of peace diminished. An anti-
French party, still existing in the Netherlands and draw-
ing strength from the ambiguity of the French policy,
opposed a new treaty with this power. Fear of secret
favour to the Catholic population was repeatedly ex-
pressed in the ensuing negotiations. Thanks to Char-
nace's ability, the French money, the support of the
The French Alliance 1 1 1
prince and of the war party, they led in April to a treaty
of subsidy notwithstanding the antagonism of Amster-
dam. By it the States promised not to negotiate during
eight months for peace or truce and not to conclude it
within a year, while France in this time was not to make
any agreement with Spain. France, unless it began a
war itself with Spain, was to give, besides the customary
subsidy of a million, another million and 300,000 livres
for a regiment of French troops in the service of the
States. Both parties were satisfied with this result.
France was assured of the continuation of the war in the
Netherlands without directly taking part in it, and the
States secured considerable money. Most pleased was
the war party in the United Provinces, which had van-
quished Amsterdam's opposition. Highly honoured by
the States and by his own government, Charnace re-
turned to France, not without making liberal presents to
his friends in the administration of the States, especially
to Musch and De Knuyt.
The war meanwhile brought slight advantage in this
year. Aytona laid siege to Maestricht, the prince to
Breda, but neither gained possession of the beleaguered
fortress, and when Aytona came to the relief of Breda,
Frederick Henry drew back to the Meuse country and
from there went into winter quarters. After his victory
over the Swedes at Nordlingen the new governor pro-
ceeded along the Rhine to the Netherlands and made
his entrance into Brussels early in November. Don Fer-
dinand was an intelligent nobleman of twenty-five years,
energetic, valiant, remotely resembling Archduke Albert,
but more of a fighter, one of the best of the Hapsburg
princes. His aim was not a truce or peace, but vigor-
ous war. Richelieu also had become convinced that war
was for France the only means of settling Netherlandish
affairs. He believed that a division, between France and
the States, of the country to be conquered could not be
ii2 History of the Dutch People
effected without great dangers. "It might happen soon
afterwards that, there being no barrier between us and the
Dutch, we should enter upon the same war, in which they
and the Spaniards now are," said he with the statesman's
far-seeing vision. Better for both parties would be the
formation of an intermediary Catholic state. These views
were held when an embassy from the States came to
France — the envoy Langerak having died — to bring the
ratification of the treaty and to settle the cooperation
proposed by Charnace. The ambassadors, Pauw, or
Heemstede, as he was called from his lordship, and De
Knuyt, representatives of both parties, received besides
an ordinary instruction a secret one, both determined in
consultation with the prince and his cabinet "in the
chamber" of His Excellency and not in the assembly of
the States-General. They were to persuade Louis
XIII., if possible, to engage in actual war against Spain
and to propose an eventual division of the south accord-
ing to the linguistic frontier, so that France would
obtain the regions where French was spoken, and the
remainder would go to the States, making them the
"neighbour and firm bulwark' of France. Thus the
prince had the entire conduct of this important affair in
his own hands and deliberated only with a few trusted
members of the States-General — a new proof of his great
power in these days.
At the end of June the ambassadors arrived in Paris
and began immediately negotiations which led some days
later to the draft of a treaty. By it France promised
with 8000 men to conquer Dunkirk and Grevelingen,
afterwards with the prince Breda, Hulst, and Gelder, to
help drive out the Spaniards, and not to divide the south
but to make it into a "free and sovereign country." De
Knuyt took this project home in August, and Pauw
remained in Paris, where a readiness was soon manifest
for anything, even for a partition, so great was the im-
The French Alliance 113
pression produced by the battle of Nordlingen. De
Knuyt returned to Paris in September, but in November
he had to go home again for new instructions on the sub-
ject of the Catholic religion in the provinces to be con-
quered, which was disputed over for a long time until
the States yielded. To the vexation of Richelieu and
Pauw the offensive and defensive alliance was not
actually concluded before February 8, 1635. Each
party furnishing 30,000 men, a joint war was to be waged
for the liberation of the southern provinces, if they
manifested a willingness to cooperate within three
months, otherwise they were to be divided up following
a line from Blankenberghe between Damme and Bruges
along the southern border of Brabant and Limburg.
The Catholic religion was to be maintained as it existed
in the territory to be divided, and negotiations with
Spain were to be only "conjointly and with common
consent."
It was a question whether this alliance might be called
an advantage to fhe United Netherlands. The danger
of having France for a neighbour was great, but the
Dutch rightly thought that it had not yet gone so far.
It was evident that a reasonable peace could not be
secured. What could then be more desirable than
France's powerful help against Spain, which had been
urged ever since the days of Prince William? The treaty
embodying Richelieu's idea of forming a Catholic state
in the south — the old plan of Jeannin and Olden-
barnevelt — was to a certain extent a victory for the
policy of the States, since France was drawn into the
war. Even Holland had to give way to this argument.
Much seamanship was still necessary to bring the
Calvinistic statesmen to an approval of the provision,
abominable in their eyes and contrary to the "old
maxims," concerning the maintenance of the Romish
faith in conquered districts. In May, France formally
VOL. IV. 8
ii4 History of the Dutch People
declared war and sent its troops under de Br£ze and
Chatillon to the frontier to act in concert with the
prince. In case of cooperation the prince was to have
supreme command over all the troops, unless the duke of
Orleans or the cardinal de Richelieu joined the French
army.
This league between the cardinal-diplomatist and
the diplomatist-general endured eight years. It was
aided by Richelieu's trusted agents in the prince's army,
by Charnace" succeeding Beaugy as ambassador, by
d'Estrades and other French officers in the Dutch service,
and was characterised by friendly letters and mutual gifts
and courtesies, in which the most influential statesmen
had no small share.1 The prince looked after the mutual
interests more in his camp than did the newly appointed
ambassador in Paris, Willem van Lier, lord of Ooster-
wijk, who merely performed the functions of a consul.
The united power was great enough. In May, 1635,
a French army of 20,000 men was already in Luxemburg
to join the prince's equally large force. But Spain had
able and energetic defenders in Don Ferdinand and
Aytona, while the French generals were far from able
and energetic. The allies succeeded in uniting their
troops at Maestricht and moved into Brabant, but the
expected uprising of the south did not occur. Robbing
and plundering, the combined force advanced to the
neighbourhood of Brussels and sacked Tirlemont, but
Don Ferdinand adopted Alva's old strategy, avoided
battle, provided the cities with strong garrisons, and
thus obliged the hostile army, after an unsuccessful siege
of Louvain, to fall back in disorder to the Meuse.
1 Thousands of francs were repeatedly paid to them. Musch, Cats,
Ploos, Haersolte, De Knuyt, Noordwijk, and others are mentioned by
name among those who did not hesitate to accept payment for services
rendered or to be rendered to France in the negotiation of agreements and
treaties (Waddington, i. , p. 283).
The French Alliance 115
Disease and famine ravaged the French-Dutch army which
in July lay at Roermond. At the end of the month a
Spanish force surprised Schenkenschans on the Rhine, so
that the Betuwe was endangered, all the more so when
Don Ferdinand occupied Goch, Cleves, and Gennep. The
governor returned gloriously to Brussels in the fall; the
most serious harm he had suffered was the loss of Aytona,
who had died of fever.
The recapture of Schenkenschans now became the
chief purpose, and it was only accomplished after
incredible exertion in April, 1636. Great was the
disappointment over this first campaign. The French
complained bitterly of the neglect and misery that
brought a pestilence upon them. It raged also in the
Dutch cities, while the French troops, badly organised,
commanded, paid, and provisioned, died by hundreds in
the Veluwe and the garrisons. Each tried to throw the
blame on the other, but even French writers admit the
bad condition of the French army in those days before
Turenne and Cond6, not to be compared with the
Dutch army under Frederick Henry, whose talent shone
less in the open field than in war on fortifications.
The following year was no more profitable for the
allies. A Spanish army invaded Picardy, frightening
Paris itself, and was repulsed with difficulty. An
attempt of the prince to take Breda failed owing to the
approach of the Spaniards under Feria. In Holland
people complained of financial distress, demanded a
reduction of the troops to 22,000 men, and were inclined
to participate in the negotiations preparing at Cologne
for a general European peace. When France noticed
this and Spain's desire to negotiate separately with the
United Netherlands, Richelieu warned Charnac6 to be
on his guard, and the latter protested vigorously. The
war, however, went on. For 1637 a joint attack on
Dunkirk was planned, but storm and contrary winds
n6 History of the Dutch People
detaining the troops in Zealand, the prince, on July
2 ist, suddenly laid siege to the coveted Breda, which he
surrounded with an intrenched camp as was done with
Bois-le-Duc in 1629. Don Ferdinand's army sought to
draw him off by a campaign on the Meuse and really
captured Venloo and Roermond. The siege of Breda,
ending with its surrender on October 10th, was one of
the most brilliant military exploits of the time, one of
Frederick Henry's most remarkable feats, but it cost
much money and many dead and wounded. Among the
killed was Charnace" righting valiantly in an assault upon
the stubbornly defended city.
This victory was the most important advantage for
a time resulting to the Dutch side from the alliance.
Year after year campaigns were planned on the
French and Dutch frontiers. The new French am-
bassador at The Hague, d'Etampes, succeeded in 1640
by La Thuillerie, and the military agent, Godefroy
d' Estrades, made agreements with the prince who,
supported by the aged Sommelsdijk, negotiated in
the name of the States concerning the troops to
be furnished by both sides, the subsidies to be
given by France, and the fleet to be sent out
by the States. But the results remained far below
expectations. The severe defeat of the Dutch before
Calloo in 1638 during one of the repeated attempts upon
Antwerp, the prince's unsuccessful attacks on Gelder
and Hulst, where the Frisian stadtholder Henry Casimir
perished in 1640, the combined Franco-Dutch operations
of 1642 on the lower Rhine, in which the French general,
de Guebriant, could accomplish little after a victory over
the imperial troops at Kempen, increased the disappoint-
ment of France and gave occasion to complaints of the
slight power developed by the States and the prince.
Ridicule was heaped on the indecision and slowness of the
prince, which did not diminish with years and made him
The French Alliance 117
hesitate to undertake such great enterprises as the
French demanded with Gallic vehemence. Only Gennep,
a "villainous hole" in the Cleves territory, was taken in
164 1 by the prince's army. The slender results of the
much desired alliance awakened vexation in the United
Netherlands also and strengthened the peace party. Fred-
erick Henry's continued sufferings from the gout made
him likewise less eager for war. The French conquests
in Artois and on the borders of Hainaut and Cambrai
were mostly lost, and the condition of affairs was not
changed by the death, in 1641, of the young Don Ferdi-
nand, who was succeeded by the equally energetic
Francisco de Melo as governor and captain-general of the
Netherlands.
Better fortune attended operations on the sea in 1639.
Marten Harpertszoon Tromp, the worthy successor of
Piet Heyn, was now in command of the Dutch fleet.
Under his direction great reforms were effected in naval
affairs, and the victory won by him before Dunkirk in
February, 1639, with a squadron of eleven vessels over
the enemy's fleet of twenty ships promised much for the
future. Some alarm was felt concerning this future, be-
cause there had been talk for years of an armada fitting
out in Spanish and Portuguese harbours and destined to
bring a considerable army to the Netherlands. Dunkirk
ships had already departed for Spain to accompany the
armada through the English Channel. Tromp received
orders to cruise with thirteen vessels in the Channel and
watch for the enemy, while Banckerts with twelve others
was to blockade Dunkirk and Witte de With with five
ships remained not far away. In the middle of September
this divided force was surprised by the approach of a
great fleet from Corunna under the Spanish admiral
d'Oquendo who had no less than 6j heavy galleons with
1700 cannons and 24,000 sailors and soldiers. D'Oquen-
do's fleet had commands to avoid an engagement and,
n8 History of the Dutch People
according to a very general agreement with the English
government, which, however, did not expect so large a
force, in case of danger from the Dutch or French fleet to
run into the Downs on the English coast. From there
his troops under the protection of the English fleet were
to be conveyed over to Flanders in the Dunkirk ships,
as his galleons were of too deep draught for the Nether-
landish harbours.
On receipt of definite information about the armada
the prince had set the admiralty boards to work in order
to collect as many ships as possible for the reenforcement
of Tromp, who was to unite the three squadrons already
at sea. Work in the yards went on with feverish haste,
especially when news came that the armada was in the
Downs. The West India and East India Companies,
the owners of privateers and cruisers, were asked to lend
their vessels, which were speedily equipped and sent to
sea. Meanwhile Tromp had engaged the enemy on the
15th with his own ships and those of De With, repelling
the attack of the enormously superior force and causing
d'Oquendo to seek refuge on the English coast. In the
night of the 16th to the 17th Tromp intrepidly renewed
the unequal conflict and chased the flying enemy. Then
Banckerts joined him, and the fleet, after laying in
ammunition at Calais, took its station before the Downs,
whither d'Oquendo had steered his course. Tromp
immediately sent his report to Holland with a request
for reinforcements, especially of fire ships, and for instruc-
tions how he was to act towards the English. The
States-General resolved on the 2 1st, without deliberation,
to order him, while awaiting reinforcements, to keep the
Spaniards busy, or, in case an opportunity should offer,
to attack the enemy without regard to the harbours,
roadsteads, or bays of the kingdoms where the hostile
fleet might be reached, and — this he must keep secret as
long as possible — if he were strong enough, to defend
The French Alliance 119
himself with arms against such nations as should seek to
prevent his taking advantage of the enemy.
The attitude of the English was really suspicious.
Admiral Pennington with some thirty vessels lay between
the two fleets and warned Tromp earnestly of the con-
sequences of an attack upon the enemy guarded by Eng-
lish cannon. Tromp's council of war hesitated to move,
although about thirteen Dunkirk ships had already
escaped, and numbers of Spanish soldiers were going
over to Flanders secretly from other points of the English
coast. But the States-General adhered to their resolution,
notwithstanding the English, desirous of obtaining from
Spain a large sum for their protection, threatened venge-
ance for any violation of their law. There was a moment
of halting at The Hague, because the prince, who was
just then negotiating about the English marriage of his
son, wished not to offend the English court, and began
to be "scrupulous." Tromp, however, failed by chance
to receive ambiguous orders sent him, and the English
nation now expressed its favour for the Dutch side, so
that the arming of the English fleet had to be suspended.
In the middle of October it was definitely decided to
persist in the "vigorous" resolution, considering the
state of opinion in England and on the fleet before the
Downs, which had gradually been increased to over sixty
vessels and eleven fire ships, manned by sailors attracted
by Tromp's name as a guarantee of victory. The Dutch
admiral endeavoured to get the enemy out of the Downs.
He let one of his own ships bring spars and masts from
Dover for d'Oquendo, and offered a quantity of powder
to the Spanish admiral, who courteously declined the
offer and refused to leave the Downs. Then Tromp
determined to attack as soon as the wind veered to the
west. This occurred on October 21st, when he ranged in
order of battle his fleet now grown to ninety-five vessels
and eleven fire ships, announced his plan to the English
120 History of the Dutch People
admiral, and at break of day fell upon the foe, while a
strong squadron under De With watched the English
fleet. A fierce battle ensued, and thanks to the superior
sailing of Tromp's ships, to the bravery of Jan Evertsen,
Houtebeen, and other commanders, to the skill and
seamanship of captains and sailors, it ended in the com-
plete defeat of the Spaniards. Under cover of a heavy
fog d'Oquendo escaped to Dunkirk with ten of his
ships; forty of his vessels destroyed or burned, fourteen
carried off in triumph, over 5000 dead and 1800
prisoners formed the loss of the Spanish side, while the
Dutch lost but one ship and a hundred men. On
"Triton's chariot of victory" the valiant admiral returned
to The Hague, greeted by the acclamation of the whole
country, which in a day of prayer gave expression to the
feeling of thankfulness inspiring all for the great triumph
that had broken Spain's power. Don Ferdinand's army
meanwhile was reenforced by troops from the Downs and
the English coast, later by the remains of d'Oquendo's
force — the chief purpose of the entire expedition. The
French were made to feel this to their great vexation
through the vigorous invasion of the Spaniards into
Picardy. They had more reasons to be vexed. The
visit of the queen-mother Marie de Medicis, who in 1638
unexpectedly travelled from Brussels to the United
Netherlands and was honourably received there, dis-
pleased Richelieu and the king, particularly when Fred-
erick Henry was moved to send his favourite De Knuyt
to Paris to attempt a reconciliation which was politely but
firmly declined. There was some resentment because
so little was accomplished on land and sea in the follow-
ing years by the great general and the great admiral.
Moreover the French still mistrusted the peace party,
which constantly grew bolder, in Amsterdam especially,
where people feared a conquest of Antwerp and urged a
reduction of the land forces.
The French Alliance 121
Spain sought to use this feeling among the Dutch by-
offering anew to negotiate. Incessantly Spanish and
imperial agents bestirred themselves to induce the United
Netherlands to discuss a truce or peace and thus to
separate the two allies or rouse mutual distrust between
them. In the autumn of 1635 the States negotiated
through their recorder Musch with the Spaniards first at
Arnhem, afterwards at Cranenburg. Not a year passed
but Spain made some effort to bring the United Nether-
lands to a separate negotiation or to show the prince the
advantages to be derived from it for him and his house.
Now a Brabant pastor, then a monk, or a French noble
opposed to Richelieu, or the Danish ambassador was
employed as intermediary. In 1641 an imperial ambas-
sador, Count Auersperg, accompanied by the Spanish
agent Friquet, appeared at The Hague, causing the
French government annoyance. But Spain cherished
too many illusions of the conditions it could secure in
case of peace or truce, and of the power of its money
and promises over the Dutch leaders. Negotiations
between Spain and the United Netherlands were not yet
serious, but France understood that it must keep an eye
upon the sail, the more so because deliberations at Ham-
burg concerning a general European peace resulted,
towards the end of 1641, in preliminaries fixing the terms
on which representatives were to be sent by the different
governments to a peace congress at Miinster and
Osnabriick. Much was still to be done before this con-
gress could meet, but its foundations were laid.
The aged Richelieu died in December, 1642, and,
although his follower Mazarin was immediately intrusted
by Louis XIII. with the conduct of affairs, the States
felt uneasy about the course of events in France, espe-
cially when in the following May the king himself passed
away, and his widow took the government into her hands
for her young son. Thus began again in France a period
122 History of the Dutch People
of internal disorders, little calculated to persuade a waver-
ing ally to vigorous cooperation and steadfast adherence
to treaties. The peace party from now on worked
earnestly for negotiation, if necessary for separate
negotiation with Spain. In the long run Spain would
see that it must moderate its conditions in order to end
the war with France and the United Netherlands or with
one of them.
CHAPTER VI
LAST YEARS OF THE WAR. PEACE OF MUNSTER
THE United Netherlands had now become a state
which could not possibly submit again to the sceptre
of Spain's king. Laying down the law in northern Europe,
showing their preponderance in the neighbouring, small,
German states, mediating in England driven through
dissensions between king and Parliament into civil war,
and ruling the seas, they stood the strongest power of
Europe with France and against Spain, honoured or
feared by those who needed their help or dreaded their
enmity. And the arch-enemy saw its world-embracing
empire fall. Portugal became free; Catalonia threatened
revolt; Italy was in a ferment; the Philippines alone
remained Spanish in the East Indies; all Spain's
possessions in the West Indies were harassed by Dutch
fleets; commerce was destroyed, industry was broken
up, bankruptcy of the state was at the door. Then came
May 19, 1643, the great defeat of Rocroy, when the
young duke of Enghien commanding a French army
annihilated the old Spanish regiments. Spain's ruin
seemed near at hand.
But Philip IV. did not lose heart. His minister
Olivarez was forced to resign, and De Melo in the Nether-
lands was dragged down in his fall. In the summer of
1644 De Melo was replaced by the excellent diplomatist,
Manuel de Moura-Cortereal, marquis of Castel-Rodrigo,
with whom the veteran imperial general Ottavio Picco-
lomini was to restore the lustre of the Spanish arms.
123
124 History of the Dutch People
Later the king's illegitimate young son, Don Juan of
Austria, was to be above them as governor in name in
order to have a chief ruler "of royal blood." Castel-
Rodrigo would then only be his lieutenant-general.
These changes gave little satisfaction to the south-
ern Netherianders. The illegitimacy of the expected
governor and his being under age appeared humiliations
to them, and the new Italian-Spanish government re-
called the darkest years of the war, the most unpopular
rulers of the luckless provinces. The nobility began to
lift up its head again ; there were disturbances in Brussels,
Ghent, and Bruges; pamphlets stirred the fire; Mazarin
even tried to win over De Melo from Spain. But Hol-
land's waxing influence and the waning power of the
sickly and aged prince made the Dutch less eager for a
joint conquest of the Spanish Netherlands, and uneasi-
ness was felt at the pretensions of France. Galium
amicum, non vicinam became more and more the maxim
of Holland's statesmen with Pauw, a former friend to
France, at their head. Mazarin's plan of putting the
duke of Orleans in possession of the southern Netherlands
and forming them into an intermediary state found slight
favour in Holland.
Mutual distrust assumed alarming shapes, and France
feared that peace would be concluded by the United
Netherlands as much as the latter were apprehensive of
the attitude of the French government which sat far from
firm in the saddle and might any day see the factious
nobles arrayed against itself. The Catholic sympathies
of the French court seemed quite strong under the new
government, and some effort was expected from it to
assure at least the free exercise of their religion to the
Catholics in the United Netherlands, still numbering
little less than one-third of the population. Catholic
activity developing here as everywhere since the begin-
ning of the century, a great increase of the clergy, the
Peace of Munster 125
rumoured zeal of the Beguines, sisters in secular garb ex-
horting Catholics to take part in their religious solemnities,
noteworthy conversions like that of Vondel excited great
indignation. Calvinistic synods and church councils
made many a complaint of "popish insolences" and
"Romish exorbitancies," and soon there was a temporary
strictness in enforcing the placards against the "Romish
susperstitions. " Although the avarice of officials, whose
hands were stopped by bribery, and the moderation of
many magistrates, who were supported by the prince,
worked in favour of the Catholics, the Protestants could
not be expected to remain content with visitations of
houses and condemnations to fines, by which means the
government wished to hold the Catholic population
within the bounds of a narrow personal liberty of con-
science. A general prohibition of the Catholic faith was
urged. In this respect also agreement between the two
allies left much to be desired.
The alliance continued. Five years more — Mazarin's
felix quinquennium — the joint war lasted, year by year
carefully planned by d'Estrades and the prince of Orange.
But the Dutch army accomplished little. In 1643 Hol-
land secured a reduction of the army of the States to
46,000 men by a considerable limitation of the number
of men in the companies. An attack on Flanders was
executed with slight energy by the apathetic prince, and
the army returned early to winter quarters, satisfied with
having made possible Enghien's victories in Luxemburg
and Hainaut. The fleet, too, had little success on the
Flemish coast. The results of next year's campaign
were better. Sas van Gent, the key of the Scheldt
country, fell into the prince's hands after a brilliant siege.
To the vexation of the French no use was made of this
conquest to cut off supplies from Flanders, Brabant, and
Hainaut. Still more resplendent was the campaign of
1645 in Flanders. On the French side with the help of
126 History of the Dutch People
Tromp's fleet, Mardijk, the bulwark of Dunkirk, then
Ypres, Cassel, Comines, Menin, Bethune, and other
places in Flanders were taken, so that this province was
as good as lost to Spain. The prince's army and that of
the French marshals Gassion and Rantzau approached
one another near Ghent, but they could not agree upon
cooperation and separated again. Then the prince laid
siege to Hulst and captured it within a month (November
5th).
Once more the great general took the field and threat-
ened Antwerp in 1646 despite his suffering from an attack
of apoplexy. But he was no longer able to carry such
an arduous undertaking to success and returned to The
Hague in a pitiable condition, almost a wreck. The
French got possession of Courtrai and other towns and
finished the campaign brilliantly in October by conquer-
ing Dunkirk with the aid of Tromp's fleet. The fall of
this nest of robbers caused an outburst of joy in the
Netherlands, but in recent years so many difficulties had
arisen with the French government, respecting the trade
of the Dutch merchants with the enemy and in conse-
quence of French privateering, that people asked whether
Dunkirk in French hands might not become a centre of
dangerous commercial rivalry or of new piracies.
Flanders now lay at the feet of the young French king,
who was absolute master of Artois and a portion of
Hainaut, Namur, and Luxemburg, while Brabant, Lim-
burg, and the northern section of Flanders were already
partly subject to the States or exposed to their invasions.
The Spanish troops were stationed under the walls of
Ghent, Bruges, Antwerp, Brussels, Namur, and Mons to
defend the chief cities as long as possible, and the duke
of Lorraine placed some of his forces at the disposal of
the Brussels government. Indescribable was the misery
of the country plundered by its own soldiers as well as
by the enemy, and the finances were exhausted. Not-
Peace of Miinster 127
withstanding all this, the population remained faithful
to its old sovereign and would not hear of rebellion, so
the discontented party of the nobility did not venture to
move. The States of the southern provinces showed
themselves ready for more sacrifices and new taxes.
The appointment of Archduke Leopold William of
Austria to the governorship of the Netherlands, the
emperor's brother, an able general, a good administrator,
and a devout Catholic, raised the hope of the unfortunate
country, where he appeared in April, 1647. But it was
then almost peace, as the prince had declared to the
gentlemen greeting him at The Hague in the autumn of
1646.
Richelieu was still alive when the French government
finally consented with its allies, the States-General and
Sweden, to open negotiations for peace at Miinster and
Osnabriick with Spain, the emperor, and the Catholic
German princes. The papal nuncio Chigi and the
Venetian ambassador Contarini were to act as mediators.
The imperial envoys arrived at the appointed place in
July, 1643, and the others slowly appeared. Not until
November did Mazarin send two French ambassadors,
Claude de Mesmes, count d' Avaux, and Abel Servien,
count de la Roche, to Miinster by way of the republic,
where they were received by the States-General.1
The result of this French embassy was entirely satis-
factory to Mazarin. Two treaties were concluded in The
Hague at the end of February. One related to the next
campaign. The other, a guarantee treaty, concerned
the Miinster negotiations and stipulated that there should
be a joint negotiation with Spain, that all conquests
must be retained, and that no treaty of peace could be
made otherwise than conjoint ement et dhin commun con-
sentement. Thus the States bound themselves anew to
1 Aitzema, Vtrhael van de Nederlandsche Vreedehandeling, i., p. 457;
"Waddington, ii.( p. 40.
128 History of the Dutch People
France, a triumph for Mazarin, the war party, and
French diplomacy. The ambassadors took a formal
leave on March 3d, but not without a coup de theatre.
Before their arrival.two violent pamphlets-had appeared
against the peace, entitled Necessary considerations of the
faitliful NetJierlanders and Considerations on the ten-
horned and seven-headed truce or peace of Minister —
Monster. The first asserts the desirability of not laying
down arms until the "Seventeen Provinces" are liberated.
Truly, war is "the remedy for all our illnesses." God
has set our country "for a wonder to all the world," as
it flourishes by war. May He therefore make "the meet-
ing at Miinster like a Babel, so that Miinster will not bring
forth this Monster." The second, the Considerations, is
even sharper, railing against the "children of Belial" and
sounding the watchword helium securitas with vehement
abuse of Spain and the pope.'
With the treaties of the spring of 1644, the war party,
supported by the prince of Orange, won a victory which
was, however, diminished by the imprudence of one of
the French ambassadors. D'Avaux, himself a devout
Catholic and urged on by some zealous Catholics of the
country,1 ventured, against the advice of his colleague
Servien, in the farewell audience of the States-General
to insist in a sharp "harangue" upon greater freedom for
the Catholics in the Netherlands. This incautious act
raised a violent storm in the provinces and brought the
alliance with France into great danger. That was just
what the enemies of France had been expecting ever
since 1572. The preachers inveighed from their pulpits
against the "popish ally"; Holland's regents were con-
firmed in their opinion that France could not be trusted
as a neighbour; half a score of pamphlets appeared
immediately against the Catholics. The Anatomy or
dissection of the per?iicious design of the paputs of to-day
1 Negotiations secretes de Miinster, i., p. 194; Waddington, ii., p. 46.
Peace of Munster 129
was particularly savage in its accusations. The uneasi-
ness was calmed by the effective action of the States-
General, whose president refused d' Avaux's request,
secured at once the adoption of a "vigorous" anti-
Catholic resolution, and referred sharply to the impropriety
of this "ticklish" proceeding, but distrust continued and
hurt the cause of France here more than anything else.
A severe placard against the "papists" and stricter super-
vision of their religious worship were the immediate con-
sequences. The desire of cooperating with France either
in war or in negotiations for peace was not increased.
Negotiations at Munster progressed very slowly. The
States-General refused to send representatives there,
unless they were addressed as "Excellency" and treated
with the same courtesies as the envoys of Venice
received. These questions of etiquette are more than a
mere form in diplomacy. This form was to show the
Netherlands to diplomatic Europe as completely inde-
pendent even of France and "sovereign." Monarchical
France, still more or less in the habit of regarding itself
as the guardian or saviour of the young state from Spanish
tyranny, hesitated long but finally yielded to this
demand "in order to take from our enemies the hope of
dividing us, on which they are incessantly working."
Affairs were far from being advanced enough for the
ambassadors of the States to enjoy these ceremonies.
During the whole of 1644 the provinces deliberated upon
the embassy of the States-General to Munster and upon
the instructions to be drawn up. This slowness angered
the French allies who were afraid of Spanish intrigues
and gold. In the matter of the instructions the first
question was whether a truce or a definitive peace should
be proposed. The following year was also spent in inter-
minable discussions, and still the Dutch envoys did not
appear at Munster to work in concert with those of
France as had been agreed. Spain, long anxious to per-
VOL. IV. — 9
130 History of the Dutch People
suade the States to a separate peace, cleverly sought to
take advantage of this procrastination. In the spring of
1645 the lord of Noirmont came from Brussels to The
Hague ostensibly to ask a safe-conduct for a Spanish am-
bassador to Minister but really to see whether there was
any inclination for a separate treaty leaving out France.
To this Spanish emissary as well as to others from Brus-
sels it was speedily evident — what was no longer a secret
to anybody in the country — that the Estates of Holland
wished to see an end to the war, and the prince of
Orange, on the contrary, hoped for much from vigorous
hostilities in conjunction with the French army. Diplo-
matically active Spain endeavoured by all sorts of
intrigues to estrange the two allies from one another
and then to induce the States to consent to a separate
peace. Spain thought it could bring France alone to
reason, where civil dissensions seemed ever on the point of
breaking out during the minority of Louis XIV. The
States appeared for the time being the foe most to be
dreaded, and it was hoped to satisfy them by a recog-
nition of their independence without any further loss of
territory.
Until the middle of 1645 both the States-General and
the Spaniards thus neglected to send ambassadors to
Miinster. In July appeared there in the name of Spain
the count de Peflaranda, outwardly a grandee of the old
stamp, cold and haughty, but an experienced diplo-
matist. With him were the archbishop of Cambrai, a
shrewd ecclesiastic, and the Burgundian Antoine Brun,
skilled with pen and speech, the writer of important
pamphlets, and a born diplomatist. Further efforts
were made with the help of Castel-Rodrigo in Brussels to
win over Frederick Henry by seductive offers to a peace
advantageous to him. Dom Miguel de Salamanca, a
monk of noble, birth, appeared in the prince's camp in
September. But neither he nor other secret emissaries
Peace of Miinster 13 l
succeeded, for the prince declared that "he would never
separate from France." Spanish intrigues had more
success with peace-loving Holland. The accomplishment
of Holland's plans for armed intervention in the war
between Sweden and Denmark against the prince's
judgment; Holland's refusal to do anything for Charles
I. of England; the impossibility in conquered Hulst of
carrying out the agreement concerning freedom for the
Catholics, which impossibility, the prince saw, would
render more difficult the winning of the south — all these
facts show that the prince could not manage the Estates
as he pleased. Spain took advantage of these differ-
ences. While the two French envoys in Miinster, so
much at variance that the duke de Longueville had to be
sent as a third person to keep order, were dancing the
"ballet of peace," Spain started in the winter of 1645-
1646 an intrigue which extorted admiration from Mazarin,
an expert in such matters.
Dutch negotiations at Miinster advanced a great step.
Eight representatives of the States-General, two from Hol-
land and one from each of the six other provinces, arrived
in Miinster on January 11, 1646. A stately commission
they formed, consisting of: Barthold van Gent, lord of
Meinerswijk, representing Gelderland and acting as
chairman ; Johan, lord of Mathenesse, and Adriaan Pauw,
lord of Heemstede, for Holland; Johan de Knuyt, the
prince's adviser, for Zealand; Godard van Reede, lord of
Nederhorst, for Utrecht; Frans van Donia for Friesland ;
Willem van Ripperda, lord of Hengeloo, for Overyssel ;
Adriaan Clant of Stedum for Groningen. The ablest
and most influential members were undoubtedly Pauw
and De Knuyt. The delegation was bound by oath to
ample instructions, no less than 1 16 articles in length,
the substance being that a truce of at least twelve years
must be sought with full recognition of independence, and
that the agreement of 1644 for joint action with France
132 History of the Dutch People
must be maintained, so that a close correspondence must
be kept up with the ally's ambassadors.
This correspondence was just what the Spaniards
wished to destroy. At Miinster the Spanish plenipoten-
tiaries were extremely courteous to the Dutch and sug-
gested a renewal of the Truce of 1609. But they began
something else at the same time. In the history of the
revolt of the Netherlands there had been talk of an
arrangement between the Spanish and French crowns to
have a marriage of a member of the royal family of
Fiance to a Spanish infanta who was then to receive the
Netherlands as her dowry. In 1644 the Venetian am-
bassador at Miinster, Contarini, had sounded the French
envoy d' Avaux about such an approach to Spain. Con-
tarini came back to the subject in the summer of 1645,
but the French government cautiously declined or post-
poned all negotiation. If it could be made to appear
that France herself had proposed such a marriage
between the young Louis XIV. and a Spanish infanta,
the existing distrust of France would increase, and the
States, or the prince himself perhaps, might be
induced to anticipate France by consenting to a separate
treaty with Spain. Especially would the distrust become
great, if suspicion were raised that France had bargained
with Spain for the sovereignty not merely over the
Spanish Netherlands but over all the Netherlands.
With the deepest secrecy everything was prepared and
discussed by the Spanish ambassadors at Miinster with
Castel-Rodrigo. Something had probably leaked out of
another plan, conceived much earlier by Mazarin, for
persuading Spain to cede the Spanish Netherlands to
France, which in return would stop supporting the insur-
rection in Catalonia, would give up Roussillon, and would
not be averse to the king's marriage with a Spanish
infanta. In February Mazarin sent d'Estrades to The
Hague to sound the prince concerning this plan. The
Peace of Munster 133
States might then obtain Antwerp either for the prince or
themselves. D'Estrades was cautiously to bring up the
subject of the marriage, but only with a view to the
possession of the Spanish Netherlands, while Spain and
France were to declare the northern provinces free.
Castel-Rodrigo sent from Brussels to the prince a
report1 of the pretended French offer to Spain concern-
ing a mediation by the queen-regent of France. The
prince grew suspicious and received d'Estrades coolly at
first. The affair was just the reverse, and this time
Spain had first spoken of the marriage. D'Estrades
communicated Mazarin's plan to Frederick Henry who
seemed finally not unwilling to consent to it. On
February 28th the prince, appearing personally in the
Estates of Holland and the States-General, made known
what d' Estrades had told him and urged that the project
should be approved, but that more should be asked from
France, the division of the Spanish Netherlands in
accordance with the 1635 treaty of partition. While the
matter stood thus, a cleverly constructed pamphlet in
French appeared from the Spanish side,2 entitled The
discovery of the depths of Spain concealed under this prop-
osition of giving the infanta of Spain in marriage to the
king of France with the seventeen provinces of the Nether-
lands as a dowry, in which, under the guise of a violent
attack upon Spain, France was much compromised as
desiring sovereignty over the States. There arose great
indignation3 in the Dutch provinces under the influence
of the rumours, coming from all sides and diligently
spread by Spain, about the real plans of France. The
prince himself, on account of his attitude towards
d'Estrades, fell temporarily into suspicion with the States
•Cheruel, Minor it/, ii., p. 276.
* Negotiations, iii., p. 131, where Mazarin says this in a letter to his
plenipotentiaries at Munster.
1 V.0.n der Capellen, ii., p. 142.
134 History of the Dutch People
of having conspired secretly with France and Spain,
while Pauw, warned by Spain, hastened from Miinster
and thought of carrying through rapidly a separate treaty
with Spain. Mazarin considered that his only safety
lay in caution and perfect sincerity. No "useless
reproaches, which would lead them to do worse," he
said, but frank declarations both at Miinster and The
Hague. Before the end of March such a declaration was
made in the name of the queen-regent of France. She
asserted that she would refuse all Spanish offers and
would negotiate according to the treaties concluded with
the States "conjointly and to the satisfaction of this
state."1 Mazarin congratulated himself that he had not
given into the hands of the Spaniards a single bit of writ-
ing relative to the affair.
It was high time, for Holland, "full of suspicion," had
already declined to furnish money for the new cam-
paign in Flanders. Public feeling improved at once and
early in April a treaty was signed for the campaign of
1646. Spanish machinations had failed this time. What
had occurred caused an outburst of distrust of France.
From the pulpits men preached against France, alluding
to the night of St. Bartholomew, the French Fury,
Richelieu's persecution of the Huguenots, and the
separate peace with Spain concluded by Henry IV. in
1598 at Vervins. A series of anti-French pamphlets
appeared, discussing also Mazarin's ambiguous attitude,
plans ascribed to the Catholics, andd' Avaux's harangue.
Characteristic of the popular opinion is the Miinster gossip?
of which at least six editions came out in 1646, and
which advised separate truces in the interest of com-
merce— "when it goes well with the merchant, then it
goes well also with hundreds of thousands of common
workmen " — and on account of the dangers now manifest
1 Aitzema, Vredeh., ii., p. 29.
sKnuttel, No. 5289-95.
Peace of Minister 135
from the French side. France, it asserts, is beginning
with its connections to surround us on all sides and to
predominate over all Europe. To the same category
belongs the pamphlet St. Anne s dream, in which a
woman enlightens her husband on the danger of having
France for a neighbour ; the French gossip remarks on
the matrimonial plans; the Sibyl of Holland makes a
fierce assault upon Ryckstadt (Richelieu) and Zamarin;
the Copy of a letter sent to The Hague in French describes,
as perilous to the state, the ambition of the prince of
Orange "who has no other design than to raise his
fortune upon our ruins."
Pamphlets in favour of France flowed out slowly
against this broad stream of libels. Mazarin invited his
ambassadors at Munster to answer Le caqnet francois,
and in April, 1646, appeared for this purpose the Letter
of a Venetian gentleman to his friend in Turin ' with a
Dutch translation. This letter referred to the Spanish
intrigues of the spring and to the Spanish desire for
"universal monarchy," which must have made Spain,
the "sick man" of those days, smile sadly at the contrast
between its former pretensions and present weakness.
Of the same kind are the Earnest and faithful discourse
and the Holla?id gossip. One pamphlet supports the
interests of the fatherland against opponents of all sorts.
It is the remarkable little book, The unfeigned Nether-
land patriot ', repeatedly printed and afterwards continued,
in which the much reviled Musch is pilloried and both
Spaniards and Frenchmen are made out all that is bad,
with the result that nothing more than truces ought to
be concluded. It shows that Dutch neutrality must be
maintained between the great powers and may pass for
the first rough sketch of the later policy of the States
toward Europe.
Amid all the talk raised by more than twenty-five
1 Nigociations , iii., 410.
136 History of the Dutch People
pamphlets in this year both the negotiations in Munster
and the war in Flanders continued. In both it appeared
that the seed of suspicion had grown up luxuriantly
between France and the States. The prince's increasing
weakness of mind and body was also harmful in the pre-
vailing mistrust of the intentions of the princess and her
son. The events of the spring of 1646 had made the
best friends of France waver: the "blue little books
scattered among the people" show this plainly. Popular
opinion, regarding the Spaniard as the country's enemy,
now changed completely and for good,1 as is evidenced
by numerous anti-French pamphlets and the desire for
peace expressed in them. Even the prince had been
unable to keep his old sympathy for his mother's
native land and had turned angrily from his former
friends, especially when Spain showed a willingness to
satisfy his wishes. He was reconciled with d'Estrades
again and between the severe attacks of his malady seemed
inclined to cooperate with France, but the old confidence
had disappeared. This was only too evident to the French
envoy at The Hague from the attitude of the prince's
friends and from the increasing influence of the
princess, whose sympathies for France had never been
strong in spite of all its presents to her of pearls, diamonds,
and money. But France's greatest enemies were the
principal regents of Holland, as sufficiently appeared
from all their acts, and they would gladly have con-
cluded a truce or peace with Spain.
From 1646 Mazarin could not count upon the aged
prince and his friends among the ambassadors at Mun-
ster, who inclined more and more to the side of Pauw and
the party of peace. De Knuyt became very suspicious
to the French, because he and the other Dutch representa-
tives, with the exception of Nederhorst, conferred openly
and secretly with those of Spain and concealed from the
'Compare Doc. inid,, T. 82, p. 356.
Peace of Munster 137
French the subject of their deliberations. There were
murmurs of the bribery of Pauw and De Knuyt, even of
the princess, by Spanish gold. Both those gentlemen
dined and wined at Munster with the Spaniards and
were extremely intimate with them. From intercepted
correspondence of Peilaranda the French ambassadors
saw plainly what was doing. Spain conceded everything
to the States, and in May agreement had been reached on
many articles of a proposed treaty for a truce. In the
summer the Dutch envoys went home in turn, appar-
ently to seek an approval of their actions from the pro-
vincial Estates. The French protested to their Dutch
colleagues at Munster and to the States-General and the
province of Holland at The Hague. The States answered
satisfactorily, but their army, taking the field late in
the summer, lay still, and everything indicated the
expectation of a suspension of hostilities preliminary to
a treaty. The Hollanders at Munster tried with little
success to mediate also between Spain and France. In
November, 1646, however, the preliminary treaty be-
tween Spain and the republic, seventy articles long, was
ready. It was no truce but a treaty of peace.
In the autumn Holland had urged upon the other prov-
inces to negotiate not for a truce but for a definitive
peace, to which Spain seemed well disposed. This pro-
posal prevailed at length, although the ever bellicose Zea-
land long opposed it. The word truce was replaced by
peace in the provisions already agreed upon. After
much wrangling, negotiations were so far advanced at
Munster in January, 1647, that seven of the eight Dutch
envoys resolved to sign the terms made with Spain
on condition that this signature should only be valid when
a treaty between France and Spain became possible.
This stipulation was dangerous to the work of peace, as
France positively refused to give back its conquests in
Italy, and Spain would not consent to the interference
138 History of the Dutch People
of france in the affairs of Catalonia and Portugal. The
States might be expected to let this condition drop,
whenever peace between Spain and France should be
impossible to bring about.1
A profound difference of opinion arose between the
Dutch ambassadors at Miinster in the course of these
negotiations. The Utrecht delegate, Nederhorst, did
not feel justified in thus working against France, con-
tinued his consultations with d' Avaux and Servien long
after his colleagues had stopped them, and refused to
sign the preliminary treaty with Spain as long as the
States-General and his province had given him no
special authorisation to do so. France understood that
matters bad taken a serious turn and determined upon
extreme efforts to bring the States back to the right road
at the eleventh hour. It had to contend against the newly
awakened distrust of France, to remind the house of
Orange of its old relations with the French royal family,
and to bribe, if possible, some prominent persons in Hol-
land, in order to prevent the conclusion of a separate
treaty between Spain and the States. Early in January,
1647, Servien came from Miinster to The Hague ostensi-
bly to make new guarantee and subsidy treaties with the
republic but really to disturb the work of peace. He
brought 30,000 livres for the bribery of statesmen and of
clerks who could furnish him documents of all kinds,
A superficial acquaintance with the correspondence
between the French plenipotentiaries and their govern-
ment shows such expectations to be far from baseless.
So thought also the Spaniards. Pefiaranda wrote con-
cerning the States: "it is a government in which every-
body takes pay."2 From the Spanish side, 200,000
guilders were provided for the first expenditures to pro-
'On all this see Doc. ined., T. 83, pp. 3-118, and Negotiations, iv.,
passim.
2 Doc. iniJ., T. 84, pp. 123, 169, 178.
Peace of Minister 139
mote an exchange of the ratifications. Seldom does one
encounter such a positive proof as can be given of the
bribery attempted by Servien in the spring of 1647. It is
his accounting for the 30,000 livres.1 After reading this
document one ceases to wonder that the accusation of
bribery was so often heard in those days. Repeatedly
Nederhorst charged his opponents Pauw and De Knuyt
with it and they him. Servien managed matters very
cleverly. During half a year he worked assiduously to
break up the newly concluded peace. Vehement ha-
rangues to the States-General, letters no less sharp, special
missives to the provinces outside of Holland, pamphlets
against peace, conversations with the leading statesmen,
visits to the chief cities — he spared nothing to attain his
end.
The death of the prince in March, 1647, made
little change in the situation. The health of the long
suffering Orange prince had rapidly deteriorated in the
last year. His legs were swollen, his hands stiffened, his
throat and lungs gave out, his mind now and then entirely
failed him ; a sort of childishness began to appear, which
unfitted him for the serious consideration of affairs and
made him wish more for peace and rest. He was now
ruled completely by his vigorous wife, while his son,
afraid of the father's jealousy, kept in the background
and dared only act in secret with d' Estrades and
Mazarin. The son, who longed eagerly to distinguish
himself in war, was a decided adherent of the French
policy of cooperation, and influenced by Mazarin and his
agents he privately opposed the party of peace. 2 The
Spanish intrigues did not miss their aim in these circum-
stances, although the old prince would not allow himself
to be led into compromising engagements with Spain.
1 See Blok's essay: De Nederlandsche vlugschriften over de vredesonder-
handelingen te Munster, in Vers, en Med. Kon, Akad., iv., I, p. 321.
2 Waddington, ii., p. 133.
i4-o History of the Dutch People
Suddenly his condition grew worse and within a few days
he was dying. On March 14, 1647, he breathed his last.
His young successor, William II., twenty-one years of
age, ardent and energetic, but frivolous and, though brave,
inexperienced in war, little of a statesman, and, despite
his indisputable rights, not immediately put by the prov-
inces in the place of his dead father, showed himself at
first more inclined to enjoy questionable pleasures with
his friends at court, in the ballroom and the chase, in the
theatre and on the race-course, than to take a strong
hold of affairs. He let them go as they pleased, not
without manifesting sympathy for the French govern-
ment, but, under his mother's influence, not declaring
himself sharply as to the desirability of peace. No great
help could be expected from him by the peace party but
also no opposition, provided the interests of the house
of Orange were not neglected.
The advocates of peace saw their plans succeed.
Almost simultaneously with Servien appeared in the name
of the Spanish government Philippe le Roy, secretary of
finance at Brussels, provided with over a million and a
half guilders, to work for peace. Le Roy came on behalf
of the marquis de Castel-Rodrigo, who was anxious to con-
vince the States-General of the unwillingness of France to
conclude peace upon any terms whatever and to give
them the means of overcoming the opposition of this
power. To the vexation of Servien, le Roy was admit-
ted to the States-General and delivered his message in a
long document, the True Relation? a survey of the
negotiations, which was printed like Servien's harangues
and propositions and distributed everywhere as a pam-
phlet. Thus was published in the spring of 1647 another
series of pamphlets, numbering with reprints no less than
fifty, in which Servien and the war party contended in
'Cf. Vredeh., ii., p. 203 ; Negotiations secretes, iv., where several other
pamphlets are also printed.
Peace of Minister 141
"many beautiful discourses and tracts " with the party
of peace.1
Some of these writings proceeded from Antoine Brun,
the well-informed diplomatist, who crossed the frontiers
on pretext of a journey to Brussels and wished to visit
The Hague. The French ambassador moved heaven
and earth to prevent this, so that the Estates of Holland
from fear of public opinion begged Brun to give up his
purpose. The negotiator returned by way of Leyden,
Amsterdam, and Deventer, not without conferring with
various persons, distributing money, and praising the
peaceful disposition of Spain in a Representation dated
from Deventer, which was supported by some Observations
attributed to Adriaan Pauw. By the latter was a collec-
tion of pieces relating to the negotiations and personally
assailing Servien. The most noteworthy work of this
time is Brun's ToucJistone of the true interests of the
United Provinces of the Netherlands and of the intentions
of the two crowns concerning the treaties of peace. In this
Servien's productions were contested point by point in
excellent French, among others the sharp Letter written
from The Hague by a French gentleman to a friend in
Paris, and the advantages of peace were contrasted with
the evils of war. The violent tone of Servien's speeches,
calling out violent replies, tended with these pamphlets to
stir up the minds of men. Servien openly accused Pauw
and De Knuyt of "impostures which they have forged in
concert with the ministers of Spain"3 and demanded the
punishment of these faithless ambassadors.
The other Dutch plenipotentiaries now left Munster3 for
The Hague,as for lack of integrity they were also attacked,
1 Vredeh., ii., p. 249 ; Van der Capellen, ii., p. 176.
3 Aitzema, Vredehand., ii., p. 336 et seq.
3 Negotiations, iv., p. irg; Doc. ined., T. 83, p. 226. Pauw remained
there the last — until April — but he was finally left completely alone by the
French ambassadors.
H2 History of the Dutch People
Nederhorst by the Spaniards, the others by the French.
None of them was present at Miinster in the summer.
They were of little use there, when negotiations ter-
minated between Spain and the ambassadors of the States,
and the only question was whether the provinces would
sanction the conclusion of peace without France. This
long continued uncertain, and great excitement prevailed
about it in all the provinces. Holland, where Amster-
dam, under the lead of Pauwand Andries Bicker, turned
opinion against France, was ready for this course and
sent delegations in advocacy of it to the other provinces.
War stopped in fact, and notwithstanding the urgency of
France it was resolved not to take the field in 1647, the
Spanish responding with a suspension of hostilities on
land and water. A weak attempt of William II. to keep
up the war by sending troops into the district of Waes,
under the pretence that Spain was also collecting soldiers
in Flanders, was sharply countermanded by the States-
General. It was really as good as peace.
To save appearances the States-General on July 29th
signed at last a new treaty of guarantee with France, but
only for the not very probable contingency that peace
should be concluded at Miinster also between France
and Spain. Satisfied with having given another check
to the Spanish policy, Servien returned immediately to
Miinster, where the temporarily interrupted negotiations
were resumed in September. It was evident that the
States might make peace with Spain at any moment.
Like genuine traders, they sought to bargain for more
than was already obtained. Pauw, "the shrewdest and
most dangerous of all,"1 feigned after his return to Miin-
ster a willingness to cooperate with France, aiming
naturally to render Spain more pliable. Spain gradually
yielded upon nearly all points, so that Sweden and
1 Negotiations, iv., p. 80; compare for these iast negotiations especially
Doc. ined., T. 83, p. 476 ; T. 84, p. 5.
Peace of Miinster 143
Austria intervened in order not to raise the States too
high. Then Pauw and his friends restrained themselves,
and everything was ready at Miinster by November.
Pauw and De Knuyt with Mathenesse, indisputably the
three chief personages, left for The Hague on October
16, 1647, and endeavoured to carry the affair through.
Violent discussions took place in the States-General, but
it was finally agreed that for the sake of the existing
treaties one more attempt should be made to bring
about peace between France and Spain.1
Thus began again the mediation of the States at Miin-
ster, but at the same time the treaty of peace with Spain
was brought into shape. The mediation between France
and Spain seemed at first to have some success, but the
agreement between the latter and the States was already
so far advanced that Spain urged peace upon the republic,
threatening to break off everything. The signature of
the treaty was alone lacking, and Nederhorst's opposi-
tion gave the French hope that the affair would not be
settled, especially when De Knuyt, veering with every
wind and apparently influenced by the warlike young
prince, exhausted himself in assertions of his willingness,
with Zealand and the house of Orange, to help France to
a satisfactory peace.
The French soon had no more illusions. At The
Hague the French ambassador La Thuillerie still pro-
tested, and by Nederhorst's advice France endeavoured
to secure postponement so far as possible. But nothing
availed. De Knuyt became more intractable every day,
and Nederhorst observed that he would eventually have
to give way to the general wish. He declined to par-
ticipate on January 30, 1648, when the others after some
hesitation signed under pressure from Spain, which
declared it would consent to no further delay. The
French government continued to protest at The Hague,
1 Van der Capellen, ii., p. 204.
144 History of the Dutch People
first against the signing, then against the ratification,
but Holland, always guided by Pauw, pushed the affair
through in spite of the resistance of Utrecht and Zea-
land. The end was that the States-General by five out of
seven votes resolved on April 4th to confirm the peace.
Utrecht yielded a few days later, but Zealand persisted
in its refusal until after the formal exchange of the rati-
fications on May 15th in the city hall of Munster.
It may be imagined that these varying opinions brought
out another flood of pamphlets over the Netherlands in
the course of 1647. These pamphlets show that three
parties existed : the strong and active peace party which
more and more won the upper hand; the small war
party1 whose writings are most violent in tone; and the
quite numerous neutrals who would have preferred to
make peace in conjunction with France but in the end,
like middle parties usually, displayed little force and
went over to the camp of the peace party. The prince
of Orange was of slight aid to the war party, the less
so because his mother ardently desired peace, but
Zealand's stubborn opposition was to be ascribed to him.
His later opinion of "these Amsterdam rascals who
made peace" is well known, but the French government
had reason to complain of his far from vigorous attitude
in these critical days. It did not hold to his view that
the war must be continued in any case.3
The stream of pamphlets flowed on in the spring of
1648. 3 The French ambassador's harangues and propositions
were followed by Ingredients and amplifications of
answer ; the French Corrective was replied to by a sharp
Lenitive ; and the war party resorted to the anti-Spanish
weapons from its old arsenal to oppose the ratification of
the treaty of January 30th. Remarkable is the paper
1 Archives, iv., p. 226 : "Those who favour us are few in number and
hardly dare to speak."
'Cheruel, Minorite, ii., p. 488.
sKnuttel, No. 5672-5740.
Peace of Miinster 145
war between Nederhorst and Pauw, who had become
fierce personal enemies at Miinster. Nederhorst' s friend-
liness towards France at Miinster roused the ire of Hol-
land's representatives as much as their supposed Spanish
leanings did his. The numerous visits made openly
and secretly by the French upon their Dutch ally, the
interviews in his house and theirs, were excused by the
conscientious Nederhorst on the ground of the original
instructions given the envoys of the States, command-
ing them to act in close harmony with the French. On
the same ground he reproached his adversaries for their
intimate relations with the Spanish plenipotentiaries, who
treated Pauw and De Knuyt especially with extreme
civility and would have nothing to do with Nederhorst
after his refusal to sign the first draught of peace of
December, 1646. Matters were no better between
Nederhorst and the others in the course of 1647.
Mutual accusations of bribery occur in the pamphlets of
the spring. The Deductions presented to the States-
General by both parties in January, 1647, had not
bettered the situation. There was serious talk in the
Estates of Holland and even in the States-General of
dismissing Nederhorst, but the support given by the
Estates of Utrecht to their representative prevented this.
His refusal to sign the definitive treaty of peace of
January 30, 1648, caused renewed exasperation. He
was sickly and often did not attend the meetings of his
colleagues. Although he signed later, his repeated
absences prevented action for the time. The Reasons for
his new refusal he presented to the States-General on
February 3, 1648. They were immediately answered in
a vehement Contrary advice and refutation by Mathenesse
and Pauw, to which Nederhorst replied in an equally
violent Representation. These writings were widely read
in the spring of 1648.
A sequel to this contest of pens was that waged in the
VOL. IV. IO.
146 History of the Dutch People
summer of 1648 and occasioned by the appearance of a
sharp anti-Spanish pamphlet, entitled : La Confession
de r imprivienr , almost simultaneously coming out in
Dutch as The printer s confession. Servien, apparently
with Nederhorst's aid, made a last powerful effort, shortly
before the signing of the ratification, to throw suspicion
upon Pauw and his friends. This remarkable pamphlet
explains clearly once again the advantages of a close
alliance with France in opposition to "Bicker and his
adherents" and "Pauw and his cabal," whose avarice
and eagerness for the profitable commerce with Spain
are scourged. The ambition of Pauw and Bicker,
"those great personages who have become friends like
Herod and Pilate," is ridiculed. Pauw was indeed the
generally recognised leader of the peace party.1 The
Answer to the printer s confession (by De Knuyt?) is no
less violent against the "French tributary Nederhorst,"
the "little devil" from Utrecht. The following Refec-
tion, with its coarseness directed against the " jaundiced
scoundrels," Bicker and Pauw, and De Knuyt alias Guyt
(rogue), surpasses all in vulgarity of language. The
long Penitence and the worthier Netherlandish absolution,
attributed to Pauw himself, finish this unpleasant con-
fession series. Soon afterwards Nederhorst died.
The tone of the writings last mentioned shows the pre-
vailing bitterness and how weak the opponents of peace
were to descend to such means in order to avert their
coming defeat. The Dialogue between Warnaer and Fred-
erick, written between April 17th and 25th, refers to the
dissensions between Holland and Zealand, which latter
province threatened with the support of the prince and
of France to continue the war and to live by privateer-
ing like Tunis or Algiers. It refers also to the strife
between Holland and the other provinces which made a
1 Hence the gratitude of the Spaniards towards him {Doc. ined., T. 84,
P- 96).
Peace of Miinster H7
regent say: "rather French than Hollandish." This
discord was indeed a great peril. But the views of Hol-
land triumphed likewise over the not very serious opposi-
tion of William II. coming up at the eleventh hour. The
popular rejoicing at the peace in Holland and elsewhere
was manifest in the performances given in June in honour
of the peace with words by such men as Samuel Coster,
Gerard Brandt, Jan Vos, with verses by Vondel and
others addressed to Andries Bicker and his colleagues.
Vondel's Leeuzvendalers immortalised this feeling in the
charming idyll of Hageroos and Adelaert, "united by
unfeigned love," and sung the song of peace.
Joy was not everywhere. The war party smarted
under its defeat and abstained from festivities. The
representatives of France, Sweden, Portugal, and Hesse
declined to burn before their dwellings the tar-barrels
offered them. The prince did not yet openly venture to
show displeasure, but to his friends he expressed his
indignation at the intrigues of the peace party. Zealand
and Leyden had no celebration, and in many a city and
village the preachers inveighed from the pulpit against
the promoters of peace. People remembered on June
5th, the day of the proclamation of peace, that just
eighty years earlier Egmont and Hoorn had been
beheaded, and the festivities seemed somewhat forced,
"like a marriage that takes place without the consent of
friends," as Aitzema jestingly remarks.
In truth a dark shadow upon the treaty was this lack of
the "consent of friends," particularly of that of France,
with which country a close alliance had so recently been
made. The excuse often heard for this breaking of faith
with France, that this kingdom only feigned a wish to
conclude peace and never really desired it, rests on an
unjust conception of the facts.1 It is not to be denied that
the United Netherlands for their own advantage left
1 Compare Cheruel, Minority ii., p. 475.
148 History of the Dutch People
France in the lurch, and they were certainly not in such
dire distress that peace became absolutely necessary.
This was rather the case with Spain, and if France and the
States had acted "conjointly and with common consent,''
as was the phrase of sworn conventions, it would have led
to peace also between Spain and France, which was now
postponed for eleven years. No other apology for the
conduct of the States towards France can be found than
the very dubious morality embodied in the proposition
that treaties are only valid so long as they coincide with
the temporary interest of the powers concerned, an idea
that has countless times been put in practice.
The peace of Miinster was brilliant indeed, and the
United Netherlands might well be proud of the place it
gave them among the powers of Europe. The famous
treaty,1 seventy-nine articles in length,ydeclared in Article
1 "the States-General of the United Netherlands and the
respective provinces of the same with all associated
districts, towns, and appertaining lands" as "free and
sovereign States," on which the king of Spain "makes no
claim now, nor ever hereafter shall claim anything for
himself, his successors, and descendants," and with which
he concludes "an eternal peace." ! With the German
empire there was to be a continuation of neutrality and
friendship, the king cooperating until the confirmation of
the emperor and empire should be obtained. The terri-
tory was indicated by the possessions then held, so that
all the conquests of Maurice and Frederick Henry were
kept, unless they had been recaptured by Spain. A
court, consisting of an equal number of judges from each
side, was to settle the minor differences regarding fron-
tiers and rights. The status quo was maintained in the
East and West Indies, and each party was not to trade
there in the ports of the other. The intercourse in
Europe between the two countries was restored to the old
1 Aitzema, iii., p. 259.
Peace of Miinster 149
footing of friendship, with prohibition of higher taxes
than their own subjects paid, retention of the former
exemptions from toll, and abolition of the king's rights
to tolls on the Meuse, Rhine, and Scheldt within the
borders of the United Provinces. The Scheldt and its
canals were kept closed by the States; the vessels and
goods coming in and out of the Flemish ports were to
pay duties equal to what was imposed on those entering
and leaving the Scheldt, so that the dreaded competition
of Antwerp and Flanders would be finally suppressed.
In the matter of religion everything likely to cause
scandal was to be avoided in public exercises both in the
Netherlands and in the dominions of the king, and
ecclesiastical property in the United Netherlands was
restored or paid for. Restitution was to be made of
the property of the house of Orange, even in Burgundy,
with exceptions previously agreed upon. The members
of the house of Nassau were not to be prosecuted for the
debts of the late Prince William I. of Orange. Prisoners
on both sides were to be released without ransom and
with complete amnesty for all political offences. All
records and documents relating to places ceded, also
those concerning litigation, etc., were to be mutually
delivered. The allies of both sides, who within three
months after the ratification should wish to accede, were
to be allowed to participate in the peace, especially
Hesse, East Friesland, Emden, and the Hanse towns.
Both sides promised to protect the seas and rivers as
much as possible from piracy.
Such was the treaty alike honourable and advantageous
to the United Netherlands. It put an end to the war,
which had been waged during eighty years with vary-
ing success, which under the able guidance of the three
princes of Orange and of the States of Holland, Zealand,
and the other provinces had called into being the strong
and independent state now making its appearance among
150 History of the Dutch People
the powers of Europe. That state was destined for at
least a hundred years to hold an important place in the
history of the world — the glory of its citizens and their
descendants, an object of admiration to contemporaries
and later generations.
CHAPTER VII
FIRST YEARS OF PEACE
THE young republic of the United Netherlands after
the peace of Miinster appeared resplendent amid
Europe's states. Her territory, inconsiderable compared
with that of the great powers of the time, would scarcely
have given her a claim to a modest place in the council
chamber of Europe, but the glorious history of her
origin, the energy of her relatively large population, and
the development of her strength often allowed her a
deciding voice. She owed this not merely to herself,
but also to the political circumstances which for the
moment prevented other, greater, and more populous
states from exerting their full force.
France, after the battle of Rocroy, that lowered Spain's
military renown, coming up more and more as the first
power in Europe, beheld itself weakened in the midst of
an arduous foreign war by internal commotions, by the
contest of the Fronde against the omnipotent Mazarin
and the court of the reigning queen-mother. The
brilliant Paris of Henry IV. and Richelieu was the scene of
civil war and a strife of barricades, and the restlessness
prevailing there and in the provinces acted unfavourably
upon the influence of France abroad. Unhappy is the
country where the king is a child, even though this child
is named Louis XIV. The old enemy, Spain, lay ex-
hausted and now sought more in diplomacy than in war
the means of preserving some of its importance in
Europe. England, since Elizabeth with greater mari-
i =;i
152 History of the Dutch People
time pretensions than its actual sea-power, and now, in
Cromwell's days, disposing of a disciplined army under
one of the greatest generals it has ever known, was para-
lysed by the civil war which in 1649 brought King
Charles I. to the scaffold. The German empire, enjoy-
ing long desired peace after a barbarous war of thirty
years, had seen in this war the bonds uniting its states
still further loosened: neither the emperor, constantly
menaced by the Turks, nor Brandenburg, Cologne,
Bavaria, Saxony, Hesse, or any other German state could
match the republic in power and prestige. The Baltic
powers did not feel equal to her: Denmark sued for her
favour to hold Sweden in check; Sweden, although
proud of its victories on sea and land, hesitated to oppose
the States, its old allies; Poland followed unwillingly the
Danish example. Asiatic Muscovy respected the strong
commercial state of the west more than any other in
Europe. The Turks still considered the republic as their
ally against Spain in the Mediterranean Sea. The
piratical states of Africa's northern coast feared to exer-
cise their calling too openly at the expense of the Dutch
merchant ships, remembering the sharp lessons inflicted
upon their corsairs by such commanders as Tromp, Evert -
sen, De Ruyter, and Van Galen. Italy's antiquated
little states, mostly chained to Spain, were of slight con-
sequence in Europe; Venice asked the support of the
States in its hard fight against the Turks. Little Por.
tugal alone ventured to thwart the republic. It was not
really the republic but the West India Company, the
commercial corporation, with which it contended for the
mastery in Brazil, calculating that the States were enjoy-
ing the just concluded peace too much to engage again in
war.
How proud the Dutch must have felt at the place in
the world won by their country! We find the echo of
this feeling in the contemporary prose and poetry. The
First Years of Peace 153
historian Wicquefort, commissioned by the Estates of
Holland to write the history of the time, reminds his
readers "that this history may be put upon a parallel
with the finest histories of past ages,"1 and says of
the republic "that there is no power in Europe which
has not sought her friendship and which has not found
advantage in her alliance." In his Song of Peace Vondel
sings to "hollow and hungry Europe " :
" Netherland's peace doth now laws give
To all realms and princes around,
Light she sheds on healthful ground,
With torch and trump to make joy live."
And he compares his "Batavians" with the "State of
the valiant Latins." The pamphlets of those days show
the plain Dutch citizens expressing their opinions on the
monarchs and countries of the world. Over the beer,
in the boat, on the waggon, in the bookshop political
events are discussed without fear and with a remarkable
knowledge of affairs. Citizen and peasant judge and
condemn Charles I. and Cromwell, Mazarin and the
French nobles with equal freedom. The good people
of Amsterdam seek the latest news from distant lands
every morning and try to profit by it. "Thus the world
all seems to be built about Amsterdam."
The "profit" of the merchant became more and more
the principle guiding the policy of the States, especially
of the Estates of Holland. And in Holland it was
Amsterdam that gave the tone, as was shown by
its pushing through the peace of Munster despite
all opposition. The interest of commerce was to
rule the politics of the republic so long as Amsterdam
had its way, supported as it was by many regents in
Holland, whose cities were dependent on Amsterdam or
considered commerce as necessary to the existence of
1 Hisioire des Provinces Unies, i., p. 2.
154 History of the Dutch People
their country. But on the other side stood a powerful
party with quite other interests in domestic and foreign
politics, the old Orange war party. It could still count
upon the preachers, whose hatred against Spain and
Rome was coupled with a strong aversion to commerce,
which they abominated as incompatible with true re-
ligion. It found a vigorous leader in the young prince
of Orange who did not conceal his dislike of "those
rascals who have made peace," of whom he wished he
could "break the neck,"1 and who now rising from his
life of "debauchery and pleasure" hoped for a resump-
tion of the war. It was supported by the army and its
officers, whose income fell off in time of peace, and by
Zealand, which sadly needed its rich revenues from pri-
vateering during war. The opposition between the two
parties speedily appeared in foreign affairs. Amsterdam
and the prince soon antagonised one another secretly and
openly in all things.
This was evident from the attitude of the republic
towards Spain, the latter country being represented
from June, 1649, by its ambassador, Antoine Brun.2
More than anybody else on the Spanish side, Brun
was convinced that peace with the republic had alone
rescued the southern Netherlands, placed between two
fires, for Spain from the danger of a partition between
France and the States. So he came with the purpose of
maintaining this peace as long as possible. In the be-
ginning there were naturally many matters to cause fric-
tion, particularly with reference to disputed territory, to
commercial interests, and to the possession of ecclesi-
astical property. But Brun settled everything quietly
with the support of Archduke Leopold William, gov-
ernor of the southern Netherlands. The able Spanish
^Archives, iv., p. 314.
s P. L. Muller, Spain and the parties in the Netherlands , in Nijhoff's
Bijdr. N. R. vii., p. 136; Waddington, La Republique des Prozinces-
C/nies, ii. , p. 270.
First Years of Peace 155
diplomatist kept on good terms'with the princess-mother,
Frederick Henry's influential widow, and with her
friends. Through her and them he attempted to win the
young prince, but he quickly observed that the prince,
full of aversion to Spain, the arch-enemy of his house,
was not to be persuaded by any large pensions or prom-
ises of future revenues. Brun's hope remained fixed
upon Holland, and with its statesmen he cooperated to
prevent the prince from throwing himself into war again
in alliance with France. The courtesies he heaped on the
States, the pompous phraseology in which he recognised
their independence on every occasion, were intended to
show Spain's good and loyal feeling towards such plans.
France, both Mazarin and his opponents of the Fronde,
desired nothing more than this renewal of the war,
and the prince himself was burning with impatience to
resume the ancient strife of his fathers. Like his cousin
William Frederick of Nassau and his confidant Cornells
van Aerssen, lord of Sommelsdijk, he believed in his
heart that Spain in 1648 was only saved from ruin by the
peace and must have given up the southern Netherlands,
if the war had been continued. By a new alliance with
France to retrieve the loss suffered, by a joint conquest
of the southern Netherlands to prevent Spain from ever
attacking the republic again at a more favourable oppor-
tunity, and thus to realise the brilliant plans of his
father, the old vision of his grandfather who was so
foully murdered by Spain's hireling — this was the prince's
ideal. In August, 1649, we find him in secret relations
with d' Estrades, who, under Frederick Henry, had
repeatedly been the intermediary between the Oranges
and the crown of France. Willem Boreel, arriving at
Paris in 1650 as Dutch ambassador, remained outside of
these affairs. The French ambassador at The Hague,
Brasset, zealously aided in them, as did William Fred-
erick and Sommelsdijk who maintained relations with
156 History of the Dutch People
Brasset and through him with Mazarin. But the prince's
ideal was opposed by Holland, not merely from aver-
sion to war, from fear of Antwerp's competition and of
the greater influence of the prince of Orange in time of
war, but also because it did not want powerful France for
a neighbour and was unwilling to strengthen the threaten-
ing supremacy of France in Europe by conquering a part
of the southern Netherlands. The large number of
Mazarinades in French and Dutch distributed in the
Netherlands proves an extraordinary interest in French
affairs.
With regard also to the attitude towards England the
prince and Holland were in sharp antagonism. Both
abhorred the sentence of which Charles I. had been the
victim, but the prince, with whom the prince of Wales,
now King Charles II., had been sojourning since July,
wished for nothing more than vengeance for his father-
in-law's death and help from the States for his brother-
in-law. His dynastic interests made him hostile to
Cromwell and Parliament, and he desired, even before a
war with Spain, a joint war, in alliance again with
France, against revolutionary England for the restora-
tion of the Stuarts. Holland did not want what would
have been chiefly a naval contest and most injurious to
its commerce and fishery. It had supported the attempt
by a special embassy to dissuade Parliament from carrying
out the sentence against Charles I. The influential
Pauw himself went to England with Joachimi on this
mission. But when the sentence was executed, Holland
wished to remain as neutral as possible between Parlia-
ment and the new king, who was greeted as "King
Charles II." without adding "of Great Britain."1
Holland prevented the States-General from lending an
ear to the requests of Charles II. for help in money,
ships, or ammunition.2 It acquiesced in the Victrix causa
1 Aitzema, iii., p. 324.
2 Gardiner, History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, i., p. 68.
First Years of Peace 157
placet Deo, translated in a pamphlet: "the justice of a
war is always decided by the victory." The preserva-
tion of neutrality brought many difficulties. When in
the autumn of 1648 two envoys of Parliament, Dr. Isaac
Doreslaer, a Hollander by birth, and Walter Strickland,
appeared at The Hague to announce an embassy from
Parliament and to urge that the royal fleet should not be
received in the harbours of the Meuse, where it had taken
refuge from the Parliament's fleet, Holland recognised the
justice of this claim, and the prince had to yield, though
he continued to aid the royal family with advice and
money. While Holland rendered all honour to the two
envoys as ambassadors of a friendly power, it could not
secure their reception as such by the States-General, the
royal English resident Boswell continuing to be recog-
nised. The horrible murder of Doreslaer on May 12th by
Scottish partisans of Charles II. in The Hague remained
unpunished, to the vexation of Parliament, under the
pretext that the perpetrators could not be discovered
among the many English refugees in the capital. The
assassins fled to the southern Netherlands, and nothing
was done but to protect Strickland, who tarried longer to
keep an eye upon the intrigues of the royalists. But the
States-General persistently declined to receive him, so
that, bitterly complaining, he left The Hague in the
summer of 1650. After this treatment of its envoys Par-
liament sent his passport unasked to the Dutch ambassa-
dor in London, the old Joachimi, but in order to please
Holland assented to the dispatch of Gerard Schaep of
Amsterdam as commissioner or consul in charge of the
interests of Dutch subjects and even honoured him like a
real ambassador. Thus the republic and its new Eng-
lish sister were on a very delicate footing, and not much
was needed to precipitate a conflict, especially as the
royalists started from here all manner of plans, equip-
ping ships and soldiers for Scotland, where Charles II.
158 History of the Dutch People
was recognised as king and whence he hoped to win
England. Numerous pamphlets printed in the Nether-
lands concerning events in England showed the inter-
est of the people in these complications and were
often violent in tone against the regicides and sym-
pathetic towards the distressed English royal family
and the Bohemian court, now also in very embarrassed
circumstances.1
Less sharp was the conflict of opinion with regard to
the Baltic states. Denmark saw that it could only op-
pose Sweden with the help of the States-General, and
the inducement it offered for this help was naturally a
reduction of the burdens of the Sound toll. In the name
of Frederick III., who had succeeded Christian IV., the
Danish statesman, Corfitz Ulefeld, appeared in 1649 at
The Hague to propose to the republic a defensive
alliance and a redemption of the Sound toll. The prov-
inces having no commerce with the Baltic objected to
an alliance with Denmark from fear of offending the
Swedes, and the prince was on this side. But Amster-
dam, so greatly interested in the Baltic commerce,
carried through the "redemption treaty" in 1649 together
with the defensive alliance, both for thirty-six years. The
treaty was really concluded by the three provinces only,
Holland, Friesland, and Gelderland. The amount to be
paid Denmark for the redemption was fixed at 350,000
guilders a year.8
Another commercial affair was the great question with
Portugal concerning Brazil. Renewed for twenty-five
years in 1647, the West India Company, whose stock
stood at thirty per cent.,3 endeavoured in every way to ob-
tain financial and material aid from the state against Por-
1 The queen of Bohemia begged the States for assistance, as she could not
pay baker and butcher (Aitzema, iii., p. 324).
'Aitzema, iii., p. 332; Waddington, La R/publique des Provinces- Units,
ii. , p. 261.
3Netscher, Les hollandais au Br/sil, p. 155.
First Years of Peace 159
tugal, continually victorious in Brazil. The Portuguese
ambassador at The Hague, Francisco de Sousa Coutinho,
sought to prevent this help by clever diplomacy. In Octo-
ber, 1649, it was finally resolved to assist with a fleet the
company, which had long ago lost Angola and Loando in
Africa, and only retained possession of a few places in
Brazil, but before action was taken, its condition became
so bad that all help seemed superfluous. After Count
John Maurice's departure Witte Corneliszoon de With
appeared unable with his small force to sustain the rapidly
declining Dutch authority in Brazil. He retired in 1648
to Recife and asked for reinforcement, but he was left to
his fate and gave vent to his indignation in numerous let-
ters, complaining of his pitiful want of provisions, etc.,
and declaring he would serve "rather the Turk than the
company." At last his circumstances grew so desperate
that in the spring of 1650 he returned, upon his own re-
sponsibility ? with a few ships to the fatherland. He
arrived in May, but, for leaving his post without orders, the
prince, after consultation with the States-General, had
him thrown into prison at The Hague, while his captains
were imprisoned by the admiralty at Amsterdam. Hol-
land was exasperated at this asserted violation of its
sovereign rights by the prince, the States-General,
and the admiralty. The captains were liberated from
prison by violence. Without the consent of the pro-
vincial Estates the States-General had no jurisdiction
in any of the provinces, and De With, as a subject of
Holland, could only be tried before a judge of Holland.
Fearing Holland would release the admiral also on its
own authority, the prince allowed him to be conducted
to his lodging. Meanwhile the Portuguese rule was
restored in Brazil it the expense of the company,
and war with Portugal did not break out. There
was no desire to engage in a new war for a dying
company, whose misfortune was chiefly due to poor
160 History of the Dutch People
management and neglect,1 no matter how loudly the
stockholders cried.
Relations were reasonably good with the smaller states
on the eastern border, especially with the friendly elector
of Brandenburg, now related to the house of Nassau.
The States remained on amicable terms with the "Great
Elector," one of the "most considerable" German
princes of his day, who then resided at Cleves and later
appointed as governor there John Maurice the Brazilian,
although they kept possession of his fortresses Emmerich,
Gennep, Wesel, etc. They were friends also with the
energetic landgravine of Hesse, who extended her gar-
risons far over her frontiers to the Rhine and to East
Friesland. The States held Emden and Leeroord in
East Friesland as strategical points. East Friesland, as
well as Bremen and other Hanse towns, needed the sup-
port of the States against Oldenburg, which had estab-
lished a toll upon the Weser, thereby getting into serious
difficulties. But the States were unwilling to begin war
even with little Oldenburg, for the sending of a few war
ships to the Weser might have caused general hostilities
to break out in northern Germany, so lately pacified."
Here in the east also it was plain that so long as Hol-
land and Amsterdam had their will, the republic would
not be inclined to enter into war, even when, as in the
case of Portugal, the honour of the state was at stake.
Holland had urgently needed peace, had secured it by
great exertion, and would not allow it to be disturbed,
even though the direct opposition of the young prince
must be encountered. It was now the question whether
the prince would yield in the long run to Holland's
wishes so at variance with his personal inclinations, with
the dynastic interests of the Stuarts especially, and with
1 Van Rees, Geschiedenis der Staathuishoudkunde ; ii., p. 211.
5 See for all these affairs Aitzema and Wicquefort passim, Waddington,
ii., p. 263.
First Years of Peace 161
the political traditions of his family. Young and ardent
in spirit, personally popular, surrounded by young
officers, urged on by the family of his English wife, full
of sympathy for France, and sharing its indignation at
the peace of Miinster, he would be a dangerous adversary
for Holland's statesmen, if ever he could win as much
influence as his father had enjoyed. The policy of the
republic would then be ruled not by the commercial
interests of Holland but by dynastic and political con-
siderations of a general nature. Thus the republic's for-
eign affairs were closely connected with the influence of
the prince,1 and her internal condition must be of impor-
tance to the rest of Europe. And just in these years
came a domestic crisis which was attentively watched
from abroad.
Holland's endeavour was to prevent the prince from
obtaining the great influence which his father had
secured between 1630 and 1640. Naturally it aimed at a
diminution of the prince's power by cutting down the
army, the excellently organised instrument which his
father and uncle had used to establish their authority.
There was cause enough in the present state of peace
to disband some of the troops become superfluous after
the treaty with Spain. The financial burden, under which
Holland had groaned for years with its debt of 120 millions
of guilders, would be lessened by such a disbandment.
This had been one of the chief reasons of Holland's
eagerness for peace.11 On the conclusion of peace the
army consisted of about 60,000 men, cavalry and
infantry, costing annually nearly ten millions. The
prince, the council of state, and the Estates of Holland
agreed that so many troops were no longer necessary,
' Mazarin refers to this at the end of 1649: Archives, iv., p. 326. Cf.
Waddington, ii., p. 251.
2 Wijnne, De geschillen over de afdanking van't krijgsvolk ( Werken Hist.
Gen., No. 41), p. xiv. Cf. De Beaufort, Geschiedk. Opstellen, ii., p. 66.
VOL. IV.— II.
1 62 History of the Dutch People
and July 30, 1648, a reduction was effected,1 by which all
the cavalry companies were brought down to sixty horses,
and fifty men were taken from each company of infantry,
retrenching one-third of the cost and making the troops
less than 35,000.
But Holland was not satisfied with this. In the spring
of 1649 further economy was discussed with the prince,
who would not hear to it, and who with the council of
state and Count William Frederick urged that, in face
of the large armies of other countries and on account of
possible domestic disturbances, sufficient troops should be
kept to guard the frontiers and to garrison the fortresses.
They thought that 30,000 men at least were needed as
during the Truce. Holland wished to see fifty men more
mustered out from each company, which the prince and
council considered too much. After some discussion the
Estates of Holland resolved in October that the payment
of money to citizens for the lodging of the soldiers
should cease and that the soldiers should receive full pay
and provide their own lodgings; that the heavy cuirassiers
should be changed into light arquebusiers; that 600 for-
eign troops paid by Holland and fifty-five companies of
them in the whole army should be disbanded besides half
of the remaining cavalry. The prince deemed this reduc-
tion too considerable, and when Holland on its own
authority discharged the 600 men, the council of state
and later the six other provinces in the States-General
declared this action unlawful, which Holland on further
consideration acknowledged. The prince finally con-
sented to the transformation of the cuirassiers into
arquebusiers and agreed to subscribe to the disbandment
of the 600 men, if this were accomplished by the States-
General, alone sovereign in military matters according to
him, but he refused to send off more than a few com-
1 Aitzema, iii., p. 273. There is a difference in the statements concerning
the amount of the various reductions.
First Years of Peace 163
panies of the excellent foreign troops. After remon-
strances from Holland in the interest of its involved
finances, the prince made some further concession, but
Holland insisted upon the disbandment of fifty-five com-
panies of infantry and nearly half of the cavalry, reducing
the army to less than 25,000 men. During the autumn
of 1649 the wrangling continued, while Holland jus-
tified to the other provinces its attitude by official
letters and secretly, and the States-General sought to
dissuade Holland from the threatened arbitrary disband-
ment.
Little progress was made in the spring of 1650. Hol-
land asserted that it would have an annual deficit of one
million guilders even with its proposed disbandment, and
flatly declined to approve of the number of troops desired
by the prince, appealing to its right to be taxed no more
than it wished. It was no longer simply how many and
what troops should be mustered out, the difference at last
being only about a few hundreds, but it was chiefly the
difficult constitutional question how far a province, as pay-
master of the troops standing to its apportionment,
had a right to consider itself invested with sovereign
power over those troops, — whetherthe army of the republic
was a whole or whether it consisted of seven separate
armies. This was connected with the important question,
how far the provincial sovereignty went as opposed to
that of the States-General — the old apple of discord
which had caused so much mischief in Oldenbarnevelt's
time. The antagonism between what may be called the
federal and the unionistic conceptions of the state of the
' United Netherlands appeared sharply, joined as in the
days of the Truce with the not unjustified dread of too
great power for the princes of Orange. Just as Maurice
in 1618 championed the rights of the States-General
against the Estates of Holland, William II. now
defended the same rights. As Oldenbarnevelt then
164 History of the Dutch People
accused the prince of aspiring to sovereignty, the
Estates of Holland now ascribed the same desires to his
young nephew. There was already talk of the useless-
ness of a stadtholder in time of peace, or at least of a
captain-general.
The contest was a matter of personal and financial inter-
est to many noble officers in the army, while the prince,
intimate with the French and English officers and in case
of civil dissension relying more upon the foreign than
the native soldiers, would not consent to a disbandment
of just those foreign troops. With an eye to his English
plans and to the possible renewal of war with Spain, the
prince was unwilling to weaken the army too much. On
the other hand, Holland's friendly attitude towards Spain
and the Parliament of England showed plainly that it
would have nothing to do with any such plans. The
opposing parties expounded their views in bitter pam-
phlets, and the whole country took part in the strife, as in
161 8, though not with the violence natural to religious
disputes. There were not wanting efforts to bring
religion into the affair: preachers like Stermont at The
Hague, Goethals in Delft, and Teelinck in Middelburg
warned against the religious ideas of the Holland party,
which seemed to them merely a later edition of the
Arminian faction. This time the Hollanders were not led
by the council pensionary, as the land's advocate was
now called. Jacob Cats had been too faithful a follower
of Frederick Henry to oppose his son, and the aged
Pauw kept in the background. At the head of the party
stood the burgomasters and ex-burgomasters of Amster-
dam, the most prominent being the brothers Andries and
Cornelis Bicker, of whom the former was considered an
ambitious magistrate and the head of the "cabal."
Attracting attention with them were Jacob de Witt,
formerly burgomaster of Dordrecht, a violent and
obstinate man, and Van Beveren, burgomaster there.
First Years of Peace 165
A minority even in the Estates of Holland favoured a
middle course or stood on the prince's side.
The prince was powerfully supported by his cousin,
Count William Frederick, who was now playing the part
of William Louis in 1618, urging his young relative to
resistance and consulting with him on the measures
to be adopted.1 Also the prince was much under the
influence of his confidant, Cornelis van Aerssen, lord of
Sommelsdijk, a friend to France, the son of Francois, a
colonel in the service of the States, a rich and influential
man, who with less ability dreamed of acting the part of
his father against the "Spanish-loving Arminians."
Further the prince was influenced by the dangerous
intriguer, Cornelis Musch, clerk of the States-General,
and among the prince's advisers must be named his
secretary, Hildersich. These four constantly appear in
the pamphlets as the trusted counsellors of the prince,
mention sometimes being made of Alexander van der
Capellen, lord of Aartsbergen, and Johan van Rheede van
Renswoude of Utrecht. There was a close connection
between domestic and foreign politics in these dissen-
sions. While no shadow of proof exists that the Hol-
land party consulted Spain secretly, as the prince and
his friends supposed, it is certain that the prince himself
sought the advice of the French crown concerning his
measures and that, for the contingency of civil war in the
republic, he counted upon the support of France for the
six provinces against Holland. France was to be prom-
ised that peace with Spain should be broken after the
restoration of internal tranquillity. Though the French
government actually bound itself to nothing, it evidently
desired to see the prince victorious. But it was unwill-
ing to compromise itself and waited for the turn domes-
tic affairs would take. For the time being, the young
and inexperienced prince seemed the weaker party as
1 Archives, iv., p. 320 et seq., especially p. 336. Cf. Wijnne, p. lxxxv.
1 66 History of the Dutch People
compared with rich and powerful Holland which, led by
Amsterdam, opposed his plans vigorously and might be
able to lift him from the saddle.
As early as December, 1649, William Frederick in a
letter written partly in cipher advised his cousin to break
with reliable troops the resistance of Amsterdam. A
month later he conjured him not to yield too much and
particularly to keep an eye upon Amsterdam, pointing
out that matters were going as in 161 8 and threatening
the Union with dissolution. Holland's uncompromising
attitude excited fears of a repetition of the disturbances of
161 8. The majority in the Estates of that province urged
ever more vehemently the arbitrary disbandment. There
were attempts at a settlement. The moderate council
pensionary submitted proposals to the prince, who per-
sisted in his own opinion. A new proposition from
Holland was rejected, whereupon the province deter-
mined not to bring the affair before the States-General
again. An earlier proposal of some Leyden lords to agree
to the prince's last offer, but first to subject the companies
of foot and horse to a small reduction, was accepted on
June 1st in the meeting of the Estates of Holland, though
with a protest of six opposing cities. The request, imme-
diately made by the States-General, not to carry out
the intended disbandment was refused, and three days
later discharge papers were sent to twelve companies of
cavalry and thirty-one of infantry belonging to Hol-
land's quota. The Estates of this province then separated.
There was no doubt that the six other provinces stood
together in opposition to Holland in this matter. Natu-
rally the prince, advised by his cousin who had come to The
Hague, and appearing with him and the council of state
in the States-General on the 5th, desired the highest
body to remind the officers that they owed obedience to
no provincial Estates.1 Further the States-General
1 Vander Capellen, Gedenkschriften, ii., p. 283.
First Years of Peace 167
resolved to send a " very notable deputation" to the
cities of Holland, which deputation was to be appointed
by the prince, while full authority was given him to take
measures for the preservation of peace and the main-
tenance of the Union.1 This most important resolution
invested the prince temporarily with dictatorial power
and was hastily passed. But the difficulty was that the
resolution was adopted only by a majority of votes and
under protest from Holland, while Utrecht opposed but
yielded later, and Gelderland objected to the "authorisa-
tion" of the prince. Considering further that the voters
were not numerous, the whole assembly consisting at
most of about thirty persons, the authority granted
the prince assumes a doubtful character. The prince's
presence during the discussion influenced the course of
affairs, although he departed before the voting. On the
following day the prince came again to the meeting and
informed it that he would himself head the deputation,
to which he had appointed four members of the States-
General : Aartsbergen of Gelderland, Mauregnault of
Zealand, Renswoude of Utrecht, Clant of Groningen;
two members of the council of state, Asperen of Hol-
land and Lucassen of Zealand, besides the treasurer-
general Brasser. This communication was accepted as a
notification, and the prince was asked to persuade the
cities of Holland to yield "by all means of induction."
The deputation started out on the 8th of June, accom-
panied by a brilliant retinue of about 400 officers, de-
signed to impress magistrates and population. Only one
town, Medemblik, was not visited, but the prince appeared
in all the other towns of Holland entitled to vote. The
result, however, did not equal the expectations. Some
cities showed themselves ready to consent to the prince's
will. No less than nine refused more or less roundly to
yield. Dordrecht set the example : its town-council,
1 Wicquefort, i., Pieces justijicatives, No. xiv.
168 History of the Dutch People
sharply addressed by Aartsbergen, complained of his
tone and politely broke off negotiations. Schiedam,
Alkmaar, Monnikendam, and Edam, the citizens of the
last place receiving the prince brilliantly, declared they
would answer only in the assembly of the States. Haar-
lem and Delft reported a willingness to receive only the
prince, which he did not desire. Amsterdam repeatedly
besought him to come merely as stadtholder and without
the deputation, but the prince declined this, and, when he
came with the deputation, the town-council refused to re-
ceive the latter and afterwards the prince himself.1 On the
25th the deputation was back again at The Hague. Two
days later the prince made a report to the States-General,
declaring in substance that the answer of the members
of Holland had been various.
The prince was very indignant at the attitude of some
cities. According to Aartsbergen, however, he had
hoped to be insulted in order "to seek reparation in other
ways." He made his complaint of Amsterdam's treat-
ment in the Estates of Holland on the 30th and had it
printed. Amsterdam issued a reply at the end of the
following month, but after a few days it advised the
Estates of Holland that the deputation as "unusual"
must be disapproved of, and nothing like it could be
allowed, further that Holland ought to protest to the
States-General and the separate provinces, and without
offending His Highness should request of him new pro-
posals for diminishing the taxes. The Estates of Hol-
land resolved upon the latter and appointed a commission
for the affair. Thus negotiations began again and on the
15th brought a proposition from the prince, his cousin,
and the council of state, to keep 3000 cavalry and over
26,000 infantry, to reduce the money for lodging to a
•Van der Capellen, Gedenkschriften, ii., p. 292 et seq. These notes of
Aartsbergen himself deserve more consideration than the somewhat deviat-
ing reports elsewhere.
First Years of Peace 169
half, while officers mustered out were to obtain a
pension, and those remaining in the service received the
same pay or a little less. The commission from the
Estates of Holland wished to discharge 1125 men and
116 cavalrymen more, to abolish the allowance for lodg-
ings, and to cut down the pay of the officers. From a
"conciliatory advice" soon presented to the Estates of
Holland it appeared that they wanted to disband only
585 more men than the prince, so that, "the difference
being of slight importance," no great trouble would have
resulted, if much more had not already happened between
the prince and Holland. It was determined on July
29th to make this advice into a resolution.
But Holland on the 27th had sent a letter to the six
other provinces defending its "separate discontinuation
of the payment of some militia," and the prince, angered
by opposition, now decided to make use of the resolution
of June 5th and to throw the sword into the scales. In
concert with his advisers he concluded to arrest six mem-
bers of the Estates of Holland, who, as he said later,
had shown "insolent obstinacy," and with a reliable
armed force to occupy Amsterdam or some other cities.
The double plan was carefully arranged weeks before-
hand and was now to be rapidly executed.
Early on the morning of Saturday the 30th, Jacob de
Witt of Dordrecht, Jan de Wael, burgomaster, and
Albert Ruyl, pensionary of Haarlem, Jan Duyst van
Voorhout, burgomaster of Delft, Nanning Keyser,
burgomaster of Hoorn, and Nicolaas Stellingwerff, pen-
sionary of Medemblik, were summoned to the prince, but
on their arrival the lieutenant-colonel of his guard, Van
Meteren, arrested and locked them up each in a separate
room of the prince's quarters. The persons named were
chosen, not because they all had especially declared them-
selves against the prince's plans, but to punish the
respective cities for their opposition. The prince, who
170 History of the Dutch People
was ready to depart for Amsterdam, requested Cats to
report the arrest to the Estates of Holland, and the
council pensionary, "amazed as by a rare wonder," so he
himself testifies, obeyed in fear and trembling.1 The
Estates remained in session but resolved to consult their
principals in order to find expedients "in these quite
unexpected and perplexing affairs, " and Monday was
appointed for the return of the delegates sent to the cities.
Meanwhile an armed force from neighbouring garrisons
and the prince's guard occupied all entrances to The
Hague. The president and members of the States-
General were summoned to the prince and informed of
what had occurred. The prisoners on the following day
were conveyed under military guard by Van Meteren as
commandant of Loevestein to that fortress. Thus the
first part of the plans was carried out to the prince's
satisfaction.
The operation against Amsterdam was not so success-
ful. The management of this affair, which the prince him-
self wished to undertake at first, was finally intrusted to
Count William Frederick. From different provinces
forty-eight companies, numbering about 6000 men, were
collected at Amersfoort, Utrecht, Muiden, and Ouwer-
kerk, and later were joined to them 4000 men more
under command of the count himself and of the lords of
Noordwijk and Sommelsdijk. The intention was to sur-
prise the city, and this was to be effected by Major Gen-
tillot, a Frenchman, who, leaving Utrecht by the night
boat with fifty picked officers and soldiers, was to seize
upon a gate early in the morning and let in the count and
his troops. Thus it was expected to master the city with-
out bloodshed, which the prince desired to avoid in any
case. Gentillot lay concealed with his men at Ouwerkerk
early on Saturday morning, waiting for the promised
approach of the other troops. But disaster befell. The
1 Tweeentachiigjarig /even.
First Years of Peace 171
commander arrived in the night from The Hague at
Abcoude, and Sommelsdijk and Dohna from Gelderland
were also there in time, but the cavalry, ten companies
from Arnhem and Nimwegen under Captain Mom, went
astray in a storm near Hilversum on the heath and came
much too late. At the appointed time there were only
four companies of cavalry in Abcoude, with which it was
not dared to begin operations from fear of armed resist-
ance, so that Gentillot, tired of waiting, drew back upon
the main force at Abcoude.
Meanwhile the wandering cavalry had been observed by
the postal messenger from Hamburg to Amsterdam.
He had been incautiously allowed to proceed to the city,
and just after eight o'clock he informed the burgomaster,
Cornelis Bicker, that he had seen unknown troops a few
hours away. The report was soon confirmed by the
governor of the castle of Muiden and by fleeing peasants.
Bicker, who chanced to be the only burgomaster present,
had the gates closed at once, raised the drawbridges,
and assembled the town-council, believing some Swedish
or Lorraine soldiers from Julich or Brabant were ap-
proaching, and remembering recent rumours of hostile
designs against the city. Later in the day vigorous
measures of defence were taken : the council of war was
summoned, the militia was called to arms, cannon were
dragged to the walls, armed vessels were stationed in the
Y and Amstel, and preparations for inundating the sur-
rounding country were made. Count William Frederick,
at last in possession of his whole force, moved from
Abcoude close to the city, but he found it so ready for
resistance that he did nothing but send in a letter from
the prince, which was to have been delivered to the
town-council after the surprise. The prince expressed a
wish with the support of his troops to give his message to
the council. Not until evening did two members of the
council come in an armed boat to inform the count that
172 History of the Dutch People
Amsterdam had reported to the Estates of Holland what
had occurred and would await the reply, meanwhile
repelling all violence. The count determined to remain
where he was and to ask the prince for further orders.1
The next day, Sunday, Amsterdam deliberated upon
wnat should be done and considered the possibility of
cutting the sea-dikes in order to drive away the soldiers
by water. Count William by command of the prince
posted his troops so as to begin the surrounding of the
city from all sides. The prince himself remained at The
Hague until after the morning sermon, and departed for
the camp with a great company of noblemen and officers
to conquer the city by a siege. At Halfweg his cousin
met him, the ever moderate Louis of Nassau, lord of
Beverweert, directed his attention to the danger of in-
undation and offered to go to The Hague and bring
about a conciliatory deputation from the States-General
to him, while the prince was negotiating with Amster-
dam. Thus the affair might still be arranged. This
negotiation began on the 1st of August, and an agree-
ment was concluded on the 3d. Already experiencing
some of the injury a siege might cause to its commerce,
and perceiving that the other cities would let it fight out
its battle with the prince alone, Amsterdam submitted
and promised for the next three or four years to conform
to the will of the States-General concerning the disband-
ment, while the prince agreed to raise the siege. A
separate article, which the city vainly endeavoured to
escape, stipulated that the two Bickers, the leaders of the
opposition, should leave the government. The deputa-
tions of the States-General and Holland to the prince
found the matter settled. The soldiers departed on the
following day, and Amsterdam resumed its usual appear-
ance without having had actual fighting.8
1 See his report to the prince : Archives, iv., p. 388.
s See on all this Wijnne.
First Years of Peace 1 73
The prince had attained his object, although not quite
in the anticipated way. The six arrested members
remained a few weeks longer in confinement at Loeve-
stein, but after consultation with their cities they were
released one after the other in the latter part of August,
the cities having to remove them from office. The
"reasons and motives" for the imprisonment were
delivered in a sealed packet by the prince to Holland and
the States-General, and so this affair came also to an
end.1 The disbandment was taken up again in August,
and the prince met the universal wish for economy by a
sacrifice of the foreign troops so dear to him. This was
agreed to by a unanimous vote of the States-General,
while it was also established that no province could
disband on its own authority, and differences must be
settled by amicable agreement or by the stadtholders.
Twenty French, thirty-two English, and three Scotch
companies were designated for discharge besides twelve
companies of cavalry ; four companies of cavalry and
1000 men of the infantry continued in service six weeks
longer, while an effort was made to decide about them.
In response to the prince's communication the Estates of
the six provinces thanked him for the trouble he had
taken. At the end of August the prince went to Dieren
to amuse himself, after his success, with hunting, and
Cats says in rhyme:
" All that trouble great, 't was gone in a moment's flash
Like the thick clouds, which the heavens with wonder dash."
The result of the contest increased the prince's credit,
although the opposing party, now again called the
"Loevestein faction," was still dangerous because so
numerously represented in the town-councils of Holland.
The attitude towards France was modified in accordance
with the known partiality of the now powerful Orange
1 Archives, iv., p. 398.
174 History of the Dutch People
prince, who in August expressed to d' Estrades1 his hope
of soon seeing war break out again with Spain. If
mediation between the two warring powers failed, peace
could be forced upon Spain by arms. After the conclu-
sion of peace between France and Spain, English affairs
might be taken in hand, and the republic's influence
would be exerted for the benefit of the Stuarts.
In September matters were fully discussed, and the
prince consulted with Brasset and in deep secrecy with
d' Estrades, who was then in command at Dunkirk, as to
how mediation could be best arranged. He wished the
States-General to send an urgent communication to the
archduke at Brussels, intimating that he should not let
his victorious troops penetrate farther into France, but
should accept the mediation of the States. But the
States determined simply to offer their mediation to both
parties, and this was chiefly due to Holland's efforts.
The French wanted the affair to be taken up more vigor-
ously, though it was evident that much must happen
before Holland could be persuaded to an actual war. In
October the draft was made, probably by Mazarin," for a
treaty between France and the republic, stipulating a
joint war against Spain in the spring of 165 1 in case the
official mediation of the States should fail. The time
was not ripe for such far-reaching plans, and under the
circumstances the prince would certainly not have
approved of the draft. Yet he did not give up all hope.
Before the middle of October he went from The Hague
to Dieren again, ostensibly for hunting, but really to win
over the Estates of Gelderland to his designs. A nego-
tiation concerning the sale of Cleves and Mark by
1 Archives, iv., p. 404. See Blok's Archivalia te Parijs, pp. 34, 35, and
Fruin's articles on these plans for war and mediation in Bijdr. ?,de R. ix.,
p. 1, and x., p. 197; Waddington, La Re'publique des Provinces -Unies, ii..
P- 348.
2 Fruin in Bijdr. ix., p. 21.
First Years of Peace 175
Brandenburg to Prince William seems to indicate other
plans, connected perhaps with a ducal title in Gelder-
land — plans and prospects of much importance for the
republic's internal condition.
While all this was in suspense, and nobody could tell
the result, the news suddenly came that the prince had
been taken sick at Dieren. Some days later the illness
was pronounced a light case of small-pox. Although the
treacherous nature of this malady was well known, the
reports at first excited no alarm. The patient was
brought to The Hague, and the disease was supposed to
be taking its ordinary course, when it was announced
that the prince had died late in the evening of the 6th of
November. It was a terrible blow to the house of Orange
and to the fatherland. Although the exasperation of the
Holland party gave utterance to many a bitter word
concerning the departed, although an unknown donor
thus exulted in the contribution box of an Amsterdam
church :
" The prince deceased,
My gift's increased;
No news pleased more
In years four score,"
there was nobody untouched by this sudden death. Is
it strange that murmurs of poisoning were heard and have
continued even to our time? They arose from the
apparent carelessness of the physicians in their early
treatment of the case, and Spain's presumed interest in
the prince's death strengthened the otherwise baseless
suspicion.1 Deep was the dismay of the people attached
to Orange, and only the birth of a son, eight days later,
afforded some consolation, or at least some hope for the
future, which seemed at first dark for Orange as well as
for the fatherland, that felt the absence of a prince of
1 See De Beaufort, Geschiedkundige Opstellen, ii., p. 102.
176 History of the Dutch People
Orange as a national misfortune, as the beginning of the
young republic's fall.
In these circumstances the regents, especially those of
Holland, showed themselves fully equal to the task of
governing. They took the opportunity to organise the
state without any chance for confusion and to establish
upon a firm basis the influence of the Estates recently
menaced by the prince's vigorous proceedings. This
was accomplished not by the "Loevestein faction" alone.
The moderate elements of the Orange party, disabled by
the prince's sudden death, helped in maintaining the
government of the States on the old footing. Of the
two parties the former, headed by the aged Pauw, with
the Amsterdam lords and Jacob de Witt, long remained
the more powerful ; the other could do little under the
lead of the rather unprincipled William Frederick, of the
very moderate Beverweert, and of the marshal Johan
Wolfert van Brederode insignificant as a statesman, and
paralysed by dissensions, particularly by that flaming up
between the princess dowager, Amalia, and the young
princess royal.
The jealousy between the ambitious grandmother and
the proud mother of the new-born prince injured the
Orange party greatly. While still confined to her bed the
princess royal, who aspired to the sole guardianship over
her son, quarrelled with Princess Amalia, who adduced
the youth of the princess as a reason for appointing
another guardian, having her own son-in-law in view, the
elector of Brandenburg. The affection of the princess
royal for her English family in exile, which she was
eager to assist with the money of the Oranges, the
arrogance of the English king's daughter towards her
mother-in-law, the former lady of the court of her aunt
of Bohemia, augmented the division in the Orange family.
It was furthered also by the mutual jealousy of the
"Nassau counts": William Frederick and John Maurice,
First Years of Peace 177
and Brederode, the "born count of Holland," a scion of
the race that asserted its descent from the ancient family
of counts, all three having an eye upon the military
posts of the dead prince, by the opposition to the elector
as a foreigner, and by discord between him and the chief
advisers of the princess royal, Beverweert and Johan van
Kerchoven, lord of Heenvliet- Under these circum-
stances some universally hated Orangemen, like Johan
de Knuyt in Zealand and Musch in Holland, became
victims. De Knuyt was removed from his post of first
nobleman, and the clerk escaped a similar fate and an
investigation of his far from spotless life by a speedy
death.
The question of the guardianship was referred by the
Estates of Holland to the court of Holland, which pro-
nounced for the mother as guardian with the addition of
the elector. The grandmother and the elector appealed
from this decision to the High Council, which declared all
three guardians with the prince of Landsberg, a Palati-
nate relative of the Orange house. This met with the
approval of none of the parties, and after much wrangling
an agreement was reached in August, 165 1, that the
guardianship should be exercised by the princess royal as
guardian, together with the princess dowager and the
elector. The cradle of young William Henry of Orange
was surrounded by quarrelling members of the family.
Even over his name difficulties arose, the mother wishing
to call him Charles after her brother, the English exile.
But uncommon princely splendour was displayed at his
christening as also at his father's funeral.
Naturally the Estates of Holland and of the other
provinces encountered slight opposition in getting
possession of the rights enjoyed by the princes of
Orange. Immediately after the prince's death the
States-General came together hastily, informed the
different provinces of the event, and requested them to
VOL. IV.— 12.
178 History of the Dutch People
take the necessary measures "in this highly important
conjuncture." The Estates of Holland at once declared
their readiness to maintain the union, as well as religion
in accordance with the principles of the synod of Dort,.
while regarding the militia they appealed to the resolu-
tions adopted in 1646. Some days later they invited the
other provinces in "General Convocation" to send a
number of extraordinary delegates to regulate affairs, and
deputations went to the provinces to advocate this
matter and apparently to see that the "General" or so
called "Great Assembly" was made up as much as
possible to Holland's liking. The sitting States-General
had acted under the prince's influence and were not so
easily to be managed. The States-General did what Hol-
land proposed and summoned for the middle of December
the seven provinces to a "Great Assembly." Meanwhile
the Estates of Holland resolved to settle the question
of the appointment of magistrates. Every town desiring it
received from the Estates the privilege of naming its own
magistrates, the town-council usually nominating two per-
sons, and one of them being chosen by lot. Evidently
the plan was not to appoint a stadtholder or a temporary
"lieutenant" for the young prince in that capacity. It
was asserted "that it was quite uncertain what he would
grow to," and the appointment of a lieutenant was
dangerous for the future of the prince himself.1 Zealand,
where the friends of the house of Orange were daily losing
influence through the reaction against their omnipotence
duringthe life of the first three princes of Orange, coincided
in this opinion, as did also Utrecht, Gelderland, and
Overyssel. A few days after the prince's death Gronin-
gen had chosen Count William Frederick in his place.
The Estates of Holland seized upon other rights of the
deceased Orange prince, such as the bestowal of the
higher military offices, of the forestership, the naming of
'Aitzema, iii., p. 467.
First Years of Peace 1 79
the rector of Leyden University, the granting of par-
dons; the prince's guard became the guard of the
Estates; the keys of the gates were thenceforth to be
kept by the magistrates of the town instead of by the
military commander. Holland likewise entered into
"private correspondence" with the other provinces,
particularly with Zealand, in "preparatory conference"1
over all sorts of affairs, which it desired to carry through
the "Great Assembly" to be convened.
The Great Assembly did not meet in 1650 but was
solemnly opened on the 18th of January, 165 1, in the old
knightly hall of the counts decorated with trophies of
the Spanish war, with conquered flags and streamers.2
The large hall offered by the Estates of Holland was pro-
vided with benches arranged around the sides in the
manner of an amphitheatre. In the middle before the
chimney there was a table for the officers and for the for-
eign ambassadors to be received. A considerable number
of deputies from the seven provinces was present ;
especially from Holland and Friesland came many of
the ablest magistrates, mostly members of the States-
General; and this assembly might have passed for an
extraordinary meeting of that body. After a short
address by Pibo van Doma from Friesland, whose turn it
was to preside over the States-General, Jacob Cats in the
name of Holland made a long speech — "after his manner
quite long and more polite than strong or touching"
Wicquefort says of it. He affirmed that, nobody of the
house of Orange now being capable of assuming the
dignities of its fathers, circumstances made necessary
deliberation upon the maintenance of the union of 1579.
Three preliminary points had to be kept in view: the
lJoh. de Witt to Dordrecht, Jan. 7, 1651 (Rijksarchief). These and
later notes from De Witt's correspondence are mostly taken from Fruin's
full extracts.
8 Holl. Mercurius, 1651, p. 60. Further, Wicquefort, ii., p. 3 ; Aitzema,
hi., p. 496.
180 History of the Dutch People
union, religion, and the army, but the rule for the first
two was already laid down in the union of Utrecht
and the synod of Dordrecht, and consideration of the
army was alone needed. Holland opined that the
appointment of a new captain-general should be
omitted, and that it would be enough to have a field
marshal and to regulate the rights of the provinces
towards the council of state in the matter of the
army. The province plainly indicated the Estates as
the paymasters and consequently supreme commanders
of the army.
These subjects were discussed for several months,
until August, though not always in a fashion accept-
able to Holland. Much negotiation ensued upon one
point of the union: the ever difficult question of how
mutual differences were to be settled. Friesland and
Groningen held that the stadtholders were indispensable
for this purpose. Friesland secretly suggested the house
of Nassau, now that the house of Orange could furnish
no suitable stadtholder, with an eye of course upon its
own stadtholder, William Frederick. The other prov-
inces considered the States-General, or the courts of jus-
tice, or chosen judges as the proper arbitrators in such
cases, and Holland, that would have nothing to do with
William Frederick, the besieger of Amsterdam, declared
the matter of the appointment of a stadtholder "purely
provincial," to which the other provinces finally agreed
with the exception of the two named. Holland and its
four partisans maintained in fact their resolution of
appointing no stadtholder, while naturally Friesland and
Groningen adhered to their view. The question of arbi-
tration was so little decided that both parties persisted in
appealing to their right. The marriage of Count William
Frederick in 1652 to Princess Albertina Agnes, the second
daughter of Frederick Henry, brought him later into
prominence in case a temporary representative should be
First Years of Peace 181
thought of for the young prince, a contingency by no
means impossible.
With regard to religion an agreement was soon beyond
question upon the principles of Dort. They were to be
maintained by each province in its territory "with the
power of the land." But the five delegates from the
provincial synods desired further vigorous action against
"popish idolatry, superstition, and hierarchy," against
the "innumerable Jesuits, priests, curates, and monks,"
who were overrunning the land "in thousands like
locusts" ; they asked also for enforcement of the placards
against other sectaries, against the public worship of the
Jews and the calumniation of the reformed doctrine in
books and other writings, finally for observance of Sun-
day and for measures against brothels, theatres, luxury,
and such crying sins, in order to show that the authorities
had not in vain received "the sword."1 The "politic"
Estates of Holland were unwilling to go so far, although
the more orthodox Zealand urged that satisfaction should
be given to the preachers. Friesland, Groningen, and
Overyssel sided with Zealand, but Gelderland and
Utrecht hesitated. A proposal of Holland was, on
January 27th, converted into a general resolution of the
assembly. It declared that the Dort principles were to
be conserved, that other sects should be kept " in all good
order and quiet," that the placards against the Roman-
ists should remain in force.
There was much more discussion concerning the army
which had lately given rise to such dissension. Four
things were prominent: the chief command, the trans-
fer of garrisons, and the secret correspondence about
military affairs within and without the country. The
provinces were of most varying opinions, but Holland
and Zealand agreed in wishing to intrust the chief com-
mand to the council of state and not to the States-
'Aitzema, iii., p. 506.
182 History of the Dutch People
General ; furthermore they wanted in this time of peace
no captain-general or admiral-general, but simply the field
marshal — now Brederode — at the head of the army and
the Holland lieutenant admiral, Tromp, at the head of the
fleet. Endless was the wrangling over these points, and
over the appointment of the young prince as captain-
general with or without a lieutenant. The two princesses
addressed vigorous representations to the Estates in
favour of the young prince, Princess Amalia in Holland,
the princess-widow in Zealand, where the Orange party
was still so strong that the Estates of Holland deemed it
necessary to send a deputation thither to keep the prov-
ince on the right path. This deputation, among whose
members were Jacob van Wassenaar, lord of Obdam,
and John de Witt, pensionary of Dordrecht, opposed
successfully the intrigues of the Orange party. A prop-
osition emanating from Holland attributed the transfer
of garrisons to the States-General, but by advice of the
council, which was to obtain a report or instruction
drawn up by the separate provinces, and to them was to
belong the right of moving troops within their borders
and of giving consent to the movement of troops into or
out of the province; the soldiers were to swear allegiance
to the general government as well as to the Estates har-
bouring and paying them. This proposition became a
resolution of the assembly. A captain-general was not
named as Holland wished, no decision being reached.
Nothing was settled about the appointment of army
officers, so that the provinces did what they pleased.
The secret correspondence on military affairs was left to
the States-General. Other military matters were ar-
ranged, the supreme power of the provincial Estates
coming out strongly. Several minor affairs were regu-
lated in the Great Assembly. A sharp resolution intro-
duced by Zealand to prevent bribery1 "by gifts and
1 Wicquefort, ii., p. 25. "It could not be denied that this corruption
First Years of Peace 1 83
pensions" was followed by a placard, which naturally did
not remedy the evil. New instructions were drawn up
for the council of state, the chamber of accounts, the
boards of admiralty, the higher and lower officers of the
general government. The foreign embassies remained
subject to the States-General. The sittings and travelling
expenses of the deputies of the States-General and the
council of state were established.
Towards the end of the important meetings, to which it
was sought to give a more solemn character by decreeing
that the resolutions adopted should be considered "of
the same power and vigour" as the union of Utrecht/
the council pensionary, Cats, in an evil hour raked up the
troubles of 1650. He had repeatedly offered in the Es-
tates of Holland to resign on account of his great age,
but no action was taken so that in June, in order to
bring out a decision, he simply laid upon the table impor-
tant papers in his possession, among them being a written
"Complaint" against Amsterdam and the carefully
guarded ' ' Reasons and motives' ' of Prince William ' ' both
with regard to the arrested gentlemen and to what is
begun at, by, and about the city of Amsterdam." The
reading of the latter violent document excited at once
such indignation that special commissioners were author-
ised to investigate it further. They proposed to offer a
written refutation of it to the Great Assembly, to request
it to declare illegal the resolutions of June 5 and 6, 1650,
which had led to one thing and another, and to withdraw
the thanks previously offered to the prince. Holland
examined the whole affair thoroughly and learned that
Musch was the chief author of this document as well as
of the complaint against Amsterdam. Musch was dead,
had reached the noblest parts of the state." Cf. Pamphlet Thys., No.
5900.
1 The resolutions are sometimes comprehended under the name " Further
union of The Hague of 1651 " (Pamphlet Thys., No. 5879, 5880, et seq.).
1 84 History of the Dutch People
but Sommelsdijk, whose conduct naturally came under
discussion, considered himself in danger and found it
desirable to defend himself before the commissioners by
appealing to the orders of the prince as captain-general
and of Count William Frederick.1 The latter also was
now seriously implicated and menaced with a judicial
investigation, whereupon Friesland, on July 20th, pro-
posed to the Great Assembly a "resolution of amnesty,
forgiving, and forgetting," so that no further dissension
should arise over these affairs of the past." Holland
desired each province should do strict justice for itself,
evidently with an eye to its subject, Sommelsdijk, who
had not succeeded in clearing himself. Not until Som-
melsdijk had promised not to appear in the Estates of
Holland unless the nobles again admitted him, and upon
strong pressure from Friesland, which, with Groningen's
support, threatened to hold all the resolutions of the
Great Assembly as null, if amnesty were not accepted,
did Holland yield, and amnesty was unanimously re-
solved on the 19th of August. The towns of Holland,
from which the six members came, had already sharply
declared that those gentlemen had faithfully performed
their duty; Amsterdam received from Holland over
54,000 guilders for its expenditures of 1650 "in the
service of the country."
Two days after the adoption of the amnesty Cats in
Holland's name delivered a flowery farewell address, laud-
ing the harmonious spirit of the assembly and testifying
to its important achievements, its forgiving disposition,
and God's apparent blessing upon its work. A religious
service was attended by all, and in the evening the ring-
ing of bells and the firing of cannon announced the end
of the Great Assembly. In the middle of September
followed a day of public thanks, fasting, and prayer, and
1 Archives, v., p. 411.
2Aitzema, iii., p. 582.
First Years of Peace 185
men exulted loudly: "now the Lion has again a clog
upon his claw."1
The work of the assembly was unquestionably impor-
tant. By its resolutions, as well as by what it left undone,
it fixed the government of the republic in the form result-
ing from the insurrection against Spain. Availing itself
of the temporary eclipse of the sun of Orange, it organ-
ised the government of the States, with all its faults and
without great changes, for the needs of the moment.
The aristocracy of the regents, whose representative
it might be considered, maintained through it, under the
lead of Holland's statesmen, the principle of "aristocratic
government" in opposition to the monarchical tendencies
of recent times and to feeble democratic utterances here
and there. The principle set up by Oldenbarnevelt
and his partisans was most plainly subscribed to by the
Great Assembly in all its acts. John de Witt thus
formulates this principle in one of his letters: "these
provinces are not together una rcspublica, but each prov-
ince is separately a sovereign rcspublica, so that these
United Provinces must be called not by the name of
respublica (in the singular number) but by the name of
respubliccz federatce or unitce (in the plural number)."3
This principle may be regarded as of great importance
for the future of the United Netherlands, although it was
far from finding universal acceptance.
1 Jer. de Decker.
8 Dated May 10, 1652 (Rijksar chief).
CHAPTER VIII
FIRST ENGLISH WAR
THE Great Assembly had not confined itself to the
regulation of internal affairs, as was at first in-
tended, but had considered also the foreign relations of
the republic. This resulted naturally from its giving
audience to foreign ambassadors. Important was the
announcement of the coming of an embassy from the
English republic on account of recent difficulties with
England. These difficulties concerned not alone the
attitude of the United Netherlands towards Parliament
and towards the pretensions to the English throne of
Charles II., the "king of Scotland," as he was officially
called, but were of a more critical nature.
Between the English and the Dutch nations there had
long existed a commercial jealousy which, from the begin-
ning of the seventeenth century, brought their seamen
and merchants into sharp rivalry almost over the whole
world. The disputes respecting the fishery on the
English coast and the question of the Dominium. Maris
in the time of James and Charles I., though not entirely
forgotten, were not taken up by the English during their
internal troubles. Shortly after the battle of the Downs,
that denial of English supremacy even in English har-
bours, the aged Aerssen had been sent (1639) to London
to conjure the expected storm, but the ambassador found
little to do. Although King Charles's first minister,
Lord Strafford, complained seriously of the "greatest
affront of the world" done to England, nothing came of
186
First English War 187
the complaint. Seeing that England could do little, the
States paid no attention to the English pretensions.
Meanwhile the English claims had excited a deeply
rooted hostility to the English in a large portion of
the population of the Netherlands. Many merchants,
seamen, and fishermen showed aversion to everything
that was English. There was further since the king's
execution a universal detestation among the Dutch of
the English regicides, who had laid hands upon their
sovereign. The old complaints of English arrogance
towards foreigners were repeatedly heard in the Nether-
lands and appeared in numerous pamphlets dealing with
English affairs of the day. As England's power rose
under Cromwell's energetic rule, these complaints did not
become less, especially when English war ships about
1650 began annoying Dutch merchantmen with the search
of their cargo and crew on the pretext of acting against
the piracy of the French and of the English royalists in
the Channel.
The feeling in England towards the Dutch was not
kindly. A self-conceited contempt for the smaller nation
and ridicule of its peculiarities, of its slowness, its intem-
perance, its distrust, its thirst for gain, the comparative
roughness of its "mynheers," its exaggerated neatness,
led to sharp criticism of the republic's inhabitants. Eng-
lish travels and pamphlets of the time are full of all this.
The protection granted in the Netherlands to those now
considered as England's enemies, the unpunished murder
of Doreslaer, the preference shown to the king's am-
bassadors over those of Parliament, the memory of
the unfortunate Ambon affair, commercial difficulties
in India and elsewhere — all had occasioned much
bad blood and increased in England the national enmity
toward the Dutch. As long as the civil war continued,
the attitude of the States with regard to the old
pretensions was without danger, but conditions changed
1 88 History of the Dutch People
when, in 1650, the English republic seemed permanently-
established and Cromwell powerful enough to uphold
it at home and abroad. The death of Prince William,
the protector of the Stuarts, apparently lessened the
chance of further troubles, and late in January the Great
Assembly resolved to recognise the English republic as
"free and sovereign." Joachimi, the able old ambassador,
was to depart for London in his former capacity, and thus
diplomatic relations with England actually broken off
would be resumed.
Before he crossed the sea, the English embassy arrived
at The Hague for the purpose of securing a much closer
union between the republic and its English sister. The
government of the English republic earnestly desired an
alliance based upon agreement in religion and political
institutions, in economic development, in all sorts of
interests, and upon the friendly relations of former days,
"for the general good of Christendom as well as for our
own." In 1649 the English government had voiced this
feeling to Heenvliet and Pauw,1 and Doreslaer had been
commissioned to offer a closer union.2 The brilliant
embassy of the Lord Chief Justice Oliver St. John and
Strickland, with a retinue of nearly 250 persons including
many noblemen, reached the Meuse escorted by five war
ships at the end of March, 165 1, and later The Hague.
St. John was unquestionably the head, one of the most
influential English statesmen of the period and possessed
with the idea of a closer alliance, while "the wild scheme
of political union"3 was to come up only in case the off ers
of alliance were favourably received. The reception on
the side of the States left nothing to be desired, but the
populace showed open enmity and abused the embassy
1 Mitsukuri, Englisch-niederlandische Unionsbestrebungen im Zeitalter
Cromwells (Tubingen, 1891), pp. 25, 26.
2 Aitzema, iii., p. 377.
3 Gardiner, p. 357.
First English War 189
in the worst way. St. John proposed "a more strict and
intimate alliance and union" for the promotion of "a
more intrinsical and mutual interest of each in other,"
founded upon similarity of religion, government, and
commercial interest. The idea encountered cool reserve
upon the part of the Dutch. The majority of the
population of the Netherlands, favouring the Orange
family and the Stuarts, wanted no close connection.
Not to displease the ambassadors, it was declared that
"a treaty over common interests" would be concluded.
But this was altogether too general for St. John. He
desired a "clear and satisfactory answer" and formally
offered a close, defensive alliance which was then dis-
cussed seriously in the provincial Estates.
While the affair was in suspense, news came thatTromp,
sent out to curb the royalist privateers on the Scilly
Islands, had occupied one of these islands. This act,
viewed with suspicion in England, also the attitude of
the populace and of the Bohemian royal family, Prince
Edward being especially conspicuous, in The Hague
towards the Englishmen of the embassy so angered
Parliament that it summoned St. John home and only
rescinded this resolution, when Holland promised to stop
the insults and actually prosecuted Prince Edward.
Negotiations were resumed, the English now consider-
ing chiefly the support given the Stuarts in the Nether-
lands, while the Dutch sought reciprocity of commercial
advantages with restoration of the Magnus Intercursas
of 1496. The English, showing little diplomatic talent,
reverted often in vague terms to the plans of union, but
the States, ever dreading public opinion, made answer
more in general. The English demands concerning the
royalists appeared on the contrary very definite. In cer-
tain cases they asked for the confiscation of the property
of those daring to support the royalists, thus also of the
princess of Orange, a request impossible to grant. Pro-
190 History of the Dutch People
posals were made on both sides, until St. John under-
stood that little was to be obtained from the States and
took his departure on the 30th of July in great vexation
at the failure of his mission. Neither the banishment of
the Stuarts nor the close alliance was attained.
Parliament's tone in reply to St. John's communica-
tions was very bitter. The English government now
thought of war to force the obstinate States into an
engagement with England that would prevent them from
ever harbouring England's enemies. The fear of such an
extremity induced the States-General, after the close of
the Great Assembly, to resolve upon the sending of a
Dutch embassy to England. There it soon became
evident that hostility was wanted. England was begin-
ning to appreciate more and more the importance of its
fleet which was coming up under able managers like
Cromwell's colleague Vane and excellent commanders like
Blake and Penn. The English republic exerted itself to
put its navy into a condition to oppose the fleets of other
nations, perceiving that England's power, peace, and
commerce could only be satisfactorily sustained by a
strong navy. Charles II. 's defeat by Cromwell in the
battle of Worcester on September 3d, his flight to
France, the subjection of almost all Scotland by the
English army, and victories in Ireland soon afforded Par-
liament an opportunity to devote its attention entirely
to the navy and commerce.
Naturally it came into conflict with the interests of the
United Netherlands, the greatest maritime power of the
time, whose ships covered the oceans, whose commercial
spirit sought to overcome all competition. England was
still dependent upon Dutch commerce, which had made it-
self master of nearly all the carrying trade of northern and
western Europe. Trade between England and France
went on largely in Dutch vessels, and the treaty just con-
cluded with Denmark gave them greater influence in the
First English War 191
Baltic than ever before. St. John after his return urged
strong measures and in August presented his famous
Navigation Act to Parliament, which made it a law
October 9, 165 1.1 The Navigation Act, undoubtedly
directed first of all against Dutch commerce, prohibited the
importation into England of foreign, non-European prod-
ucts otherwise than in vessels belonging to English-
men or inhabitants of English colonies and manned by-
crews, of which half at least must be Englishmen.
European products might alone be imported in English
vessels or in vessels of the country where the products
were grown or made. The Act would assuredly injure the
Dutch carrying trade to England and Dutch commerce
in general, and it might serve to develop English naviga-
tion. It was the beginning of the vigorous commercial
policy that was to make England great as a nation and a
maritime power and has inscribed upon its banner "rule
the waves." It sounded like a challenge to the whole
world, and first to the commercial nation on the other
side. But the men putting through the Act did not wish
it to cause war at once, for they intended it only as a
piece of competition in commerce. And it would not
have led to war, if new fuel had not been added to the
long smouldering fire of dissension. This new fuel con-
sisted chiefly of a larger number of seizures of Dutch
ships by English cruisers which repeatedly searched
neutral vessels for contraband and even brought them into
English ports. That this took place not merely in the
"seas about England," but out on the ocean, and even
upon neutral coasts, was very disagreeable to the Dutch
and quite opposed to their cherished theory of the "open
sea.
In these circumstances it was of great importance that
the conduct of foreign affairs in the republic should rest
in able and experienced hands. After the resignation of
1 Gardiner, ii., p. 82.
192 History of the Dutch People
Cats as council pensionary of Holland, the aged Adriaan
Pauw had been unanimously chosen for this office so
influential when there was no stadtholder. Reluctantly
the venerable man assumed for the second time the
dignity of the Atlas belgicce libertatis. But with him a
young statesman soon began to attract attention, the 26-
years old John de Witt,1 pensionary of Dordrecht.
John de Witt, second son of burgomaster Jacob de Witt,
was brought up in the best circles of Dordrecht, where his
family had been in the government since the fifteenth
century. He studied law with his brother at Leyden
University, then travelled through France on horseback
with his brother, and visited England. Obtaining his
degree at Angers, John, the younger son, settled at
The Hague in 1647 as an advocate; Cornelius, the older,
entered the government of his native city. At The
Hague John moved in the society of the magistrates,
taking part in the social life of the gay capital of the
Oranges, studying mathematics as much as his law
business would allow, and now and then amusing himself
by writing poetry, by translating Corneille's Horace.
Accounts of him at this time2 depict him as a grave and
tall young man, with an oval face, a yellowish com-
plexion, brown hair and eyes, simply but carefully
dressed, attracting notice by his extraordinary knowl-
edge and development, by his clear insight, his love of
order, his uncommon talent for the persuasion of others,
further by his capacity for work and by tranquillity of
mind, making his maxim ago quod ago, by his honesty
and his inaccessibility to bribery and flattery.
1 He was born at Dordrecht, September 24, 1625, according to Wicquefort
(iv., p. 537), who knew him well. Geddes, i., p. 30, makes him two years
older, but that is impossible, as his brother Cornelius was born July 10,
1623.
2 On the youth and pensionaryship of De Witt: Geddes, History of the
administration of fohn de Witt, i., the first chapters, and Lefevre Pontalis
fean de Witt (Fa.ris, 1884), i., p. Si, 133 et seq.
First English War 193
The father's imprisonment by command of the prince
must have shocked the son who with Cornelius set about
securing his release. The exclusion of the father from
any place in the government menaced their future also,
when the prince's death suddenly improved their po-
sition. Jacob de Witt returned immediately to the gov-
ernment of Dordrecht, and John became pensionary
of his native town on December 21, 1650. With a
few members of the government he then represented the
city regularly in the Estates of Holland, soon also in the
Great Assembly, where he exercised an important
influence, especially in the treatment of the English pro-
posals. Concerning them and domestic affairs we
possess noteworthy information in his correspondence
with his city.1 In the autumn of 165 1 he assisted Pauw
in managing relations with England. He was a member
of the committee appointed January 25, 1652, by the
Estates of Holland to give advice on English affairs.
As pensionary of the "first city" of Holland he could
claim a place on that commission, but his ability drew
attention to the young statesman who was soon greatly
to influence the fate of his country.
After negotiations with St. John were broken off and
the Englishmen had departed, the Great Assembly,
upon motion of Holland, resolved to send an extraordi-
nary embassy to England. The unexpected promulga-
tion of the Navigation Act lessened the chances of its
success, and some months elapsed before the embassy
started. It consisted of Cats, the former commissioner
Schaep, and the Zealander Van de Perre. These gentle-
men landed at Gravesend on Christmas, receiving all the
marks of honour, though hooted at by the people of
London, where caricatures and pamphlets appeared
against them. The embassy was to negotiate not only
over the Magnus Intercursus, but also for the repeal of
1 The letters are in the Royal Archives.
vol. iv. — 13.
194 History of the Dutch People
the Act, the cessation of the troubling of Dutch mer-
chantmen by English ships on pretext of searching for
French goods, the revocation of the letters of reprisal
already granted against the Dutch, and for an indemnity
to the injured merchants — in short, for the recognition
by treaty of the theory of the "open sea."
Parliament, after listening amusedly to the bombastic
Latin oration of the aged Cats, did not decline to open
negotiations, and immediately suspended the letters of
marque, but the English statesmen met the complaints of
the States with counter complaints, embodying old and
new grievances. With the murder of Doreslaer, the
insults heaped on the English ambassadors, the protec-
tion of England's enemies, the Sound treaty, etc., came
up again the questions of Ambon, the Downs, the
fishery, of the obstacles to English commerce in Russia,
the East and West Indies. Large demands for repara-
tion were made, while the repeal of the Act and indem-
nity for the damage to Dutch commerce were refused.
Another demand was that the Dutch with all nations
should acknowledge England's supremacy in "English
waters" — a very elastic expression — by striking flag and
sail before English ships. If a Dutch ship or fleet met
an English squadron, the Dutch ships were accustomed
to strike flag and topsails and to fire a salute. The
number of shots fired, 9, 7, or 5, depended upon the Eng-
lish commander's rank, whether he was admiral, vice
admiral, or rear admiral. For a single ship without a
commander of this rank, salutes were sufficient without
any striking; on sailing into English harbours the flag
was struck and replaced by a pennant, while salutes were
exchanged.1 All this, particularly the last demand,
caused exasperation in the Netherlands. It was seen
that England wanted war, and the leading statesmen, De
1 Aitzema, iii., p. 731, according to Tromp's own explanation of the
custom.
First English War 195
Witt especially, dreaded this as a great misfortune for
both nations. First of all the increase of the navy was
an urgent necessity.
Economy had been introduced in the navy after the
peace of Miinster. Some ships of war were sold openly
or secretly, also to England, or dismantled; many sea-
men were discharged ; and good captains went into
the merchant marine. In February the States-General
resolved to fit out fifty, later one hundred more vessels, for
the protection of commerce1 which could not be well
enough guarded by the fleet of nearly seventy-five ships
then in existence. The resolution to enlarge the navy
was brought to the notice of the various powers, includ-
ing England. It was regarded by the English govern-
ment as a threat and occasioned a considerable increase
of the navy on that side also, so that it soon numbered
far over one hundred sails. The English vessels were
larger and better manned than the Dutch, even than
Tromp's flagship, the Brederode. While both sides
prepared, the Dutch ambassadors continued to negotiate,
but the long list of grievances with the indemnity desired,
which the English government in March laid before
them, was not promising. A month later that govern-
ment requested before further negotiation "settlement
of the demands, which are a matter of right and justice
and touch our honour." Negotiations went on until the
end of May, when an unexpected event precipitated the
crisis.
The question of the right to search the cargo of neu-
trals and to confiscate the enemy's goods in neutral
vessels gave rise to it. During the prevailing tension
between France and England the English admiralty
desired their cruisers to exercise this right without
restriction. On the other hand, the States-General in
1 Gardiner, Letters and papers relating to the first Dutch war, i., p. 85;
Wicquefort, ii., p. 122.
196 History of the Dutch People
1650 had incorporated in a treaty with Spain the princi-
ple that a neutral flag covered the cargo except only in
case of contraband. The English government would not
accept this new rule of international law, but the States-
General wished its recognition and the guarantee of
Dutch ships against injury. It was again the oft-dis-
puted question of the "open sea." Tromp, the aged
lieutenant admiral, who was to command the fleet, was
personally opposed to the English demands, particularly
to that concerning the flag. The brave seaman was wont
to say that he would only strike the flag "when the Eng-
lish were the strongest." He was now sent to sea in
May with fifty vessels. According to his instructions he
was to protect the Dutch ships from search, defend them
against molestation, and free them from seizure. With
regard to striking the flag, he was told generally that he
must have a care that the state should suffer no affront,1
so that this delicate matter was left to him, although he
was recommended to approach the English coast as little
as possible, and to keep rather to the Flemish shore in
order to avoid a collision.
Tromp anchored between Dunkirk and Nieuwpoort,
but encountered a storm and sailed on May 29th to
Dover to repair damages, while he informed the English
ships in the Downs of his intention. At Dover, however,
he met Captain Van der Zaen, who reported that he had
fought with a British frigate of Blake's fleet about strik-
ing the flag and that seven merchantmen convoyed by
him through the Channel were in danger of capture.
Tromp, who had not yet saluted the castle of Dover,
now sailed towards the English coast and there came
upon Blake cruising with fifteen ships in the Channel.
On Blake's approach Tromp made ready, as he insisted
later, to strike the flag; he struck his pennant and
stationed a man by the flag, when Blake, presuming that
De Jonge, Zeewezen, i., p. 413.
First English War 197
Tromp was unwilling to strike, began hostilities and fired
repeatedly upon the Dutch admiral's ship, first with
warning shots across the bow, then straight at the ship.
After some hesitation Tromp answered with a shot
which was followed by Blake's full broadside and by a
regular fight between the two fleets. Twelve English
vessels hastened from the Downs, and the battle soon
became general until darkness separated the combatants.
Tromp had lost two ships and withdrew to the French
coast, confining himself, as he afterwards declared, to
defensive tactics.1
There was great indignation in London at Tromp's
attitude. A commission of inquiry, of which Cromwell
was a member, pronounced him guilty. Opinion differed
in the Netherlands, where many disapproved of Tromp's
action and attributed it to his Orange partisanship, it
being well known that the Orange party desired war in
the interest of the Stuarts and of the young prince, who
might then be made captain-general. John de Witt and
others hoped for peace. They believed peace to be more
to the Dutch interest than war. The English would
have the "golden mountain" of the rich Netherlands to
attack, while the Dutch would have to assail the " iron
mountain" of England impoverished by civil war. If
the Dutch were victorious, what advantage would result
to them? And what might they not lose? New instruc-
tions commanded Tromp to act only on the defensive
and to strike the flag ''according to ancient custom." It
was immediately resolved to send Pauw himself to Eng-
land in order, with the help of the Hollander Willem
Nieuwpoort already there, to convince Parliament of the
peaceful disposition of the States and to cause the battle
of Dover to be forgotten, as the consequence of a
misunderstanding. At the same time the fitting out of
'Gardiner, ii., p. 119; Geddes, p. 209; Gardiner, Letters, i., p. 170
et seq.
198 History of the Dutch People
the 150 ships was hastened. On the English side also
great zeal was shown in strengthening the fleet under
direction of the admiralty committee of the council of
state, with the navy commission subordinate to it,: and
with the advice of the excellent general, Robert Blake.
Under Blake, William Penn and George Ayscue were
appointed vice admirals, and Bourne was rear admiral.
Cromwell himself at Dover looked after preparations for
the war. As early as June, sixty English vessels lay
ready in the Downs, while Dutch merchantmen were
seized in all English ports.
Pauw, hastily departing for England, made the greatest
exertions to preserve the peace. But the feeling in Hol-
land grew more warlike, as its people considered them-
selves stronger on the sea, and in Parliament also many
urged war, expecting great profit for the developing Eng-
lish commerce. Cromwell desired no war with the sister
republic of a like faith and ancestry, for he hoped to win
it over to his religio-political plans in Europe, to the
great Protestant alliance against the Catholic powers.
He seems to have pushed preparations for war in order to
dissuade the Netherlands from war by a development of
force and in order to strengthen the English war power.
Pauw did not fully understand his disposition. Seeing
England's preparations, he feared a declaration of war at
an unfavourable time and advised more firmness. At
the end of June the States-General sharply formulated
their demands, ordering the ambassadors in case of
refusal to return. Soon nothing else was left for them
to do. The torch of war was lighted and Tromp received
instructions to inflict all possible injury on the English.
With his fleet of nearly 100 ships and 11,000 men he was
to keep commerce and fishery from harm. Both govern-
ments issued long manifestoes in justification of their
conduct.
1 Oppenheim, Administration of the Royal Navy ; i., p. 346.
First English War 199
What had been feared soon came to pass. The great
extension of Dutch commerce promised England an
advantage with its situation in the path of almost all the
Dutch merchantmen. Vice Admiral Ayscue, summoned
from the West Indies, succeeded in destroying a fleet of
Dutch merchantmen near Calais, while Blake himself fell
upon the fishing fleet off the Orkneys and captured the
Dutch war ships protecting it. Tromp first blockaded
Ayscue in the Downs, but did not fight him on account
of the efficient defence of the coast. He then followed
Blake northwards and found him late in July, but was
prevented from attacking him by a violent storm and
returned home with scarcely half of his storm-ravaged
fleet. Ayscue sailing out again was repulsed near
Plymouth by the Zealand commander, De Ruyter,
who was convoying a merchant fleet through the
Channel.1 The disappointment over Tromp's expedition,
the distrust of his loyalty to the existing government,
the heavy loss sustained in the fishing fleet, caused his
suspension immediately after his return. There was talk
of bringing him to trial. Vice Admiral Witte de With
was given chief command in his place to the great vexa-
tion of the disorderly crews of the fleet, who would not
allow the strict captain upon Tromp's ship. With
difficulty he succeeded in joining De Ruyter menaced in
the Channel by the English superiority, and united they
encountered Blake in the Downs October 8th after a
severe storm. De With contended valiantly, but with-
out much discretion, against Blake's larger force. The
cowardice of a score of his captains, who took to flight
during the battle, so reduced his strength that after a
sharp engagement he ordered a retreat on the following
day.3
The injury suffered and the stoppage of commerce and
1 Geddes, p. 227; De Jonge, i., p. 422; Gardiner, Letters, ii., p. I et seq.
sGeddes, p. 254; Gardiner, Letters, ii., p. 217.
200 History of the Dutch People
the fishery caused increasing discontent and led in the
autumn to a movement in favour of the young prince of
Orange. "Although our prince is still so small, stadt-
holder he must be for all," sang the people. And the
partisans of Orange in the States sang with them. In
Zealand and Gelderland there were disturbances, and the
elevation of the young prince was proposed in the
Estates. Holland deemed it necessary to send a deputa-
tion to Zealand to avert the threatening peril. John de
Witt was at the head of this deputation. On its arrival
it ran the risk of being assailed by the populace which
' ' seemed to have grown above the government. ' ' ' People
flocked from the country around into Middelburg, so
that the deputation had to be guarded by armed men.
But De Witt spurred his frightened colleagues into
courage, and they delivered their message. Zealand,
nevertheless, endeavoured to persuade the other prov-
inces to appoint the prince captain-general, and his
cousin William Frederick as his lieutenant. The Estates
of Holland took great pains to combat such ideas and
managed to draw out the affair without entirely stop-
ping it, because the Orange leaders by pamphlets and
secret machinations continued to stir up the people
against the government of the States.
Thus far the Dutch unmistakably had the worst of it.
But on the Tuscan coast Jan Van Galen in August had
succeeded in blockading two small English squadrons in
Leghorn and Porto Longone. In the North Sea also the
year did not end without more encouraging results.
After De With's defeat the recreant captains, mostly
belonging in Zealand, were punished or at least sentenced
by a special court to severe punishment, but it appeared
impossible to restore discipline on the fleet with-
out Tromp's all-powerful authority. Tromp was
persuaded to take up his task again for the father-
1 De Witt, Brieven, v., p. II.
First English War 201
land, though not without bitter complaint of the
lack of confidence shown him. In November the
hero sailed into the North Sea with a fleet of
almost one hundred ships escorting nearly five hun-
dred merchantmen. Storm and fog compelled hirn to
bring back the latter, but with some sixty ships he put
to sea again early in December and on the ioth met
Blake off Dungeness. The English fleet was now some-
what less in number, though its vessels, as usual in this
war, were larger and better manned. This time many
English captains left their admiral in the lurch, and
Blake suffered a severe defeat, making Tromp for a time
master of the sea, so that he threatened a landing upon
the English coast and caused people to fear an attack
on the Thames, where many war and merchant ships
were as good as unprotected.
The reorganisation of the English fleet was effected
under Blake himself and the two able generals of the
army, Monk and Deane, who were placed on the fleet.
By the middle of February it was again ready to put to
sea. It found Tromp in the Channel on his voyage back
to the fatherland with a convoy of 150 merchantmen.
Off Portland the fleets met February 28, 1653. A fierce
fight ensued during two days with the English vanguard —
the English had adopted the Dutch custom of a division
into squadrons, — but Tromp, who had already been at sea
nearly three months, perceived speedily that his powder
would soon run short, and the merchantmen impeded
his operations. On the third day only thirty of his
ships appeared able to offer resistance, bravely led by
himself and by his subordinates, Johan Evertsen, Pieter
Floriszoon, and De Ruyter, who had also covered them-
selves with glory in the first and second days. With
unsurpassed seamanship Tromp fought through the
enemy's strong force, losing but a few of his vessels, and
in the evening of the third day, almost without powder,
202 History of the Dutch People
he reached at Grisnez the French coast with its chalk
reefs, and during the night outsailed the pursuing enemy
in a masterly manner. The three days' battle, which
went on from Portland to the mouth of the Channel,
was one of those engagements, in which the Dutch,
though worsted, so often displayed not merely valour but
especially their seamanship in a way to extort admiration
from the enemy.1
The party, opposed with Cromwell and Vane to the
war and regarding it as against brethren in the faith, as
fratricide, was growing stronger meanwhile in England,
particularly now it appeared that the Dutch Republic was
not so easily to be conquered as the war party had
imagined. In August the old diplomatist Gerbier had
been sent to The Hague as a secret agent; the strict
Puritan admiral, Ayscue, had refused to serve longer in
this war and had laid down his command at the instance
of the former Puritan exile, Peters, now an influential
statesman after living for years in Rotterdam. The
enthusiasm for the war had quickly subsided on the
Dutch side also; the defeats, commercial losses, increas-
ing want of money, the defects of the fleet, had changed
public opinion. England was disagreeably affected,
furthermore, by the hostile attitude of Denmark, which
at the instigation of the Dutch ambassador Keyser
closed the Sound to English vessels. Sweden also,
whither Van Beuningen had been dispatched in Septem-
ber, 1652, as ambassador of the States, seemed more
inclined to the Dutch than to the English side. Gerbier's
secret discussions amounted to little, but they were soon
continued by Dolman, an English colonel in the Dutch
service who was sent to England, and by Stone, an Eng-
lish captain of horse. Finally in the early spring of
1653 a secret letter was drawn up from Pauw to the master
of ceremonies of Parliament or to some other member
'De Jonge, i., p. 447; Gardiner, ii., p. 157.
First English War 203
with an offer to open negotiations. Pauw made some
difficulty about signing this letter, although he was
authorised by the Holland committee for English affairs,
so the matter was brought ''under oath of secrecy" be-
fore the Estates of Holland, the letter was then signed
by Pauw and handed to Stone, who immediately de-
parted with it for England.1
The sending of this letter in the name of the leading
Dutch statesmen was a dangerous sign of exhaustion.
There was no mistake about it. Fishery and commerce
were at a stand, bringing thousands to beggary; the
harbours were crowded with vessels; the lack of grain
was seriously felt ; and money was no longer to be found
in the public treasuries. All sorts of means were
thought of to provide money for pressing needs, but it
quickly appeared that the only satisfactory way was —
peace. This feeling was welcome to the Dutch states-
men who had tried to prevent war and were now waiting
for a chance to restore peace. The most influential of
them was the young man who had become the right hand
of the enfeebled council pensionary and might already be
considered as his presumptive successor: John de Witt.
He was unwilling to let the opportunity pass, and urged
the other members of the committee on English affairs
to work for peace. It was chiefly due to him that the
secret letter was sent off. This had scarcely taken place,
when Pauw died (February 21st), and De Witt, who had
repeatedly shown uncommon capacity and energy in
filling his place temporarily, was a few days later again
invested temporarily with the important office by an
almost unanimous vote, a proof of great confidence in the
young statesman, who might be regarded as Pauw's
pupil. The secret letter carried to London by Stone
made its way, but the war party in England, considering
1 Concerning this, see the very important letter of De Witt to Van
Beuningen dated February 13, 1653 (Royal Archives).
204 History of the Dutch People
the battle off Portland as a victory, was stronger for the
time being, and more vigorous action appeared necessary
to enable the peace party there to assert itself. So De
Witt in March requested in deep secrecy the Estates of
Holland to send official letters to Parliament and the
council of state, proving that peace was really desired by
the government of the most powerful province. The
Estates agreed to this, although Leyden, always favour-
ing Orange, objected to acting without the other prov-
inces. It was further resolved upon De Witt's motion,
as soon as Parliament took up the plan, to do away with
secrecy and to reveal all in the States-General.
The affair appeared for a moment to go wrong. The
letter of the Estates became known to all England and
was printed as a "humble supplication" for peace, which
made a very bad impression upon the people in the
Orange provinces extremely sensitive concerning Eng-
land. De Witt cleverly righted this by communicating
quickly the whole matter to the States-General which,
contrary to his expectation, were soon reconciled to the
separate secret negotiation. The Orange party violently
opposed the action as against the provisions of the
Union regarding treaties with foreign powers. But De
Witt surmounted these difficulties, when the answer of
Parliament seemed favourable and it showed a readiness
to take up again the negotiations of July, 1652. He
wanted to propose a truce and send an ambassador at
once, but the Estates of Holland would not go so far.
A friendly letter only was sent requesting Parliament to
indicate a neutral place for resuming negotiations (April
30th) ; De Witt accomplished this merely by a majority
of four to three provinces, which was really in conflict
with the Union.
This letter found conditions in England changed not
unfavourably. Cromwell with the army's support had
dissolved Parliament on the same 30th of April and
First English War 205
established another government with himself as actual
dictator, until England should give itself a more mo-
narchical form of government, either by his restoring the
Stuarts, as the royalists hoped without good reason, or
by his assuming the royal title himself or some other
corresponding to it. The last occurred, and on Decem-
ber 16th " His Highness Oliver Cromwell, Lord Pro-
tector of the Republic of England " took the oath as
such amid the acclamations of his soldiers and partisans,
while the English people quietly looked on, weary of
change and longing for a strong government. A peace-
ful attitude was to be expected from one who had dis-
approved of the war, but little sign of this appeared at
first. The English council of state, sufficiently informed
of the enemy's desperate condition, rejected De Witt's
proposition and insisted simply upon taking up the
interrupted negotiation over the English demands.
Meanwhile the war was to be prosecuted vigorously.
The States resolved to venture the utmost to rescue
the rich fleet expected from France, before it should fall
into the hands of the English in the Channel. Hope
for the new year of war was inspired by the good news
still coming from the Mediterranean, where Van Galen
on March 13th destroyed, at the cost of his own life,
Appleton's British squadron off Leghorn, the second
under Badiley immediately returning to England.
Success was most desirable, for should the "French
fleet" be captured, innumerable people would be
ruined, and still worse would become the sad condition
of Amsterdam, where grass was growing in the once
crowded streets and 3000 houses stood vacant, where
many wharves, shops, and warehouses were closed and
the want of work hurt all classes. Not alone Amster-
dam, but also "the whole country was quite full of
beggars." '
lDe Jonge, i., p. 420.
206 History of the Dutch People
All hope was fixed on Tromp, but he expected little
from a fleet that was too weak in ships, men, and
armament to measure itself with the ever stronger navy
of the enemy. He disclaimed all responsibility for the
expedition. But he succeeded in bringing the
"French fleet" to port, while another large merchant
fleet came safely along Shetland past the English fleet
of Monk and Deane, Blake having not yet entirely
recovered from the wound received in the last battle.
Early in June he sailed out again in search of the Eng-
lish and met them June 12th off Nieuwpoort on
the Flemish coast.1 The two fleets were nearly equal in
size, about one hundred ships, but the English vessels
were larger and better manned and armed. De Ruyterand
De With commanded the van and rear, Tromp himself
the main division of the Dutch. During two days the
fighting was desperate, but the English, reenforced on the
second day by Blake with some fresh vessels, won the
victory, and on the morning of June 14th Tromp, im-
pelled also by his scarcity of powder, withdrew among
the shoals where the enemy could not follow. Tromp
had lost twenty ships, while Deane was killed among
others on the English side. The three Dutch admirals
complained bitterly of the condition of their vessels com-
pared with those of the enefriy. De Ruyter would not
go to sea again ; De With acknowledged the mastery of
the English; Tromp declared that thirty of his ships
might be called unseaworthy, and any further attempt
would result in the fleet's destruction.
The English now blockaded the entire coast and
threatened a landing to the despair of the population,
which resorted here and there to insurrection, loudly
calling for the restoration of the prince of Orange, the
magical remedy that was expected to bring rescue from
dire distress, although the prince was still a young
'De Jonge, i., p. 467; Gardiner, ii., p. 333.
First English War 207
child. The States under these circumstances resolved
in June to send envoys to England. The men chosen
were Hieronymus Van Beverningh of Gouda, Nieuw-
poort from Holland, both intimate friends of De Witt,
Van de Perre from Zealand, and Jongestal from Fries-
land.1 The English council of state did not receive
them in a very encouraging manner, but Cromwell put
himself in touch with Nieuwpoort and showed him
the way to an agreement, perhaps to a close alliance
between the two republics — the resumption of St.
John's plans, based now upon the conviction that God
desired the cooperation of the two states for the glorifica-
tion of His name and for the liberation of the world
from the insupportable yoke of the Romish dominion.'
Furthermore, the reestablishment of good friendship
seemed to him in the interest of both; together they
might rule the whole world's market, impose their will
on Europe, and regulate all commerce. Thus spoke
the powerful leader of England's destiny, mingling
political and religious, commercial and moral principles,
as was his custom. While influential, he was then in
fact only a member of the council of state, which per-
sisted in the old demands for reparation on account of
previous injuries to the English, although that council
also wished una gens, una respublica, an idea that went
farther than the close alliance between two states pro-
posed by Cromwell — one state under one common
government, with the same laws, possessions, and
interests.3 These demands were unacceptable to the
States. They desired no such close union, and two of
the envoys went home for instructions, while Beverningh
1 Especially important for this negotiation are De Witt's letters to Bever-
ningh (Royal Archives), which Wicquefort, ii., p. 239, may also have drawn
upon, and the Thurloe Papers on the English side. Thurloe was then
English secretary of state.
8 Geddes, p. 336.
3 Gardiner, ii., p. 345; De Jonge, i., p. 511.
208 History of the Dutch People
and Van de Perre remained in England, hoping for
Cromwell's support.
The decision still rested with the guns. Once more
the States had exerted all their strength to free the coast
from the blockade, and Tromp early in August sailed
with a part of the fleet northwards from the Wielingen
in search of Monk, who had De With shut up near
Texel. On August 9th he outwitted Monk and after a
fight off Petten took advantage of storm and darkness to
unite with De With. Off Ter Heide on the coast a
fierce battle occurred August 10th, in which Tromp
soon received a mortal wound in the breast and died,
encouraging his men in his last moments. Despite the
bravery of Evertsen, De With, and De Ruyterthe result
was again a severe defeat for the States, which lost
26 ships, and over 6000 men. The English fleet,
also, was so injured that Monk gave up the block-
ade and returned to his own ports. This last fact
excited some hope among the Dutch so badly hit by
Tromp's death, and the States showed slight inclination
to discuss seriously the English demands, however
much trouble the temporary council pensionary took to
persuade them to do so.
Amid the rebellious disposition prevailing at Rotter-
dam, Delft, Haarlem, Dordrecht, Medemblik, Enkhuizen,
in the cities of Zealand, at The Hague itself, while prep-
arations were making to withstand an English landing,
while the whole government of the States seemed about
to fall into anarchy, the young De Witt undismayed held
with a firm hand the reins of authority. He, too, saw
danger approaching ever nearer; he saw with anxiety
the hundreds of ships confined in the harbours and the
Zuyder Zee, the prices of provisions rising, the lack of
work spreading, the tumultuous call for the prince
becoming bolder. But he considered the prince's eleva-
tion a greater misfortune than all this, seeing in the feel-
First English War 209
ing of the princess for her royal brother in exile the germ
of a new and relentless war with the English republic,
of the destruction of freedom and the whole common-
wealth. His own safety was in peril, but he did not
hesitate to accept the doubly dangerous post of council
pensionary, the "vexatious office," the "gilded slavery"
now permanently offered him. His ambition and his
responsibility towards the fatherland, whose prosperity
he always identified with his party's victory, impelled
him not to refuse the office. The young man took the
oath on July 30, 1653. Like his predecessor and in view
of Oldenbarnevelt's fate, he asked as a servant of the
Estates of Holland a "strong act of indemnity for his
assurance and security." At once he opposed energetic-
ally Zealand's proposition to the States-General (July
28th), backed by Friesland and Groningen, to make the
prince captain-general and admiral, and his Frisian
cousin his lieutenant during his minority. Holland had
him draw up a sharp "deduction" against the plan.
Zealand's scheme was frustrated for the time.
The report of the two envoys returning from England
was considered in the usual slow fashion, and De Witt
sought to gain even more time, like a fisherman watching
attentively for the right instant to attain his object.1
He managed to prevent the recall of the two envoys left
behind, while Beverningh and his colleague in London
kept Cromwell and the council of state busy, sometimes
negotiating with both, sometimes secretly with the
former only, about the grand but fantastic plans going
through the English statesman's mind, and based upon
a great Protestant commercial alliance with a close
league of England and the Netherlands. Cromwell sent
a formal proposition to the two gentlemen.3 He offered
an offensive and defensive alliance between the two
1 Geddes, p. 357.
2 Gardiner, ii., p. 349.
VOL. IV.— 14.
2io History of the Dutch People
independent nations, protected by sixty English and
forty Dutch ships, with a sacrifice of the English com-
merce in India for a money indemnity, with equal
rights for both in Europe and Africa, thus abrogating
the Navigation Act, while America, with the excep-
tion of Brazil, was to be left to England. The alli-
ance was to be directed against the Catholic powers,
and missionaries were to be scattered over the whole
world. The practical Dutch envoys, little favouring
this mixture of religion and commerce, were unwilling to
go so far and prolonged the negotiations. When the
other two in the middle of November returned to Eng-
land, they brought merely a general offer for the
renewal of negotiations concerning a treaty of peace and
a subsequent alliance.
Little was done at sea all this time. The English
under Monk's direction endeavoured to reorganise their
navy, but mutinies in the autumn impeded this and had
to be put down by force. The want of money was also
felt. The Dutch made ready more speedily. The death
of the beloved hero, "whose like the earth has not often
borne and possibly will not easily be found in the
future,"1 had put the States into a difficult situation.
His natural successor was Johan Evertsen or Witte de
With, both vice admirals, after whom ranked the com-
manders, Pieter Floriszoon and De Ruyter. The first
two were not wanted, because one was a partisan of
Orange and a Zealander and the other was so hated,
while the last seemed too young and could not be
appointed without affronting the first. Having perhaps
in mind Monk and Deane in England, who were
originally army officers, the States chose for lieutenant
admiral the head of the Holland fleet, Jacob van
Wassenaer, lord of Obdam, governor of Heusden, a
colonel of cavalry and nobleman of Holland, an
1 De Witt to Boreel {Brieven, i., p. 2); Wicquefort, ii., p. 226.
First English War 2 1 1
adherent of the States party, but quite unexperienced
in naval matters. He received only a provisional
appointment ; De Ruyter and Pieter Floriszoon were
raised to the rank of vice admiral, Cornelis Tromp and
two others to that of rear admiral. An expedition
under Witte de With in September and October
succeeded in protecting the East Indiamen and escorting
home the fleet returning from India, which had sailed
around Ireland to Bergen in Norway, but his fleet as
well as Monk's was later dispersed by storm.
Meanwhile there was a "restless, factious, and
grievous time" in the Netherlands, as Aitzema says,
while anger against England, the cause of all the
trouble, took deep root among the whole people. The
heavy taxes awakened universal dissatisfaction. More
and more it became evident that the country needed
peace. Cromwell was made Protector in December,
1653; this gave almost unbounded power to the man in
England, who had always desired peace, and circum-
stances there appeared more favourable, although the
most violent Independents wanted to carry through the
war. With tears in his eyes the new ruler declared that
nothing had so grieved him as this war.1 Now he hoped
to realise his cherished plan for an alliance and urged it
strenuously, deeming other disputed points of minor
importance. The envoys were careful not to offend
him by a refusal, showed a willingness to consider, and
finally got from Cromwell the draft of twenty-seven arti-
cles. Some of them were very aggravating, stipulating
that the prince or any of his family should never hold
the offices of his forefathers, not even the command of
a fortress or a ship, that all attempts to elevate him
should be suppressed by force and, if necessary, with
English help, that an annual sum should be paid for the
fishery on the English coast, that only a limited number
1 Geddes, p. 365 ; Gardiner, ii., p. 353.
212 History of the Dutch People
of Dutch war vessels might appear in British waters, that
the flag should be struck to English ships, etc.
The negotiation was carried on with the utmost
secrecy, and even the States-General heard little about
it. But such conditions were plainly "desperate," and
the envoys demanded their passports. The disappoint-
ment of De Witt was great, and for a time the only
expedient seemed to him a vigorous prosecution of the
war. A strong fleet, brought together by a last exertion
of energy, efforts to secure an alliance with Denmark,
France, Poland, and the Hanse cities, were proposed by
him first in Holland and afterwards in the States-
General.1 Cromwell saw the danger of this firmer
attitude of the States, and his resumption of negotiations
with Van Beverningh showed it. He was really anxious
for peace, and the English nation wished it also, as it
had suffered heavy losses and was subjected to insupport-
able taxation. Early in 1654 he therefore dropped
several demands or modified them considerably, but he
insisted resolutely upon two: the prince of Orange must
be excluded from all offices, and Denmark was not to
be included in the treaty of peace. Negotiations did not
advance beyond this, until in the middle of January the
envoys returned home for advice. At Gravesend an
emissary from Cromwell overtook them with the report
that he yielded on the subject of Denmark. It was
already manifest that Cromwell, fearing an Orange rising
among the people of the republic, would be content
with a secret article regarding the prince's exclusion.
But the envoys despaired of ever obtaining a secret
article of this nature from the States-General, and Crom-
well insisted, because he considered this matter of vital
importance to the existence of the English republic and
to England's safety.
De Witt was well informed of the course of affairs,
1 Aitzema, iii., p. 860.
First English War 213
having been in secret correspondence with the two Hol-
land envoys, particularly with Van Beverningh. He,
too, saw the impossibility of the acceptance of such a
secret article in the treaty of peace with England. Such
a treaty would be approved neither by the States-General
nor by a single one of the provinces, he wrote to Van
Beverningh.1 Cromwell appears privately to have given
the latter to understand that, if necessary, he might be
satisfied with a declaration that the province of Holland
would adhere to the resolutions previously taken concern-
ing the stadtholdership and the captain-generalship, and
that any captain-general to be appointed should be
obliged to swear to the treaty with England. It is not
quite certain whether this expedient was suggested by
Holland's envoys and De Witt.a The other stipulations
of the peace occasioned no serious objection, but the
formal exclusion of the prince was not to be thought of,
not even in Holland alone. De Witt's cleverness sur-
mounted all difficulties in a way that proved his extra-
ordinary diplomatic talents. Van Beverningh after a
week returned suddenly alone to London. Urged by
De Witt, the States-General sanctioned his mission, which
was to keep an eye upon the sail in London besides
secretly to appease Cromwell with regard to the
exclusion. Then the council pensionary induced the
States-General to resolve not to send the treaty about to
be concluded with Cromwell to the provinces for advice
but to ratify it immediately after its reception. The other
two envoys, Van de Perre having died, now went back
also, being called with Van Beverningh "extraordinary
ambassadors to the Lord Protector," by which the new
state of affairs in England was recognised. A new
1 Geddes, p. 387 et seq. The account by Geddes drawn from the best
authorities is very full upon this entire matter, and has here been followed
in its main points.
2 Geddes and Gardiner believe the idea proceeded from Cromwell.
214 History of the Dutch People
official negotiation then began, and beside it in deep
secrecy a second one with Cromwell, in which De Witt
and Van Beverningh played a fine but dangerous game.
By the middle of April De Witt had not been able to
fulfil his secret assurance to Cromwell and present the
exclusion to Holland, but the Estates of that province
adjourned on April 20th for the Easter recess, and De
Witt so managed that the treaty of peace, from which
the stipulation concerning the prince was left out, was
not signed at London before the day the recess
began. On the following day (April 21st) he had the
treaty come from England to The Hague; one day later
it was ratified by the States-General, spurred by De Witt
to unprecedented rapidity, and sent signed on the next
day to England.
The concluded treaty ' spoke more of a general friendly
relation between the two countries than of a fusion such
as St. John had desired. They were to live in peace
and not to support or harbour each other's rebels or
enemies. Dutch ships in the British seas were to strike
the flag and lower their topsail. The States were to
do justice in the so-called "massacre" at Ambon. Arbi-
trators were to settle the differences with Denmark.
Disputes concerning possessions and commerce in India,
Brazil, Muscovy, besides those about the Greenland
fishery, were to be submitted to commissioners appointed
by both sides and, if they did not agree within three
months, the Protestant cantons of Switzerland were to
arbitrate. The prince of Orange was not mentioned by
name in the treaty of peace, but Article 32 provided
that the States-General and the Estates of the provinces
should oblige every stadtholder, captain-general, general,
or admiral ever appointed by them to swear to observe
the treaty, as they with their people promised to do.
But something more occurred. Cromwell had secretly
1 Aitzema, iii., p. 918.
First English War 215
declared that he would only ratify the treaty with this
"temperament" concerning the prince, deviating from
his original demands, in case the ambassadors assured
him that within two or three months he should receive
the desired formal Act of Exclusion of the prince given
by the Estates of Holland for that province. This was
announced by the two ambassadors of Holland in a
special letter to the Estates, not then in session,
together with an account of their promise to Cromwell
to recommend the Act. A private letter to De Witt,
however, informed him that there was still hope of
persuading the Protector to renounce this. The council
pensionary acted as if he had not received his letter,
pushed the treaty of peace through the States-General,
as related above, and then summoned the Estates of
Holland for the 28th of April. At the beginning of the
meeting all the members were sworn to secrecy, and the
official letter of the ambassadors relating to Cromwell's
wish was then read to the Estates. The reading excited
indignation at their conduct, and although Dordrecht and
Amsterdam wanted to pass the Act, the deputies of nine
towns refused to take this important step without first
consulting their constituents; the nobility appeared
divided. Now the matter had to go to the towns,
which might have made an end to secrecy, but De Witt
arranged that only the ruling burgomasters, again under
oath of secrecy, should read the ambassadors' letter. If
they did not consent to assume the responsibility, the
town councils in their turn were to be put under an oath
of secrecy before they might read the letter. Every-
thing must be done as quickly as possible, and on May
1st the Estates met again. At the morning session
voting began, and a majority was obtained for the Act,
when there came a package from Van Beverningh for De
Witt and a letter for the Estates from the ambassadors
in London. The letter asserted apparently that Crom-
216 History of the Dutch People
well demanded the delivery of the Act within a few days
after the ratification and proclamation of the treaty, and
that otherwise he would not consider the peace binding.
De Witt's package contained his correspondence with
Van Beverningh, which he would gladly have kept secret,
and he reproached his correspondent for thus impru-
dently returning it. The evening sitting brought four-
teen votes for the Act; the nobility had yielded under
the influence of Brederode, who was interested as field
marshal in not having a captain-general appointed; and
the deputies of five towns were given until May 4th to
see their constituents. After a stormy discussion on
that day the opposition of four, Haarlem, Leyden,
Enkhuizen, and Edam, appeared unconquerable. Sharp
words were exchanged ; and De Witt finally tried to
pass the Act by a majority of votes, exciting violent pro-
tests from the minority. But nothing else could be
done. De Witt drew up the Act in the evening and
carried it through by a majority of fourteen to five
votes, Alkmaar having joined the four towns mentioned.1
The Act was sent to the two ambassadors of Holland
on the following day, although they were commissioned
to deliver it only in case of extreme necessity. Mean-
while the peace was signed and proclaimed by Cromwell
in London amid great popular rejoicing, all honour
being shown to the Dutch ambassadors. No less exulta-
tion attended its proclamation in the Netherlands, with
firing of cannon and ringing of bells, with bonfires and
waving flags, while fervent prayers of gratitude rose in
the churches, now the suffering of the people seemed
past.
More was to follow. During five weeks longer the Act
remained in the hands of the ambassadors. But the
1 The cautious Brederode, related to the house of Orange, remained
absent in spite of De Witt's urgency, overmits wyde purgasi huydtn morgen
so laet hebben ingenomen.
First English War 217
secret was already betrayed. A bribed clerk of De Witt
had given information to Count William Frederick, and
like wildfire the report spread of a separate negotiation
and secret agreement between Cromwell and Holland.
In the States-General De Witt was asked for informa-
tion, but he answered generally that Holland had done
nothing illegal. People began to suspect something,
and a storm arose. Friesland violently assailed Hol-
land ; the princesses wrote passionate letters to the States-
General ; there was popular agitation in several provinces.
De Witt stood firm as usual, but even Dordrecht com-
menced to waver to his vexation. The deputies of this
town absented themselves from the meeting of the Hol-
land Estates which, themselves fearful of the con-
sequences, thanked their ambassadors in London for not
yet delivering the Act. Enlightenment was more loudly
demanded in the States-General, first from Holland
which evaded the question, then from the ambassadors
in London, who were ordered on June 5th to send over
to the States-General all secret instructions received from
the Estates of Holland. De Witt succeded in getting
this order postponed until the following day, but at once
he informed the two Hollanders in London of what was
to be expected, intimating to them that it was now time
to act, i. e., to hand over the Act, provided it were done
immediately.
There was again a vehement discussion on the 6th of
June in the States-General, but the resolution of the
5th was definitively passed, and De Witt was obliged to
acquiesce in having the Estates of Holland allow the two
Holland ambassadors to send over a copy of the Act to
The Hague. But in the evening of this day he per-
suaded the States-General at the eleventh hour to
transmit their order to send over the instructions and
not yet to deliver the Act, on account of the importance
of the matter, in cipher instead of in the ordinary form —
218 History of the Dutch People
a master trick Geddes rightly calls this. To this letter
in cipher he joined another in ordinary writing to the
two Hollanders, communicating the assent of the Estates
of Holland and remarking that it would be too late,
because the Act probably was already delivered. It
happened as he expected after his repeated warnings.
While the ambassadors' clerk in London was decipher-
ing the letter with difficulty, and they were awaiting the
end of this work, Van Beverningh, who had understood
De Witt's hint, left the room, in company perhaps with
Nieuwpoort, and hastily handed the Act over to Crom-
well. The thing was done, and when the clerk finished,
and the ambassadors could read what was wanted
of them, the fulfilment of that wish was no longer
possible. Thus the young council pensionary attained
his end by a devious way. Peace was concluded and
confirmed, and Cromwell was made content with a
document that seemed also to assure the authority of the
government of the States.
No doubt De Witt should have avoided the necessity
of delivering an Act which sanctioned the interference of
a foreign power in the republic's domestic concerns.
The whole affair gives proof of the consummate diplo-
matic ability of De Witt, but it is only to be justified
when one assumes his conviction of the absolute
necessity of the Act. That absolute necessity is not cer-
tain, because from Cromwell's doings and sayings it can-
not surely be made out whether he would have broken
the peace, as he threatened, if the Act were not
delivered. There is reason to believe that he would not
have ventured it, but it is 'undeniable that he acted
towards the ambassadors as if he intended so doing in
case they broke their promise. The attitude of De Witt
and the two ambassadors is, therefore, quite defensible,
because it must not be forgotten that they felt the
indispensability of peace for the republic, that they were
First English War
219
willing to do anything possible to obtain this peace and,
now it was secured, not again to endanger it. Whether
Cromwell first desired the Act, or De Witt originally
wanted it, which is less probable on account of his knowl-
edge of domestic politics and his cautiousness, the course
of events showed that it would profit neither of them.
More than anything else it served to embitter the people
against De Witt and his party. It helped undermine the
government of the States and finally strengthened the
prince's party, which could have been neither Crom-
well's nor De Witt's purpose. Its demand was an act of
bad statesmanship.
CHAPTER IX
THE COUNCIL PENSIONARY AT THE HEAD OF THE
STATE
NONE of the earlier or later council pensionaries ever
possessed such an influence in the state as John de
Witt obtained soon after the first English naval war.
Oldenbarnevelt's influence alone is to be compared with
it. This was due to John De Witt's rare personality, to
the extent of his personal relations, and to the circum-
stance that no prince of Orange opposed him. No other
member of the government of the States could equal
him. There is but one voice as to the ability of the
celebrated citizen of Dordrecht even among his enemies.
Not only as a statesman but also as a financier, an
organiser, a scientific mathematician and natural philos-
opher he stood very high. His statesmanship may be
reproached with a certain narrowness, because he did
not embrace in a masterly glance the past, present, and
remote future, like Oldenbarnevelt, but almost ex-
clusively watched the relations of the Netherlands to
France, England, Sweden, and Denmark, and looked
after the immediate future. His financial measures
strengthened the republic's credit. His talent as an
organiser raised the Dutch navy from its unsatisfactory
condition at the time of the first English naval war to
the brilliant height, at which it stood during the second
war, and enabled the Dutch admirals to measure them-
selves with the English upon not unequal terms. His
220
The Council Pensionary 221
repute as a mathematician was established by his inven-
tion of the chain shot and his writings on curves,1 highly-
esteemed by such mathematicians as Christiaan Huyghens
and Van Schooten, and treating of the intricate problems
of hyperbolas, parabolas, ellipses, conic sections, and the
determination of place in plane and space. His calcula-
tions of the chances of life and their connection with life
and redeemable annuities laid the scientific foundation
for the modern theories of life insurance. His share in
De la Court's noted work on the political and economic
condition of Holland about 1660 proves his capacity as
an economist, and his extensive correspondence shows
his clear insight into many things. His name has rightly
been given to a period of Dutch history, because he was
at once a representative and leader of his people.
One of the most important events of De Witt's private
life was his marriage (February, 1655) to Wendela
Bicker, the daughter of a deceased burgomaster of
Amsterdam, and related to a number of the first families
of magistrates.8 The family connections of De Witt were
thus largely extended, a great advantage in Holland
governed by comparatively few families of municipal
magistrates, and De Witt did not scorn this advantage.
Even the appearance of bribery was always avoided by
De Witt, but he used all means to secure offices for able
members of his family. The appointment of his brother
as governor of Putten (March, 1654), of his father as a
member of the chamber of accounts (1657), of his relative
Van Slingelandt, later of Vivien as pensionary of Dord-
recht in his own place, of numerous cousins to all sorts
of municipal and provincial posts, showed that he was
often successful in widening the circle of his family in
the government of Holland. His letters on these un-
edifying affairs afford a certain enjoyment by reason of
1 EUmenla curvarum linearum (Lugd. Bat. et Amst., 1659).
' Lef£vre-Pontalis, i., p. 119.
222 History of the Dutch People
his uncommon knowledge of local interests and of man-
kind. A like pleasure is given the reader of his correspond-
ence with the ambassadors of the States, either in the
printed edition of his letters, or in the collections still
reposing in the Dutch archives. The Holland ministers
sent missives of the same tenor to the States-General
and the Estates of Holland, but the most important
matters were written to him alone. He always
maintained personal relations with the foreign am-
bassadors at The Hague. Concerning domestic affairs
De Witt carried on an extensive private correspondence
with influential men in various provinces and towns.
He kept himself informed of everything by this corre-
spondence, sometimes of a very intimate nature and
communicating the secret resolutions of governmental
boards,1 while he was in personal touch with these and
other gentlemen during their repeated sojourn at The
Hague as deputies to the States-General.
The first domestic affair after the peace to attract
attention was the sharply criticised attitude of Holland
towards Cromwell's demand for the Act of Exclusion.
The excitement of May and June continued for some
time, especially after the copy of the Act finally came
from England. Friesland and Zealand openly complained
of Holland to the States-General. A cloud of pamphlets
spread over the country, and from the pulpits sounded
the most vehement tirades against this new attack of the
"Loevestein faction," nothing else being talked of in
taverns, waggons, and boats. The Orange party tried to
make all the capital possible out of the matter, and Count
William Frederick appeared at The Hague to lead the
movement and, with the two princesses and Zealand, to
accomplish something for the young prince. But there
1 We even hear repeatedly of the bribery of municipal and provincial
clerks by these correspondents. Secret documents of importance were thus
often obtained.
The Council Pensionary 223
was no harmony in the guidance of this party. De Witt
successfully replied to his opponents in the States-
General. A letter from Cromwell to Zealand exhorting
it for the sake of religion not to endanger the treaty
missed its aim and occasioned more bitterness. Some
disturbance in North Holland was brought about by a
journey of Count, soon Prince, William Frederick, the
emperor in 1654 raising his entire house to the rank of
imperial princes. Amsterdam and other cities took
measures to guard against a possible assault. The
garrison of The Hague was strengthened ostensibly
against the disorderly troops returning from Brazil.
Commissioned by the Estates of Holland De Witt
with the aid of Van Beverningh drew up a "Deduction"
in defence of Holland's and his own conduct, the
manifesto of the existing government. This Deduction
comprised an argument for the necessity of Holland's
action in the interest of peace, which otherwise would
not have been obtained ; then a demonstration of the
legality of the Act ; afterwards a proof of the propriety
of Holland's action towards the other provinces, the
foreign powers, and the house of Orange. It went into
a calculation of the thanks given to the Orange family
in money and offices since the insurrection against
Spain, on the other side alluding to the gratitude which
the other provinces owed to Holland for the Spanish as
well as the English war. The reading of the document
lasted for hours, first in the Estates of Holland, then in
the States-General (August 5th), but naturally it did not
convince the opposing party. Gradually, however,
minds subsided into calmness, because people began to
understand that peace would be imperilled, if Holland
were forced to revoke the Act and Cromwell were thus
defied.
The commotion assumed critical aspects in some prov-
inces, particularly in Overyssel and City and Land.
224 History of the Dutch People
There had long been friction in Overyssel 1 between the
Orange party and that favouring the Estates of Holland.
Rutger van Haersolte, steward of Salland and bailiff of
Lingen, headed the Orange party ; friends of De Witt
guided the other faction. The death in October, 1653,
of Ripperda, bailiff of Twente, to whose office Haersolte
aspired, gave rise to violent dissensions. In April, 1654,
Haersolte was appointed by a majority, while the
minority protested strongly and accused the majority of
intrigues and its candidate of murder, perjury, and
bribery. The minority prevented the installation of the
candidate and absented itself from the meeting of the
Estates. Though the matter seemed of slight impor-
tance, the resulting discord continued over three years
to the great injury of the entire province. Majority
and minority of the Estates met separately amid mutual
protests and threats, and each considered itself the real
Estates of Overyssel. When the States-General came to
discuss the affair, Holland, standing of course on the
side of the minority, wished a deputation from the
States-General to restore peace, but the troubles were
declared "domestic," such as should be settled with-
out the interference of other provinces. As the con-
fusion went on increasing, the States-General in
September, 1654, offered their mediation and tried to be
neutral by receiving delegates from both parties. But
Holland openly supported its friends of the minority,
when the majority, urged by Haersolte, chose in October
the young prince as stadtholder of the province, with
William Frederick for lieutenant during his minority.
Prince William Frederick visited Kampen and Zwolle
and took the oath as lieutenant stadtholder, but he was
not received at Deventer. Both parties collected taxes
and disposed of the militia, but neither contributed what
1 See Bussemaker, Geschiedenis van Overijsel gedurtnde het eerste stad-
houderlooze tijdperk (2 vols.,'s Gravenh., 188S-89).
The Council Pensionary 225
was due to the general government. Something had to
be done, so the States-General in September, 1655,
resolved to send a deputation to the province, but Hol-
land in its turn now considered the affair as "domestic"
and prevented the deputation. Other political diffi-
culties had meanwhile brought De Witt and Prince
William Frederick into closer relations. Their agreement
was not disturbed by the discovery of the treachery of
De Witt's chief clerk, Johan van Messen, who had com-
municated the most secret papers to the prince's agent,
Theodoor van Ruyven. An important result of the
deliberations of De Witt and the prince was a missive
from Their High Mightinesses to Overvssel, dated January
28, 1656, requesting both parties to send delegates to The
Hague for the purpose of settling their differences with
the help of William Frederick. This was done, and De
Witt and William Frederick undertook mediation. The
draft of an agreement abrogated the resolutions of the
Overyssel Estates taken in the affair after April 8, 1654,
a general amnesty was proclaimed, Prince William
Frederick laid down his lieutenancy and Haersolte his
office of bailiff. The matter remained under considera-
tion in the province during the whole year, while Prince
William Frederick and De Witt worked less heartily
together. Hasselt had long been at variance with
Zvvolle, and early in June, 1657, the troops of Zwolle
bombarded Hasselt, cities and country in the province
preparing for civil war. Fortunately Hasselt gave up its
pretensions after a few shots from the Zwolle batteries
and made a treaty with the majority. The minority
turned for justice to its powerful protectors, Holland and
Amsterdam, but De Witt presented a new agreement
which was accepted. Cornelis de Graeff and John de
Witt were appointed mediators to settle everything
amicably in conjunction with commissioners from both
parties. On August 20th all was finished, and in the
VOL. IV.— IS.
226 History of the Dutch People
name of the Estates of Holland a decision in seventeen
articles set aside opposing resolutions, decreed a general
amnesty, postponed the subject of the stadtholdership
until the prince's majority, and annulled the election of
William Frederick and Haersolte. New regulations for
the government were introduced. A meeting at Raalte
on October I, 1657, sealed the agreement that restored
order in the province.
De Witt's influence here won success in most respects
for the party supported by Holland, and it was not other-
wise with the disturbances occurring about the same
time in City and Land.1 A revival of old dissensions
was here to be expected under the weak government
of William Frederick as stadtholder. The guilds of
Groningen, led by the architect Gerrit Warendorp, op-
posed the rule of the city patricians. Further there was
a strong party of malcontents among the country nobility,
headed by the ambitious Osebrand Jan Rengers, lord of
Slochteren, and voicing the ancient grievances of the
country against the city. Another league hoped with
the help of the municipal government to withstand
Rengers and his partisans. In 1655 the disorder became
so great in the Estates that a general massacre seemed
imminent, after Rengers and a colleague were expelled
by violence. The two parties in the Ommelands had
separate assemblies, and government and justice stood
still. A deputation was sent by the States-General
under the lead of De Witt in concert with William
Frederick. De Witt succeeded in restoring harmony,
and both parties appeared satisfied. But a year later
the condition of affairs was again bad in the province.
Rengers and the influential Rudolf van Inn- und
Knyphausen, lord of Lutzborg in East Friesland, formed
a league, as usual in this province, with the chief purpose
1 De Boer, De woelingen in Stad en Lande in het midden der zeventiende
eeuzv (Groningen, 1893).
The Council Pensionary 227
of securing all the important offices. The action of the
two lords led to fighting in the assembly, where weapons
were finally prohibited and a guard was placed. The
election of officers in February, 1657, was attended with
such confusion that the deputies of the city called for
the intervention of the States-General. Against the
plans of the city government Rengers and Lutzborg
stirred up the guilds, and they opposed the desired
deputation by bribing Johan Schulenborgh, delegate
from the city to the States-General. A popular rising at
Groningen was led by Warendorp, and the plundering
of houses and assaults upon magistrates compelled the
city government to accede to the demands of the league
of the Ommelands. The States-General sent no deputa-
tion, the league triumphed, Rengers and Lutzborg suc-
ceeded one another in the highest offices. After a few
years the city government and its friends among the
nobles felt strong enough to attack again Rengers and
Lutzborg. But they resisted and remained supreme
until the end of 1658, while the stadtholder looked on
helplessly and De Witt from The Hague continued to
support his friends in the province. A new deputation
from the States-General in the spring of 1659, invited
by the party of Rengers, favoured the league's oppo-
nents and a better enforcement of justice, against which
Rengers and his friends had often sinned.
Dissensions in the other provinces were less important,
but testified also to the necessity of a stronger central
government.1 Everywhere in the republic differences
prevailed, in which Holland secretly or openly sustained
the anti-stadtholder party and the council pensionary
made his influence felt. He succeeded usually in restor-
ing order without removing the root of the evil, a policy
of dexterity which would lead not to thorough improve-
ment but in difficult circumstances to great confusion
1 Wagenaar, xii., p. 397.
228 History of the Dutch People
and sudden upheaval. De Witt avoided this upheaval
for years by many small remedies, but could never flatter
himself with the hope of having escaped the danger of
irremediable confusion. That was only to be done by
strengthening the government, either in the separate
provinces, or in the collective state, which was at variance
with the principles of government adopted in 165 1.
Besides these provincial affairs there were other
domestic matters which disturbed the whole country
and were cleverly managed by De Witt. The first
concerned the office of field marshal. Brederode died in
September, 1655, and his position was eagerly coveted
by the two princes of Nassau, William Frederick and
John Maurice, the former a general of artillery, the
latter a general of cavalry. But Holland, guided by
De Witt, endeavoured to postpone action, as it saw the
germ of new complications in the appointment of so
great a lord to this supreme military post. Especial
objection was made to William Frederick, whose share in
the Amsterdam affair was neither forgotten nor forgiven,
and whose attempts to seize upon the lieutenant stadt-
holdership were too evident. De Witt had a plan for
harmony adopted in the Estates of Holland, decreeing
that all writings and resolutions in all the provinces
against the Act of Exclusion should be destroyed, that
Prince William Frederick should renounce his office of
lieutenant stadtholder in Overyssel, that no field marshal
should be at the same time stadtholder or captain-
general in any province, that the new field marshal
should swear to observe the peace with England.
William Frederick sought to become more friendly
with De Witt to the vexation of many of the Orange
party, who complained of his treason. For a time it
seemed as if the question of this high military post were
to be joined to that of Van Beverningh, whom the States'
party wished to appoint treasurer-general of the Union
The Council Pensionary 229
after his return from England. The Orange adherents
would not accept Van Beverningh, just as Holland
opposed the appointment of a field marshal, and a com-
promise for both parties to agree to both candidates was
not carried through. At the end of 1656 De Witt
succeeded in obtaining the appointment of his trusted
colleague as treasurer by a majority in the States-
General, but when the other party wanted to decide
about the field marshal by a majority vote, Holland
objected and appealed to the complete authority of the
provincial Estates in military matters as one of the
essential parts of freedom. De Witt was moved by fear
of too great a military power in one hand. The Orange
party was far from being equal to him and his able
friends. The disputes between the two princesses of
Orange, the jealousy between the two princes of Nassau,
the incapacity of the party leaders, gave De Witt the
finest chances to thwart their plans again and again.
De Witt kept a watchful eye upon everything, upon
the attitude towards the church, upon the finances in his
province. Danger threatened in ecclesiastical affairs,
because De Witt knew the influential preachers must be
respected, and the government of the States, mindful of
what had occurred in the time of the Truce, feared
nothing so much as their displeasure. One of the council
pensionary's first letters aimed to remove the suspicion,
which had arisen against him as a Cartesian, of laxness
towards "the papal superstition and other errors." The
apostolic vicar of the diocese of Utrecht, Jacobus de la
Torre, could testify in his Relatio seu descriptio status
religionis catholicce in Hollandia (1656) to the flourishing
condition of his church in these parts in spite of all the
placards and resolutions and of the strife between his
secular and regular clergy, the Jesuits troubling him in
their struggle for greater influence. Here and there
persecutions might take place, but there was generally a
230 History of the Dutch People
connivance obtained by bribing the officials charged with
the surveillance of the Catholics.1 At The Hague an
ample opportunity was afforded in the residences of the
ambassadors of the Catholic powers, especially of France
and Spain, for the Catholics to hold their services, and
hundreds of them from the country around availed
themselves of it. In many cities and villages it was an
open secret where the Catholics met, and seldom were
they disturbed by the authorities. This condition did
not of course satisfy the Reformed churches, and com-
plaints were often made of the weakness of the magis-
trates. But in executing the placards the old principle
was adhered to : the States desired rest in ecclesiastical
matters.
In like manner the ruling party treated the complaints
of the theologians about the teachings of the Cartesian
philosophers, particularly those of the vehement Pro-
fessor Adriaan Heerebord of Leyden. De Witt thought
the liberty of philosophising might remain untouched,
but the immoderate zeal of those professing the right
philosophy ought to be restrained. The resolution of
the Estates of Holland of September 30, 1656, imported
that the curators of Leyden had to watch over the
limits between theology and philosophy, and that the
philosophemes of Cartesius should not be taught for the
sake of peace and tranquillity. Thus the freedom of
philosophy was maintained in general, only in name it
was put in bonds on behalf of rest and peace. De Witt's
letters to the moderate Professor Heydanus show plainly
that the States were only anxious to guard against reck-
less extravagance and would allow all liberty to him and
men of like opinions.
To the displeasure of the orthodox Calvinists this
attitude appeared in the way the sects, such as the
Mennonites, the Remonstrants, and the rapidly increas-
1Knuttel, De toestand der katholieken, i., pp. 223, 246.
The Council Pensionary 231
ing Collegiants, were managed or rather left unmolested.
Although a zealot occasionally insisted upon the deposi-
tion of Remonstrant magistrates, they were constantly
getting into the government, even at Amsterdam, and
were not troubled, if they did not make themselves or
their opinions too prominent. The Collegiants, resem-
bling in many respects the Remonstrants and Mennonites,
remained at first more in the shade, being naturally
quiet country people. Their chief seat, Rijnsburg
where the Van der Kodde family had placed itself about
1620 at their head, became the centre of a remarkable
religious movement which, besides liberty of worship,
accepted the principle of liberty of speaking or "proph-
esying" for every member of the community, and thus
opposed the ordained clergy and considered their
existence contrary to ancient Christianity.1 The lack of
Remonstrant preachers after 1619 under the pressure of
persecution helped this free preaching very much. Later
pious Remonstrants joined the Collegiants and extolled
their principles as recalling those of the first Protestants
in the country. Laymen also championed zealously their
doctrines, as the former Rotterdam baker Frans Oudaen,
head of the Rijnsburg society about 1660. Eminent
men, Van Beuningen, Adriaan Paets and Johan Hartig-
veldt of Rotterdam, came into close touch with the
community. Thus attention was drawn to them more
and more, and their following was extended about the
middle of the century.3 At Rotterdam, Amsterdam,
Leyden, Haarlem, in some villages of North Holland,
similar "colleges" arose, striving for a regeneration of the
Christian church without a binding confession of faith,
without minister or prescribed church rites except baptism
by immersion and the communion, without wishing to
be called church communities, in perfect freedom resting
1 Van Slee, De Rijnsburger Collegianten, p. 58.
2 Hijlkema, Jteformateurs, p. 10.
232 History of the Dutch People
only on the authority of the Bible and with a liberal
conception of mutual toleration, so that many Mennon-
ites, Remonstrants, and even Catholics were received
among them. A strong current was felt among the
Mennonites in this direction, reviving memories of the
old Anabaptists. Dr. Galenus led the movement, which
caused a violent schism among the numerous Mennonites
of Amsterdam, the two parties formally separating in
1664 after nine years of strife.
Other "reformers" appeared. The mystical street-
preacher Johannes Rothe, the herald of the expected
"fifth monarchy," was one of the most notable among
them. After the peace some Quakers came over from
England and won followers. But the greatest activity
went out from the Collegiants, and their steady
increase annoyed the preachers of the Reformed com-
munities. The complaints made by consistories and
synods of this new sort of "erring minds," "Socinians,"
"half Turks," of these "blasphemers of God's Holy
Name," these "foxes in the vineyards," to the Estates
and municipal governments accomplished little more with
those "rulers of the world" than the complaints of the
"popish insolences." There would occasionally be
some strictness or persecution by the authorities, but in
the long run it was toleration. Into their circle the
young philosopher Baruch de Spinoza at Amsterdam was
taken up, when he began about 1654 to turn away from
the faith of his fathers.1 He met the Catholic Cartesian
Franciscus van den Ende, who made him and many
others in Amsterdam acquainted with Cartesian princi-
ples. He found consolation in them after his expulsion
from the Jewish community in 1656 and settled five
years later in Rijnsburg, the seat of the Collegiants,
with whom he might be considered as intellectually
allied. The numerous freethinkers in Holland also did
1 Meinsma, Spinoza en zijn kring, p. 102.
The Council Pensionary 233
not escape the vigilance of consistories and preachers,
but no kind of pressure could bring any strong action
against them. The governing party adhered to its
tolerant principles, in part because its members often
felt attracted to the new dogmas, in part from a longing
for rest and peace.
De Witt's activity in financial affairs was important.
The heavy debt, under which Holland groaned in con-
sequence of the Spanish war, burdened its budget in
1650 with seven million guilders of interest upon a sum
of over 150 millions, and the English war considerably
increased this sum. During and immediately after the
war De Witt set to work to lighten the burden by a
reduction of the interest. Such reductions of interest
were not uncommon. In 1640 Holland had lowered the
interest on its debt from 6| to 5 per cent., and the
States-General had followed that example in 1649. Now
De Witt sought to reduce Holland's interest from 5 to 4
per cent, and encountered violent opposition. But,
supported by Van Beuningen and others, he succeeded
in convincing the Estates of the desirability of the
matter, especially when he joined the reduction with a
plan of redemption, by which Holland's entire debt
would be paid off in forty-one years, and the States-
General also reduced their interest from 5 to 4 per cent.,
so that Holland's securities yielded no less than those of
the Generality. The credit of Holland was thus placed
on a solid basis, and De Witt might well glory in "the
great work, upon which I have for some time past
exerted all my strength," by which his province profited
annually to the amount of 1,400,000 guilders, represent-
ing a capital of twenty-eight millions.
If De Witt could have had his way, the maintenance
of peace would have been the chief aim of the Dutch
policy in Europe, because he believed in his soul that
for a country living by commerce and navigation nothing
234 History of the Dutch People
was so necessary as peace on land and sea. Pieter de
la Court's work, revised by De Witt for the first edition
under the title of Interest van Holland, said that " Hol-
land's maxim ought to be to seek after peace for its
inhabitants with all proper means and to avoid war."
The general condition of Europe in these years gave
reason for apprehension concerning the future. Two
parties in Europe still opposed one another, France with
England, now on friendly terms, and Spain with
Austria, between which the republic would naturally
have looked for support from the former party. The
coolness of France towards the republic, which had left it
in the lurch at Munster, must be overcome so far as
possible, and De Witt bent his utmost energy to this
end, especially when French piracies in the Mediterranean
in 1657 and De Ruyter's vigorous action against them
threatened to lead to serious difficulties owing to the
unskilfulness of the Dutch ambassador Boreel. Watch
had to be kept, furthermore, of the progress of the
French in the southern Netherlands, where under
Turenne in 1658 they captured Dunkirk and Gravelines
and in cooperation with England, to which Dunkirk was
ceded, threatened Flanders. The Spanish governor, Don
Juan of Austria, was at his wit's end and gave up
resistance, so that a conquest of the southern Nether-
lands by both powers seemed imminent.
What was to become of these lands? Neighbourhood
to France was not considered desirable, and as little so was
the rule of England in the Flemish ports and Antwerp. It
appeared preferable to revert to the old plan of making
the southern provinces a "free republic " under the pro-
tection of both France and the United Netherlands. The
peace of the Pyrenees in November, 1659, put an end to
these complications. That peace left France in posses-
sion of a large part of the conquered territory in southern
Flanders, Hainaut, Namur, and Luxemburg. But the
The Council Pensionary 235
marriage of the young and ambitious Louis XIV. to
the oldest daughter of Philip IV. brought new perils,
although the infanta solemnly renounced for herself
and her descendants all claims to the Spanish crown
and its possessions, while the lands and cities now ob-
tained put France in a position to resume the sub-
jugation of the Netherlands at any time with a
good prospect of success. Spain saw the consequences
of this condition and understood that its interest was
to retain the friendship of the republic as much as
possible.
Relations with England left at first little to be
wished. The Dutch ambassador Nieuwpoort was very
friendly with Cromwell and his able secretary of state
Thurloe,1 and no reason for discontent was given by
allowing the Stuarts in the Netherlands. But there was
no diminution of the commercial rivalry : the Navigation
Act raised up English commerce and augmented the
mutual jealousy. During the English-Spanish war
difficulties again arose through the search of ships for
contraband. England also protected Portugal, between
which and the Netherlands the long threatening war broke
out in November, 1657. This war was limited mainly
to a naval demonstration under Obdam on the Portu-
guese coast and to captures of Portuguese merchantmen
by De Ruyter. Cromwell's death in 1658 prevented any
strong action of England against the Netherlands, as the
weak government of his son, Protector Richard, was
not equal to a vigorous guidance of England's policy.
The arrival at The Hague of the energetic George
Downing, as English ambassador, who wished to see the
commerce of England upheld with strength and ability,
gave occasion for all sorts of troubles, by which the old
grievances were raked up again, the good understanding
'His papers, the Thurloe Papers (London, 1742), are together with the
ordinary State Papers an excellent authority for the history of these days.
236 History of the Dutch People
between the two nations was little promoted, and a new
war seemed in the end unavoidable.
There was more imminent danger for a time on the fron-
tier, near which the turbulent bishop of Munster constantly
threatened his capital. The league of the Rhine, concluded
in August, 1658, under the influence of France, in which
the electors of Cologne and Mainz, the rulers of Neuburg,
Hesse, and Brunswick, and other princes allied them-
selves with Sweden and France, pointed to new perils.
The fear that the Catholic princes contemplated a mutual
union for the protection of Catholic interests in the
empire and the desire of the land provinces to have the
affairs of Munster settled impelled the council pensionary
to vigorous action on behalf of Miinster's people. The
siege of Munster by the Catholic princes gave the oppor-
tunity for a deputation to Munster, and, when the bishop
declined the proffered mediation of the States, troops
were collected in October on the eastern frontier. The
resolution to this effect, passed in Holland notwithstand-
ing Amsterdam's opposition, adopted also by the States-
General, and the consequent movement of troops in
Gelderland and Overyssel resulted immediately in the
yielding of the bishop of Munster and the relief of the city.
But this attitude of the republic embittered the haughty
bishop and led later to new and greater troubles.1
Much more serious were the complications in the north
after the accession of Charles X. Gustavus to the throne
of Sweden (1654). Resuming the policy of Gustavus
Adolphus, he sought to establish the supremacy in
these regions of Sweden over Poland, Denmark, and the
Hollanders, who had endeavoured of late years to unite
Sweden and Denmark by an alliance and thus to assure
peace in the Baltic. The war against Poland begun by
Charles X. was a critical affair for the republic, recognised
1 See Der Kinderen, De Nederlandsche Republiek en Munster, p. 73 tt
seq.
The Council Pensionary 237
as the protector of the political equilibrium hereabouts
since the events of 1644 and 1645, particularly when
Dantzig, the centre of the corn trade, was blockaded by
the Swedish fleet and threatened by Swedish troops.
The States had already tried to enter into closer relations
with Brandenburg and had gathered troops on the East
Frisian frontier to watch the Swedes ruling over the
neighbouring Bremen territory. It was resolved to send
a deputation to Sweden and another to Denmark to pre-
serve peace in the Baltic. In December, 1655, Charles
Gustavus got possession of Elbing, and Brandenburg
went over to the Swedish side in the hope of throwing
off Poland's sovereignty over Prussia. Despite Swedish
protests, De Ruyter's squadron in the spring of 16*':
sailed for the Baltic and then a fleet under Obdam, v j
was soon in command of forty-two ships. In July ie
appeared before Dantzig, raised the blockade of the r ity
after uniting with a Danish squadron, remained t .ere
until October, and then returned home, leaving ',1 the
city a Dutch garrison of 1500 men. The deputation to
Sweden under De Witt's cousin and successor as
pensionary of Dordrecht, Govert van Slingelandt, and
that to Denmark under the experienced Van Beuningen
were likewise successful. Sweden in September renewed
at Elbing the old treaties of friendship with a declara-
tion of the neutrality of Dantzig, and Denmark was
brought to a defensive league, evidently designed to
oppose Sweden and in case of necessity to restore peace
by force of arms. The treaties with Sweden and
Denmark plainly did not agree with one another.
De Witt had at first taken up the Dutch policy in the
north with great caution, believing with Amsterdam in
the importance of peace. The good understanding
between him and Van Beuningen, who was known to him
from the pensionary days in Dordrecht, who had resided
at the Swedish court as "extraordinary deputy" during
238 History of the Dutch People
the English war and had been in intimate correspond-
ence with De Witt, influenced De Witt as much as
did his consultations with his wife's uncle, Cornelis de
Graeff van Zuid-Polsbroek, a prominent citizen of
Amsterdam. The opinion of De Witt and Van Beu-
ningen had first been that the interest of the republic
would best be served by an alliance of the two rival
northern powers under the mediation of the States, but
Sweden's aggressive attitude caused this idea to be given
up gradually. In its place Van Beuningen matured the
plan of holding Sweden in check by an alliance of the
States with Denmark and by a display of force upon the
part of the Dutch for the protection of the threatened
- iltic states. DeWitt incautiously approved of this, while
a.\ 'Jding all aspirations for an actual war with the power-
ful Sweden, now in close friendship with England and
Fra ice, so that European complications were to be feared
fron -a war in the north, in which besides Denmark the
State;:'' would have no other allies but the enfeebled
Catholk powers, Spain and the emperor. This change in
the Dutch policy was to be attributed to the influence of
Van Beuningen and Amsterdam. De Witt reproached his
old colleague for the intrigues, by which he endeavoured
to lead the republic into sharp antagonism to Sweden.1
Van Beuningen succeeded in obtaining the rejection of
the treaty of Elbing by the States, a defeat for De
Witt's prudent policy, and in persuading Frederick III.
of Denmark in 1657 to don again the "rusty harness,"
while Poland, the emperor, and even Brandenburg now
also opposed Sweden.
This policy exposed the republic to great dangers, as
it at the same time had difficulties with France, waged
war on Portugal, settled the Miinster affairs with a high
hand, and stood upon anything but a firm footing with
England. The lamentable defeat of the Danes, who
1 Naber, De staatkunde van Johan de Witt, p. 118.
The Council Pensionary 239
were driven from Bremen, lost most of Schonen, in the
early spring of 1658 also Funen and the small islands,
and soon saw the Swedish king attack Zealand and menace
Copenhagen, quickly led to the peace of Roeskilde,
by which Denmark became almost wholly dependent
upon Sweden. The struggle of opinions in the republic
was just decided in favour of Van Beuningen, when the
unexpected news of this peace came to take away the
basis of his policy. Van Beuningen did not give up, but
urged Denmark to disregard the treaty of peace, promis-
ing the support of the States. Charles Gustavus of
Sweden, observing this, suddenly assailed his enemy
anew in August and laid siege to Copenhagen by land
and sea, closing up the Sound with his fleet and by the
conquered forts of Elsinore and Kronenborg. This
energetic attitude of Sweden made Van Beuningen win
his cause. The Swedish power must now be curbed, and
De Witt offered no further objection to helping poor
Denmark. Early in October Obdam was sent to the
Sound with thirty-five ships and 4000 troops under
Colonel Piichler to relieve Copenhagen and to "ruin"
the Swedish fleet, so that no dangerous naval power
could arise in the Baltic. On the 8th of November
Obdam met the somewhat larger Swedish fleet under
Wrangel in the Sound and actually destroyed a large
part of it after a bloody battle, in which the valiant Dutch
vice admirals, Witte De With and Pieter Floriszoon,
lost their lives, while Obdam himself with his ship only
escaped disaster through the efficient support of Aart
van Nes and some other captains.1 The small remnant
of the Swedish fleet retreated to the forts, and Copen-
hagen's siege was raised. The Dutch ships did not
return home after this success but remained in the Sound
on account partly of the appearance there of an English
fleet, whose intentions were mistrusted.
1 De Jonge, i., p. 558 et seq.
240 History of the Dutch People
This English interference, backed up by the French,
moved the Dutch statesmen to act with "vigour," and in
May a new naval force was dispatched to the Sound under
De Ruyter with Johan Evertsen and Meppel as vice
admirals, so that in the spring of 1659 no less than
seventy-five Dutch ships with 12,000 men and over 3000
guns were collected, exclusive of Piichler's 4000 men.
Thus it was hoped to keep Denmark from making in
desperation a secret agreement with Sweden. Mean-
while a treaty concerning northern affairs was concluded
with England and France, chiefly maintaining the peace
of Roeskilde, but leaving out the closing of the Sound
to foreign vessels. Much of the year was spent in
negotiations, and Copenhagen was still besieged upon
the land side. The differences with England and France
regarding the Baltic policy were finally removed by De
Witt, and the English fleet left the Sound to return
home. But matters in the Baltic went little better until
in the fall Denmark, helped by the Dutch arms, began
to get the mastery. Obdam, suffering greatly from the
gout, had also gone home with some twenty ships after the
departure of the English fleet. The rest, commanded by
De Ruyter, gave powerful support to an attack by land
upon Funen, where the Dutch admiral bombarded the
town of Nyborg, November 24th, and forced it to
surrender. Afterwards he shut the Swedish fleet up in
the harbour of Landskrona and wintered at Copenhagen,
where honours were showered upon him. Some
difficulties still existed between De Witt and Amster-
dam, in part because Amsterdam complained seriously
of Obdam's conduct. De Witt took pains to come to an
agreement in views with Van Beuningen, until the
latter finally approved of the treaty of Elbing. For-
tunately for the course of affairs the Swedish king died
suddenly February 23, 1660 ; his young son succeeded
him; and now tranquillity was quickly restored in these
The Council Pensionary 241
regions under the mediation of the States, which
brought about peace at Oliva May 3d between Sweden
and Poland and on June 3d peace at Copenhagen
between Sweden and Denmark. De Witt might well
be content with the result, for success had at last come
to his plans for the mediation of the States between the
belligerents. He had raised higher than ever the con-
sideration shown the Dutch in the Baltic without disturb-
ing the general peace of Europe and in conjunction with
the two great powers, whose enmity he most feared,
whose friendship he deemed most desirable for the
Netherlands.
A time of peace seemed to have dawned upon Europe.
The peace of the Pyrenees, followed by that in the
Baltic, had cleared away the greatest difficulties. The
war with Portugal still remained, but the draft of a
treaty drawn up in the Estates of Holland was soon
made, notwithstanding the opposition of Zealand,
Utrecht, Gelderland, and Groningen, the basis of a
negotiation with Portugal at The Hague, where in the
name of that kingdom the able Count de Miranda
appeared. It was speedily evident that Brazil would
have to be given up by the West India Company, but
Zealand and Gelderland, both interested in the company,
refused their cooperation, and the vote of City and Land
could only be obtained, because its representative,
Schulenborgh, was apparently bribed by Portugal and
approved of the treaty against the wish of his province.
The treaty with Portugal was signed (August 6, 1661)
under the vehement protest of Zealand and Gelderland,
which asserted, not without reason, that to conclude a
treaty of peace by a majority of votes was contrary to
Article 9 of the Union of Utrecht. But Holland carried
first the peace through and after more negotiation (at
the end of 1662) the ratification. The long delay was
owing to the desire of the East India Company in the
242 History of the Dutch People
interval to conquer as much of the Portuguese posses-
sions in India as possible and to the hope of the Portu-
guese for better terms. Brazil was ceded to Portugal
for eight million guilders, free trade except in Brazil
wood with this henceforth Portuguese colony, complete
freedom of trade with Portugal. The West India Com-
pany did not recover from this loss.
England had mediated in these negotiations, but
circumstances there were much changed. Richard
Cromwell's weak government, the omnipotence of the
army, and the waxing confusion in the affairs of the
English republic had turned popular opinion to the side
of the exiled royal house. General Monk, the com-
mander of the army in Scotland, soon put himself in
communication with Charles II., who shortly before had
gone in vain to the Pyrenees to obtain help from France
or Spain in the peace negotiations, and who was now
again in Brussels. Monk offered him in the spring of
1660 the crown of England, Scotland, and Ireland.
Everything was prepared in deep secrecy, and in May
the recall of the Stuarts was a fact. Charles received
the news at Breda, the old possession of the Oranges,
whither he had betaken himself at Monk's request. This
important event threatened to disturb the era of peace
just opening for the republic. The government of
the States had repeatedly made the English exile feel
its hostility, and regarded his house and that of the
Oranges as its worst enemies, so how could it now as-
sume a tolerant attitude towards him without menacing
its own future? But De Witt, inexhaustible in clever
moves, incomparable in the use of the means of the
moment, managed to overcome these difficulties as well
as those arising from the nearly contemporary change in
France, where Mazarin's death, in March, 1661, intro-
duced a very monarchical government.
In foreign affairs also the council pensionary was about
The Council Pensionary 243
1660 the recognised leader of the republic, the states-
man who, by his comprehensive knowledge of political
conditions, by his rare capacity for work, and his end-
less resourcefulness, really merited universal confidence.
Though the genius of the great advocate might be lack-
ing in him, John de Witt was never at a loss for
expedients which could rescue the republic from its
temporary dangers, and he steered the ship of state with
a steady hand upon the surging waves of European
politics. His diplomatic activity shows us the cautious
leader, the calm calculator, the acute judge of men,
and his domestic policy also makes us admire him. He
was not a man who excited enthusiasm, who in burning
zeal conducted his party to victory along the royal road
of open strife; he is the quiet thinker, who seeks to
convince by plain argument, who yields where the
opposition appears too great, and is moderate in
triumph, the object more of rational than of passionate
admiration — the best type of the Holland regent of
those days, simple and worthy, incorruptible and stead-
fast, cool of head and heart, vigorously doing his duty
to the end, scevis tranquillus in undis as few of the
Dutch statesmen before and after him.
CHAPTER X
LAND AND PEOPLE ABOUT l66o
s
CONSIDERABLE in number are the accounts of
the Dutch republic and its inhabitants of this
time. English and French travellers visit it and describe
land and people as they appeared to the foreigner.
Native authors take up the pen to unfold the Interest
van Holland in the mother tongue for their countrymen
principally or the ddlices de la Hollande in the interna-
tional French. The tone of all these accounts is that
of high praise for the many excellent and admirable
things furnished by the small territory. Twenty, forty
years earlier the foreigner stood amazed at all manner of
sights here in the midst of a continuous war and in a
state, whose arrangement in consequence of this war
showed much that was uncertain and temporary. Now
everything was more established, had become more last-
ing, and peace seemed to invite to an investigation of
the bases, upon which reposed the expectation of still
greater development in the future.
Eyes were chiefly directed to Holland, the richest
and most populous of the provinces, the most powerful
and influential, whose supremacy had replaced that of
the princes of Orange for a time at least, so long as the
young heir of their traditions had not yet arrived at the
years of discretion. Years must still elapse before
young Prince William could act for himself; well
educated, residing alternately in the Binnenhof at The
244
Land and People about 1660 245
Hague and in his castle at Breda, William III. of Orange
grew up, with a clear mind and promising talents, but
delicate in health and needing the cares that surrounded
his youthful existence. We have a description of his
appearance at this time: "very handsome, with a long
but well-formed face, a gentle eye, an aquiline nose, and
an alert mind, he speaks well and boldly." '
The regents now ruling powerful Holland knew well
that they could not always prevent his rise, and although
theoretically they might regard him as merely an
eminent personage, as perhaps the most eminent subject
of their commonwealth, although they hoped by adroit
measures to hinder the union in his hands of all the
dignities of his forefathers, yet it could not escape them
also that the people considered his elevation to those
dignities as a matter of course. For the time being,
however, the government of the patriciate, of the
municipal aristocracy, seemed to be supreme in Holland
at least, and the government in the other provinces was
more and more modelled after it.
Holland attracted the most attention in the republic.
Only rarely were the steps of the foreign traveller directed
towards the other provinces, usually towards the neigh-
bouring Zealand which showed so much resemblance to
Holland and was so closely attached to that province.
Only rarely did he penetrate to Utrecht and Gelderland,
and then he confined himself to the chief places of those
provinces; the north, even important Friesland, was but
little visited ; the regions of the south, the conquered
territories, the generality lands, remained quite unknown
to the foreigner. And the writers of the fatherland paid
but slight attention to most of the "seven provinces";
they, too, limited themselves in their accounts principally
to Holland and its cities; even the smallest of these cities
found their admiring historians, while the larger places
1 Voyages de Mons. de Moneonys, ii., p. 127.
246 History of the Dutch People
in the remaining provinces often had to wait long before
being described.
There was a certain similarity to be recognised in the
outward appearance of the cities even of the more remote
sections of the republic. Whoever crossed its frontiers
from the southern Netherlands or the German side was
immediately struck by the neatness and prosperity
prevailing everywhere. But so considerable a city as
Utrecht with its numerous wooden houses failed to
impress by its exterior the traveller, who visited it after
Holland, either by the size and beauty of the buildings
or by its clean streets, although stained glass was here to
be seen in simple dwellings, although one encountered
here, as in Holland even in the homes of the peasants,
the paintings of the great and little Dutch masters of
the time as the ordinary decoration of rooms. Country
towns like Deventer might number some large and tall
edifices, they could be compared with a city of Holland
neither in extent nor in splendour; only as fortresses
did these "frontier cities" surpass in situation and plan
since the days of Maurice those of Holland.
Going from Rotterdam, which was already called "the
second Venice" and attracted notice by its brisk com-
merce with England, particularly by its cloth trade,1 to
the elegant but quiet Delft, a region was traversed where
"the whole district seems rather one single villa than
the country, " a with tree-shaded canals, in which swans
and ducks swam freely around the numerous canal boats
and other vessels. From the never sufficiently praised
city of The Hague, the exquisite "village of villages,"
with its magnificent Voorhout, Huygens' " Batava
Tempe," its Vijverberg, and its splendid forest, the
'Wood," where birds warbled and princes and lords,
statesmen and merchants "sauntered gravely" under the
1 The Dutch drawn to the life (London, 1664), p. 108.
s Monconys, ii., p. 132.
Land and People about 1660 247
shady trees, with its stately palaces and bustling crowd,
one travelled to Leyden, learned and industrious, but
unhealthy and repeatedly ravaged by pestilence, with its
umbrageous Rapenburg, through a glorious country rich
in trees and meadows, which found its match in the
lovely downs above Haarlem, in the prosperous region
between Hoorn and Enkhuizen, but was only excelled by
the beautiful banks of the Vecht with their superb lanes
and villas, then already sung by the poets as the ideal of
nature and rustic life, being continued in the much
lauded fields between Utrecht and Amersfoort, le plus
beau chemin du monde at this time. What a difference
from the heaths of Gelderland and Overyssel, from the
bad roads in Brabant, which could not be passed over
even in the middle of summer without plunging the
waggon up to its axletrees in the water! Astonishment
was excited by the active traffic in Holland, where
regular boats on the canals, famed for their clear water
and environed by trees, united the cities in addition to
the waggon service as of old ; only some parts of Zealand
and Friesland and the immediate vicinity of the city of
Groningen could equal it.
These three provinces were the ones which might
to some extent be compared with Holland in their
abundance of meadows, drainage, diking, and laying out
of canals. Zealand, however, had already seen its best
days, and was beginning to suffer from the difficult com-
munication between the scattered islands and from the
continued emigration of the population to the more
promising Holland ; the improvement of the fens and the
consequent building of canals in Groningen, though
undertaken partly with capital from Holland, increased
at this time, under the lead of such energetic personages
as Adriaan Wildervanck, the prosperity of the province in
a great measure; the construction of dikes on the islands
of Zealand brought great profit to many people in Hoi-
248 History of the Dutch People
land and Zealand, those in the northern quarter of
Holland were for the most part completed before the
middle of the century.1 The improvement of the Eem
for the benefit chiefly of Amersfoort, the placing of the
Slaper dike in the Gelderland valley after 1652 for the
prevention of inundations, the plan for the canalisation
of the Grift at Apeldoorn, indicate great activity in this
direction in other provinces also ; the clearing of the
fens northeast of Meppel, begun in 1625 by Roelof van
Echten, shows by the name of the "Holland Field"
that Holland capital was here invested again in the "high
fen"; the continuous diking of the Lauwers and the
Dollart, partly with capital from Holland, was ever
redeeming more land in the far north.
But the strength of the country lay in the cities of
Holland, chief among which was Amsterdam, enlarged
again in 1658 and now grown to a city of nearly 150,000
inhabitants. Its magnificent canals, in crescent form
spanning the city in a constantly widening circle, its
"islands" on the side of the Y, were set with rapidly
increasing rows of warehouses and dwellings, among
which the splendid mansions of the rich merchants on the
Keizersgracht excelled above all. An author proudly
exclaims: "whoever has not seen Amsterdam, has seen
no ships and does not know what maritime affairs are.""
Its magazines and harbours, its churches and orphan asy-
lums, its celebrated house of correction, its arsenal, its
city hall especially, the "eighth wonder of the world,"
first used in 1655, all things were worthy of the proud
city which found its equal nowhere in the world.
Leyden was praised as the most beautiful city of
Europe, as among cities "what spring is in the
seasons," flourishing from its trade in cloth and well
known on account of its renowned scholars and its more
1 See Blink, Nederland en zijne bewoners, ii., p. 144.
s(Parival), Les ddlices de la Uollande, p. 92.
Land and People about 1660 249
than 2000 students. Haarlem, since 1667 connected
with Leyden by a canal, was the seat of the beer and
linen industry. Little and quiet Delft was a prosperous
town of brewers and men living upon their income.
Ancient Dordrecht was the centre of the brisk commerce
on the rivers, particularly in French and Rhenish wines.
Rotterdam through its English commerce had already
come up as one of the greatest cities of the land.
Pleasant and healthful Gouda, almost entirely spared by
the pestilence in this century so often appearing in the
Dutch cities, was amid a watery region a country town
frequented by men of leisure and abounding in pipe
factories. There were further some thirty smaller and
in part walled towns and four hundred villages, many of
which would have been called cities in other countries.
And all this was in a territory scarcely sixty miles in
circumference, whose population may be estimated at not
much less than one million, half of the whole population
of the republic.1
This population, by its constant meeting with other
nations over the entire world, by the settlement of many
foreigners in its midst, by the influence of French
civilisation upon the upper circles, was already on the
road to lose some of its peculiarities, at least so far as the
dwellers in the cities were concerned, but it still pre-
served singularities enough to fascinate the foreign
traveller. Its healthy mind, its vigorous energy, its
constancy, its inexhaustible patience, its steady persever-
ance, its ardour and power in work, its care for the poor
and unfortunate, its moderation in eating generally, the
respectability of its magistrates, its simplicity of dress,
1 Het Interest van Holland reckons the population at nearly 2^ millions,
but with a conjecture which the author himself calls "rough and uncertain,1'
while the calculation of the poll-tax in 1622 makes out a population of over
600,000, which is assuredly too small for this time (see Interest van Holland,
p. 18 et sea.).
250 History of the Dutch People
its interest in public affairs, its freedom of thought,
speech, and writing, its good laws, its wholesome and
robust appearance, its intelligent deliberation, its
frugality, orderliness, and honesty, that made it save
and not squander what it saved upon luxury but lay it
up or devote it to the adornment of house and garden,
its astuteness and cleverness in intercourse, the neatness
of its dwellings, the purity of its morals, the ennobling
influence of the women on society, are highly praised
even by the most prejudiced critic.1
Its mistrustful nature, its inclination to scorn the
foreigner and to take advantage of his inexperience, its
lesser reliability in affairs, its obstinacy, which caused it
to be said in an angry mood that one could sooner con-
vert a Jew to Christianity than convince a Hollander of
his error, its slowness in decision, its coolness and
reserve, its aversion to forms and compliments, its liking
for drink very strong among the lower classes and not
rare in the governing circles, its obtrusive selfishness,
were, however, equally observed ; so also was the rapid
deterioration of its former military virtues in years of
peace. It allowed its wars to be waged by hired troops,
as had been the case since the end of the sixteenth
century, so that it became unaccustomed to the use of
arms, and its militia only continued in existence for the
sake of the shooting festivals and the manly uniform
which raised the wearers in the people's eyes.
It is not to be denied that exceptions to the rule here
occur, and whoever considers the life of this time at The
Hague' will be struck by the notable deviations from the
picture here presented of Holland's people and their
characteristics. These differences: immorality in the
higher circles, idleness of the elegant ladies and gentle-
1 The Dutch drawn to the life, p. 50; Temple's Observations, Ch. iv.
* See especially: Betz, Het haagsche leven in de tweede helft der iyd' eeuw
('s Gravenh., 1900).
•
Land and People about 1660 251
men, excessive luxury, prevalence of gambling, univer-
sality of the duel for insignificant reasons, all proceed
from the development of the court life at The Hague in
Frederick Henry's later days and in the time of
William II., when a crowd of young noblemen from
France particularly, attracted by the military renown of
the Oranges and by the brilliancy of the stadtholder's
court, settled in The Hague and introduced the refined
but corrupt French habits to the aristocratic society there,
which regarded Paris as the university of civilised life.1
And though sometimes the traces of a like spirit may be
elsewhere perceived, generally they are derived from that
source, and facts show them to be exceptions. Memoirs
like those of Constantijn Huygens, the son, those of
the lively Madame de Zoutelande, of the wearisome
rhymester Coenraet Droste, such correspondence as that
of Christiaan Huygens, present to us the existence of
this time at The Hague in all its colours, but on the
other hand stands the evidence concerning the life and
domesticity of old Holland, as it was still to be seen
among the great majority of the population, in the
journals of Doubleth, the letters of John de Witt,
the biographies of the great Dutch naval heroes, literary
personages, and statesmen, in Cats's pictures of family
life, in the dramas and farces of the time, in the travels
and observations of foreigners.3
When Temple, the English ambassador, who spent
two years here, speaks of the simplicity of the first sea-
man and the first statesman of the period, when he
testifies to the plain life of both — De Ruyter not being
distinguished outwardly from an ordinary sea captain or
merchant, De Witt simply dressed, living like a common
citizen, followed upon the street by a single servant, the
1 Voyage de deux jeunes hollandais a Paris, ed. Faugere, 2e ed., p. 5.
2 See in general : Schotel, Het oud-hollandsch huisgezin der zeventiende
eeaw (Haarlem, 1868).
252 History of the Dutch People
one who waited on him and his family at their plain
table, — he intimates that so all the magistrates live. But
he remarks also that the officers in the Dutch service live
otherwise, although in his opinion they differ favourably
from those in other countries.
The same sharp-eyed English statesman divided the
people here into five classes: peasants, mariners, mer-
chants, men living upon their income, and noblemen and
officers. He describes the first as diligent and dull,
plain and honest, at least so long as they dwell far from
great towns, simple and temperate, even poor in their
way of living, so that they are content with but little
nourishing food and may therefore be regarded as tall
but not proportionately strong. Rougher and sterner
are the mariners, sparing of words as well as in their life,
hardened and tough, more valiant in defence than in
attack. A little more easy of intercourse are the mer-
chants and tradesmen in the cities, constant and ener-
getic, dexterous and unreliable where their advantage
is at stake, standing upon their rights and possessed of
mercantile honesty. The magistrates come from the
class of men living upon their property in the cities.
They are former merchants grown rich or the sons of
former merchants, marrying into mercantile families,
living on the income of their estates in the country, on
life and redeemable annuities to the charge of municipal,
provincial, or general government, on the interest of
their shares in the great companies, sometimes also on
the revenue from their capital invested in large com-
mercial affairs. Great capital is not so often found among
them as among the actual wholesale merchants; their
wealth, as a rule, is only moderate, because interest is at
a low rate and the income from landed property seldom
exceeds two per cent., while the salary of the offices is
small. The young sons of the magistrates study law
usually at Leyden and Utrecht to prepare for government
.
Land and People about 1660 253
positions and complete their education by a journey to
France and England or to Italy. The class of the
nobility is hardly elevated in consideration above that of
the magistrates. In Holland it is small in number, partly
in consequence of the long Spanish war which extin-
guished many families. Only a few noble families remain
there, which proudly hold themselves aloof from the
families of the magistrates, even from those which by
purchase have come into possession of noble estates and
titles. The nobles imitate principally the French
nobility, just as the officers and the wealthy merchants'
sons do, and like them they would gladly shine in a
stadtholder's court.
Such was the society of Holland. That of the other
provinces showed about the same type : somewhat
rougher, somewhat more uncivilised in outward appear-
ance as well as in inward characteristics, somewhat less
spoiled also by the less turbulent life and the less
luxury. The numerous nobility of Gelderland, Utrecht,
and Overyssel asserted itself vigorously in those three
provinces like the influential nobility of Friesland and
Groningen, less polished than that of the eastern prov-
inces owing to the greater remoteness of the northern
provinces, from which its members only went to Hol-
land to sit temporarily in high government boards and
were then wont to adopt the customs of Holland.
The foreigner saw all this with interest, but Temple
says at the end of his observations on the people of
Holland that a man would choose rather to travel than
to live in this country, where the earth is better than the
air, profit is more in request than honour, where there
is more sense than wit, more good nature than good
humour, more wealth than pleasure, where a man finds
more things to observe than to desire, and more persons
to esteem than to love.
One of the most striking peculiarities of the Hollander,
254 History of the Dutch People
of the Netherlander in general, was his attachment to
house and garden and resulting therefrom, with mutual
freedom, the strong bond of family not alone in the
household but in the larger circle as well. Some writers
are astonished at the liberty which the children enjoy in
the street and in the house, a school for the strong
independence of opinion and action appearing in youth
even towards father and mother. Others are moved by
the free tone, the independent attitude of the servants,
who do not allow themselves to be ruled by the whims
and caprice of masters and mistresses. Still others
testify1 to the uncommonly great influence of the married
woman, mistress in the household, where she sways the
sceptre and binds even her husband to the strict rules of
neatness and good order, while she not seldom meddles
in affairs of state, particularly when the appointment of
members of the family to office is in question.2 But in
his house the Dutchman suffered no interference from
the authorities, no annoyance of any sort. It may be
said of him too that his house was his "castle." Upon
it he spent gladly his hardly earned and carefully
hoarded money to beautify it and to arrange it according
to his taste.
The old Dutch house,3 which as early as the beginning
of the sixteenth century was distinguished by its gable
in the shape of steps, still remained generally faithful to
this form of building at this time, although it was grow-
ing higher and narrower and was more lavishly decorated
with images and figures, with adornments to frame and
crown it. These ornaments usually bore some relation
to the trade or business of the owner and often, in the
absence of a signboard, gave a name to the dwelling
which sometimes derived its appellation from the family
1 Temple, Observations; Parival, p. 25.
s See Bontemantel, ed. Kernkamp, ii., passim.
3 See Schotel.
Land and People about 1660 255
of the master of the house or from his satisfied or severe,
joyful or sombre state of mind at the time of the build-
ing. With the increase of wealth and of the number of
independent gentlemen the former penthouses on the
lowest story necessary for business disappeared, and
there were more windows; the simplicity of the decora-
tion of gable and cornice, of inner chamber and rear of
the house, was less striking, while the yard from a bleach-
ing ground became more and more of a garden, adorned
with flowers and shrubs, with statues and parterres,
little fountains and hedges cut in figures, again after the
French style, with white sand and gravel artfully
arranged in the form of mosaics. Formerly these gardens
were more frequently found outside the walls of the
town in the vicinity, with a summer-house for the centre
and stiff beds of flowers and vegetables. These outside
gardens continued in use for nearly two centuries longer,
but together with the gardens near the houses they were,
after the tulipomania of about 1636, richly provided
with all sorts of flowering and bulbous plants. The com-
mon citizen also diversified his bleaching ground with a
little flower garden, preferably by the side of the canal
where he dwelt. Within and without great care was
taken to secure neatness and cleanliness. Fresh paint,
beautifully scoured copper or painted iron knockers and
knobs on the door delighted the eye. Stoop and gable,
passages and rooms were regularly, even daily, scrubbed
and washed, Temple ascribing this to the desirability of
avoiding the effects of the extreme moisture of the air and
giving the same reason for the striving after cleanliness
and neatness in the house, evidenced by the constant
cleaning and polishing of furniture and metal-work, the
favourite occupation of the Dutch wives and daughters
who could hardly be imagined without duster or washing
utensils.
This cleanliness, however, extended less to the body
256 History of the Dutch People
and not always to the clothing. In the highest circles
there was a certain aversion to washing, even of the
hands and face, which remained for days without contact
with water, as did the unexposed parts of the body often
for weeks and months. Uncleanness of the hair was very
common, and the women in this respect were quite the
equals of the men, surpassed them frequently in neglect
of personal cleanliness, in carelessness and filthiness of
apparel. "Dirty as an eel" is the verdict on Holland's
men and women of this time, and the "shining counters"
are compared unfavourably with the "foul faces."
Of the ordinary city house the front room was the
most important apartment, where the family lived
mainly, unless it was used as a workshop, as was the case
with tradesmen. Then the small and plainly furnished
little office just back of it became the living room, for
which it was occasionally destined in more pretentious
houses. The white sand covering the wooden floor of the
rooms, whenever a small carpet did not render this un-
necessary, heightened the impression of cleanliness as
well as the shining tiles setting off on the walls the
brightly polished wooden wainscots. Mirrors and glasses,
rows of tin and copper vessels and plates shone from all
sides upon the visitor, carefully arranged and scoured,
resplendent as gold and silver. The sand was strewn in
beautiful figures on the floor and under the chimney
during the summer, if floors of Italian mosaic could not
be afforded. Paintings by more or less known masters
hung upon the walls, a decoration that was nowhere
lacking, not even in the house of the poor townsman or
of the common peasant in the country. They often
served as an investment for money on account of their
relatively high value. Such pictures were found especially
in the rooms of state, which were mostly situated in the
second story and were distinguished by the paper or gilt
leather hangings or by the colour of the painted wainscot.
Land and People about 1660 257
With plain citizens these rooms had mats on the floor, in
wealthier homes they were provided with inlaid floors or
with rich tapestries on floors and walls. Finely sculp-
tured cabinets and chests, curiosities from east and west,
Frisian clocks, elegantly carved chairs and tables, artistic-
ally stained window-panes with armorial bearings or
figures from biblical or profane antiquity, exquisite glass
and mirrors, costly porcelain and stone jars attracted
attention here. But the mistress of the house was
reluctant to let the careless stranger enter. Only after
removing his boots or shoes was he admitted to those
sanctuaries, however desirous the owner might be to
have her treasures admired. In the sleeping-room carved
bedsteads with heavy curtains of green damask, fine
serge, or cloth were only seen in the houses of aristocratic
and very wealthy people. The ordinary citizen, even
though quite rich, slept in the ancestral bed built into the
more or less sculptured wall, up to which one had to
climb with a ladder or a stool. In all houses there were
beds of down and an abundance of clean linen which com-
forted the foreigner as he thought of those dark "sleeping
closets," carefully hidden from sight during the day by
painted or carved doors. Smooth English mats on the
floor augmented here the impression of neatness. Huge
chests for linen with fine copper or iron trimmings, well-
stocked wardrobes and cabinets furnished the sleeping
apartments. The kitchen with its shining vessels, its
beautifully washed tiled floor and tiled or plastered walls,
its caned chairs, its full "treasury" or cupboard for
dishes and plates, its amply provided tin closet where the
daily tinware found a place if not received in the tin
closet of the front room, its well-kept hearth or fire-pot,
testified to the love of neatness, which was regarded as a
cardinal virtue in the servants no less than in the mistress
of the house.
Thus the worthy Hollander lived in his home, to
VOL. IV. — 17.
258 History of the Dutch People
which he was attached, although he might like to while
away an hour at the nearest inn or tavern in discussing
with his neighbours the happenings of city and country,
the vicissitudes of the war in remote parts, the interests of
commerce and industry, while enjoying a glass of beer or
wine.
The ordinary drink of the people was still beer, "small"
or "thin" beer; the heavier Hamburg, English, Heusden
beers, the local brews of heavier kinds of beer, were also
not disliked. The Delft beer was in general use from
the fifteenth century in the other provinces too, whither
much of it was still exported in the seventeenth century,
as well as of the Haarlem, Deventer, Harlingen, and
Breda beers, the fame of the last being on the wane. In
the first half of the century tea appeared chiefly in the
apothecary's shop as a medicine, as a "universal"
panacea "for all sicknesses and diseases," but about 1660
it came into fashion as a drink after the example of
Paris, and soon the Chinese soothing syrup and chocolate
became for women what coffee was later and what
tobacco was from the beginning of the century for the men.
" Tobacco sucking " from the long Gouda pipe might be
called a masculine habit about the middle of the century,
and "tobacco houses " were in high favour, for men
smoked but little at home, at most on the stoop before
the house. The Franco-Spanish custom of taking snuff
rapidly penetrated into Dutch parlours, and the snuff-box
became a common article for men and women both.
The Paris fashion had great influence also here.
At banquets there was anything but moderation so far
as concerns eating. The temperance of the Hollanders
in the eating and drinking of daily life, often ridiculed as
niggardliness by foreigners and particularly by English-
men, was as proverbial as their intemperance at feasts
and dinners. Bread and butter with milk or beer was the
ordinary breakfast even of the citizen in easy circum-
Land and People about 1660 259
stances. Butter and cheese at the same time was a
superfluity. The peasant drank buttermilk; sweet milk
was for the inhabitant of the city and was peddled early
in the morning through "Holland rich in cream and
milk," as "fine, pure morning's milk." Of the midday
meal eaten at twelve o'clock the principal dish was soup
with peas and beans as the chief ingredients or cabbage
and bacon, and meat was comparatively little employed,
mostly in hotchpot. The upper classes made more of a
ceremony and in "dainty abundance" prepared the mid-
day meal after the French style, having usually fish for
the second course, salad for the third, and tarts and fruits
of all kinds. Beer was commonly drttnk at meals by the
citizen ; the higher classes added to the heavier sorts of
beer a rich choice of French and Rhenish wines. Brandy
was usual even among well-to-do people only at feasts
and sociable gatherings. Gin did not make its fatal
appearance until later in the train of the potato, which
was little known as a food here at this time, although
Raleigh as early as 1584 had brought it from Virginia to
England and it had appeared some years afterwards in
the Leyden botanical garden. Forks were in fashion
only among the upper classes ; the citizen, even though
well off, ate with his fingers. Supper was eaten towards
bedtime; it consisted mostly of bread and butter again;
among the more wealthy people it was enlarged into a
new repast. About ten o'clock the old-fashioned citizen
then went to bed, it being the hour also for closing gates
and taverns. Few people remained up longer, and many
retired earlier.1
In general the life of the Hollander in the middle of
the seventeenth century manifests a tendency to greater
luxury, even to extravagance, which gave rise to a rivalry
in fine carriages, costly apparel, furniture, jewelry, and
1 See Kalff in the work : Amsterdam in de ifde eeuw, section " Domestic
and social life," p. 7 et seq.
260 History of the Dutch People
other things. Extravagance induced the daughter of a
merchant of this time foolishly to use her expensive lace
neckerchief in order to make the fire blaze up more
merrily. Luxury appeared also in the more elegant
clothing after the French fashion as well as in the fineness
of the superabundant linen, hoarded in huge chests and
closets and forming the pride of the thrifty mistress of
the house. The costly bodices of silk and velvet decked
with gold, pearls, and precious stones, the short silken
jacket, the large red or blue hooped skirt bordered with
silver and gold thread, the "hooped barrel" ridiculed by
Huygens in his Kostelick Mai — that biting satire on the
fashionable costume of his time — underneath the expen-
sive satin, damask, silk petticoat, or stays of all colours
edged with lace, became ever finer and more magnificent ;
the modest black cloak or mantle with a hood concealed
all this upon the street, unless it were coquettishly held
open, and sometimes the light rain-coat imported from
France. From the middle of the century a quantity of
ribbons and bows adorned the dress of the women in the
French fashion. Stiff corsets, diamond hairpins, gold
and coral necklaces, earrings and bracelets, perfumes,
fans, hair dyes, cosmetics, and patches made their
appearance to the vexation of the old-fashioned mothers
and of the preachers and censors in prose and poetry,
who often raised their voices against all this extravagance
which caused the loss of Holland's "ancient fame for
plain respectability." No less ire was aroused by the fine
lace collars — the "sloping plaited ruff, pride of all the
peasants," says Huygens — folded less stiffly since the end
of the sixteenth century but not less richly ornamented
and in the middle of the seventeenth worn in broad folds
around the neck over the remarkably low-cut dress, by
the lace cuffs about the wrists, the pretty leather or silk
gloves, the numberless jewels burdening the attire, the
gayly embroidered stockings, and red-heeled shoes. Poets
Land and People about 1660 261
and prose writers like Huygens and Heemskerk describe
the exaggerated elegance of the feminine costume —
"more flag than covering" — in inimitable style, some-
times lashing the foolish extravagance with cutting
ridicule, sometimes unfolding with ironical admiration the
mysteries of the refined art of the toilet.
The costume of the men was much less extravagant,
although the French fashion began to make itself felt
here, too, more and more among the wealthy class. The
round felt hat with broad flexible brim of old times was
giving way to the small Swedish head-covering with
narrow brim, to the Polish cap, to hats of round or
pointed crowns with modish ribbons, plumes, and tufts of
feathers, such as only fops had worn at first. The short-
clipped natural hair of Maurice's time was becoming old-
fashioned in comparison with the long and curly locks of
the younger men unfeelingly adopting the fashion of big
wigs. The sober mantle of black cloth over the modest
black doublet, adorned only among the rich with gold or
silver buttons, became gradually brighter and finer in
stuff and colour and was soon replaced by the fashionable
silken mantle, while the doublet now slashed and trimmed
with gold lace was of costly velvet, silk, and satin, and
the stiff linen Spanish collars and sleeves since the time
of Frederick Henry made way for all sorts of French lace-
work, the rings and bracelets compressing hands and
fingers giving evidence also of refined luxury. The
breeches, decked with ribbons and bows, slashed and
pulled up in the French manner, vexed old-fashioned
people who in the "laced flapping tattered smallclothes"
of the younger men saw incorporated the frivolity and
wickedness of their century and shunned the dangerous
appearance of effeminacy and immorality presented by
the borrowing of fashions for men from the dress of
women and the reverse. The gilded swords of state, the
cosmetics and patches used also by the dandies, the red
262 History of the Dutch People
stockings, the expensive garters, the elegantly buckled
high-heeled shoes, perfumery and hair powder became
more and more the fashion for men. In all these things
of beauty men went farther in the Netherlands than
in France, where young Louis XIV. set an example of
simplicity in dress to the court and issued placards against
extravagant splendour, so that the Dutchman and the
German in Paris were recognised by the lace and ribbons
of their costume and were consequently openly laughed
at.1
The country people alone retained generally the old
national dress as well as the captains and sailors with
their great baggy breeches of the ancient time, but the
dweller in the city began to imitate more the elegant
costume of the wealthy, though he adhered usually to
the tasteless Dutch cut. The pamphlets repeatedly
mention tradesmen and storekeepers who run about
dressed like "bannerets" and decorate their houses like
burgomasters.
All this luxury was naturally the result of the remark-
able prosperity prevailing among the wealthy classes of
the population at this time, of the much discussed
flourishing state of commerce and industry, which ever
filled the foreigner with amazement and admiration, the
native with pride and pleasure. This prosperity was not
quite universal, for here also the labourer was not want-
ing, who had little share in the luxury, but the fact that
he could easily make twelve to fifteen stivers in a day
testifies to the relative welfare, while the abundant care
of the poor, the constantly increasing number of hospitals
and refuges for the indigent in the cities and large
villages prevented actual misery. Not to mention some
exceptions, the wealth was quite evenly distributed over
the well-to-do class, so that an estate of 40,000 to 50,000
1 Voyage a Paris, pp. 31, 56, no.
Land and People about 1660 263
guilders might be considered as the smallest fortune of a
rich man.
People began, however, as elsewhere to comprehend
the harm of this growing extravagance, and not only
writers and ministers opposed it, but the municipal
governments commenced thinking again of renewing the
old statutes against excessive luxury at weddings and
feasts, in dress and costly things, and even set about
making new regulations. Repeated reference to this
occurs in the pamphlets, and the luxury of some is con-
trasted with the dearness of bread and the indigence of
others. Measures are demanded for preventing the
gnawing poverty that threatens the needy, when the
necessities of life grow dearer. In the trying time of the
English war poverty rose to a critical height among the
working class. And after that came in 1655 the evil of
the pestilence to scourge the country. Over 13,000
people died then in Leyden, about one-fourth of the
population, and nearly 18,000 next year at Amsterdam.
The large disbursements of the almonries, amounting in
1660 at Amsterdam for the Reformed alone to 238,000
guilders, exclusive of the distribution to the indoor poor
which sometimes ran up to 600,000 guilders, indicate the
great number of the poor, as do the countless exhortations
to charity and the establishment of poorhouses and
work-houses that were no sooner erected than filled.1
Foreigners note, however, that poverty in the Neth-
erlands was relatively not so prominent as in other
countries.
The general prosperity depended mainly upon the com-
merce which is depicted for us in a vivid but certainly
not impartial mariner by the already mentioned Interest
van Holland, written by the Leyden manufacturer Pieter
de la Court and carefully revised, improved, and aug-
1 De Bosch Kemper, De armoede in ons vaderland, p. 97.
264 History of the Dutch People
merited by John de Witt and Pieter de Groot.1 This
presentation starts from a fair consideration of Holland's
natural condition, situation, and population, which is
thrown upon the sea for support. Comparing the Hol-
land of those days with that of Raleigh's time, the
writer assumes that fishery and maritime commerce with
everything connected therewith had increased to one-
third more, an estimate that can hardly be regarded as
far wrong, though it must of course be taken in the
rough. The circumstance mentioned by De la Court, that
a half more ships sail to the east than to the west, seems
to show that the carrying trade over all Europe was large
and commerce in transit was the main affair, but that
the consumption in the country itself must have been
considerable, though allowance be made — which the
author neglects to do — for the great share of the goods
arriving in Dutch ports from the east that was then
exported along the rivers to Germany and the southern
Netherlands. Commerce was very much helped by the
low rate of interest, 3 to 4^ per cent., which the Holland
merchants paid for their borrowed capital in consideration
of their well-deserved credit. This low interest resulted
partly from the small income of real property on account
of heavy taxes and from the relative absence of very rich
landlords and extensive landed possessions.
Dutch commerce had at this time reached its highest
point according to the judgment of the most capable
writers. It did not extend further than a score of years
earlier, but the merchant secured an opportunity to
develop his plans unmolested now that peace was
enjoyed, the dissensions with England had temporarily
1 De la Court's little book first published in 1662 under this title, although
prohibited, was speedily reprinted, and later made over by the writer into
his Aanwysingh der politike gronden en tnaximett van de Republike van
Holland en Westvriesland (Leiden & Rotterdam, 1669). See J. Heemskerk
Land and People about 1660 265
ceased, the state of war in north and south was ended,
the Dutch ships of war were often making the Moorish
corsairs on Africa's northern coast feel the power of the
States, and were upholding the honour of their flag on
the seas of the world.1 English rivalry began to come
up seriously in consequence of the Navigation Act,
which continued in full force under Charles II. also to
the disappointment of the Dutch merchants, but for the
time being Dutch commerce was a match for that
rivalry. It was even more so for the French, Danish,
Swedish, and German competition, which could not be
so well measured against it chiefly for want of the capital
so abundant here and so easily obtainable. The princi-
pal aim of Dutch policy must be the preservation of the
"blessed" state of peace according to De la Court and to
De Witt himself, and the "interest of Holland" seemed
to profit by everything working in that direction. The
rise of a stadtholder's power, therefore, had to be
opposed in every way, because experience in the past had
taught that another political tendency was to be expected
from it, which would not be determined by commercial
interests but by general politics and even by dynastic
motives, inspiring naturally slight sympathy in the mer-
chant, whenever he saw in them no advantage to him-
self. De la Court's book, which exhibited this tendency
most plainly, excited as much satisfaction and agreement
in the ruling party as indignation and protest in their
Orange opponents, as appears from the violent pamphlets
published for and against it in these years. The author's
Bz. in the Gids of 1853; Van Rees, Verhandeling over de politike gronden
en maximen; Veegens, in Historische Studien, ii., p. 30; Fruin, in the
Gids, 1865, ii., p. 459.
1 Pringsheim, Beitrdge zur wirthschaftlichen Entwickelungsgeschichte der
Vereiniglen Niederlande, p. 14, shows an increase of commerce from 1660
after a temporary depression, evidently the result of war.
266 History of the Dutch People
person and principles were vehemently assailed in them ;
he was in his native town repelled from the communion
table as an immoral person and had to be protected from
the popular fury.1 This did not, however, prevent
him from issuing in 1669 a new, rewritten edition of
his work with the title — Exposition of the salutary
political principles and maxims of the republic of Holland
and West Friesland.
The extraordinary rise of the East India Company, by
which nearly all Indian wares "are fixed to Holland,"
appeared to the author no less a reason for the great
prosperity than peace. This assertion is not worthy of
full belief, and De la Court himself really understood
this, as is evident from his views concerning the evil
consequences of the strict maintenance of the monopoly
of the "close companies" and concerning their endeavour
to secure the highest profits with the least trade.
Regarding the East India Company, the "flourishing
century," spoken of by Van Diemen's successor, the
governor general Cornelis van der Lijn, after the restora-
tion in 1646 of peace on Java with the susuhunan of
Mataran and the sultan of Bantam, had dawned upon it
more in appearance than in reality. Van Diemen's
strong government had made the company's name every-
where dreaded and established its authority both in the
Archipelago and upon Ceylon, Malacca, and Formosa
on solid foundations. The renewal of its charter in
1647 seemed to put it in a position for obtaining large
gains during twenty-five years more, especially if it
would enter upon new paths. The company, however,
adhered to its old commercial principles. Notwithstand-
ing the representations of many members of the Indian
government," the chamber of seventeen, for fear of its
1 See Wttewaall, Proeve van De la Court's Welvaren van Leiden, p. xiii.
See Van Rees, Gesch. der Staaihuishoudkunde, i., p. 367.
2 De Jonge, Opkomst van het Ned. gezag in Qost-Indie, vi., p. iv.
Land and People about 1660 267
beloved monopoly, would not hear to greater freedom for
private commerce, while by the small salaries of its officials
it gave occasion for secret trading and dishonest practices
of all kinds.
Van der Lijn and his successor Carel Reinierszoon,
under whom the rule of governor and councils was again
regulated and fixed after the old style, supported by
justice and police under their management and connected
with the exclusive maintenance of the Reformed religion,
were not the men by vigorous action to lead the com-
pany into new ways or even to bring it to a more flourish-
ing condition along the old ways. They obeyed the orders
of the seventeen, kept up the monopoly, and manifested
towards the native princes at the request of their masters
"a benevolent, modest, humble, and friendly attitude,"
towards the English and other rivals a cautious reserve
in order to afford no opportunity for grievances. Peace
seemed the best means for the promotion of commerce.
So far as possible the seventeen desired to avoid the costly
wars of Van Diemen's time. Tney wished thenceforth
exclusively to see efforts made for an increase of the
dividends, not for an increase of power and territory.
The days of Coen and Van Diemen were gone forever.
It was forgotten that in these regions commerce and a
display of force irrevocably went together.
The appearance of Johan Maetsuycker, as the successor
of Reinierszoon who died in 1653, able as he was, did not
open a new epoch. A clever diplomatist and a careful
magistrate, quite after the heart of his "principals" in
the fatherland, more than a brilliant warrior and an
organiser as Coen and Van Diemen were, he upheld the
company's authority during twenty-five years upon the
whole with great success. With the help of the talented
Rijklof van Goens, governor of Ceylon for a long time,
he drove the Portuguese from their last footholds upon
that island and the shores of Hither India; only Goa and
268 History of the Dutch People
a part of Timor remained in their hands at the peace
with them, which did not take effect in India until
1663. The important Formosa gave way before the might
of the enterprising and cruel Chinese pirate Coxinga,
owing also to the bad conduct of the commander Coyet
who was punished by banishment to a remote island, but
Palembang in 1659 and Macassar chastised in 1660 and con-
quered some years later by Speelman atoned for this loss to
a certain extent, and on the Moluccas the company's sway
continued undisturbed. The pliable governor general
sought as much as possible to shun difficulties with the
English and the native princes in accordance with the
wishes of his masters and the policy of his immediate pred-
ecessors. But the company's commerce did not increase
under his administration, and it was quite to the contrary.
The spice trade of the Moluccas went first to Macassar,
thence quickly to other parts, having been much limited
by the company's measures, particularly during the sway
of the governor De Vlaming van Oudshoorn, who
destroyed the clove crop everywhere except upon
Ambon and the Oeliassers and punished and even
exterminated unmercifully the rebellious population for
its opposition. Batavia itself languished by reason of the
vigorous competition of Bantam, where an active and
able sultan with the help of Arabs, Englishmen, and
Danes brought about an important commercial movement
that seriously threatened the company's trade. Coen's
plan for bringing colonists to Batavia, supported by
Maetsuycker as an excellent method of raising the
rapidly sinking Batavia, began again in 1662 to be carried
into effect, but the number of colonists still remained
small.
The chief concern for the seventeen was that the
dividends continued at a good height, 25, 30, sometimes
40 per cent., although they fell some years to 12^ per
cent., especially at the time of the first English war
Land and People about 1660 269
which stopped all commerce temporarily.1 We know
that these large dividends cannot be considered a criterion
for the flourishing condition of the company, as they did
not always proceed from actual earnings, but could often
be paid only from money collected. It was precisely
these dividends, however, that brought the profits most
in evidence, and therefore De la Court could say for this
time that the company notably increased the prosperity
of the country, although these profits were not based
upon the company's real progress. Outside of the circle
of the company's high officials and its highest directors the
actual condition of the great commercial corporation was
as good as unknown. The mysterious bookkeeping of
the company and the confusion pervading it made it
extremely difficult for any but the initiated to see that
neither the large dividends nor the resulting high prices
of the shares of the company were infallible proofs of its
prosperity. But aside from the large dividends it was the
considerable clandestine profits, enjoyed by officials in
India and the fatherland, by the managers even of the
company's business, that contributed to the growth of
wealth in the fatherland, a fact which redounded as little
to the credit of those officials and managers as did to
Holland's forefathers the often wild speculation in the
company's shares on the Amsterdam Bourse, bringing
naturally great gains to some but quite as great losses to
others.
Very important for the company was the establish-
ment of a small colony of Netherlanders at the Cape of
Good Hope, where, under the lead of the energetic ship's
doctor, Jan van Riebeek, who governed there during ten
years, a fort was built and land was distributed to the
company's officers. A beginning of colonisation was thus
made for the benefit of the East Indiamen sailing to and
from the Indies, the Cape from this time becoming for
1 Klerk de Reus, Uebersicht, Beil. vi.
270 History of the Dutch People
them a much desired resting place, where they could take
in provisions, such as water, fresh meat, and vegetables,
and tarry for a time for the restoration of health. On
Riebeek's departure in 1662 there was already a nucleus
of cattle-raising European colonists in the neighbour-
hood of the fort, and people were beginning to penetrate
farther into the unknown interior. The colonies formed
about the same time on Mauritius, Ceylon, and Cochin,
sustained by Maetsuycker in the beginning with good
result, seemed to open a new future for the development
of these promising islands and coasts, a boundless field
of development for the Dutch nation.
Much less important were both commerce and colonisa-
tion in the regions over which the West India Company
extended its activity. Its charter also was prolonged in
1647 for twenty-five years, but it then fell into a sad
state, mainly by reason of the complete ruin of its power
in Brazil. On January 26, 1654, the company's dominion
here ended with the surrender to the Portuguese of
Recife and three other forts still occupied. General
Schkoppe, who had conducted the defence in recent
years, stipulated for himself and his men transportation
to Holland with arms and baggage. At the trial, after
his return, of him and his two chief civil officials it was
very plainly evident that a longer defence had been
impossible. Brazil was lost for good by the peace of
1661, but freedom of trade for the Dutch with that
country and Africa was secured from the Portuguese, and,
besides the artillery left behind and returned, a sum of
eight million guilders came as an indemnity to the com-
pany. But this arrangement could not save it. Re-
peatedly it had been upon the point of bankruptcy, and
neither the very lucrative slave trade, the main resource
of its possessions on the Guinea coast, nor the commerce
in certain products of the small islands in the Antilles
still owned by it could more than postpone its fall. With
Land and People about 1660 271
difficulty it dragged out its existence, while its shares,
obstinately falling, began to approach the zero point,
and most of its possessions, neglected and impoverished
like itself, led a miserable life. The greatest gains in its
territories were obtained by private merchants, partly
through the secret evasion by the company's poorly paid
officials of what still remained of its monopoly. The slave
trade furnished rich revenues to some houses, notably to
the firm of Coymans in Amsterdam, and anger was fre-
quently displayed when people ventured to discuss openly
this "unchristian" but profitable commerce.1
One only of its colonies formed an exception to the
unfavourable rule, New Netherland governed since 1647
by Peter Stuyvesant. Under his vigorous and intelligent,
though ofttimes arbitrary, rule an end was made to
the wars incessantly waged with the Indians under his
predecessors, Van Twiller and Kieft. Security in the
territory occupied and the generally friendly relations
with the neighbouring English colonies of Massachusetts,
Connecticut, and Virginia made the population of the
colony slowly increase, so that by 1660 it had risen to
about 10,000 souls, chiefly settled upon Manhattan Island
and along the banks of the Hudson. The capital — it had
been prophetically named New Amsterdam — then con-
tained 1600 inhabitants. Great dissatisfaction, however,
prevailed in the colony with Stuyvesant's arbitrary
administration and with the almost complete absence of
any influence of the people upon it. Moreover, the
West India Company gave itself little concern about
its extended possession, except so far as this procured
some gains by the revenue from the trade in beaver
skins. A great danger for New Netherland lay in the fact
that the English government had never recognised
actually the legality of the settlement and from 1606 had
1 See pamphlet Thys. 7374, entitled : Tsamenspraeck tusscheti een
hollantsch ende brabantsch koopman.
272 History of the Dutch People
claimed for itself the entire coast from Virginia to the
St. Lawrence River, while the white population of New
England bordering in the west on New Netherland was
ten times as large as that of the territory taken possession
of by the company. During the first English war the fate
of the colony had hung by a silken thread, and the Eng-
lish colonists were still clamouring for the maintenance
of the presumed English rights. It was to be foreseen
that the weak colony, virtually left to itself and enclosed
on the north and south by English possessions, would be
unable to withstand a serious attack by the English.1
The fishery was still regarded ever as the nurse of Hol-
land's commerce and industry. The herring fishery and
the catching of cod in particular were called " very power-
ful means of subsistence," and a number of other trades
depended upon them as of old. There was no sign of a
falling off in these branches of industry at this time. De
la Court estimates the number of persons in Holland
employed in them as about the same as those living by
commerce. Enkhuizen, Maaslandsluis, and Vlaardingen
were still, according to Temple, the chief fishing towns.
The Greenland fishery had become established mainly in
West Friesland and flourished greatly since the fall of the
Northern Company in 1642. At first it seemed as if the
whale fishery would dwindle away. But it revived
speedily. De la Court says that over 12,000 fishermen
went north every year to engage in this fishery and that
the product since 1642 had increased ten to fifteen times.
The development of this fishery was very favourably in-
fluenced by the protection bestowed upon it by the
Estates of Holland which prohibited Netherlander from
taking part in any foreign whale fishery, by the preven-
tion of the export of fishing apparatus, casks, boats, and
other things necessary to the business and best to be
1 For affairs in America see the excellent studies of Fiske, especially The
Dutch and Quaker colonies in America (2 vols., New York, 1899).
Land and People about 1660 273
obtained in this country, by the obligation for the fisher-
men to bring the whales caught and the oil and whale-
bone into Dutch ports and to sell them there, by the
strong guard given the whalers by the war ships of the
States. Coupled with this industry there was a small
trade with the Eskimos of Greenland's coasts and Davis
Strait in wood, copper kettles, axes, knives, and
trinkets.1 "Commissioners of the Greenland fishery,"
composed of the principal shipowners, had the super-
vision of these interests.
The branches of industry connected with navigation
and the fishery, not only shipbuilding on the Zaan but
also the manufacture of nets, ropes, sails, anchors, and
cables, flourished naturally as much as did navigation
and fishery themselves. Industry in general seems in
these years to have given slight grounds for complaint,
although De la Court earnestly urged a reduction of the
oppressive imposts and abolition of the restrictions that
held almost every branch of industry in chains. The
halls and guilds in his native city and elsewhere, keeping
the woollen and cloth manufacture under the guardian-
ship of the municipal government, appeared to him in
conflict with the principles of freedom, from which he •
expected the richest fruits for commerce as well as for
industry. He believed not unjustly that without great
harm an attack could never be made upon liberty of
worship, which had promoted the commerce and industry
of the country in great measure by attracting hither so
many manufacturers and merchants expelled from other
lands.
These free economic principles were far from being
applied to industry. It still remained locked in the
fetters of the guiids of the Middle Ages. The immense
importation of raw materials from all countries of the
1 See Zorgdrager, Groenlandsche Walvischvangst ; Luzac, Holland's
Hijkdom, ii., p. 277.
Vol. IV.— 18
274 History of the Dutch People
world, the facility for the Netherlander of transporting
his manufactures elsewhere on his numerous ships made
less palpable for the moment a large portion of the
annoyances of the ancient limitation of industry in
countless laws and ordinances. Obstructive regulations
were in many cases accompanied by measures of protec-
tion against foreign competition or that even of
other cities, which were helpful to the manufacturer.
In the long run the restrictions were not to be a match
for the universal longing for liberty felt by the mer-
chant.
The foreigner at this time was struck by the flourish-
ing condition of all industry, particularly of the cloth,
linen, and woollen manufacture, of the brewing of beer,
of bleaching, and of everything connected with trade, as
well as by the enormous commercial activity in the small
territory. The character of Dutch industry still remained
in general that of small industry, divided among a
number of small masters. Large factories were only
exceptionally found in the cities, though appearances
looking to a change in this respect were beginning to be
noted especially after the settlement here of emigrant
manufacturers from France. Narrow individual under-
standing, the absence of a proper distribution of work,
continued to prevail in manufacturing ; the exclusiveness
and limitation of the Middle Ages were still felt strongly,
while commerce had long since cast off such bonds and
was making an ample use of its freedom, if necessary to
the detriment of the industry of the moment. The time
was soon to come — undoubtedly harmful to the excellence
of the product but not to the temporary interests of the
producer — when the manufacturer also would learn that
the sale of goods is influenced not so much by their
"inner quality" as by the purchaser's taste, a principle
that was held up by the worldly-wise De la Court to his
fellow-citizens in his remarkable Welvaren van Leiden%
Land and People about 1660 275
not published until our day and in many ways the basis
of the later written Interest van Holland.
The Leyden author so well informed on economic
matters, who is considered one of the most remarkable
economists of the seventeenth century, was not so observ-
ant of the religious phenomena about him, to which he
gave attention only so far as they might serve to explain
the economic principles championed by him.
He would have been the last to deny that religion
played a great part in his time. With his liberal concep-
tion of religion, which brought him into the odor of
atheism, he knew very well that the inhabitants of his
city and country were in general little helped by that
liberality. He refers repeatedly to the self-interest that
ought to prevent the ruling Reformed party from using
their power to suppress people of other opinions, who even
in Holland were in the majority by far. Not half the
population of that province is of the Reformed faith, he
says of his days; in particular most of the "old inhabit-
ants," peasants, monied men, and nobles are still
Catholics, many indeed Protestants but Mennonites or
Rijnsburgers. In Utrecht, Gelderland, and Overyssel
Catholicism was unquestionably far in the majority, al-
though some districts, as the Veluwe since John of
Nassau, counted many of the Reformed religion. The
number was very small in the three northern provinces and
Zealand, as appears from De la Torre's report of 1656. '
The Catholics above the Meuse at this time may be
estimated at about half a million.
The freedom of worship in this country astonished all
foreigners extremely on comparing it with conditions
elsewhere, but no less astonishing was the large number
of Protestant sects resulting therefrom. Most attention
was attracted by the numerous Mennonites among the
1 Reprinted in the Ar chief van het aarlsbisdom Utrecht, x., p. 95 ; xi.,
PP. 57. 374-
276 History of the Dutch People
tradesmen, fishermen, and sailors, especially in North
Holland and the country of Friesland. Much less
numerous but proportionally not a little influential by
their rank and fortune, abilities and possession of offices,
were the Remonstrants in some cities and villages of
Holland, besides the less prominent Lutherans and
smaller sects.
The mercantile government of the United Netherlands
understood that by bringing religious differences to the
fore it would in time make native and foreigner averse to
inhabiting and visiting these regions, and, considering
the fact that in all Europe the number of the Reformed
faith could scarcely be calculated as one-twentieth of the
population, it regarded its interest to lie in the adoption
of freedom of worship for all, so far as possible, for one of
its maxims. The Reformed Church remained privileged
above all, and it alone enjoyed complete freedom in
accordance with the Dort principles fixed in 1618 and
1619, which the government repeatedly declared its wish
to maintain, but all attempts to carry these principles to
their utmost consequences were steadily thwarted, and
the actual rights of an exclusive state church were never
obtained by it. The placards against adherents of other
opinions continued to be upheld in name, and the govern-
ment apparently listened now and then to those who
desired measures against the heterodox and dissenters,
but the latter could be sure of toleration, provided they
did not assert themselves too publicly. "No man can
here complain" testifies Temple, "of pressure in his
conscience : of being forced to any public profession of
his private faith: of being restrained from his own
manner of worship in his house, or obliged to any other
abroad." Better acquainted evidently with the higher
than with the lower circles, he exaggerates somewhat the
mutual toleration found here, the absence of religious
dissension, and the friendly attitude between the sects,
Land and People about 1660 277
but he does not say too much, theoretically at least,
when he affirms that as elsewhere every man could eat,
lodge, and market where he chose, here every man could
pray with whom he pleased without any notice being
taken of it. He had seemingly heard little of the great
conflict that shortly before his arrival in the republic
had shaken the entire Reformed Church to its founda-
tions, the fierce dispute between Cocceians and Voetians,
which might have caused a revival of the old discord of
Arminians and Gomarists.
After a quarrel over the Sabbath agitating men's
minds during years, a new important difference came up
about 1660 between the theologians of Leyden and
Utrecht, that concerning the forgiveness of sin and the
doctrine of grace, in which Voetius himself strongly
opposed the "Leyden heretic," being soon helped by
Maresius of Groningen, who forgot his former disputes
with Voetius to join him in combating Coccejus and his
friends, whose doctrine resembled the Arminian con-
ception of predestination. Coccejus's moderate opinion
found support in the government hostile to theological
faction and composed to a large extent of elements half
or wholly Arminian. On the other hand, the Voetians
depended upon the partisans of Orange, in old times the
protectors of the stricter orthodox tendency. Political
and ecclesiastical dissensions thus threatened to bring
the republic into trouble again, and in particular the strife
over the "public prayer" gave occasion to violent com-
motion in church and state, when the Estates of Hol-
land (1662) took up anew the subject of naming the
prince of Orange in public and church prayers and for-
mulated a prayer making no mention of the house of
Orange. But resolutions and the clever avoidance of
dangerous points of dispute succeeded still in conjuring
the peril of a renewal of former factions, although the
internal contentions in the church could not be ended.
278 History of the Dutch People
Outside of the Reformed Church the odium theologicum
was no less powerfully active as is manifest from the
dissensions among the Mennonites. Among the Catholics
also the serious difference of opinion regarding the
validity of the ordained clergy as opposed to the secular
priests had increased greatly of late years, and the adroit-
ness of the apostolic vicar, De la Torre, and the caution of
his successor, Johannes van Neercassel, could only with
difficulty preserve a certain measure of the outward
harmony so necessary here in the ever dangerous situation
of the Catholic Church. Although the bepraised mutual
toleration left much to be desired, it is positive that the
government's policy in ecclesiastical affairs, aiming so far
as possible to bestow freedom upon all, providing public
order was not disturbed, succeeded in preventing the
dissensions from becoming too evident, and in compel-
ling the varying opinions, however sharply opposed to
one another, to keep an actual but sometimes only super-
ficial peace. Thus the country could remain what it had
been since the revolt against Spain, a refuge for all
opinions notwithstanding religious quarrels, an asylum
for the foreigner exiled from elsewhere on account of
his faith.
De la Court speaks of science still less than of religion,
and in his book on Leyden our manufacturer seems but
little convinced of its importance to the commonwealth.
He considers it mainly from the point of view of the
material advantages procured by it for his native city
and perceives, therefore, the interest of enticing there as
many students as possible. "Excepting holy theology,
mathematics, history, and languages" he judges it quite
useless, "nowhere serving but to obtain among the
ignorant a step to practice." He has a particular dislike
for philosophy which he thinks "ridiculous" and adapted
"to extinguish all human wisdom." But, he says,
although the students should wish to hear the Koran
Land and People about 1660 279
explained, they must be given what they want, because
only in that way are they attracted. Fortunately the
men in power thought otherwise. Strongly under the
influence of the Cartesian ideas penetrating more and
more among the developed class, they had more than
formerly an eye and ear for the progress of natural
science.
The universities, Leyden first of all, which early in the
century were especially noted for the flourishing state of
the classical and theological studies, had not lost their
renown, although the number of students no longer
assumed such proportions as had been the case about
1640. This was a result both of the restoration of peace
in Germany and of the disappearance of the matchless
philological geniuses, who constituted Leyden's glory in
the first half of the century, possibly also of the exten-
sive exploitation of the foreign students mentioned by
some authorities and of a certain love of ease that had
arisen with the university's success.1
Coccejus still lived at Leyden, the acute and com-
passionate author of the Summa doctrines de fcedere et
testamento Dei. In Utrecht Voetius still swayed his
heavy sceptre with unabated adherence to the principles
of Dort. The vehement Maresius of Groningen con-
tinued to stand in the breach, since 1641 as the successor
of Gomarus on the watch for all heretical doctrines,
whether Arminianism or Cartesianism or whatever else
must be to the strictly orthodox mind from the devil.
They upheld the fame of dogmatic studies in the Nether-
lands, against which the philosophy of the Cartesians,
proclaimed by Regius and Franciscus Burman at
Utrecht, by Heydanus and his protege Arnold Geulinx
at Leyden, managed to defend itself successfully, being
sure of the support of the friendly, ruling party in the
States and in spite of the mild prohibition of 1656 that
1 Wttewaall, Proeve van De la Court's Welvaren van Leiden, p. 148.
280 History of the Dutch People
was not strictly enforced. The death of Salmasius after
his return from Sweden to Leyden had been a great loss
to classical literature, but the old tradition was brilliantly
maintained by Gronovius moving from Deventer to
Leyden, while Golius as a student of oriental languages
followed in the steps of his noted predecessor Erpenius.
Nicolas Heinsius was indisputably the greatest and most
many-sided of the Dutch philologists of this period,
although he spent a long time in Sweden and devoted
himself there more to diplomacy than to philology. The
Deventer, later Utrecht professor, Graevius, came after
him and Gronovius not without distinction. With all
these special mention may be made of such famous jurists
as Antonius Matthaeus and Paulus Voetius of Utrecht,
Ulric Huber of Franeker, Dirk Graswinckel, secretary of
the Chambre Mi-partie and heir of De Groot's renown as
a student of international law, in which he was far from
equalling his celebrated predecessor.
But not one of them attained such a European fame as
that of the ingenious Christiaan Huygens, the great
mathematician and physicist, brilliant among the first
students of natural science of all times. A pupil of
Frans van Schooten, the noted Leyden professor of
mathematics, from whose school came also John de
Witt, Jan Hudde a member of the Amsterdam govern-
ment, and the little known but skilful physician Hendrik
van Heuraet,1 he far surpassed those excellent men of the
second flourishing period of mathematical studies in the
Netherlands following that of Stevin. De Witt's admi-
rable studies on curves and the calculation of proba-
bilities, Hudde's application of pure mathematics to
"more useful" questions of daily life in his native city,
Heuraet's promising first essays are not to be compared
with what Huygens accomplished. He looms up over
1 See Korteweg, Het bloeitijdperk der wiskundige ivetensc happen in Neder~
land (Amsterdam, 1894).
Land and People about 1660 281
them all like a giant, the victorious refuter of the theory
of the quadrature of the circle, the successful solver of the
most difficult problems in numbers, the founder of the
calculation of chance, the inimitable, clear thinker, who in
mathematics put "the firmness of the rhetorical connec-
tion and the plainness of the demonstration" far above
the results, the discoverer of the law of the conserva-
tion of the vis viva of motion and of the conservation of
motion of the centre of gravity, of the pendulum's laws
of motion, of Saturn's ring and moon, the inventor of
pendulum clockwork, of the gunpowder machine, pre-
cursor of the gas machine and consequently of the steam
engine, the talented expounder of the phenomena of
light, of gravitation, of magnetism, the greatest mathe-
matician, physicist, mechanician of his time, "the new
Archimedes."1 In the spring of 1666 he settled in Paris
and helped establish there the Acacttmie des Sciences, of
which he was one of the first and foremost members. In
his fatherland he found but few among the many
dilettanti to understand and appreciate his work, so he
left it in order from a more central place to let the light
of his genius shine over the world, surrounded by men
with whom he had been for years in close scientific
relation, until the strict Catholicism prevailing at the
court of Louis XIV. made life there difficult for him
also, the liberal thinker, and drove him back to the
fatherland.
The Netherlands swarmed* with men who, under the
influence of Cartesian ideas, devoted themselves to the
natural sciences, mostly estimable dilettanti like old
Constantijn Huygens himself, who in his letters and post-
humous writings displays a remarkable insight into
scientific problems and had long kept up a correspond-
1 See on him in general: Bosscha, Christiaan Huygens (Haarlem, 1895).
2 See Sorbiere's account of his travels through Holland in 1660 (Bijdr. en
Meded. Hist. Gen., xxii., p. 57).
282 History of the Dutch People
ence with learned men of other countries. The famous
Anna Maria van Schuerman, versed in all branches of
erudition and art, may be mentioned in this connection.
No stranger staying in Utrecht neglected the opportunity
of trying to meet this noteworthy lady, which was not
always easy owing to her aversion to such visits. Almost
every important city in Holland counted one or more
celebrities who sometimes inclined to charlatanry like
the Rotterdam anatomist and chemist Lodewijk de Bils.
The notorious search for the philosopher's stone, one of
the chief elements in the rise of scientific chemistry, had
a great influence upon this tendency to quackery. An
important place among the chemists of the time was
taken by the foreigners — Glauber, a physician at Amster-
dam, and the singular Frenchman Borri. Inventors of
all sorts found interested hearers in the republic and
could easily obtain there a patent for their inventions.
Thus the French mechanician, Du Son, became the
object of universal attention at Rotterdam in 1653 on
account of the wonderful ship devised by him, which
seemed destined to take the place of sailing vessels but
soon proved useless, although great expectations had
been at first excited.
The great interest in scientific study, which showed
itself more and more in the Dutch provinces, had also a
favourable influence upon bookselling and the pub-
lisher's business. In the sixteenth century Frankfort
had been the great market for books, the centre of the
book trade, but the Thirty Years' War, which converted
Germany far and wide into a desert and made its ravages
felt on the Rhine no less than elsewhere, had robbed this
city of the largest part of its business. Leyden, the seat
of learning, where hundreds of students gathered every
year and famous representatives of science met, appeared
for a time destined to enter upon the rich inheritance.
Its booksellers and publishers travelled over Europe to
Land and People about 1660 283
buy old books and to sell new ones; its book auctions
obtained great renown like those of Frankfort formerly.
The peace of Miinster, the waning splendour of philo-
logical studies at Leyden, above all the decreasing number
of foreign students there injured this flourishing trade,
but the Elzeviers succeeded in maintaining their old
fame. Leyden and Amsterdam were long known over
the whole world as the foremost seats of printing, where
under the protection of Dutch liberty many works were
printed and published that were elsewhere prohibited by
the arbitrary decision of governments or the influence of
the clergy. With Paris they possessed the largest share
in the book business of those days.
If the republic might be called the promised land of
inventors, dilettanti, publishers, booklovers, no less was
it the land of painters and engravers. The aristocrat
and the common man, the dweller in cities and the
peasant, were accustomed to decorate their houses with
art works of more or less importance. A portion of capital
was invested in paintings, and they formed a consider-
able item of inventories and inheritances. There was
almost no board of government or guild which did not
own several portraitures of its members past or present,
in full consciousness of their dignity seated in their
meeting room amid the emblems of their business or
office. There was no officer of militia but he wanted to
be immortalised upon canvas. Every family of conse-
quence had its portrait gallery. At every fair of any note
pictures and prints by well-known masters were offered
for sale. Every notable event in the life of the family
or in the state was commemorated by a painting, a
print, or a medal. Every city of any extent could show
its art amateurs and collectors of paintings. From no
period of Dutch history are so many masters of art to be
named, have so many art works of importance come down
to us as from these days, when an abundance of money
284 History of the Dutch People
allowed people to indulge in the luxury of art collecting.
It requires no demonstration that, wherever art becomes
to such an extent the fashion of the time, much that is
mediocre is furnished as well as much that is excellent.
Even for the best artists of those days this result of over-
production has been verified by competent connoisseurs,
while the equally proved fact, that some studios became
factories of art works, where the master with rapid hand
touched up the productions of his promising pupils and
disposed of them afterwards as his own works, testifies
to the same striving to satisfy an unusually heavy demand
by a proportionate supply.
Of many of those pupils the masters of the preceding
period might be proud, while they themselves continued
to work with undiminished skill. Rembrandt was still
in his prime and at this time he created perhaps his most
beautiful works: the unsurpassed "Syndics of the Cloth
Guild" (1662), the profound "Homer" (1663), the series
of family portraits of Amsterdam patricians, the oft-
repeated portraits of his Saskia, the striking Jewish and
popular types of the Bible pictures on canvas and copper,
which continually reveal new beauties to the beholder.
Among his pupils he could point to a Govert Flinck who
decorated the city hall of Amsterdam with masterpieces,
to the excellent portrait painter Ferdinand Bol, to the
landscape artist Philips de Koninck, to Samuel van
Hoogstraten portraitist and writer of the remarkable
book InleydingJi tot de Hoogeschoole der Schilderkonst, to
Nicolaes Maes fertile in admirable portraits, and to
many others. Scarcely any of his artistic contemporaries
escaped the great master's powerful influence, but his
last years, until his death in 1669, were darkened by
financial and domestic troubles. Nobody approached
him, unless it might be Johannes Vermeer of Delft, the
exquisite colourist, who knew how to conjure up the
most splendid lights in landscape and interior. At
Land and People about 1660 285
Leyden Dou had excellent pupils and imitators of his
fine style of painting in Frans van Mieris, Gabriel Metsu,
Godfried Schalcken, Quiringh Brekelenkam. The "can-
dlelights," the cabinet genre pictures, and the interiors
of the Leyden school belong to the most attractive speci-
mens of painting of this period. Jacob van Ruysdael
excelled his uncle and teacher Salomon in the reproduc-
tion of the poetry of the water and the dunes in the
vicinity of Haarlem and is esteemed the first landscape
artist of the century, the best expert in the beautiful
atmospheric and light effects of Holland. The reveller
Jan Steen, Van Goyen's son-in-law, passing his life in
poverty and miserable circumstances, created at Haarlem
and Leyden those humouristic pictures of tavern and
kirmess jollity, of household disorder and delights which
made his name proverbial. The sons of Frans Hals and
his able pupils Jan Miense Molenaerand Philip Wouwer-
man, the latter himself the founder of a numerous school
of landscape painters and world-famous for his hand-
some horses, recalled the great portrait painter of
Haarlem. Gerard Ter Borch of Overyssel established his
great name as a portrait and genre painter. Johannes
Lingelbach happily imitated Wouwerman, Claes Berchem
more Van Goyen ; Ostade had excellent pupils in Dusart
and Brakenburg. Meindert Hobbema, little known in
his time, is now celebrated as the equal of Ruysdael. Aert
van der Neer, as little considered in his days as Hobbema
was, is now highly praised for his exquisite moonlights
and night conflagrations. The court and fashionable
painter Gerard van Honthorst, whose portraits have
survived in large numbers and testify to his fertile but too
industrious talent ; the Delft painter of churches, Gerard
Houckgeest ; the many-sided Karel du Jardin — they all
can only be named here. Ludolf Backhuysen of Emden
and especially Willem van de Velde the younger im-
mortalised the great sea fights of the English wars and
286 History of the Dutch People
the fame of the Dutch navy. Many, very many more
names might be mentioned here, of animal painters like
Melchior d'Hondecoeter, of painters of flowers and still
life like the De Heems and Willem van Aelst, of the
productive painter of landscapes with animals and figures,
Adriaen van de Velde, who was regarded as the best in
his line, of the versatile painter and draughtsman of
landscapes, portraits, and small pictures, Adriaen van der
Venne. No side of Holland's rich life of those days
remains unrepresented in the works of its artists, no
expression of Dutch nature but finds its reflection in the
immortal productions of Dutch art.
But other branches of the fine arts may look back
too upon this time as a flourishing epoch. The en-
gravers and etchers of the second half of the seventeenth
century, a Rembrandt, a Willem Jacobszoon Delff, can
measure themselves with those of the first half. A
number of painters, particularly portrait painters, are also
world-renowned as engravers and prove themselves
experts at drawing, but the superabundance of ornament
around the engravings shows already, though the technic
is still undiminished, the beginning of the end of the
great time. The fine Suyderhoef reproduces upon
copper the tints of the painters in an inimitable manner;
the etcher-engraver Bloteling, the poet-etcher Luyken,
are ranked but little lower. Among the sculptors stands
in the foreground Rombout Verhulst, the greatest of
Dutch sculptors, the creator of the monuments to Tromp,
De Ruyter, the Evertsens, and Van Ghent in the
churches of Holland, to Clant and Knyphausen in
Groningen, to Polyander van Kerchoven and burgomaster
Van der Werff at Leyden. Arthur Quellinus of
Antwerp, his equal, adorned the new Amsterdam city
hall with forceful statuary.
In the department of architecture the men coming up
at the close of the preceding period continued for a long
Land and People about 1660 287
time to set the fashion. The many architectural works
necessary in extending and beautifying the cities: gates,
public buildings, houses of private individuals in old and
new quarters of the towns, an increasing number of the
last excelling in architectural style and adornment, gave
the city architects as well as the carpenters working for
their own account an opportunity to display their taste
and talent. The Hollander's love for his dwelling, the
desire to let some of the prevailing prosperity appear on
the outside, the fashion of renovating the gables brought
into existence those numerous more or less beautiful
gables of the seventeenth century, whose abundance helps
to form the peculiar type of the Dutch cjties. Artists like
Salomon de Bray of Haarlem, painter, draughtsman, archi-
tect, author, all at once, could at this time give expression
to the inspiration of their genius to their hearts' content.
The genuine Dutch Renaissance style still flourishing
about 1640 is, however, more and more lost in the
tendency to the classical style followed after the example
of France. The old peaked gable is given up for the
horizontal cornice; instead of the sharp gable running up
to a point comes the heavy monumental horizontal line;
luxurious decoration with pilasters and leafy ornament,
with baskets of fruit on the cornice, with wreaths and
garlands upon the gable above and near the windows,
takes the place of the former charming simplicity and
prepares for the reign of the rococo which is soon to
dawn.
If we thus see traces of an approaching decline in
some arts notwithstanding their brilliancy, this is very
distinctly perceptible in literature. The somewhat
rugged national strength, that spoke from Roemer
Visscher, Bredero, and the young Vondel, that animated
Huygens and Cats to their best works, has ceased to
inspire the literature of this time. Vondel, Huygens, and
Cats still live — the last died in 1660, the other two
288 History of the Dutch People
survived him a score of years, — but Cats amuses himself
in his last years with tedious reflections on his old age
and his tranquil life in the country. Huygens's Zeestraet
(1667) is far from being equal in wit and form to his
Voorhout, and his Cluyswerck (1680) does not reach the
height of his Hofwijck. Vondel's imperishable poetical
power alone, not visibly reduced after his conversion to
the Romish Church and the domestic troubles of his later
years, rose after the Lucifer (1654) and the Jephta (1659)
once more in 1667 to the height of the famed swan song
in the Noach, noble fruit of his genius, which may be
placed with the best poems of his earlier days, just as
the ScheepskrooTi voor Van Galen, the proud Uitvaart
voor Tromp, the Zeetriomf der Vrij'e Nederlanden (1666),
and many a passionate song of triumph of this glorious
time may be compared with the songs in honour of
Frederick Henry's victories. But those who followed :
Anslo, Brandt, Oudaen, Vollenhove, Antonides van der
Goes even, who unquestionably occupies the first place as
poet among the younger ones with his IJstroom, did not
fulfil the promise of their youth; the last died too early
to allow of the development of his fine poetical gifts,
excelling in strong imagination and pure diction. The
unbridled romanticism of a Jan Vos, whose Aran en
Titus seemed for a time to open a new epoch for the
drama, soon degenerated into a display of "art and
machinery," which fascinated the multitude more than it
cultivated their taste or awakened fine thoughts in them,
feasting their eyes upon murderous spectacles in desolate
mountain regions, upon dragons, infernal spirits and
monsters, upon bolts of lightning, pillars changing into
bears, tigers springing out of trees, celestial chariots
drawn by peacocks and swans. The days were coming
when the toiling poets would place "unwearied work,"
which "conquers everything," above inspiration often
far to be sought, when dramas and poems fashioned after
Land and People about 1660 289
the French pattern would drive out both the classicism
of Vondel and Hooft and the romanticism of Vos. With
the foundation of the society Nil volentibus arduum at
Amsterdam in 1669 under the management of Dr.
Lodewijk Meijer began a new period of Dutch literature,
that of a formal art bound down to fixed rules and
models, soon overpowering all true art wherever it
appeared, as did the rhetoricians of the sixteenth century.
In the department of prose the affected style of Hooft's
Historien had a great influence on the historical writings
of Brandt and others. The grave stiffness of the
ordinary written language was little adapted to lead to a
rapid development, the less so because men soon imitated
the French novel of those days and deviated further
from the free forms, of which Marnix had given the
example in his Byencorf 'and which are only to be found
again in some well-written pamphlets of the seventeenth
century. In those pamphlets, whose language has
hitherto attracted too little attention from Dutch philolo-
gists, are often found the best productions of the easy
prose of those days, much more natural than the prolix
language of the learned men, than the complimentary
forms of the epistolary style of the cultivated classes
larded with French words and turns of expression, than
the more or less conventional tone of the popular books
of the time. There is to be heard the proud Dutch
burgher of the most flourishing period in his real shape,
coarse and rough sometimes but round and open, proud
of his freedom, jealous of his rights.
Vol. IV.— 19
CHAPTER XI
YEARS OF PEACE
AT last the happy time seemed to have dawned, for
which men had thirsted so long. The peace of
Miinster had been followed by temporary domestic
dissensions, then the English war had brought the
republic into great danger, the northern war had again
menaced its most important interests, the Portuguese
difficulties had constantly attracted attention, the
Miinster troubles had threatened war on the east, and
the war between Spain and France, so closely related to
the long war of independence, had continued to disturb
the quiet of Europe. Now all appeared to be over: the
peace of the Pyrenees was concluded ; Miinster, for the
time being, was made to see reason ; Portugal was
satisfied ; the north was pacified ; in England the revolu-
tionary epoch was ended; little was to be feared from
the young prince and his party. De Witt and his
friends could now enjoy their victory. So it seemed.
But much still impelled the Dutch statesmen to vigi-
lance, and not for a moment could the council pensionary
give his active mind rest, because new troubles were
threatening. Spain and Portugal did not have to be
guarded against : the former was crippled permanently,
and the latter was scarcely able to protect the scanty
remnants of its greatness. The northern affairs, too,
were out of the way: Sweden, Denmark, Poland, were
exhausted, and the smaller powers, Muscovy and
290
Years of Peace 291
Brandenburg, counted for little. The emperor, assailed
by the Turks, was obliged to turn all his attention to
that side. The mighty States-General believed they
could without danger neglect the claims of Miinster,
Cologne, and Neuburg.
Feeling with regard to France and England could not
be so secure. The way the young Louis XIV. took full
possession of the royal power after Mazarin's death, his
marriage to the oldest daughter of the king of Spain, who
was nearing the grave, and whose only son was a weak
child, warned such a statesman as De Witt of what was
to be expected from Henry IV. 's grandson, the heir of the
French pretensions to the southern Netherlands. To
obtain these provinces would have satisfied one of the
great monarch's dearest wishes. Like many of his pred-
ecessors and successors he regarded the possession of
the Walloon portion at least of the Netherlands as indis-
pensable to the safety of his own northern frontiers.
Louis's attempts to make himself master of the princi-
pality of Orange could not be disagreeable to the party
now ruling in the republic. The occupation of the city
and castle by French troops in March, 1660, with the
secret and well-paid cooperation of the governor Dohna,
was viewed by the States with apparent indifference.
The ambassadors sent to France under the lead of Van
Beuningen to prepare a close alliance between England,
France, and the republic soon saw that this was im-
possible but that a separate alliance with France might
be obtained. After Mazarin's death an offensive and
defensive league with France was concluded April 27,
1662, for twenty-five years with promise of a mutual
guarantee of treaties made, of possessions and rights in
Europe, with reciprocal commercial advantages, and
with limitation of the number of troops each should
furnish for the other's aid to 12,000 men on the Freuch
side and 6000 men on the Dutch side. The replacement
292 History of the Dutch People
of de Thou, Sommelsdijk's friend, as French ambas-
sador at The Hague by d' Estrades was sure to strengthen
the alliance. The new ambassador, who had first brought
about in England the cession of Dunkirk to France,
seemed the proper person to renew the old friendly
relations with the republic. The mission of d' Estrades,
who reached The Hague at the end of 1662, was further
to tranquillise the States-General with regard to the
French plans about the southern Netherlands, of which
he, the French government's former emissary to Fred-
erick Henry and William II., was fully informed. Those
plans were far from innocent. The French queen at her
marriage had renounced her rights to the Spanish throne,
but the renunciation had been closely connected with
Spain's promise to pay a considerable dowry. The
renunciation, as stipulated in the treaty of the Pyrenees,
was not to be valid, if the dowry were not paid.1 Now
exhausted Spain was not in a condition to pay this
dowry, or at least it failed to do so, and France had thus
a good excuse for declaring the renunciation null, which
it would have done in any case, as it had never seriously
intended to keep the young queen's promise. Before
the treaty with the States Louis XIV. had repeatedly
sought to obtain from Spain the voluntary cession of a
part of the Netherlands under promise of support against
England and Portugal. a But Spain perceived that with
the loss of the Netherlands its influence in central Europe
would entirely disappear, and it refused just as it had
declined to pronounce the renunciation of the French
queen void. So Louis XIV. did not hesitate to ally him-
self with the republic in order with its help to attain his
purpose.
The French king comprehended the necessity for
caution and for respecting the fear of the proximity of
1 Lonchay, La rivalile" de la France et de V ' Espagne aux Pays-Bas, p. 193.
2 Legrelle, La diplomatic francaise et la succession dy Espagne, i., p. 49.
Years of Peace 293
France felt by the States' party as far back as the days of
the partition treaty. De Witt, the pupil of Adriaan
Pauw, shared this fear and believed that the annexation
of the southern Netherlands to France "would be a very
dangerous and frightful matter for this state." He
considered what was to be done for the States. Two
plans came to the front: the raising of the southern
provinces "to a free and independent republic, allied
with this state as a Catholic canton" and supported by
an alliance with France; or a partition of the southern
Netherlands. If France would not consent to the
"cantonment" or the partition, the provinces might be
put in the hands of the less formidable German emperor,
soon married also to an infanta, or with the help of
Spain, England, and the emperor they might be defended
against France and finally be converted into a separate
state. He regarded the "cantonment" as the most
desirable solution. Should Spain be unwilling, now its
king was still living, to set up the new republic, then the
attempt must be made to obtain it through a secret
agreement with France for the contingency of the
Spanish throne becoming vacant or to compel France to
accept it at that event with the help of the allies by force
of arms. De Witt thought best to present some of these
plans to the French ambassador.
De Witt opened negotiations by an unexpected visit to
d'Estrades, on March 30th, and informed him that he had
received two secret emissaries from six prominent cities
of the southern Netherlands offering to drive out the
Spaniards and to establish a republic after the model of
the Swiss cantons. The ambassador let fall some hints
of his sovereign's secret plans, though he was soon
directed to keep them concealed as much as possible, lest
Spain and the republic from fear of France might agree
to a closer connection between the seventeen provinces.
It was known in Paris that Spain had long had such a
294 History of the Dutch People
connection in view and that the Spanish ambassador at
The Hague, Don Estevan de Gamarra, was making every
effort to come to a good understanding with the States.1
Spain saw that, if it were not to lose all chance of
ever regaining its old place in Europe, the southern
Netherlands must be secured even with the assistance of
the mercantile government at The Hague. But De Witt
went further and proposed on April 12th to d'Estrades
the formal annexation of several fortresses with what was
left of Artois to France and of Bruges, Ostend, and the
northwest coast as far as Sluis to the republic, while the
rest of the southern Netherlands was to be "cantonised."
The Paris government saw in this proposal a manoeuvre
to learn the French plans and maintained a cool attitude,
though d'Estrades praised De Witt's sincerity and ad-
vised against an immediate rejection of the Dutch prop-
ositions. De Witt did not give up notwithstanding this
first opening proceeded no farther. In May he made a
formal proposal to d'Estrades for the establishment of a
Catholic republic in the south or, should this appear
impracticable, for the complete division of the southern
Netherlands between the States and France. When the
French government declared itself ready to negotiate on
these bases, he began to discuss matters with the in-
fluential De Graeff and other statesmen, meeting
privately at De Graeff' s castle of Ilpendam. The parti-
tion plan was here objected to, especially by Amsterdam,
which feared to see the competition of Antwerp spring
up again and brought up the old motto : amicus Gallus,
non vicinus. De Witt on account of this opposition went
back to the more limited plan of April 12th, which might
be carried out during the life of Philip IV. or at his
death, or at the speedily expected demise of his weak
successor. But Louis XIV. would not consent to any
1 Legrelle, i., p. 77; Mignet, Negotiations relatives a la succession
{fEspagne, I., p. 183.
Years of Peace 295
such plan for robbing his father-in-law and brother-in-law
during their life and declared he would not settle the
affair until their death.
D'Estrades in these discussions incautiously mentioned
the law of succession or devolution, of which the French
government had already secretly determined to avail
itself, if it should seem necessary to prove the queen's
rights to the southern Netherlands. The so-called
devolution law, in the provinces of Brabant, Mechlin, and
Namur a fundamental principle of the law of inheritance,
decreed that only children of the first marriage had a
right to the father's estate with complete exclusion of the
children by the second marriage. Louis XIV. believed he
might appeal to this law on behalf of his wife, who was
the daughter of Philip IV. 's first marriage, even against
the young successor to the Spanish throne, who was the
offspring of his father's second marriage. It remained to
be seen whether this law of private inheritance in some
provinces was applicable also to the succession of the
sovereign of all the provinces. The rights of the queen,
based upon the non-payment of the dowry and upon the
law of devolution, were now named, and De Witt and
Spain might consider themselves warned. De Witt
denied very strongly the validity of the devolution law,
although he did not cease to negotiate over the partial
annexation. If France were ever to obtain the southern
Netherlands, it must owe them not merely to its own
rights but to an agreement with the States.
Thus ''the great affair" remained on the tapis, and De
Witt did his best to convince the States of the necessity
of an early agreement with France. But the French
government, resting its claims to the entire inheritance of
the Spanish king on the non-payment of the dowry and
the devolution law unreservedly brought forward, was no
longer inclined to enter into such an agreement as might
conflict with these asserted rights. "His Majesty's real
296 History of the Dutch People
purpose is to remain free," wrote Lionne, the clever
leader of the French policy from the school of Mazarin,
in April, 1664, to d'Estrades, though he too was ready,
if necessary, to respect the republic's dread of French
proximity that it might not unite with Spain or the
emperor. This necessity would be felt less urgently, if
the republic were threatened from another side, and this
was already the case. Furthermore, what could be
opposed in war to the immense power of France? De
Witt knew only too well that Spain was nothing more
than "a broken reed" and the German empire "a
skeleton, the parts of which are held together not by
sinews but by iron wires without natural movement."
What was to be expected from such allies? An im-
mediate agreement with France was the only thing left,
but France itself would not hear to this now that the
republic was getting into serious difficulties and finally
into a new war with England, its only other possible
ally. Thus the affair of the southern Netherlands
remained unsettled, and the sword of Damocles was
suspended over the threads of Dutch policy to
fall whenever France should see a favourable oppor-
tunity— an extremely dangerous state of things,
whose threatening development De Witt watched with
anxiety.
Relations with England after the restoration of the
Stuarts were not so good as the statesmen at The Hague
had at first imagined. The honours, with which it was
hoped to make Charles II. forget the humiliations of his
exile, the complimentary speeches greeting him, the
friendly conversations with De Witt and other statesmen,
accomplished really but little. Never was a royal per-
sonage received in the republic with such distinction as
Charles II. at that time. The States-General and the
Estates of Holland vied with one another in courtesies.
In a brilliant procession the English retinue was con-
Years of Peace 297
ducted from Delft to The Hague on May 25, 1660.1 The
king was lodged in the palace of Maurice of Nassau,
where the States, the governmental boards, and the
republic's chief statesmen were received in audience by
him. The feasts in his honour during a week surpassed
anything ever before seen in the country. On June 2d
the monarch departed from Scheveningen for England,
after he had made on the preceding day a visit of
ceremony to the States-General and the Estates of Hol-
land to thank them for the attentions and presents be-
stowed upon him and his. He had used the opportunity
to recommend warmly to the States the "interests" of
his nephew, the young prince, and of his sister, the
widowed princess,2 and De Witt had answered with words
of gratitude to the young prince's ancestors, whose
merits were still so fresh in the memory. In his private
conferences with De Witt the king had also spoken about
his nephew, but De Witt would make no positive
promise, though he seems to have expressed himself to
the effect that the young prince must undoubtedly at
some time obtain the dignities of his forefathers. Amid
the roar of the cannon of the English fleet and the shouts
of the multitude assembled on the dunes the king took
his departure, accompanied to the last moment by
deputies from the States and by the most eminent men
of the country. All these compliments and honours,
however, could not remove the political and commercial
opposition between England and the republic, however
great pains were taken on the Dutch side to maintain a
good understanding with England, a question of life or
death for Dutch commerce. Many people already
1 Wicquefort, Verhael in forme van yournael van de reys ende V ver-
toeven van den seer doorluchlige ende machtigePrins Car el de II., Koning,
etc. (Den Haag, 1660). See Japikse, De verwikkelingen tusschen de Re~
publiek en Engeland van 1660 tot 1663 (Leiden, 1900), p. 4 et seq.
2 Aitzema, iv., p. 601.
298 History of the Dutch Pe
doubted the possibility of this. StelliivvrtT of Enk-
huizen is reported to have said at the recetion that the
hundreds of thousands expended would bc::r have been
spent for powder, lead, and ships.
An extraordinary embassy to Englan. headed by
Beverweert, the prince's cousin, was t adeavour to
bring about the good understanding. Bet p.- the embassy
was formed, Beverweert started imme after the
king's departure to promote a friendly feelig at the Eng-
lish court. But the renewal of Cromwe Navigation
Act and the revival of the old complaint - I the English
and Dutch merchants showed that enogh points of
difference still existed after all the complirnots exchanged
to cause fear for the future The failr: ■ f the king's
efforts to borrow money in the Xetherinds displeased
further the English court. Complai n both sides
began to grow sharper, although the of >ne remained
in general cordial. Difficulties attended Qe drawing up
of the embassy's instructions, because 5 feared the
desired alliance with France might be cnangcred by too
close a connection with England, and a alliance with
both powers seemed also not easy. The rovinces finally
agreed that it would be best to strive ic 1 triple alliance
with both the powers, as Holland h - ished, while
from England should be obtained ition of the
advantageous Magnus Inter cur sus of as a basis of
commercial relations. The Navigatio Act and other
restrictive laws would then disappear. he work must
be crowned by a defensive alliance In: hat hoped for
with France. With all these discussion it was Novem-
ber, 1660, before Beverweert in Englan was joined by
the other ambassadors: Van Hoorn c Holland, Van
Gogh of Zealand, Ripperda of Gronin
During nearly two years they negcated in England
and had ample opportunity to see th impossibility of
reconciling the conflicting interests o .ngland and the
Years of Peace 299
republic. ner Beverweert's pliability, nor Van
Hoorn's knov/idge of commerce, nor De Witt's incom-
parable art 01 iscovering expedients could remove the
serious difficiues in the way of an alliance. The old
differences wcr constantly coming up again : the English
Dominium Mats with regard to fishery and commerce,
England's umvlingness to recognise the principle of the
"free sea," trobles in the Indies, the relations between
the English an Dutch companies, commercial grievances
in Africa and America had to be considered at length.
After Charles I.'s marriage to the Portuguese princess,
Catherine of raganza, the strained attitude of the
republic towarG Portugal became of consequence. And
soon the diffic/aes were to be increased by the appoint-
ment of Downing the champion of Cromwell's commer-
cial policy so cstile to the republic, as mediator for
Portuguese afiirs at The Hague (June, 1661). The
faithless, brut;, varicious diplomatist, who cleared his
way with the v.*r ruler just in time, was little suited to
prepare for friedly relations, although on his arrival he
poured out ovc the States such fine words as "particu-
lar confidence, "very singular affection," "very hearty
thanks," "ver _jood and clear understanding," and
"interest of rei'ion and neighbourhood." His presence
impeded negotkons with Portugal, as he sought to pro-
mote English coimerce at the expense of Dutch interests
and exercised ressure upon Portugal, so that all De
Witt's talent \vs necessary to conclude the Portuguese
affair in a mannr not too injurious for the States.
During the ncotiations with England the question of
the prince of Oacnge soon came into the foreground.
Adroit manageicnt of the Orange party might have
accomplished mch for the prince. But this was still
lacking, and dissnsion between the two princesses pre-
vented use of th favourable circumstances. The Act of
Exclusion was : course repealed immediately, and in
300 History of the Dutch People
June Nimwegen resolved to designate the prince for the
office of captain- and admiral-general and to urge the
States-General to take charge of his education. Amster-
dam in the summer received the prince and his mother in
the most festive fashion. Through the secretary of the
prince's council, Buysero, and with the help of De
Graeff van Zuid-Polsbroek, De Witt influenced the
princess royal and persuaded her to drop the affair of the
designation and to ask the Estates of Holland to under-
take her son's education with a view to the dignities
later to be given him. Holland showed itself willing,
but in August the designation of the prince for the
military posts was taken up by Zealand, whose Estates
resolved to name him also for stadtholder and to induce
Holland to do likewise. Gelderland, Friesland, and
Groningen, perhaps also Utrecht and Overyssel, would
be disposed to join Zealand, and then Holland would
find it hard to persist in its opposition. But De Witt
anticipated his adversaries and procured from Holland in
September the resolution to take up the prince's educa-
tion in order to prepare him "as an instrument of great
hope for the service of the high commissions and employ-
ments" of his forefathers. The princess gave up Zea-
land's plan, expressed her thanks to Holland, and
named Zuid-Polsbroek and De Witt himself among the
gentlemen to look after the education. Princess Amalia,
on the contrary, proposed a purely Orange commission.
After great disputes the princess royal obtained her way.
Then she departed for England to concert further
measures with her brother for securing the designation,
now that Holland had taken the first step towards it.
The commission of education set to work at once,
although it encountered opposition from Princess
Amalia and the elector of Brandenburg. De Witt and
his friends, instead of letting the prince study longer in
Leyden so devoted to the Orange party, wished to have
Years of Peace 301
him live at The Hague "in the house and under the
eyes" of the States and to appoint one of their partisans
as his tutor in place of his bastard uncle, Zuylesteyn.
Thus William II. 's son was to be brought up in the ideas
of the States. The princess offered objections. The
matter remained undecided, when the sudden death of
the princess in England from the smallpox changed the
whole state of the question in January, 1661. In
accordance with her desire Charles II. took her place as
guardian, and the spring of 1661 saw a drawing together
of the three authorised guardians, who desired a change
in the commission and its enlargement with Orange
members under the supervision of Princess Amalia. At
the same time a new movement for the designation
began in the republic. The States showed unwillingness
to take any further trouble about the prince and revoked
the resolutions concerning his education. Zuylesteyn
and the preacher, Trigland, continued to have charge of
the education, and the youthful object of all these
intrigues pursued his studies quietly in the shadow of
academic learning at Leyden.
English efforts to secure the prince's designation in one
way or another persisted. Even the support of France
and Brandenburg was sought for them, but the former
saw more advantage in an alliance with the party now
ruling, and the latter was too desirous of the friendship of
the States to help. The relations between Charles II.
and Princess Amalia grew more strained, and the
princess soon showed herself as ready as her daughter-in-
law had previously been to agree with Holland regarding
the treatment of the young prince. In March, 1663, she
requested Holland again to undertake her grandson's
education, and Charles II. joined in this request, being
prepared then to retire from the guardianship. But
Holland refused once more. The dissensions between the
guardians made it plain to the leading statesmen that
302 History of the Dutch People
Charles II. after the death of his beloved sister would be
much less disposed to take to heart the young prince's
cause.
How strongly Holland felt in opposition to the Orange
party is apparent from the affair of the "public prayer,"
the prayer for the magistrates, among whom the prince
of Orange was still named in some provinces.1 In 1657 a
commission was appointed to investigate the subject.
Its findings were reported in December, 1662, and after a
long discussion it was resolved in the following March to
settle the matter so that the preachers thenceforth should
pray first for the Estates of the province, "as being the
indisputable sovereign," then for the Estates of the other
provinces, "their allies," further for all their representa-
tives in the general assembly of the States and in the
council of state, in The Hague only for the commissions,
courts, and chamber of accounts, and finally everywhere
for the municipal government. This resolution produced
much excitement. De Witt and the preacher Lydius of
Dordrecht drew up a historical-political deduction con-
cerning the affair. General uneasiness was felt at the
asserted attack upon the sovereign rights of the States-
General, but Holland compelled its preachers to adhere to
the new rule. De Witt's deduction and the larger work
of his cousin of the same name, John de Witt, on the
subject take a prominent place among the pamphlets of
these years.
Although the interest of the prince dropped out of the
differences with England, the others assumed a more
acute character, and as early as 1661 there was fear of a
rupture of the negotiations for the treaty of friendship
desired by the Dutch. Indignation was aroused by the
fitting out of ships in England under Admiral Holmes to
take possession of the African coast at the Gambia and
Cape Verde, where the West India Company had settle-
1 See over the whole question : Veegens in Hist. Studien, ii., p. 68.
Years of Peace 303
merits, for the Royal Company of Adventurers, of which
the king's brother, the duke of York, was the head.
Holmes's rough way of accomplishing his task did not
improve the feeling. A long list of English claims was
offered the Dutch ambassadors in London, calling for an
indemnity of eight million guilders from Netherlanders,
especially from the East and West India Companies.
The States did their best to keep the peace thus menaced.
They even allowed the capture of three regicides of
Cromwell's time, who had taken refuge in Holland, an
act of weakness shocking Dutch ideas of liberty and feed-
ing popular discontent with De Witt. In September,
1662, the treaty of friendship was signed, and the am-
bassadors and Downing returned to their respective
countries. Questions regarding the seizure of vessels,
etc., were to be submitted to a court of arbitration, but
there was no commercial advantage for Netherlanders in
England and no final settlement of the old points of
dispute now raked up again.
This conclusion of the long negotiations was critical,
because it had appeared that a strong party in England,
including the duke of York, the heir to the throne,
desired nothing more ardently than a new war with the
republic in order permanently to cripple its commerce
and sea power. The peace party, led by the duke's
father-in-law, Lord Clarendon, still had the upper hand,
but Clarendon's powerful influence was decreasing,
particularly after the sale of Dunkirk to France, like the
loss of Calais felt as a blow by the English people. New
comolaints and difficulties soon arose when Downing,
who secretly belonged to the war party and considered
the condition of the republic as extremely favourable for
a war with England, had returned to The Hague
(September, 1663). Differences about old privateering
affairs, about the violation of English commercial regula-
tions, about the lack of promptness in striking the flag,
304 History of the Dutch People
etc., were to be found, and satisfaction was always
demanded in an arrogant tone by the man who was well
known as "the most quarrelsome of the diplomatists of
his time." The dread of France's growing might,
personally shared by Clarendon, led at first to sympathy
between the two maritime nations. Downing and De
Witt seemed for a time to work in perfect harmony.
England and the republic stepped together into the
breach for the oppressed Waldenses in Savoy. But the
constant bringing up of old questions by Downing showed
that England attached more importance to jealousy of
the republic than to the interest cf general European
policy. New disputes between the Royal African Com-
pany and the West India Company added fuel to the fire.
The English government complained further of the
sojourn of English exiles in the Netherlands, of the lack
of a Dutch envoy in London with the rank of ambas-
sador, of insults to the duke of York in the press, of the
slow progress of negotiations, of the want of cooperation
with England. The feeling of the English government
and people continually grew more unfavourable, and in
the autumn of 1664 a war seemed to many only a
question of time. England's internal condition and the
government's need of money opposed an explosion, but
the tone among the people and in Parliament, the com-
plaints of the oppressions of the Dutch, became ever
more vehement. In April Parliament demanded im-
mediate redress of the dishonours, indignities, and
grievances suffered, and offered the government the lives
and fortunes of the people.
The presence at The Hague of such an ambassador as
Downing was a great danger. Charles II. and Clarendon,
however, were not the men to calm the warlike sentiment
in England, for ^hey deemed it a means of turning at-
tention from unpleasant domestic conditions. Down-
ing confirmed them in the opinion that the States on
Years of Peace 305
account of commerce, internal disturbances, and the
heavy burden of debt were afraid of a war and would
consent to anything to avoid it. This opinion was not
entirely unfounded, but there were bounds to the
patience of the States, and England was fast approach-
ing those bounds. This appeared from the resolution of
the States-General in the spring of 1664 to keep De
Ruyter at home instead of sending him to the Mediter-
ranean to combat privateering, a resolution that was not
carried out owing to more favourable news from England.
De Witt hoped to remove the differences and considered
with Downing a speedy investigation of England's pre-
tensions. Reports of English preparations continued,
and in May, 1664, the Dutch at last resolved to fit out
thirty ships, ostensibly against the Spanish pirates, and
to make ready for a large loan. Rumours of war were
rife; uneasiness in commercial circles was shown by
fluctuations in the shares of the East India Company, and
they fell from 500 to 440 per cent. Some of the English
claims were found to have not the slightest foundation,
others were to be satisfied as quickly as possible. Van
Gogh, a weak and inefficient man, was appointed ambas-
sador to London. The equipment of the fleet went on in
order to be prepared for any emergency. Intelligence
came that England was enlisting sailors, building ships,
and displaying great activity, so that it was feared she
would assail the unsuspecting merchantmen returning
from India without first declaring war.
Then arrived indisputable proof that Holmes in
February had attacked the possessions of the West India
Company on the coast of Guinea and had taken the
island of Goree and some ships. It appeared that the
Royal African Company was busily engaged in execut-
ing its plans in Africa with the support of its numerous
stockholders among the royal family and the high
aristocracy, who hoped to improve the company's bad
VOL. IV. — 20.
306 History of the Dutch People
condition by a war with the republic. The complaints of
the States-General were answered by the English govern-
ment with counter complaints respecting the usurpations
of the West India Company in Africa and its efforts to
destroy English commerce there. It was plain that Eng-
land wished to do a larger business, and that the republic
was expected to furnish the means. The Navigation Act
had not been sufficient to raise England's commerce to
the desired height. The long wished and now expected
humiliation of the hated republic was to accomplish this.
But the States would not submit to such treatment and re-
solved to support their company vigorously with twelve
war ships to be newly equipped. As these vessels could
not be ready to sail for some time, the speedy dispatch
of De Ruyter to Africa was prepared in deep secrecy.
In the States-General on the I ith of August De Witt clev-
erly tacked this resolution to the equipment of the twelve
ships, so that nobody but the initiated paid attention to
it. Even the president of the week, who signed the
resolution, did not notice it, and Downing's temporary
absence in England helped to keep the affair secret.
The possibility of such secrecy may be attributed to an
important change in the method of government made by
De Witt after the example of what had occurred now and
then under Frederick Henry, to the introduction of the
"Secret Works." These committees, originally estab-
lished to make reports and to prepare resolutions, were
clothed from June, 1663, with full power in certain
matters. Thus they were a delegation of the authority of
the States-General, and through them it became possible
to carry out important resolutions with great rapidity
and in deep secrecy. The council pensionary repeatedly
made use of them. They consisted of one member for
each province except Holland, which had two, one being
usually the council pensionary himself. Soon they
secured the right to act in special affairs as if they were
Years of Peace 307
the States-General themselves. The council pensionary's
influence was uncommonly great in these committees
owing to his experience. Thus he became more and
more the minister of the States-General and guided them
according to his views. De Witt in this way satisfied the
necessity for a central power in the state.
Meanwhile negotiations were continued at London.
While the African question was considered, while the
Dutch demands were formulated in a long list, containing
seventy-three points to thirty-three on the English list,
while Van Gogh in London and Downing at The Hague
offered draughts and held conferences with representatives
of the companies and the respective governments, minds
on both sides grew more heated, and the States and the
English government went on clandestinely with their prep-
arations. A new proposal to submit the differences to
arbitrators was made by the States and coolly received
by England. The justifiable quarantine in England of
Dutch vessels on account of the plague raging in Amster-
dam and elsewhere excited anger in the republic at the
obstructions to commerce, and complaint was made of
these "unneighbourly and unusual proceedings." The
determination to have the twelve ships for Guinea
escorted through the Channel «by the fleet under Was-
senaer-Obdam showed that the States had no intention
of playing a passive part, however much England warned
that contingencies might arise similar to those in 1652
leading to war. News came in October that Holmes had
also taken the important Cabo Corso and had threatened
St. George d'Elmina, then that another fleet had crossed
from England to America and on September 6th had
seized all New Netherland and incorporated it with the
English possessions. The West India Company uttered a
passion?te cry of distress at the loss of nearly all its
territor -* ror the West Indian islands also were seriously
menaced.
308 History of the Dutch People
The conquest of New Netherland had cost little
trouble. The director-general Stuyvesant in spite of all
the English claims had hitherto preserved his province
undiminished and maintained order in the colony with a
strong hand, but it was certain that the weak garrison
must yield to a vigorous attack. And such an attack
was to be expected. Charles II. had never officially
recognised the colony's existence, and Downing had even
said that he could not find anything of that name upon
the map. On March 22, 1663, the king gave to his
brother, the duke of York, an extensive English territory
in America as a present. The country on the Hudson
River with Manhattan, i. e., all New Netherland, was
mentioned, and in May Colonel Nicolls departed with
three war ships lent by the king to his brother and
500 men to take possession in the interest of English
commerce. The colonel first settled affairs in Connecti-
cut and appeared before New Amsterdam at the end
of August. The undismayed Stuyvesant wanted to re-
sist to the utmost with his weak force, but the colo-
nists refused to engage in the unequal struggle and
without opposition surrendered town and province to
the enemy.1
The States-General protested against all this but not
with much energy, awaiting the result of De Ruyter's
expedition still kept secret. In the late autumn some-
thing leaked out slowly of De Ruyter's mission. De
Witt answered Downing's question about it evasively,
but could not remove suspicion. When it became known
that De Ruyter had been on the coast of Morocco, people
in England realised they had been hoodwinked and
manifested great indignation. Soon a fleet appeared in
the Channel under York, afterwards a second one under
Prince Rupert of the Palatinate designed to combat the
proposed Dutch expedition to Guinea. With this
1 Fiske, The Dutch and Quaker Colonies, i., p. 284.
Years of Peace 309
attitude of England the Dutch set about making their
fleet ready. They still hoped for peace, however.
Perhaps it might be secured by the intervention of
France. But Louis XIV. showed slight inclination to in-
tervene, because his own plans could never suffer in a war
between the two maritime powers. Despite the treaty of
offensive and defensive alliance, he sought to remain
neutral in order to take advantage of any opportunity
that might be offered in the southern Netherlands.
De Ruyter succeeded without much difficulty in recon-
quering the West India Company's African possessions.
The English government replied to the first reports of
this success by laying an embargo upon all vessels,
especially the Dutch ones, in English ports in order to
provide sailors for its fleet. Downing began now to ask
indemnification for England's expenses in making prep-
arations. The attitude of France caused Charles II.
some uneasiness, until he was certain that this country
would not go to war with England for the sake of the
republic. English war ships commenced to bring in
Dutch merchantmen. The States on their side now
seized English vessels in Dutch ports, though but few of
them remained after a warning from Downing. The
Dutch fleet, being dismantled for the winter, could not
capture English merchantmen. The war party in Eng-
land was unquestionably supreme, and Parliament readily
granted all the money asked, even to the unprecedented
sum of two and one-half million pounds. The London
Exchange exulted, the people railed at the Dutch,
Parliament was praised for its "brave vote" against the
"insulting and injurious neighbours" who committed the
crime of surpassing England's commerce.
A slight chance for peace lay in England's hesitation
on account of the attitude of France. Memorials by
Downing and deductions by the States, designed to
prove their authors in the right, were addressed to foreign
3io History of the Dutch People
powers, particularly to France. The tendency was to
war, and every day an explosion was expected. In
January finally the English captain, Allen, attacked the
fleet returning from Smyrna in the latitude of Cadiz, but
the brave resistance of the commander, Van Brakel, at the
head of the convoy, saved nearly all the vessels. This
was the signal for giving out letters of marque in the
Netherlands, while the naval vessels gathered in the
harbours. England now also issued the letters of
marque long lying ready. France made one more feeble
attempt to mediate by proposing that England should
receive Van Beuningen in London with new conditions
from the States, but Charles II. answered evasively.
The States looked forward to a war with quite different
feelings from those of a few years earlier. Courage
began to rise as danger approached, and confidence in
themselves augmented, now the fleet was collected and
the sailors were streaming to it. There was not a trace
of the discord, upon which Downing had calculated.
Relying with common accord on the fleet, thoroughly
prepared by De Witt's care and commanded by excellent
officers, men were determined to resist the hated enemy.
England's declaration of war on March 4, 1665, put an
end to all hesitation, and the States boldly took up the
gauntlet.
While war disturbed anew the tranquillity of the
republic, the fire of dissension began once more on its
eastern side. The bishop of Munster had a grievance in
the rejection of his claims to the lordship of Borculoo.1
In 1406 this lordship was granted in fief to Munster by
the house of Bronkhorst. After the death of the last
Bronkhorst's widow in 1579 Munster took possession of
the territory, but the Limburg-Styrum family, related
by marriage to the extinct Bronkhorsts, pretended to the
lordship. The court of Gelderland in 161 5 decided in
1 Der Kinderen, De Nederlandsche Republick en Munster, i6jo-i666, p. I.
Years of Peace 311
favour of this pretension, and in the following year the
States recognised the count of Limburg-Styrum as the
owner of the lordship. Bishop Christopher Bernard von
Galen vigorously urged the claims of Miinster, but neither
his representations, nor the support of France and the
emperor could move the States to accede to his demands,
so that he was greatly angered. There were the old diffi-
culties between the bishop and his capital. The attitude
of the States in 1658 had saved the city from complete
domination by its lord, but von Galen did not give up, so
that Miinster repeatedly asked a garrison from the
States, as Emden was protected in that way against its
count. Friesland and the eastern provinces sometimes
took much trouble to comply with the city's wishes, but
Holland feared complications with the empire and let the
favourable moment pass for raising on this side a strong
bulwark, though earnestly importuned by the resident
Aitzema, who was intrusted with the care of the city's
interests. The States confined themselves to a weak
mediation, and the respectable delegation sent to Miin-
ster in the summer of 1660 to effect an agreement met with
little success. Before the sending of the deputies the
bishop with an army of 14,000 men had laid siege to the
city, and he encompassed it more closely and prevented
all attempts at relief, so that in despair of help from the
States it finally surrendered in March, 1661, vexed at their
unwillingness. The half-hearted action of the States also
excited the ire of the bishop, and he was ready to cool it
at the first opportunity. Further dissensions with the
States arose concerning the transportation of letters
between Amsterdam and Hamburg, which took place
partly across the bishop's territory and was there
dependent upon the privilege of the count of Thurn and
Taxis for the general imperial postal service dating from
Maximilian's time. Another serious matter was that of
the debt due, on account of an inheritance, from the
312 History of the Dutch People
prince l of East Friesland to the count of Liechtenstein,
which claim amounting to 300,000 rix-dollars was trans-
ferred in 1663 by the imperial council of Vienna to the
bishop of Miinster. The bishop offered the prince of
East Friesland, now George Christian, to assume the debt
in return for the cession of Reiderland, which territory
was mortgaged to the States-General. The prince
refused this offer, but saw no chance to pay the Liechten-
stein debt unless the States-General helped him by a
new loan. They were not unwilling, but demanded
a mortgage on all the princely lands, Harlingerland in
particular, besides the right to occupy Dylerschans and
Jemmingen, conditions not acceptable to the prince.
Von Galen prepared to collect the debt by force and had
his troops take Dylerschans (December, 1663). This act
of hostility aroused the States as well as East Friesland.
The prince hastily consented to cede the fortress to the
States which loaned him on it 135,000 rix-dollars for the
payment of the debt and gave orders to the Frisian
stadtholder to assemble a small army to defend Dutch
interests. A deputation under Van Beverningh was to
attempt the settlement of affairs in East Friesland. But
the bishop apparently wanted Dylerschans more than the
money. The emperor cooperated with him and had his
ambassador Friquet at The Hague admonish the States
not to interfere in these imperial matters.
The equipment of the Dutch troops consumed much
time, but in May, 1664, a corps of 5500 men was
gathered near Deventer. Prince William Frederick
moved on Dylerschans, which was defended by only 300
Miinster troops, and after a few days of siege it surren-
dered on June 4th under protest from the bishop. The
Liechtenstein debt, the cause of the trouble, was not fully
settled until after the death of the East Frisian prince
1 Count Enno Louis had in 1654 changed the title of count for that of
prince.
Years of Peace 313
who expired in 1665 and left a son under age. It was no
wonder that the bishop watched anxiously the course of
the complications with England, and that the latter was
disposed to take advantage of his feelings. He hoped
furthermore for help from Brandenburg, Cologne, and
Neuburg, which all had grievances against the States.
France, however, served the republic by restraining these
princes and by influencing von Galen to leave the States
in peace. The bishop saw in the English war just
beginning a fine opportunity to attain his purpose, sent
representatives to London, and concluded on June 13,
1665, with England a secret treaty, by which he was to
receive until August 500,000 rix-dollars and later 50,000
rix-dollars a month in return for the promise to attack the
Netherlands from the side of the land with 10,000 cavalry
and 20,000 infantry.
In all these doings the warlike bishop was inspired by
an exile from Groningen, Johan Schulenborgh. During
the peace negotiations with Portugal his conduct as
deputy to the States-General had been as equivocal as
formerly in the disturbances at Groningen. As president
of that body he had approved the treaty of peace, at De
Witt's instigation and being bribed, as was asserted, by
Portuguese gold, to the great exasperation of his prov-
ince. He was removed from all his political offices and
condemned to refund 4000 guilders on account of frauds
imputed to him but not fully proved. The energetic
Schulenborgh endeavoured in conjunction with Rengers
to regain his influence by means of the guilds of the city
of Groningen, with whose leaders, the architects Waren-
dorp and Van Emmen, the advocate Harkens, and the
alderman of the tailors, a certain Udinck, he had been
connected in previous commotions. A movement of the
guilds at Groningen resulted from his secret intrigues in
the summer of 1662. The municipal government saw
itself compelled to abolish some unpopular taxes and to
314 History of the Dutch People
withdraw the sentences against Schulenborgh. Then the
guilds sought more influence through a reform in the
election of the council, which was granted. It was a
turbulent summer in Groningen, but the victors soon
disagreed, and Schulenborgh was suspected by his
colleagues. The council took advantage of this. At a
favourable moment it summoned the garrison to arms,
met with support from the militia, and was presently-
strong enough to arrest Schulenborgh. At the council's
request the stadtholder William Frederick appeared in
November with a large force of troops in the city and
garrisoned it. The council had now won its cause, and
next year, on March 14, 1663, the guilds of Groningen
were regulated and made entirely subject to the city
government, the aristocracy of magistrates becoming the
master. New rules were drawn up by the stadtholder to
distribute the government fairly between City and Land,
but the end was far from being attained. The leaders of
the unsuccessful revolt were severely punished. Waren-
dorp was put to death, and Schulenborgh only escaped
the same fate by fleeing to Miinster, where he entered
the bishop's service as counsellor for the affairs of East
Friesland. The deserter hoped at the head of Miinster
troops to be restored to honour and to be revenged upon
his enemies.
The new rules of government and the suppression of
the agitation of the guilds were principally due to the in-
tervention of William Frederick. In Friesland too, where
complaints waxed loud of the hunting after office and of
bribery, he did much to improve matters. New regula-
tions brought some reform temporarily in the shameful
abuses of the local oligarchs at elections. The oligarchy
was not broken, but more tolerable conditions were
created. The Frisian prince did not long enjoy all this.
An accident while repairing a pistol, that went off
unexpectedly and sent a bullet through his jaw, deprived
Years of Peace 315
him of life on October 31, 1664, and his young son,
Henry Casimir II., succeeded to thestadtholderships with
his mother as guardian. Another misfortune threatened
the sorely tried house of Nassau, when, after the burial
of the Frisian stadtholder, Prince John Maurice, riding
over a bridge in Franeker, fell into the water and was
only rescued with difficulty. The Orange and Nassau
houses seemed never to have been further from dominion
in the Dutch provinces than in these years, when two
weak children and an old bachelor were the sole mascu-
line representatives of the two princely families which
had now for a century lived through the joy and moan of
the young Netherlandish state. Of these three John Mau-
rice had partly turned away from the republic by becoming
stadtholder at Cleves for the elector of Brandenburg,
although he might still be considered as the probable
head of the Dutch army in case of war.
How sadly situated Prince William III. was, appears
from the proceedings of the Estates of Zealand, known
as partisans of Orange, with regard to the government of
Flushing and Veere, where they thwarted the princess-
dowager in her rights as guardian of her grandson. All
the prudence of the able but imperious lady was necessary,
with the help of her daughter Albertina Agnes as
guardian in Friesland of her other grandson, to preserve
intact the family's possessions for better times. She
succeeded actually, though it sometimes seemed as if the
young prince of Orange would be quite ruined before he
became of age. His principality was in the hands of
France, and when after four years of negotiations Louis
XIV. in the autumn of 1664 consented to give back the
unjustly seized property, when Constantijn Huygens in
the ensuing spring received at Orange the homage of
the population for their young prince and the French
garrison departed, no one had any illusions concerning
the real independence of the little state surrounded by
316 History of the Dutch People
French territory. And in the Netherlands the slight hope
of the Orange partisans was fixed upon the future, when
perhaps the heir of the Oranges, of age and sustained by
the sympathy of the people, would attempt for himself
and his family to obtain his elevation from the now
supreme party of the States, which sat firmer than ever
in the saddle and under the lead of the energetic council
pensionary would certainly not be persuaded easily to
that elevation. The old "Orange above" sounded to
many like mockery, but it still sounded, and the new
song testifying to fervent love for the "small prince"
promised better days: "stadtholder must he be for all."
CHAPTER XII
SECOND ENGLISH WAR
THE two maritime powers had prepared themselves
as well as possible for the impending conflict. The
English navy, much neglected immediately after Crom-
well's death, was notably improved after the Restoration.
Under direction of the king's brother, the duke of York,
lord high-admiral of the fleet, great reforms were intro-
duced, and the intelligent administration of such men as
Samuel Pepys had a good influence. There was still,
however, a lack of money and consequently of all sorts
of things. Workmen in the yards and sailors had to
complain of poor payment, materials and provisions alike
left much to be desired, serious injury resulted from the
custom of having the posts of naval officers filled by
wholly inexperienced persons or by army officers. At the
outbreak of war England had a navy of about 160 ships
with 5000 guns and more than 25,000 men under such
commanders as Monk, Prince Rupert, Montague, Ayscue,
Lawson, and Penn, who were a match for the Dutch
admirals.1
In the Netherlands, since the imperfection of the fleet
had so plainly appeared in the first English war, work
had been zealously pushed in augmenting the number of
the regular naval ships so as no longer to be dependent
upon armed merchant vessels or upon the aid of private
1 Tanner, The administration of the Navy from the Restoration to the
Revolution (Eng. Hist. Rev., Jan., 1897, p. 17). See De Jonge, i., p. 616
et seq.
317
3i 8 History of the Dutch People
companies. With the council pensionary it was above
all his brother Cornelius who looked after the navy, and
from the latter part of 1664 many new war ships were
built, this activity being continued during the war itself
by the construction of large vessels, with forty to eighty
guns, like those of the English fleet.1 The admiralties
were spurred to renewed exertions not only in building
but also for the manning and equipment of the ships.
The vigorous management of the council pensionary,
with the cooperation of the admirals, Wassenaer-Obdam,
De Ruyter, Cornelis Tromp, the Evertsens, and Tjerk
Hiddes de Vries, overcame in part the difficulty of mak-
ing five admiralties work together. At the breaking out of
the war the condition of the Dutch navy was very satis-
factory, and it could stand comparison with the English
both in size and number of vessels and in their crews, the
superiority of the Dutch mariners making up for any
deficiency. Immediately every effort was made to send
out the fleet. The new ships were finished hastily and
others were put on the stocks. The East India Com-
pany furnished a score of large vessels; many merchant-
men were armed; a partial suspension of the fishery, the
raising of the pay, and other measures gradually pro-
vided an abundance of sailors; privateers were fitted out
especially in Zealand.
Soon came news that the English fleet, of more than
100 ships with 4200 cannon and 22,000 men, was at sea
and off the coast. But a severe storm dispersed it. The
Dutch squadrons were able to unite, and at the end of
May a Dutch fleet of about equal strength under
Wassenaer-Obdam as lieutenant admiral-general put to
sea after being inspected by the council pensionary and
other representatives of the States. On this occasion
De Witt showed uncommon knowledge of maritime
affairs, in opposition to experienced seamen demonstrat-
1 De Jonge, i., p. 633.
Second English War 3X9
ing the possibility of sailing out. Great expectations
were entertained of this "armada," the most considerable
that had ever left Dutch harbours, under command of
such men as the lieutenant admirals, Jan Evertsen,
Kortenaer, and Stellingwerff. The caution of the chief
commander in remaining upon the coast on account of
contrary winds excited vexation. Urgent letters from De
Witt, who thought of going with the fleet as deputy, and
a sharp order from the States constrained him to seek the
British coast in order to risk a battle. The English fleet,
sailing out again, met the Dutch at the mouth of the
Thames. After a few days of drifting Wassenaer, though
missing the advantage of the wind, resolved to attack.
Off Lowestoft a bloody battle was fought on the 13th of
June. This engagement resulted very unfavourably for
the Dutch, owing to the bad cooperation of the seven
squadrons forming their fleet, to the mutual jealousy of
the subordinate commanders and the lack of confidence
in their chief, so that each of the captains fought on his
own account. In the beginning Kortenaer was killed, and
several captains, in contrast to the great bravery of
others, manifested slight eagerness for the fray. The
English finally broke through the Dutch order of battle,
and the confusion now became terrible. The ships of
York and Wassenaer engaged one another; York was
wounded and his vessel was almost boarded, when
suddenly Wassenaer's riddled ship was blown up. This
event settled the issue of the combat, and many vessels
now took to flight, following the example of Kortenaer's
cowardly pilot who sailed away with the admiral's flag at
the mast. Some captains still held out, but at last all
gave way, being pursued by the English who captured
several ships and destroyed others. Stellingwerff and the
vice admiral Schram also lost their lives. Jan Evertsen,
succeeding to the command, attempted with Tromp and
others to restore order, but he too had to give up, and
320 History of the Dutch People
a disorderly flight ensued. Tromp sailed with some
sixty vessels to Texel, Evertsen himself with about
ten to the Meuse, others reached the Vhe. It was "a
total defeat," neither more nor less. Sixteen ships were
lost, nine captured by the enemy, 2000 men killed.
There was great disappointment. Jan Evertsen on
arriving at Briel was abused by a mob and even thrown
into the water; later he was imprisoned at The Hague
and brought before a court-martial in Texel, laying
down his office, though at last honourably acquitted.
Led by the undaunted council pensionary, who
hastened to Texel, the States used all means to repair
damages, so that ten days later the rear admiral Banckers
could run out to sea again with twenty vessels. The
guilty captains were severely punished, three of them
shot, others banished and disgraced. Tromp, refusing
at first to approve of these punishments, rendered great
service in restoring the fleet and was intrusted with the
chief command, while the States-General associated with
him a board of three deputies to act with three army
colonels and two experienced seamen as naval councillors.
The deputies were: John de Witt himself, Rutger
Huygens, and Johan Boreel. The fleet was on the point
of going out, when early in August De Ruyter unex-
pectedly arrived at Delfzijl from the Antilles and offered
his services. De Ruyter, the senior vice admiral, was
universally desired for the chief, and Tromp, to his
vexation and at the instance of De Witt, was relieved
from the command, while his place was taken by De
Ruyter, appointed lieutenant admiral to succeed Was-
senaer. Tromp was with difficulty induced by De Witt to
continue to serve under the new chief in the fleet, with
which he had hoped to wipe out the defeat by a brilliant
victory and to preserve from the enemy's attack the
richly laden merchantmen expected home from India.
But events brought new disappointment. Notwithstand-
Second English War 321
ing the objections of the most experienced mariners, De
Witt succeeded in getting the fleet from Texel to sea
through an outlet regarded as impracticable, which has
since, as John de Witt's Channel, conserved the memory
of his energy. The fleet, again over ioo vessels strong
with 20,000 men, sailed out on August 14th to look for
the enemy, "in a splendid condition and full of courage."
The council pensionary himself was on board to share its
perils or glory.
The enemy had attempted in the harbour of Bergen to
capture the returning fleet, which had sailed around
Scotland to that place, but was repulsed with the help of
the Danish forts. His main force still lay off the Dutch
coast, but De Ruyter, escorting the returning fleet, did
not encounter the English, and a severe storm destroyed
several ships and injured the others so that they had to
seek port. A second storm at the end of September
inflicted further damage. De Witt with De Ruyter,
however, managed to repair the fleet every time, and
early in October they again sailed out to search for the
enemy on the English coast off Yarmouth and the
mouth of the Thames. But the enemy remained inside,
and new autumnal storms and sickness compelled De
Ruyter in the first days of November to return without
having accomplished his purpose.1 The council pension-
ary now resumed his post which had been occupied
during a few months by his cousin Vivien.
The first year of the war on the sea had thus brought
nothing but misfortune and disappointment. The war
waged on land at the same time with Miinster had also
not been fortunate. Army and fortifications had been
terribly neglected. Since the death of Prince William II.
the once excellent Dutch army had become more and
more disorganised. No field marshal was appointed after
1 Most important letters concerning the doings of the fleet are to be found
in De Witt's correspondence from the fleet itself (Royal Archives).
322 History of the Dutch People
Brederode's death, and thus to please Holland the
general army was really dissolved into the seven small
armies of the separate provinces. Princes William Fred-
erick and Maurice of Nassau represented the old tradi-
tions of the Spanish war. The former had now
disappeared from the scene, and the latter withdrew in
discontent to Cleves. And the prince of Orange was too
young to fill a high military office, even under the guid-
ance of an experienced commander. Good officers were
scarce or incapacitated by age, while most of the posts
were occupied by young sons of magistrates, who prof-
ited by shameful frauds in the muster and payment of
the soldiers. The land provinces reduced their war
budget as much as possible; Holland, Zealand, and
Friesland had enough to do for the fleet to prevent their
devoting much attention to the army. The best part of
the army was used as marines in the navy. The council
of state and the prince of Nassau had year after year
warned against this condition of affairs. But their voice
had been like that of one crying in the wilderness.
Early in the spring of 1665 rumours were rife of the
bishop of Miinster's plans for war, and it was feared that
the archbishop of Cologne, the duke of Jiilich, and even
the elector of Brandenburg might join him on account
of their grievances against the States. The land prov-
inces, especially Gelderland and Overyssel, became
uneasy and called for help. The troops were reenforced
by over 11,000 men, munitions of war were collected, and
measures were taken to improve the fortresses, a credit
of 2,400,000 guilders being opened. The bishop of Miin-
ster continued his preparations after the treaty with Eng-
land, secretly supported by the attitude of the Spanish
governor at Brussels, Castel-Rodrigo, who permitted his
enlistments in the Spanish Netherlands. In September
the States concluded an alliance with Brunswick-Liine-
burg, which placed 12,000 men under George Friedrich
Second English War 323
von Waldeck at the disposition of the republic. Waldeck
was an experienced general and had refused the command
of Miinster's troops. France promised to do its best to
prevent the war and succeeded in breaking the dreaded
cooperation of the princes on the lower Rhine, so that
Miinster finally stood alone.1 War with Miinster was
plainly inevitable, and late in July Prince Maurice was
appointed chief commander with the Rhinegrave von
Solms and the Scotchman Kirkpatrick as generals and
with eight deputies of the States, including Cornelius de
Witt, "to assist with word and deed." After an unsuc-
cessful treacherous attack upon Arnhem and Doesburg
the bishop sent to the States-General at the end of
September a declaration of war, while he moved towards
the Dutch frontiers with his army under command of the
count of Hesse-Homburg. Prince Maurice complaining
of the small army left him after garrisoning thirty forts,
the States took 9000 new troops into service besides
6000 militia for the frontier fortresses. At the end of
the year the army had increased from 20,000 to 70,000
men, and the expenditures upon it amounted to over five
and one-half million guilders.
But this was all in preparation when" the bishop began
his attack. The forts of Twente and a large part of the
Achterhoek were occupied by him in September; Salland
and Twente purchased a safeguard from him ; the Dutch
army on the Yssel was not strong enough to drive him
away, but prevented his crossing the river. In October
the enemy forced his way from Staphorst and Rouveen
into Drenthe and farther into the Oldambt, where he
plundered and burned and was with difficulty kept by
Prince Maurice from attacking Groningen. Fortunately
French help now appeared, 6000 troops under General
Pradel, governor of Bapaume, sent in accordance with
1 See Der Kinderen, De Nederlandsche Republiek en Munster, i6jo-/666,
p. 277 et seq.
324 History of the Dutch People
the treaties concluded with France. Pradel's small army-
arrived at Maestricht on November ioth, twelve days
later on the Yssel, pillaging on its way along the Meuse
to its heart's content. There were many complaints of
the scandalous disorder of these auxiliary bands, to be
ascribed in part to their poor provisionment.1 Though
it was already winter, a joint expedition into Miinster
was decided upon, urged by Maurice but opposed by
Pradel, in order to force the bishop to quit the republic's
territory. Lochem was taken on December 13th after a
brief siege, and the whole army then moved to the Miin-
ster frontier, supported on the other side by Waldeck.
But Pradel soon refused to go farther, and winter quarters
were occupied before the end of the month. Thus ended
the first campaign. Little was accomplished during the
winter by the small detachments sent out by either side,
the most important events being the occupation of
Wedde by Dutch troops and the plundering of Vriezen-
veen and Emmen by Miinster.
Meanwhile peace was sought from various sides, and
especially since Beverningh with French help in February
had persuaded the elector of Brandenburg to a treaty of
subsidy and alliance with "the merchants of Holland,"
Miinster began to incline to peace, menaced everywhere
and feebly sustained by England's slow payments.
Brandenburg was to aid the Dutch with 12,000 men, if
von Galen declined to conclude peace. A second cam-
paign was prepared, Prince Maurice again receiving the
command, but before any important result was achieved,
negotiations were opened through the mediation of
Brandenburg at Cleves, Beverningh conducting them for
the Dutch. Other Rhenish princes took part, as well as
1 Der Kinderen, pp. 344, 352. Cf. Aitzema, v., p. 517, where is the re.
port of the deputies concerning the entire campaign. Further, pp. 660, 665.
Also, the Mdmoires du prince de Guiche (London, Changuion, 1764), p. 83;
Wicquefort, iii., p. 219.
Second English War 325
the emperor's ambassador to The Hague, Friquet, who
promoted a good understanding between the States and
the princes of the empire, and the French diplomatist
Colbert-Croissy, who acted equivocally. These negotia-
tions led to peace on April 18th, by which both parties
were to evacuate the territory occupied, and Miinster
gave up its claims to Borculoo and promised not to
increase its army over 3000 men. This result was more
favourable to the republic than could have been expected.
A last attempt of the English diplomatist Temple to
induce von Galen to continue the war failed. An eye
had to be kept upon the sail in this quarter for fear of
another attack. The bishop had made peace, because
he was about to be assailed from all sides, and it was
hard for him to swallow his defeat, while the course of
the war had shown that the army and fortifications of the
States were insufficient of themselves to oppose him,
whenever he should again venture upon war.
The death of Philip IV. of Spain in September, 1665,
brought new dangers into European politics, because his
son, young Charles II., declared by will his sole heir,
was so weak that he could not be expected to live long,
and then the same will indicated as successor not the
French queen, on account of the stipulations of the
peace of the Pyrenees, but Philip's second daughter,
the empress, and, in her default, the emperor and his
children. It was no secret that Louis XIV. did not
intend to accept this settlement and reckoned upon the
aid of the States. Early in 1666 he declared war on
England to satisfy the States, which had long been
urging France's engagements by virtue of the treaty
concluded. A joint naval expedition was planned with
the cooperation of a French squadron under the admiral
of France, the duke of Beaufort. The French squadron
was not assembled until late in the spring and then made
little haste to unite with the Dutch fleet. This latter was
326 History of the Dutch People
after the trials of the preceding year again in order. De
Witt had incited the admiralties to energy, and a more
powerful fleet than Obdam's was ready in spring, consist-
ing of seventy-two large men-of-war, twelve fast frigates,
and a sufficient number of dispatch boats, galiots, and
supply ships, while the East India Company offered
1,200,000 guilders in place of twenty ships. Three
lieutenant admirals, De Ruyter for Holland, Cornelis
Evertsen for Zealand, Tjerk Hiddes de Vries for
Friesland, had charge of the preparations. England's
sea power might be curbed by the help of France, whose
large fleet1 was to be escorted north by a Dutch squadron,
and with that of Denmark which consented to an alliance
after the English attack on Bergen and was willing to
fit out forty vessels. But the French fleet remained on
the Portuguese coast, and the Danish one did not leave
its own shores, so that the Dutch fleet put to sea alone in
June.
It was somewhat smaller but, on account of the size of
the vessels and the more numerous crews, stronger than
that of the year before. De Ruyter, on the new ship
The Seven Provinces, commanded this fine fleet, "at
least a third more considerable in power than it has been
in the past," says De Witt himself, while the men,
"experienced, brave, and healthy," could stand com-
parison with any previous force. It numbered sixteen
high officers, among whom were Aert van Nes and the
other lieutenant admirals, to which rank Cornelis Tromp
and Johan Meppel had also risen, the vice admirals De
Liefde, Van der Hulst, Banckers, Schram, and Coenders,
the rear admirals Jan van Nes, Cornelis Evertsen the
younger, Stachouwer, and Bruynsvelt, and the best
captains to be found, many of them obtaining great
renown then and later. In joyful expectation of victory
1 Lefevre Pontalis, i., p. 417, puts the French fleet in 1667 at no ships
with 3700 guns and 22,000 men,
Second English War 327
the fleet sailed out, divided into three squadrons and
each of these again into three sections: De Ruyter with
Van Nes in the front, Evertsen and De Vries in the
middle, Tromp and Meppel in the rear. Off North
Foreland on the nth of June the English fleet under
Monk was encountered, also divided into three squadrons
but, by reason of the detachment of twenty vessels
under Prince Rupert to hold de Beaufort in check, con-
siderably weaker than the Dutch, though provided with
heavier ships.
Then began the fierce four days' naval battle, the most
murderous of all time. On the very first day there was a
bloody fight between the English and the Flemish coast,
with great bravery and great losses on both sides. On
the second day De Ruyter broke through the hostile line
and destroyed several of the enemy's ships, so that
Monk at last had only twenty-eight vessels. In a
masterly manner he conducted the retreat to the British
coast, during which Ayscue, the vice admiral in command
of his second squadron, fell with his ship into Tromp's
hands. Prince Rupert's return from the Channel reen-
forced Monk again to about sixty ships, and once more
he was able, close by the English coast, to attack the
Dutch fleet reduced to about the same strength. This
time also the British gave way, but on the fourth day
they renewed the savage combat with even greater
violence than before, so that the sea looked red with
blood and the clouds of smoke from burning vessels
obscured the light of day. The Dutch force was in peril
for a brief space, but at the decisive moment De Ruyter
hoisted the blood-red flag in sign of a general attack,
broke the British line in different places, and was soon
chasing the enemy's fleet in a wild flight. The entire
English fleet would have been annihilated, if a dense fog
had not stopped the pursuit. Thus ended this battle in a
complete victory, and the Dutch fleet decked with flags
328 History of the Dutch People
and streamers, though severely damaged, sailed to
Wielingen, carrying in triumph six ships and 3000
prisoners with Ayscue and the corpse of his colleague
Berkeley — a proof of success that should have silenced all
the English assertions and exultations over a British
"victory." The day of thanksgiving in the Netherlands
had certainly more reason for its existence than the
bonfires in England on Monk's return, which speedily
gave place to general dejection.1
Under De Witt's energetic management the damaged
ships were quickly repaired, and early in July ninety of
them were again ready for sea. De Ruyter was once
more in command. But England, whose national pride
was hard hit by the defeat, had vigorously exerted
itself, and its fleet was also at sea under Monk and Prince
Rupert. The fleets met in the same seas on August 4th.
Tromp succeeded in putting to flight the English
squadron commanded by Smith, but in the eager pursuit
he lost sight of the dangerous situation of the two other
divisions of the Dutch fleet. The vanguard, consisting
of Zealanders and Frisians, was dispersed by the British
after the death of Johan Evertsen and De Vries. De
Ruyter with the middle division engaged the enemy
alone and was nearly overwhelmed by superior force.
With his disabled ship and some others he escaped among
the banks on the coast of Zealand, exasperated at
Tromp's conduct, which he attributed not merely to reck-
lessness but to design, and for which boiling with wrath he
reproached Tromp on his own ship. The result was a
quarrel between the two heroes, Tromp complaining to
the States-General. Nothing remained to be done but
to dismiss one of the two, and this fate naturally befell
Tromp distrusted by the ruling party on account of his
Orange partisanship. He was replaced by the colonel of
marines Van Ghent. During six years Tromp remained
1 De Jonge, ii., p. 85.
Second English War 329
out of the service, bewailing the injustice done him and
with his Orange friends considering means for overthrow-
ing the existing government and elevating the prince.
This time the victory of the English was not for a
moment in doubt. They ruled the sea and even
threatened its inlets. The rear admiral Holmes pushed,
on August 19th, within the Vlie to destroy merchantmen
lying there, and burned the two convoy ships destined
to protect them and more than 140 of the mercantile
vessels. A landing on Terschelling next day was a com-
plete success, and a large part of the island was pillaged
and laid waste. The destruction of some English mer-
chantmen on the Elbe at Hamburg afforded but slight
consolation. Early in September the Dutch fleet, eighty
ships of war strong, again put to sea under command of
De Ruyter and with Cornelius de Witt as deputy. The
British were met in the Channel off Boulogne, but they
avoided battle to the disappointment of De Witt. Sick-
ness on the fleet and the indisposition of the commander,
burning tow from a match having flown into his throat,
decided the States to recall the fleet.
The terrible fire of London, which made a deep im-
pression in England like the plague prevailing there,
seemed to the States to give a fitting opportunity to
prove that the republic was not thoroughly beaten. As
De Ruyter's illness prevented his commanding the fleet,
John de Witt in the absence of his faithful friend was
designated to lead it with the support of the lieutenant
admiral Van Nes. So the council pensionary went with
the fleet to the English coast again. Some ridiculed the
gowned admiral, but De Witt, hoping this time to unite
with the French under de Beaufort, boldly entered the
Channel and offered battle to the enemy early in Octo-
ber. Neither a battle, nor a junction with de Beaufort
followed ; storms and sickness forced the fleet to return,
and only a few ships remained at sea to protect com-
33° History of the Dutch People
merce. In the Netherlands as well as in England the
disasters of this year strengthened the peace party.
There were heavy losses on both sides, the plague had
raged violently in England, discontent was increasing at
the court's extravagance in the midst of war. The
continuance of the Dutch ambassador Van Gogh in
London and that of Downing at The Hague had encour-
aged at first the lovers of peace. Until the autumn of
1665 Downing was the soul of intrigues in the republic
with the help of the Orange party to cast suspicion upon
the States. These intrigues were discovered, and he had
to leave the country. Van Gogh followed his example
towards the end of the year. The reverses of the next
year occasioned new efforts of the Orange party which
had even wished to send the young prince to England
to obtain peace from his uncle. In these new intrigues
was mixed up the captain of horse Henri Fleury de Cou-
lant, lord of Buat, son-in-law of the late clerk Musch,
one of the many French officers finding here a military
career. Buat was a brave but insignificant man, a
drunkard, little suited to act as a secret negotiator. A
partisan of Orange by conviction, he had proffered his
services to De Witt to enter into secret relations with the
English statesmen, particularly with the influential
minister Arlington.
De Witt was not averse to approaching England. In
the spring of 1666 the Dutch negotiator at Cleves,
Beverningh, had been in confidential conversation with
Temple, the English ambassador there, and France had
immediately suspected negotiations without its partici-
pation. In preparing the campaign against Miinster in
1666 the council pensionary had thought seriously of
winning over the active Orange party by making the
prince general of the cavalry, provided Turenne himself
undertook to lead the campaign. But France protested
against any secret negotiation and was disinclined to do
Second English War 33 I
anything for the prince. It desired to support the
stadtholderless government and to weaken the two
maritime powers by their conflict in order at the right
moment to strike for itself in the Spanish Netherlands.
De Witt gave up his idea, while Zealand continued to
insist upon some military office for the prince. To
oppose this urgency De Witt determined to bring the
young prince under the supervision of Holland by hav-
ing him adopted as "child of the state." Some people
there were who believed that the state in so doing would
become "child of the prince." The princess dowager
made the request and with her aid the prince in April
was adopted by Holland as "child of the state." His
courtiers and tutor Zuylesteyn were replaced by the lord
of Gent as tutor and other attendants more to the mind
of the States, while a commission, including John de
Witt himself, was appointed to instruct the young prince
"well and thoroughly" both in the "Reformed religion"
and "in the good and salutary rights, privileges, and
maxims of the state." Thus it was hoped to thwart
the efforts of the Orange party and to direct aright the
prince's education. But in the affair itself lay the
recognition of the prince's exceptional position and
the promise of his later elevation to those dignities which
De Witt had long seen could not be permanently with-
held from him. The agreement was a compromise that
the princess could look back upon with satisfaction, and
she might expect the future to bring more. And De
Witt, however cleverly the danger of the moment was
averted, could not hide from himself that under these
finely sounding words the first step was taken on a way
that he would gladly have avoided.
In consequence of these events De Witt did not refuse
the services of so confirmed a partisan of Orange as Buat.
Like the whole Orange party, Buat expected advantage
1 See Fruin, Het proces van Buat (Nijhoff" s Bijdr., 3de R., i., p. 4.)
332 History of the Dutch People
for the prince from peace with England, and, even
before France's declaration of war against England, he
was, through Silvius, a former servant of the princess
royal and one of his friends at the English court, in
correspondence with Lord Arlington, who was married to
Beverweert's daughter. In this correspondence terms of
peace were discussed, and Buat communicated them to
Van Beverningh in De Witt's absence and to the council
pensionary himself on his return from the fleet in
November, 1665. These terms were so "unreasonable,"
that the council pensionary made but little answer to
them, but he allowed Buat to continue the correspond-
ence. Buat kept De Witt informed of unimportant
matters, but at the same time he was carrying on a second
secret negotiation with Silvius and Arlington in the name
of Tromp's friends, the violent partisans of Orange, who
desired peace at any price and were reputed to be led by
Johan Kievit, Tromp's brother-in-law. Through a
mistake in August, 1666, a letter of this last correspond-
ence with the superscription pour vous mesme fell into
De Witt's hands, and thus he learned the secrets of the
hated faction which wanted to overthrow him. Of course
Buat was lost. He neglected the opportunity to escape
and was arrested some hours later. A search of his house
furnished proof of a very extensive correspondence, but
only a little of it seemed to have been kept. Commissioners
of Holland gave him a preliminary hearing, but did not dis-
cover much of consequence except that he was in commu-
nication with Kievit and another member of Rotterdam's
government, Van der Horst. The case was then referred
somewhat irregularly to their own court of justice with a
request "to proceed with all possible promptitude and
with vigour." Enough was found to show the traitorous
attitude of the friends of Kievit and Tromp. The court's
slowness gave Kievit and Van der Horst a chance to flee,
and so poor Buat was left alone. One of the councilors
Second English War 333
favouring him, Van der Graaf, excused himself from fur-
ther participation in the case on account of remarks made
concerning his incautious visit to the prisoner. The court
was repeatedly urged to hasten matters by the States in
De Witt's absence,1 on October 4th by a deputation in
which Vivien, pensionary of Dordrecht and De Witt's
cousin, made a vehement speech. Acquittal was con-
stantly advocated by the Orange party. After long delay
and pressure also from the French ambassador the court
pronounced sentence of death with confiscation of prop-
erty by five to three votes, a severe punishment but one
that cannot be called unmerited or unjust. In default
Kievit had the same sentence and Van der Horst that of
banishment. On October nth the imprudent cavalry
captain was executed amid the general compassion of the
people who soon began to regard him as an innocent victim
of his devotion to Orange — an unjust opinion which was
fostered by the Orange party and which later greatly in-
jured De Witt and his friends.
In the autumn of 1666 the States planned new naval
expeditions for the following spring, hoping for energetic
cooperation of the French fleet. A quadruple alliance
with Denmark, Brandenburg, and the Liineburgers
absolved them from all fear of Munster and Sweden. In
England as well as in the Netherlands a new struggle was
viewed with apprehension by reason of its financial
burdens. The Dutch found it very difficult to pay the
costs of war and were forced to issue loan after loan both
for the provinces and for the admiralties. De Witt says
that Holland was paying half of its income and more for
the interest on its debt. In the war this province borrowed
over twelve and one fourth million florins.8 Sweden
1 That he was the great instigator of the trial, and that he must thus be
reproached with Buat's death is contested by Fruin upon convincing grounds.
Fruin, p, 38.
2 Lefevre Pontalis, i., p. 400.
334 History of the Dutch People
manifesteJ its readiness to mediate between the belliger-
ents and found England, the republic, and France
willing. England was prepared to negotiate at some
town in the republic's territory, e. g., in the generality
lands, which seemed better also to the States and to the
king of France than The Hague, where the intrigues of
the Orange party might have to be fought against.
Evidently England hoped for this at Breda, the prince's
barony. In April Breda was finally designated as the
place of the negotiations, and the envoys of the powers
concerned gradually gathered there. Van Beverningh
was the chief of the eight Dutch negotiators ; only three
of them were to go to Breda, the deputies of the three
maritime provinces; by this limitation De Witt hoped to
thwart the English intrigues.
Thus began the negotiations for peace.1 Van Bever-
ningh, De Huybert, the council pensionary of Zealand,
and the Frisian Jongestal were the envoys. At once the
uncommon friendliness of the French ambassadors to-
wards those of England attracted notice, but the Eng-
lish government showed less good-will, mistrusting more
and more the designs of France upon the southern
Netherlands. During the negotiations France actually
threw off the mask and moved its troops into South
Flanders. The old questions of Pularoon and the cap-
tured English vessels, the repeal of the Navigation Act
and similar laws, the treatment of rebels on both sides,
etc., were discussed at length, but the equivocal attitude
of the French and Swedes and the unwillingness of the
States to concede much retarded the negotiation, and
by the middle of June little progress was made, while
France's conduct excited uneasiness and the English
envoys encouraged by it commenced to display arrogance.
Under these circumstances it seemed desirable by some
brilliant naval exploit to show England and the world
'See Wicquefort, iii., p. 298, and the documents in Aitzema.
Second English War 335
once more that the complete exhaustion attributed to the
republic was far from having been reached. Even before
the defeat of Lowestoft De Witt had formed the plan of
entering the mouth of the Thames and of attacking the
arsenals of the English fleet. This bold plan, considered
also after the four days' battle but rejected by De
Ruyter on account of insufficient acquaintance with the
shoals of the Thames, was now at the instance of De Witt
to be carried out by the fleet made ready in spring and
again surpassing the former one in strength.1 A small
division of the fleet under the lieutenant admiral Van
Ghent, which had escorted some merchantmen around the
north of Scotland, attempted early in June to sail up the
river of Edinburgh, but was quickly obliged to turn back.
The rumour of a more dangerous plan against the
Thames began to spread in England, and measures were
taken to defend the river. These measures, however,
were soon suspended, and De Witt saw a chance to
execute his plan. Everything was prepared in deep
secrecy. Cornelius de Witt, as the representative of the
States, was sent to the fleet only a few days before its
leaving Texel in order with De Ruyter to lead the
expedition according to a commission put into their hands
by the council pensionary on the departure of the fleet.
The governor of Putten was not a little proud of the
honourable mission given him. He and De Ruyter might
indeed be "the best plenipotentiaries" for Breda. At
the Meuse a considerable detachment of troops was
taken on board. On June 14th the fleet sailed, over
eighty vessels of all kinds and exclusively fitted out by
Holland, to the British coast, where it arrived off the
mouth of the Thames in the evening of the 17th.
A squadron of seventeen smaller war vessels with advice
boats, fire ships, and galiots under command of Van
Ghent was intrusted with the real attack and sailed up
1 De Jonge, ii., p. 155,
336 History of the Dutch People
the river in the early morning of the 19th, followed at a
distance by the main part of the fleet. Some half-
equipped ships on the Thames escaped to London, but
De Witt and Van Ghent determined to go up the Medway
on the 20th, and the troops having been landed under
Colonel Dolman captured the fort of Sheerness and
hoisted the flag of the States there, the fort and its stores
being afterwards mostly destroyed. Measures were
hastily taken on the English side to ward off the attack:
batteries were thrown up and manned; some large ships
were stationed in the river behind a heavy chain to pro-
tect them; other vessels were sunk to block the passage;
troops were hurried from all directions. Monk and York
endeavoured to avoid the consequences of carelessness as
much as possible. Thus the Dutch ships could only
advance with great difficulty and not until the 22d did
they sail farther up the Medway, aided by a spring tide
with a northeast wind that drove the water into the river.
The brave Rotterdam captain, Van Brakel, captured a
heavy frigate placed before the chain ; a fire ship broke
the chain to pieces, and fire ships and armed sloops now
continued the work of destruction, the English batteries
being quickly silenced and seized upon by the troops
landed. De Witt and Van Ghent captured the Royal
Charles, which bore the admiral's flag, and other ships
were destroyed or seriously damaged. On the following
day the squadron sailed up to the castle of Upnor, where
three large vessels were destroyed by the Dutch fire ships
in spite of the valiant defence made by the vice admiral
Spragge. It even seemed possible with the help of
Cromwell's old followers to overthrow the royal govern-
ment and to restore the republic in England ; the council
pensionary at least aims at such plans in his letters of
these days. But these great designs were not carried
out. The river became so dangerous and narrow that it
was resolved to go back, also because the shipyard of
^Second English War 337
Chatham was strongly fortified and fire ships were want-
ing. Six large English vessels were destroyed, several
scuttled by the English themselves to block the river,
two — the Royal Charles and the Unity — were taken away
in triumph as memorials of the victory which was
celebrated with solemn days of thanksgiving and bonfires.
So ended the famous expedition which had cost the Dutch
side only fifty sailors and some fire ships and in England
had produced a great sensation, particularly in London,
where people began to take to flight in panic. The
brave victors received brilliant rewards and honours.
But the council pensionary considered the task as not
yet finished. He urged new attacks on the Thames and
elsewhere. The larger part of the fleet continued to
blockade the Thames, and small squadrons cruised along
the English coast to prevent the running out of merchant
vessels. One of them made in July an attack on Har-
wich, which failed as did similar attacks upon other ports
and a new attempt to go up the Thames, followed by a
third in August under Van Nes, in which the English
navy suffered heavy losses at Gravesend. The lack of fire
ships and the vigorous defence of the English forced the
Dutch this time to turn back after four days of fighting
at Sheerness and on the Medway.
These last hostilities took place after peace was really
concluded. On the 31st of July this occurred, being
undoubtedly promoted by the glorious expedition, but
operations did not cease before a month later, while the
Dutch continued their mastery over the sea. The plans
of France and complications with Sweden and Portugal
made it desirable to hold a naval force in readiness.
With the return of the fleet in October the war could be
considered as ended.
In the peace the affairs of Pularoon and the captured
ships were finally set aside, and the commercial regula-
tions enacted in the last war to the detriment of the
VOL. IV. 22.
338 History of the Dutch People
Dutch were abolished by England. The Navigation
Act remained but was modified by the stipulation that
goods from Germany and the southern Netherlands
might thenceforth be imported in Dutch vessels; salutes
with the flag were settled ; the rebels of each were no
longer to be protected. With regard to the colonies it
was arranged that both sides should possess what they
held on May 10, 1667. This caused the republic to lose
New Netherland afterwards so important, as it had
remained in British hands. But the possession was
assured of Surinam, which with its chief town Paramaribo
was conquered by the brave Zealander Abraham
Crynssen and a small squadron on February 28, 1667,
while Essequibo also was taken from the enemy and his
power in the West Indies was harmed by a battle near
the island of Nives, by the capture of the island of
Tobago, and by a successful attack upon some ships off
the coast of Virginia. Surinam became an important
possession and by the fertility of its soil made up during
a time for the loss suffered in North America. De Witt
might well speak of the "glorious" treaty securing terms
from England such as had never before been obtained and
perhaps never would be again.
CHAPTER XIII
SUMMIT OF THE REPUBLIC S POWER
\17ITH the peace of Breda begins the most brilliant
* Y period of the republic. In a letter De Witt speaks
with justifiable pride of the realisation of his prediction
that the state "within the time of two years would be
in a better condition, in greater reputation, and in higher
credit than ever before." ' "New Carthage," exclaimed
the aged Vondel, is humiliated by the "maritime triumph
of the Free Netherlands," now that "the sea lion on the
Thames" caused the English standard to be struck.
Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal dare not oppose the
republic; France seeks its cooperation in the plans long
formed against the Spanish Netherlands; Spain looks
imploringly to its former rebels for protection ; Ger-
many's princes turn for help to the United Netherlands;
even the emperor desires their friendship. Within the
country Holland's will is law, while victory confirms the
power of the magistrates, and prosperity and wealth
everywhere awaken satisfaction with the rule of the
council pensionary and his colleagues. But in the
distance appears a cloud, much larger already than a
man's hand, upon the southern horizon, where the
armies of France are crossing the Spanish-Netherlandish
frontier. And nearer at hand, in Holland's bosom,
another danger threatens the ruling party. The young
prince is growing up, sickly and weak of body indeed,
1 See Lefevre Pontalis, i., p. 409.
339
34Q History of the Dutch People
but strong in mind and strong in the love of the people
for this heir of great traditions. De Witt watches anx-
iously the coming perils, and his cry of triumph is mingled
with a word of apprehension for the immediate future.
At the beginning of the English war Lionne, the
manager of French foreign relations, had demanded
Cambrai for his help to the republic, but De Witt had
refused and had warned Spain. Louis XIV. knew well
that the republic would prefer to throw up a barrier
against his designs on this side, but he hoped by his
cooperation against England and Miinster to have made
it more favourably disposed. An understanding between
Spain and England was the direct result, although Madrid
and Brussels feared to break entirely with the republic.1
But France succeeded in ending this understanding, just
as it thwarted Spain's efforts to secure assistance in
Germany, and managed to bring over to its side the
German princes on the Rhine by money and promises.
So Spain stood quite alone in the spring of 1667, and on
the 8th of Maya Louis wrote to the Spanish regent, the
queen-mother, that his patience was exhausted and at the
end of the month he would march at the head of his
troops to take what belonged to him by virtue of the
hereditary right of his wife, whose pretensions he caused
to be expounded in a Tr ait e' des droits de la reine. What
he demanded was no less than : Brabant with Antwerp
and Limburg, Mechlin, Upper Gelderland, Namur, Artois,
Cambrai, Hainaut, one fourth of Luxemburg, and one
third of Franche Comte. The Traits was contested upon
good grounds in the Bouclier d 'Est 'at et de justice of the
baron of Lisola, imperial ambassador at London and a
native of Franche Comte. This celebrated pamphlet of
the talented opponent of French plans in Europe* was
1 Lonchay, La rivahti de la France et de V Espagne, p. 213.
2 Mignet, Negotiations, ii., p. 58.
3 See concerning him Pribram's book, Freiherr von Lisola.
Summit of the Republic's Power 341
directed especially against the devolution law, the founda-
tion of Louis's claims, and warned against French rapacity.
The freedom or slavery of Europe was in question and
was to be decided by this first attack. How was feeble
Spain to withstand the assault ?
After the protest of the regent and her governor in
Brussels, Louis marched on May 21st, and the French army
of more than 50,000 men under Turenne, inspired by the
king's presence, easily made itself master of a series of
fortresses, from Lille, Charleroi, and Armentieres to Aalst
and Dendermonde, while the Spanish force, small and
hastily collected, was dispersed at Bruges. In September
nearly all Brabant, Flanders, and Hainaut were in French
hands ; Brussels, the capital, with Ghent and Mechlin alone
remained under Spanish rule. Great was the terror in
the republic at the rapid progress of the French arms.
De Witt himself was surprised and complained of the
sudden change in the French policy. Van Beuningen,
Dutch ambassador in Paris, endeavoured to satisfy Louis
XIV. by the offer of Franche Comte' with Cambrai, Aire,
and St. Omer, but France asked for more with Spain's
recognition of Louis's rights on the death of the young
king. De Witt was in great difficulty. The peace of
Breda was not then signed and Sweden was unreliable.
A new war with France for the sake of Spain would be
madness. When peace was concluded, the council pen-
sionary declared his inclination to help Spain, provided
Bruges, Ostend, Damme, Plesschendaele, and the forts
Isabella and St. Donat were granted to the republic. The
Spanish government would not hear to this, because it
might then become entirely dependent on its old enemies.
When England made a similar offer, the government at
Madrid considered the price too high, now that winter was
approaching and the French conquests were ending with
the king's triumphal return to Versailles. But Spain fell
constantly lower. The emperor was persuaded into an
342 History of the Dutch People
agreement with France to divide the Spanish heritage at
the young king's death, while France was now to keep
much of what was conquered ; the most powerful German
princes were entirely for France ; Sweden was pacified.
The game seemed won against Spain as well as against the
States which had always dreaded becoming the neighbour
of France. On the ground of common interests Louis
XIV. requested the help of the States in getting posses-
sion of his lawful property.
Dutch diplomacy sought a way out of the dilemma. In
his letter of May 8th Louis had demanded the surrender of
the territory coming to him or of its equivalent. Spain
might give this equivalent in Franche Comte or Luxem-
burg with some fortresses so situated that the republic
would suffer no harm. France had declared its readiness
to conclude a truce of six months for the purpose of
negotiating. In the autumn negotiations began, but it
soon appeared that Louis would never renounce his wife's
claims to the inheritance of the Spanish king, and that he
could not be induced willingly to give up the territory
already conquered. Van Beuningen's protests in Paris,
De Witt's talks with d'Estrades at The Hague advanced
matters little further. Spain was as unwilling to submit
to the loss of its chief fortresses as France was to content
itself with a small part of the conquered territory. The
sole hope of the States lay in help from Sweden and
England to compel France to moderate its demands. The
party in Sweden favouring French interests, led by the
chancellor De la Gardie, was in this autumn overcome by
its opponents, and consequently the Swedish government
ordered the ambassador at The Hague, Dohna, to join
England and the republic in resisting French encroach-
ments. The English government was not so easily moved.
The new ambassador of the States in London, Johan
Meerman, was instructed to bring about an understanding
with England, and for this end he was even to threaten a
Summit of the Republic's Power 343
treaty of the States with France concerning the Spanish
Netherlands. England hesitated under the influence of
French offers, and Charles II. was ready to join France in
an attack on the republic.
The danger for the republic became great, and De
Witt had to keep his eyes open. Fortunately popular
opinion in England impelled the government in the direc-
tion of De Witt's policy. It was unwilling to see the
Spanish Netherlands in French hands and remembered
the loss of Dunkirk. Lisola's activity had much influence
upon this disposition of the English people, and Parlia-
ment showed itself averse to any participation in French
plans. The fall of the minister Clarendon and the eleva-
tion of Arlington, Beverweert's son-in-law, promoted the
understanding with the republic, and Charles II. saw
himself obliged to yield to this tendency. He had Sir Wil-
liam Temple, the English resident in Brussels and a well-
known opponent of France, come to London at the end
of December from his station by way of The Hague in
order to prepare for cooperation with De Witt. Long an
admirer of the council pensionary, Temple had little diffi-
culty in agreeing with him, and when early in January he
arrived in London from The Hague, he was able to say
that the States, though disinclined for the moment to be-
gin a joint war against France, were quite prepared to
unite with England in a mediation. On the 13th of
January, 1668, Temple left London to propose a joint
mediation four days later in The Hague. De Witt
hesitated a bit to enter into so close an alliance with the
unreliable English government, but Temple overcame his
scruples and even persuaded him to have the States-
General conclude the treaty directly with England. Thus
long discussions in the provincial Estates and the opposi-
tion of France would be avoided. In an audience of the
States-General Temple easily secured the appointment
of seven deputies in order, supported by the council
344 History of the Dutch People
pensionary, to negotiate with him. After some wavering
they consented to a defensive alliance with England
as the basis of the mediation to be offered. Temple's
urgency accelerated the formalities and on the 23d
the treaty was signed by the deputies and the English
diplomat and approved by the States-General. The rati-
fication by the provincial Estates occupied a month.
Temple and De Witt together quickly induced Dohna
for Sweden to join them and so on the 26th the Triple
Alliance was completed. The treaty provided that each
should help the other in case of attack with 40 ships and
6400 troops, while the chief purpose was to compel
France to limit itself to its somewhat moderated demands
and to persuade Spain to submit to them. If France
violated the conditions imposed, it was to be constrained
by a joint war to be content with the territory ceded by
the peace of the Pyrenees.
Thus was concluded the famous treaty that was to
maintain the equilibrium of Europe by united action of
the two maritime powers. Temple may be considered
the first vigorous champion of this cooperation which
during more than a century, with a short interruption in
the beginning, was to play such a part in European poli-
tics. Great was the joy among the partisans of the
States and the Orange party, and the universal satis-
faction was shown in the council pensionary's ball, where
the young prince and Prince John Maurice led the dance.
Louis XIV., almost sure of his affair, was surprised by the
treaty and did not allow himself to be deceived as to
its results by the consoling reports of the outwitted
d'Estrades. Van Beuningen did his best to appease the
French government, but there was much to do to accom-
plish this and to make Spain listen to reason. At first
Spain refused, but when it saw that the three powers had
no intention of guaranteeing it against all loss, it played
them the trick of sacrificing not Franche Comt£ but the
Summit of the Republic's Power 345
fortified places in the Netherlands already lost, which was
least of all agreeable to the States. There was more
difficulty with France and, while Sweden was only induced
at the eleventh hour to keep its word by increasing the
promised subsidies, it was found necessary to assemble
troops to show Louis XIV. that matters were serious.
Under John Maurice and the field marshal Wurtz the
army of the States was collected on the Scheldt and
the Yssel in order to move either upon the Spanish
Netherlands or upon the bishop of Miinster again
gathering his troops. Liineburg and Lorraine prom-
ised respectively 6000 and 8000 men, 48 ships were
fitted out, and new levies were to add 12,000 men to the
Dutch army, so that by spring 25 regiments and nearly
4000 cavalry were ready. Louis XIV., who had already
seized Franche Comte, was not prepared to enter upon a
great war and decided to comply with the demand of the
three powers to the end that he might later break their
resistance. The terms of peace were settled at St. Ger-
main en Laye on the 15th of April between Lionne, Van
Beuningen, and the English envoy Trevor. A congress
at Aix-la-Chapelle, comprising representatives from the
states interested and presided over by the papal nuncio,
was to draw up the definitive treaty. Beverningh and Tem-
ple had little difficulty in persuading the French envoy,
Colbert-Croissy, and the one from Brussels, Bergeyck, to
sign the stipulations discussed at St. Germain. On May
2, 1668, peace was finally concluded at Aix-la-Chapelle.
Louis kept Mons, Veurne, Armentieres, Courtrai, Lille,
Douay, Tournay, Oudenaarde, Ath, and Charleroi,
and gave back Franche Comte" ; he had gained a firm
footing in Brabant and Flanders, but his further pro-
gress was for the time blocked.1 A guaranty treaty be-
tween the three powers and Spain, securing to the latter
the inviolability of its remaining possessions, placed
1 Legrelle, La diplomatic francaise et la succession d'Espagtic, i., p. 148.
346 History of the Dutch People
the treaty of peace under the protection of the
allies.
A great victory for the Dutch policy was obtained in
this manner. But De Witt had few illusions concerning
its permanence. England's " usual insolence " was mani-
fested in the renewal of humiliating demands for the
striking of the flag, and commercial jealousy was far from
having disappeared, while English pride had been sorely
wounded by the defeat on the Thames, and the king's
vacillating policy inspired no confidence. Unless money
was constantly advanced for secret subsidies to prominent
officers, slight reliance could be placed on the corrupt
Swedish government, now influenced by the able French
diplomatist Pomponne in a way that alarmed Pieter de
Groot, the new Dutch ambassador to Sweden. Louis
XIV. quickly set about devising means to break the
Triple Alliance and to punish the republic for its op-
position to his plans in the Spanish Netherlands. It
remained De Witt's endeavour to induce France, whose
friendship he considered of the highest importance, to
form a buffer state by making the Spanish Netherlands
into cantons according to the old plans. But the policy
of France during recent years showed plainly that it would
not now be content with this. Such a policy as De Witt's
was therefore doomed to failure.
Danger was averted for the time being by the peace of
Aix-la-Chapelle, and De Witt could go on with his do-
mestic task of strengthening the principles of government
prevailing since the death of William II. First it was
necessary to arrange matters so that the young prince
might never unite in his hands the great civil and military
power possessed by his forefathers. Reasons enough for
anxiety were the weakening of the influence of the States'
party by the elevation of the Orange partisan Pieter de
Huybert in 1664 to the council pensionaryship of Zealand
after the death of Adriaan Veth, the resignation of Bever-
Summit of the Republic's Power 347
ningh as treasurer-general in the following year, popular
movements in different cities after the defeats of 1665,
the activity of preachers and officers in the young prince's
interest, the incessant vigilance of the princess dowager in
advancing her grandson. There were traces also of a
diminution in the personal influence of De Witt. His
friend De Groot had to lay down the pensionaryship of
Amsterdam, and was replaced by an antagonist in the town
council, which more and more opposed De Witt. By
securing for him the embassy to Sweden De Witt recom-
pensed his friend, but the blow was felt by the council
pensionary's internal policy. The death of Andries de
Graeff removed his best support in the great city, where
Gillis Valckenier, too independent to submit to De Witt's
guidance, had now become the chief personage. A dis-
agreement between the influential Van Beuningen, who
imagined himself slighted by De Witt and was made
burgomaster of Amsterdam in 1669, and the council pen-
sionary estranged the latter still more from the city.
Under these circumstances a speedy settlement of the
attitude of the prince of Orange appeared necessary.
De Witt hoped to prevent the worst by taking into the
council of state the young prince, with whose education
in the " good maxims " he now earnestly busied himself,
and, as soon as he should be eighteen years old, by
investing him with a high military office under condition
that no captain-general to be appointed should ever obtain
or keep the stadtholdership in any province. Some
members of his party desired to go further, and Caspar
Fag el, pensionary of Haarlem, and Valckenier, burgo-
master of Amsterdam, took the initiative1 for the
proclamation by the Estates of Holland of a Perpetual
Edict for the " mortification " of the stadtholdership.
De Witt hesitated, fearing that this extreme could not be
1 Bontemantel, De Regeeringe van Amslerda?n, uitg. Kernkamp, ii., pp.
17, 19.
348 History of the Dutch People
i
maintained, but finally yielded to the urgency of the two
men and brought Holland to the resolution. On Augus1-
5, 1667, came in this province an edict, by which nobility
and towns took to themselves the election of all magistrates
according to the old laws and privileges and the Estates
were to retain the gift of all offices now enjoyed by them ;
the other provinces were to be requested to decree that
no captain- or admiral-general should become or remain
stadtholder, while Holland abolished the stadtholdership
" in all manners." In December the resolution was
irrevocably confirmed without further debate, and oaths
to observe it were taken by the persons and bodies con-
cerned, the Estates doing so first.1 The resolution excited
vexation among the Orange party as well as in Zealand
and Friesland, but Holland hoped by deputations and
discussions in the other provinces to secure at least a
separation of the stadtholdership from the captain- and
admiral-generalship. In Gelderland, Utrecht, and Over-
yssel this was accomplished quickly, and Utrecht later
followed Holland's example by doing away with the
stadtholdership. The majority in the States-General now
favoured De Witt's " Plan of Harmony" and sought, in the
spring of 1668, to win over the other three provinces by
official deputations, but Zealand, Friesland, and Groningen
refused, and in consequence the prince for a time was not
admitted to the council of state. De Witt, however, did
not give up his scheme, but talked and corresponded with
influential statesmen and negotiated for the purpose of
having all the provinces adopt it at the right moment.
The sudden recognition of the prince, who without the
knowledge of his tutors betook himself in September to
Zealand, as first noble of this province, was a clever r.iove
of the Orange party, advancing him an important step on
the road to the civil offices. This recognition, giving him
entrance into the Estates of Zealand, was a warning to the
1 Wicquefort, ii., p. 373 ; Lefevre Pontalis, i., p. 505.
Summit of the Republic's Power 349
party of the States, i hat it could not long maintain severe
restrictions. Vivien, the pensionary of Dordrecht, in-
terpreted undoubtedly the secret thought of his cousin,
the council pensionary, when during the discussion of the
Perpetual Edict he stuck his penknife into the resolution
lying before him and replied to the question of what he
was doing : " I am trying what steel can do against parch-
ment."1 The young prince had listened to De Witt's
communication of the proceedings in the Estates of
Holland without any external marks of displeasure accord-
ing to his custom, cautiously hiding his real feelings in
the depths of his mind.
The course of these affairs seemed to have strengthened
the existing government. At the end of July, 1668, the
five-year period of the council pensionaryship expired
again, and the high appreciation of De Witt was shown
by his reelection with the doubling of his salary, 6000
guilders, over and above his compensation as governor of
the fiefs and keeper of the great seal of Holland, which
dignities had been his since 1660, and besides a gratuity
of 45,000 guilders for his services, to which the nobles
added 1 5,000 guilders more. The renewal of his act of in-
demnity and the promise of a place in one of the courts of
justice on his retirement assured his future. Thus he
found in the gratitude of his fellow-citizens a reward for
his hard work, in the midst of which his faithful wife died
on July 1st of this year, leaving him the care of a large
family. The beautiful letter of his friend Temple, ex-
pressing sympathy with him in this loss, gives evidence of
the great diplomatist's fine feeling, just as De Witts own
letters of this time testify to the sovereign calmness, with
which the council pensionary received the favours as well
as the blows of fortune. Thenceforth he espoused alone
the good of his country, and though he might be struck
deep in his soul, he remained outwardly what he was, the
1 Scheltema, Staatk, Nederland, ii., p. 418.
35° History of the Dutch People
watchful leader of the state, to the government of which
he had devoted his life.1
His first aim was patiently and cautiously to smooth the
way in the three refractory provinces for the acceptance
of the Harmony. He had to contend with the domestic
difficulties disturbing some provinces, especially Overyssel,
Friesland, and City and Land, in which more and more came
to light the antagonism between the partisans and op-
ponents of the stadtholder government. The most violent
dissensions raged again in Overyssel.2 The decision of
De Witt and De Graeff in 1657 had restored order here for
a time. Before long, however, the division of the provin-
cial offices caused the old discord, and the parties assailed
one another, the stadtholderless faction relying upon Hol-
land and De Witt, the stadtholder partisans having friends
in the other provinces. The attempt was made to recon-
cile adversaries by a fair distribution. Thus Haersolte in
1660 received the office of bailiff of Salland, and his rival
Raesfelt became bailiff of Twente. This method gave bitter
enemies a chance to cross each other. The question of the
control of ecclesiastical property, which occasioned troubles
also in Utrecht and was connected with the treatment of
the numerous Catholics in these two provinces, kindled
strife anew between nobles and cities. At Utrecht the
aged Voetius about 1660 opposed the States in his cus-
tomary vehement fashion. In Overyssel it was less the
preachers than the interested nobles and magistrates who
quarrelled over this property. The management of prop-
erty in the cities by the municipal magistrates was not at
all pleasing to the noblemen. Then came the Munster
invasion with its plundering and destruction by the foe
and by the French allies to disturb order in this province.
The plan of October, 1665, to send the young prince to
England to make peace and to raise him to the supreme
1 See Lefevre Pontalis, i., p. 521, where passages from letters are quoted.
2 Bussemaker. Geschiedenis van Overijsel, ii. ('s Gravenhage, 1889.)
Summit of the Republic's Power 351
command over the land and sea forces was put forth by
two deputies from Overysselto the States-General, Pallandt
and Van Langen, and was a consequence of the wretched
condition of the province. Though given up, the plan
showed how strong the Orange party in the province felt
itself. After the peace of Breda the finances of Overyssel
were in hopeless confusion. The party of Haersolte and
Pallandt began a contest with that of Raesfelt. Violent
pamphlets, accusations of bribery and intriguing were
the order of the day. Both parties applied as of old to
the States-General, each calling its Estates legitimate and
declaring the resolutions of the other null. " It was like
a man, suffering from a raging fever and with senses con-
founded by the severity of the pain, who brings forth in
delirium now this now that."1 Both parties — Kampen and
Deventer with Raesfelt, Zwolle with Haersolte — held their
assemblies, and all attempts to settle the differences failed.
In July, 1669, Holland recognised the Raesfelt party as
the true Estates, but the party of Haersolte did not give
up the struggle. There was even the beginning of a civil
war in August, 1671, soldiers from Kampen occupying
Blokzijl and Zwartsluis, while those of Zwolle seized
Genemuiden and Kuinder. An extraordinary deputation
from the States-General at last came to restore order ; it
suspended Haersolte in September from his office of bailiff
and his presidency of the Estates, and pronounced an
amnesty, but this decision did not quiet the province
despite the threatening approach of war. Induced by
De Witt, the province had quickly assented to his Har-
mony, and the dissensions had little influence upon that,
though they lessened the force of the assertion that four
provinces, or a majority, already favoured it, because it was
well known that the Haersolte party, if it came to power,
would withdraw the approval.
'Aitzema, vi., p. 584.
\
352 History of the Dutch People
The situation was different in the two northern prov-
inces. There assent was not yet obtained, and it depended
upon the victory of the " Holland maxims" which had en-
countered stubborn resistance. In Friesland this resulted
from the old disputes concerning the way of making up
the Estates. The intrigues of the great nobles, who were
generally lords of the manor, in electing the representa-
tives of the manors and the deals between members of
prominent families became very troublesome in 1668 dur-
ing the minority of the young stadtholder who had suc-
ceeded his father under the guardianship of his mother.
It was worse when deputies of the Estates belonging to
the prince's party removed by force from their assembly
some members chosen contrary to the will of the lords in
Oostergoo and Westergoo. The opposition of the parti-
sans of Holland led by Ernst Sicco van Aylva, Karel
Roorda, and others was weak, because their leaders also
participated in disgraceful bargains and divisions of offices.
The harmful fire of dissension was caused chiefly by jeal-
ousy among the magistrates, and these illegal contracts
were considered the only means of opposing the abuses of
intrigue. The shameful spectacles at elections, the sale
of votes, the bringing in of votes by giving food and drink
to whole villages, made it absolutely impossible for a poor
man to obtain any office. The result was that the rule of
the great nobles, the lords of the manors, became ever
more oppressive, and they put members of their families,
even young children, in possession of offices in country and
city. After " reform was talked in boats and waggons,"
the supervision of the legality of elections was taken from
the deputies in March, 1672, and given to a special com-
mission appointed for a year. But the cities declined to
consent to this and held Estates at Sneek, separate from
those of the three districts at Leeuwarden. The result
of change was simply — " other men, the same manners."
More roughly than in Friesland the great lords exercised
Summit of the Republic's Power 353
their tyrannical power in City and Land, even in the city of
Groningen. Here occurred all sorts of abuses at the
" muster," the examination into the competence of the
representatives elected from the country. At the request
of Egbert Clant and Johan de Mepsche the States-General
in 1667 sent delegates to reform the abuses. The city op-
posed the new regulations ; dissensions between city and
country sprang up again ; but the anti-Holland party kept
the upper hand in spite of the efforts of De Witt from The
Hague tt> defeat it with the help of Jan Osebrand Ren-
gers and his friends. To end the discord and secure the
assent of City and Land to the Harmony De Witt late in
May, 1670, went to the province with four other " arbiters "
and remained several weeks settling matters without entire
success, as the city continued to resist. The selfish inter-
ests of the great lords appeared stronger than the desire
to improve, and the " reformation " of the provincial gov-
ernment could not be accomplished. These abuses are not
astonishing in the remote northern provinces, where the
States-General seldom interfered and the stadtholder's
authority was not powerful enough to hold in check the
landowners of noble birth. In Holland, in Amsterdam
alsoaccording to Bontemantel's disclosures, terrible abuses
prevailed in the government ; family interests, personal
ambition, and love of power often had free play ; the pur-
chase of votes by promises and favours, the distribution
of fat offices to friends and relatives, the misuse of public
money, were common occurrences. And De Witt himself
was not entirely averse to them. His correspondence
shows that he looked after the interests of his relatives
and friends, that his power in Holland rested largely upon
their occupation of the offices, that he and his friends upon
occasion profited by speculations dubious in our eyes.
But in Holland the abuses were confined to limits that did
not have to be observed in the north.
More than two years passed before De Witt succeeded in
VOL. IV.— 2^.
354 History of the Dutch People
winning over the three refractory provinces to his Harmony.
The prince was now in his twentieth year, and it became
time to release him from the guardianship, in which
Holland still held him, and to admit him to the council
of state. The former took place with thanks to Van
Ghent and the others charged with his education, but the
latter depended upon the question of the Harmony. On
March 20, 1670, the deputies of the three provinces de-
clared their assent to the Harmony, being influenced by
De Witt and urged by the princess dowager to secure in
this way admission to the council of state at least. The
question was how the prince should enter the council,
with a " decisive " or " advisory " vote, or whether he was
to have a sitting without any vote. After much wrang-
ling Holland in May allowed the prince under conditions
to obtain a decisive vote until he should become captain-
general for one campaign, which could only happen by
unanimous vote. De Witt arranged the affair cleverly,
had the Harmony solemnly accepted by the States-Gen-
eral and the prince led into the council. An attempt to
pilot him into the States-General during De Witt's ab-
sence failed owing to the opposition of Holland.1
In all these transactions it was plain that Amsterdam
under the lead of Valckenier and Van Beuningen and
with the aid of Fagel no longer supported De Witt's pol-
icy but sought to oppose him. The council pensionary's
great power was a thorn in the eyes of these gentlemen ;
they complained of his arbitrary conduct, of his domi-
neering over his masters,2 of his preference of his friends,
and aimed at depriving him of office.3 But the council
pensionary, who could still rely on the Bickers and De
Graeffs and their following, offered no contest. In 1669
1 Wicquefort, iv., p. 124, is very full concerning these matters.
2 " That the country and this city are ruled by a minister, denoting the
council pensionary De Witt" (Bontemantel, ii., p. 156).
3 Fruin, Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van het burgemeesterschap van
Amsterdam tijdens de Hepubliek, in Nijh, Bijdr. jdt Reeks, v., p. 221.
Summit of the Republic's Power 355
he wanted an understanding with the opposing party,
and when Valckenier refused " for reasons " and Van Beun-
ingen was elected burgomaster, the council pensionary-
hoped to end their hostility by ostentatiously asking
their advice. Next year also the burgomaster's election
went against him, and his recommendations for offices
began to fail of their effect. This enmity to De Witt
naturally brought a leaning to the prince's party. In the
election of 1671, after all sorts of intrigues, Valckenier's
party was unsuccessful, and none of its candidates be-
came burgomaster. De Witt triumphed over the proud
relative of the Pauws and Trips, who never forgave him
this defeat. The choice of Fagel as secretary of the
States-General (November, 1670) in place of the dead
Ruysch relieved De Witt of the Haarlem pensionary so
influential in the Estates of Holland. A new victory for
him seemed the promotion of the ambassador De Groot
after his return from Sweden to be pensionary of Rotter-
dam, the second commercial city of Holland. But the
council pensionary still had powerful enemies among the
magistrates who desired with the aid of the Orange par-
tisans to overthrow the "minister." What they secretly
prepared was forwarded by the course of foreign affairs
in these years.
The excellent French diplomatists of the school of
Richelieu and Mazarin had taken for the first object of
their activity the annihilation of the Triple Alliance and
of the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle.1 They tried to accom-
plish this by working upon weak Spain and the two allies
of the republic. Spain, ruled by a passionate and avari-
cious woman and her unworthy favourites and ministers,
was in no condition to thwart the French intrigues.
Many of its statesmen, like the aged Peftaranda, regarded
1 See concerning the diplomatic intrigues of these years especially —
Lefevre Pontalis, ii., Chapters ix. and x. , where De Witt's manuscript
correspondence and that of the French diplomats are very well employed.
3 56 History of the Dutch People
the Spanish Netherlands as an encumbrance to be gotten
rid of, the sooner the better. The governors following one
another at Brussels — Castel-Rodrigo, Velasco, from 1670
the young count de Monterey — were better fitted for
their task, but found so little support in Madrid that they
were unable to achieve much. Evidently Spain must
seek the help of the republic against France, if it wished
to keep the Spanish Netherlands. Castel-Rodrigo had
therefore preferred to give up some fortified places of the
Netherlands instead of Franche Comte, because he hoped
thus to increase the Dutch fear of France, and Monterey
adhered to the republic as closely as possible.1 France
offered to exchange the Netherlands for Roussillon,
ceded by Spain at the peace of the Pyrenees, but neither
the emperor, as presumptive heir, nor Spain consented.
De Witt opposed these plans to the best of his ability,
but he soon had a more redoubtable adversary at The
Hague than d'Estrades. This ambassador, so friendly
to the council pensionary, was succeeded by one of
the ablest leaders of the new French diplomacy, Simon
Arnauld de Pomponne, who appeared late in February,
1669. He was to diminish the distrust of France in the
republic, to keep De Witt busy with negotiations, and to
treat with the Orange party in order to oust him if neces-
sary ; above all, his effort must be to remove the mistrust
of France's aims inspired by Van Beuningen. Pomponne
soon saw that the last was no longer possible and con-
fined himself to negotiating with De Witt for the purpose
of learning his plans and of giving France an opportunity
to break the Triple Alliance by working secretly on Eng-
land and Sweden ; while De Witt's attention was engaged
in negotiations.
The cunning scheme succeeded. Misled by Pomponne,
De Witt in the course of 1669 proposed two plans con-
1 Lonchay, p. 239 et seq.; Van Dijk, Bijdrage tot de geschiedcnis der
Nederlandsche diplomatic (Utrecht, 1851), p. 2S1.
Summit of the Republic's Power 357
cerning the southern Netherlands: one assigning Cambrai,
Aire, and St. Omer to France, the other giving back the
places ceded by the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in exchange
for these three lying on the French frontiers ; the re-
mainder of Belgium was then to become a separate repub-
lic. Neither these plans nor that of a division of the
Spanish Netherlands between France and the emperor
encountered approval at the French court. All De Witt's
endeavours to come to an understanding with France
failed. In June, 1671, Pomponne left The Hague to go
again as ambassador to Sweden ; shortly afterwards he
replaced the deceased Lionne as minister of foreign
affairs at Paris. Only a charge d' affaires was left at The
Hague. This attitude of France opened De Witt's eyes
at last to the necessity of putting the republic into a con-
dition to defend itself against all contingencies. Louis
XIV.'s sudden attack upon the duchy of Lorraine in
August, 1670, showed him that France had not given up
its old plans, but his representations had as little success
as those of the emperor. Lorraine, conquered within a
month, remained in French hands. The real intentions
of Louis XIV. continued to be hidden from the council
pensionary, in consequence partly of the unsatisfactory
arrangement of Dutch diplomacy, a fault that brought
the most terrible evils over the country.
The principal ambassadorial positions remained in these
years for a long time either unfilled or occupied by in-
competent persons. After the death of the Dutch am-
bassador Van Reede at Madrid in September, 1669, it
was more than a year before his place was taken by Van
Beverningh, the first diplomatist of the States, who was
there from January to July, 1671, and then returned home
after preparing the way for a league between Spain and
the republic in case of an attack by France upon either
one. The arming of France was then generally known,
and it was certain that with an attack from that side the
358 History of the Dutch People
republic would also have to sustain a war with Miinster,
unless Miinster were held in check by Brunswick-Liineburg
and Brandenburg. The prince of Tarento, once con-
sidered by De Witt as the future captain-general, and
other Frenchmen resigned from the Dutch service in the
autumn of 1670 — another indication of France's hostile
sentiments. But danger threatened, too, from the side of
England, and De Witt had not calculated upon that. The
ambassador in London, Johan Boreel, was not equal to
that important post, and it was planned to send Van
Beuningen there as extraordinary ambassador, which was
not done until June, 1670. He remained half a year, and
discussed the difficulties arising from a British predatory
foray into Surinam, England's demands for the surrender
of a man suspected of plotting the king's assassination,
the expulsion of Scotch preachers from the republic, the
groundless complaints of England about tapestries, medals,
and pictures representing the Chatham expedition, etc.
The cool attitude of Charles II. 's government towards
the Dutch ambassadors and requests proved conclusively
that vigorous aid from England could not be hoped for
in case of an attack by France upon the republic. Rumours
were already circulating of a secret alliance between France
and England, but De Witt refused to believe them. Eng-
land's disposition was meanwhile manifested plainly by
the opposition of the English government to the plans
for taking the emperor and some German princes into the
Triple Alliance, which was much desired by the imperial
ambassador Lisola, and would have frustrated the French
designs.
De Witt was no better informed of what was going on
in Paris. The place of ambassador there was vacant from
September, 1668, when Willem Boreel died, to the end of
August, 1670. Then Pieter de Groot, though just made
pensionary of Rotterdam, went there as ambassador in
the hope of doing some good through his old relations to
Summit of the Republic's Power 359
the French court from his father's days. But De Groot
accomplished little and speedily urged the States to pre-
pare for war. What he saw in France aroused his fears.
He had reason for them, because at this time the secret
league between England and France was actually effected.
Set on by York and the war party in his court, who ar-
dently longed to wipe out the disgrace of Chatham, won
over by offers of money and wiles of women, finally influ-
enced by his sister Henrietta, duchess of Orleans, Charles
II. assented to the secret treaty of Dover (December 31,
1670), which detached him from the Triple Alliance and
allied him with Louis XIV. against the republic under
promise of three million francs of subsidy a year, and of
the cession of Walcheren and the mouths of the Scheldt
to England. Repeated warnings from Madrid, Berlin, and
from Van Beverninghhad been given De Witt, but, relying
upon Temple and the alliance, he had disregarded them.
He even hoped that France would return to the old friend-
ship with the States, and from Charles II. he feared at the
most a breaking away from the Triple Alliance, but not a
new war. Van Beuningen, ridiculed by Lionne in Jan-
uary, 1671, as a " poor dupe," allowed himself to be misled
regarding the real purpose of the equipment of the English
fleet ; " the end of the comedy" was to be a bitter disap-
pointment to him and De Witt.
When Louis XIV. was ready with England, and in
Sweden also the French money lavishly spent appeared
more powerful than the anti-French policy, so that Sweden
would not hold to its alliance with the republic, he turned
to the emperor and the German princes to induce them
to leave the republic to its fate. The Rhine princes
and Munster, long under French influence and now
gained further by French money and diplomacy, were
quickly persuaded. Cologne and Munster, the former led by
the Fiirstenbergs in favour of France, displayed a readiness
to declare war on the republic in the interests of Catholicism.
360 History of the Dutch People
The downfall of the strong Protestant power, the hope
and the support of the German Protestants, would be of
great importance to the Catholic Church, and Louis XIV.
did not fail to emphasise this side of the affair to the
Catholic princes of the Rhine and to the emperor. Ef-
forts were made also to draw Spain away from the republic
and thus to expose the latter entirely alone to an attack
from all sides. The emperor, threatened by Turks and
Hungarians, consented at the end of 1671 to an agreement
with France on the basis of the plan of 1668 for dividing
the Spanish inheritance. Bavaria promised support to the
French policy, even in securing the imperial dignity for
Louis XIV. after the emperor's death. Spain remained
refractory, and Brandenburg, however much inclined to
help Louis in his designs on the Spanish Netherlands,
refused to turn against the republic.
While French diplomacy thus prepared the way and
the resourceful Colbert filled the treasury by protectionist
measures, the excellent minister of war, Louvois, with an
iron hand, organised the army for the approaching cam-
paign. It was intended to strike in the spring of 1671,
but the whole year passed in diplomatic negotiation and
military preparation. In April, 1672, after Sweden was won
over to an alliance with France, all was ready. An army
of 120,000 men,1 one-sixth cavalry, Frenchmen, Italians,
Swiss, Irishmen, Englishmen, mingled together after the
fashion of the time, but all under rigid discipline, with roo
cannons, 300 pontoons for crossing the rivers, an abun-
dance of ammunition purchased in Holland,3 with officers
formerly in the Dutch service, and commanded by Tu-
renne, Cond£ , Luxembourg, Vauban, and other famous
generals, was at the first sign to march upon the republic
1 Rousset, Histoire de Louvois, i., p. 346.
2 The agent in this vas the Jewish banker Zadok of Amsterdam, who
bought up the ammunition secretly, ostensibly for the Spaniards and for
German cities, and transported it by way of Cologne (Rousset, i., p. 338)
This Zadok played later also a treacherous part.
Summit of the Republic's Power 361
through the Liege territory. At the same time Miinster
and Cologne with 30,000 men1 were to attack its eastern
frontiers, and the united Anglo-French fleet was to assail
Holland and Zealand. Thus the republic would be speedily
destroyed. De Witt late in the autumn did not perceive
the extent of the danger. De Groot had frequently men-
tioned rumours regarding an alliance between France and
England, but not until November, 1671, did he write about
it with certainty. England's refusal to enlarge the Triple
Alliance, Charles IFs indifference to the French attack
on Lorraine, Arlington's conduct towards Van Beuningen
troubled De Witt, but he relied upon the aversion of the
English nation to France's plans of conquest and upon
the anti-French attitude of Parliament. Temple had left
The Hague, however, in August, 1670, and news came in
the summer of the following year that he would not re-
turn. Then his wife, who had remained behind, also
quitted The Hague. An English yacht, the Merlin, came
for her in August, and Charles II. made use of the oppor-
portunity to create new difficulties. The yacht was to
sail through the Dutch fleet cruising in the Channel and
fire upon it immediately, if the flags were not struck. On
the voyage out nothing was done, as a strong wind drove
the yacht away from the fleet. During the return voyage,
with the royal flag flying, it sailed among the Dutch fleet
anchored off the coast of Zealand, fired a salute in the
direction of De Ruyter's ship but received no reply, be.
cause his vessel careened very much to one side. The lieu-
tenant admiral, Van Ghent, answered and finally De Ruyter
himself, but the captain of the yacht fired back with shot,
complaining that Van Ghent had not struck his flag "ac-
cording to custom." Van Ghent paid a visit to Madame
Temple and declared he was not obliged to salute in this
way, whereupon the yacht sailed away unmolested. This
affair occasioned very unpleasant negotiations concerning
1 Knoop, IVillem de Derde, i. , p. 79.
362 History of the Dutch People
the flag question, in which the old dissensions were raked
up again and the States refused to comply with the Eng-
lish demands. The sending of the quarrelsome Downing
in December as ambassador to the States opened at last
De Witt's eyes to the danger from the English side,
though he hoped to avert it through Parliament, which,
however, was dissolved in August,i67i, and not assembled
again during eighteen months, and through the feeling
of the nation itself against France.
The danger from the French side appeared more and
more unavoidable. In 1671, Louis XIV. complained bit-
terly of the attitude of the States, of their allowing the
publication of libels against him and his government, of
the hostile tone of the newspapers in the republic, of the
duties imposed on French goods in opposition to Col-
bert's protectionist measures in France. De Groot, though
personally well received, had no further illusions and
urged at The Hague vigorous preparation. After the
French attack on Lorraine, De Witt had recommended
equipments, but the States-General, relying upon the
Anglo-Swedish alliance, were with difficulty persuaded to
strengthen their naval force, while nothing was done for
the land force. Not until the spring of 1671 was it
resolved to fit out a fleet of thirty-six large vessels and a
number of smaller ones, preparations likewise being made
to increase the army by new levies in consequence of the
gathering of the French troops on the northern frontier
and the appearance of the king himself with an army in
Flanders. De Witt seems to have contemplated the pos-
sibility of spoiling the French plans by an attack from the
Dutch side. He did not yet despair of a reconciliation
with France and thought of using his friendship with
d' Estrades who was just then in Dunkirk and might
come to The Hague. But it quickly appeared that this
could not be and that the States must arm, especially
when Louis had no other representative at The Hague
Summit of the Republic's Power 363
than an agent. De Groot now asked for his recall but
remained in Paris at the request of the States which still
expected something from his embassy.1 He had the
arduous task of defending in Paris the Dutch policy of
commercial war and peaceful assurances at the same
time, of listening to the French complaints and of an-
swering with counter-complaints. On the 1st of Decem-
ber the States addressed a solemn missive to the king to
defend their conduct towards him and to justify their
equipments on land and sea. De Groot was to deliver
this in an audience and to accompany it with oral expla-
nations. He did not get an opportunity to do so until
January 4, 1672, but the king received the letter "with
a look of indignation" and replied in threatening terms
both orally and in writing, declaring he would go on
with his preparations for war and had to give account of
them to nobody.8 All that remained possible was the
adoption of "timely and vigorous resolutions" for war,
but De Groot was left in Paris until the end of March,
when he took leave of the French court in appropriate
words and with an assertion of the good will of the States.
He had no sooner departed than Louis XIV. declared
war upon the republic (April 6, 1672), making his reasons
known to the world in a violent manifesto. The device
cvexi sed discntiam, which he had placed on a medal struck
for this occasion, testified to his purpose to destroy the
ungrateful republic, once rescued by France in the great
Spanish war from the dominion of mighty Spain.
Charles II. had preceded him by several days. Not-
withstanding the opinion of his people strongly preju-
diced against France, he had long been drifting towards
war. Downing demanded, in lofty tone, satisfaction for
1 Lefevre Pontalis, ii., p. 121. See Combes in Melanges historiques, i.,
p. 365, where is a letter from De Witt to Pomponne, dated September 25,
1671, with hope of a restoration of " the same confidence that the two
nations formerly judged to be necessary to them."
8 The two letters are in Mignet, iii., pp. 657 and 660.
364 History of the Dutch People
the insults to England, laid claim to the Dominium Maris
in the widest sense and to the recognition of it by the
States in the striking of the flag on every sea, even
though it might be to but a single English ship of war.
Everything possible was done to content him, and the
demand regarding the flag was complied with as a " sign
of deference " to the ally, not as a proof of giving up the
free navigation. But nothing availed. Downing declared
haughtily that the offer came too late, gave up his pass-
port, and went to England. The ambassador in London,
Boreel, supported in March by Meerman as ambassador
extraordinary, endeavoured still to avert the storm, misled
as he was concerning Charles II. 's real policy, but March
28th war was declared on the republic in a manifesto
similar to that of Louis. Some days earlier, after a com-
munication to Meerman, that England would attack Dutch
ships, Sir Robert Holmes had assailed the Smyrna fleet
sailing unsuspectingly by the Isle of Wight but had been
able to capture only a few vessels in consequence of the
valiant resistance of the small convoy.
England and France had preceded, Miinster and Co-
logne followed, with like manifestoes. Miinster's was
actually based on the old grievances, now however re-
placed by smaller ones of recent date and by general
complaints of the bribery of its officials, of plots against
the bishop's life, and of the sending of spies. Cologne
was offended because Rijnberk was not given back and
because the city of Cologne was supported against its
authority, old wrongs brought forward again during the
difficulties between the city and the elector about 1670.
The destruction of the republic, so these neighbours pro-
claimed, would end all this injustice. The lavish promises
of French help and money, the desire to promote the
Catholic faith by the ruin of the heretical republic, the
secret intrigues, at the Cologne court, of the Fiirstenberg
brothers entirely won over to France — all urged these
Summit of the Republic's Power 365
princes to energetic cooperation. The alliance of Cologne,
whose elector, Maximilian Henry of Bavaria, was also
bishop of Liege, had great value to France, because
the French army secured across his Liege territory a road
to the republic outside of Spanish lands, the neutrality of
which did not have to be violated.1 It was thought that
the weakness of the eastern frontier of the States would
speedily put the eastern provinces in the hands of Miinster
and Cologne.
1 Huisman, Maximilien Henri de Baviere (Bruxelles, 1899), p. 84.
CHAPTER XIV
DE WITT S FALL
WHAT had the republic, menaced on all sides, to
oppose to its enemies? Relying upon the Triple
Alliance and upon the aid of the Swedish army in case
the Spanish Netherlands were again attacked, and eager
to economise, the States-General immediately after the
peace of Aix-la-Chapelle ' had reduced their army con-
siderably and had sent over 40,000 men home, so that
only 33,000 men were left, Holland paying for about half
of them. What remained was certainly not the best part.
The officers were mostly inexperienced young men from
the governing class, and regarded their posts chiefly as a
means of making money easily ; supreme guidance was
lacking; and financial abuses abounded. The picture of
the Dutch army unrolled by the Memoir es of the count de
Guiche is far from brilliant : the avarice and incompetence
of the officers were equalled by the greediness and ig-
norance of the soldiers ; little discipline was to be seen ;
the magazines were empty, the fortifications neglected,
the ramparts planted with trees, the moats dried up ; the
militia had run down, and the drills of the citizens in
their armouries had degenerated into banquets, where the
officers outdid one another in fine apparel. " It seems
that we no longer understand war," wrote Colonel Bamp-
field in April, 1672, to De Witt, and another time he said
1 Lefevre Pontalis, ii., p. 185.
366
De Witt's Fall 367
that the Dutch officers ought to camp out for three
months to learn what was required in time of war.
De Witt quickly comprehended the danger. At the
first rumours of the French preparations, in October, 1669,
he urged a reenforcement of army and navy, the former
by 50,000 men, and the appointment of expert foreign
officers, but not until a year later was the increase adopted
with a tenth of what De Witt desired. He ceased not to
call for vigorous measures, by which he hoped to have
finally 100,000 men in readiness. To simplify the pay-
ment he wished the maritime provinces to care for the
fleet and the land provinces for the army. But the un-
willingness to spend much money and domestic dissension,
the difficulty of inducing most of the provinces to pay
their arrears to Holland and the admiralties, and the
opposition of Zealand long worked against any organisa-
tion, so that it was the spring of 1671 before the necessary
money was granted. The fleet, which had been at sea in
167 1, was dismantled for the winter, and the army re-
mained in the garrisons. De Witt, now alarmed by the
attitude of France and England both, proposed the fitting
out of 120 vessels and a new enlistment of 20,000 men,
but the Estates, slow as always and, so far as Zealand was
concerned at least, little inclined to cooperate with the
leaders of the ruling party, did not consent immediately,
and when they at last took the matter in hand the pro-
posal was cut down considerably. Great troubles arose
over the payment of all these extraordinary armaments,
which much exceeded the ordinary war budget of less
than 4^ million guilders. The bad financial condition
of several provinces brought everything down upon over-
burdened Holland, which groaned under a debt of 125
millions, and was unable to meet its obligations in spite
of De Witt's admirable financial management. De Witt's
attempts to impose new taxes failed owing to the op-
position of commerce. Loans were thus the only means
368 History of the Dutch People
of raising money, and availing himself of his studies of
probabilities and of his calculations of the average dura-
tion of life De Witt, with the aid of the Amsterdam
regent Jan Hudde, explained in a detailed report the
advantages of the issue of life annuities by the state over
ordinary loans. But the Estates of Holland were not
convinced by the council pensionary's representations,
and several ordinary loans were concluded in 167 1 and
1672, so that the province's debt bore n millions of
interest a year, representing a capital of about 240 million
guilders. This increase was met in part by taxes on
carriages and beer, in part by a reduction of interest.
De Witt proposed a reduction from 4 to 3^ per cent.,
but it was resolved to limit it to 3^ per cent., while the
deficiency was made up from the reserve fund which he
had formed in 1655. But the necessary money was not
thus accumulated, and Holland in the spring of 1672 at
the approach of war was obliged to raise a 200th penny
of all property, a few weeks later doubled and tripled and
accompanied by a land and poll tax, finally by a forced
loan with interest of from 2 to 4 per cent.
So money was at last obtained for the war. The navy
in May, 1672, was brought up to more than 130 ships, the
army, on paper at least, to about 52,000 men. De Witt
was by no means satisfied with the latter figure and, with
great difficulty, secured new reinforcements which would
increase the army to 80,000 men, and 20,000 militia were
to be called out besides bands of armed peasants to throw
up earthworks. The 100,000 men and more, deemed
necessary by the council pensionary, would thus be
assembled. In reality, however, not over 50,000 to 60,000
men were under arms at the outbreak of the war.1 He
urged rapidity in collecting the troops authorised, which
were to come largely from Switzerland, Sweden, Den-
mark, and the German countries. But all did not go as it
1 Knoop, Willem de Derde, i., p. 85.
De Witt's Fall 369
should. It was too late to put the army, neglected for
years and according to De Witt's system cut up between
seven provinces, at one stroke into a condition to meet a
formidable enemy. Furthermore, magistrates and people
lacked enthusiasm, the conviction that the fight was for
the fatherland and not for the preservation of a certain
government ; there was a want of the courage and desire
to defend themselves and to exchange tranquil enjoyment
and prosperity for privation and sacrifice. Men came
from the cities in quite large numbers, but the peasants
refused to take up arms ; the States showed irresolution
and slowness ; and De Groot in February exclaimed in-
dignantly— "is it possible that the descendants of a nation,
which laid the foundations of our freedom, so feebly
defend what their forefathers obtained with so much
glory?"1 Much had to occur to revive the heroic spirit.
The question of the command of the army was con-
nected with that of the prince of Orange and occasioned
great difficulties. The prince was now a member of the
council of state, and the youth of barely twenty took his
seat in it. He was already becoming a political personage
of importance, and De Witt had cherished some hope of
a good understanding with England at the time of the
prince's journey there in the autumn of 1670; it was even
contemplated to intrust a sort of mission to him with
Van Beuningen, but the project was given up at De
Witt's suggestion. The swiftly approaching danger of
war directed attention to the heir of the military traditions
of the famous family, however young and inexperienced
he might be. But the Harmony provided that he was not
to be proposed as captain-general before his twenty-second
year, and he would not attain that age until November, 1672.
A year earlier, however, Gelderland desired to designate
him for that office, and one province after another ex-
pressed the same wish in spite of the stipulations of the
1Wicquefort, iv., p. 354. See Lefevre Pontalis, ii., p. 232.
VOL. IV. — 24.
37° History of the Dutch People
Harmony. Even Holland wavered. In the Estates of
Holland Enkhuizen made the proposition in December,
167 1, and it was supported by the nobility, so that it cost
De Witt the most strenuous exertion to resist the appoint-
ment with the small majority following him. He was
obliged to allow the drawing up of instructions for the
captain-general to be elected. The first step was thus
taken, though Perpetual Edict and Harmony continued
in name to exist and the proposed captain-general was
bound to them, while his authority was restricted so that
it would be entirely under control of the States and of
their representatives. After these precautions De Witt,
yielding to the popular wish, consented finally to the
prince's appointment for one campaign. The desired
appointment for life could then be considered in Novem-
ber. But this concession was regarded in the States-
General as insufficient by the other provinces, and the
young prince of Orange, instigated by Fagel, declared his
unwillingness to accept the office on such conditions,
while the two field marshals, John Maurice and Wurtz,
ranged themselves on his side. De Witt saw the necessity
of giving way still further, and on consultation with Fagel
and Beverningh an agreement was reached at the end of
February, first in the Estates of Holland, then in the
States-General, conferring the office of captain-general
upon the prince for one campaign under limitations but
with more liberal instructions, which were to become
definitive in November. On the 25th the prince was in-
vested with the office amid the exultation of the people
after a speech in the States-General, and a banquet offered
by the new captain-general closed the long negotiations.
Deputies for the field were named, among whom were
Cornelius de Witt and Beverningh for Holland, the latter
showing himself more and more a partisan of Orange.
The chief officers were appointed — the two aged field
marshals, the rhinegrave of Salm as commander of the
De Witt's Fall 371
cavalry, the lord of Zuylesteyn as commander of the
infantry, other moderately able officers as generals under
them : Van Welderen and Nassau-Saarbriick with
Montbas, De Groot's brother-in-law, as commissary gen-
eral for the cavalry, the Swede Konigsmark and the fiery
Hans Willem van Aylva for the infantry, with the Scotch-
man Kirkpatrick and Van Styrum as sergeant-majors and
the Frenchman Pain-et-Vin as quartermaster general,
the count of Hoorn for the artillery. The army thus
organised was collected on the Yssel after the detach-
ment of a large number of garrisons to fortresses and forts,
so that hardly 20,000 men remained under the command
of an inexperienced youth, supported by old or incompe-
tent subordinate commanders. Garrisons and forts were
in poor condition. Trees on the ramparts were hastily
cut down, gardens destroyed, houses in the firing zone
demolished, rusted cannon brought out from the maga-
zines, powder and ball scraped together, inundations
prepared. What had been neglected for twenty-five years
could not be restored in a moment. The results of DeWitt's
system, springing from fear of the military power of the
Oranges, made themselves felt in the shape of general
military helplessness.
In a much better condition was the fleet which had been
at sea in the summer of 167 1 and was kept in good order
by De Ruyter with Banckers, Van Nes, and Van Ghent.
But its equipment had suffered under De Witt's idea that
the war would be against France only. When it appeared
that England must again be fought, it was resolved in
March to bring the fleet up to 120 ships with nearly 30,000
men. The closing of navigation to the Baltic, to the Eng-
lish and French coasts, and through the Channel, the pro-
hibition of the exportation of munitions of war enabled
the admiralties to fit out vessels speedily. A commis-
sion,1 of which John de Witt was once more the soul,
1 De Jonge, ii., p. 261.
372 History of the Dutch People
took from the States-General the care of the navy and
urged the admiralties to haste, but only Amsterdam and
the Meuse did their full duty. It was the middle of May
before the fleet was ready to sail out, which delay, to the
disappointment of De Witt, prevented an attack upon
the English fleet before its junction with the French. As
in the second English war the fleet was quite equal to
its task, and De Ruyter, commanding it as lieutenant
admiral, had no need of the young prince, whom the
Orange party had at first destined also for the dignity of
admiral-general. As in 1667 Cornelius de Witt embarked
as the plenipotentiary of the States-General.
Thus stood the means of defence on land and sea in the
spring of 1672. The enemy hoped that other circum-
stances would weaken the efforts to repulse him. First and
foremost of these circumstances was the discord among the
people. The threatening danger had turned the eyes of
the people with more love than ever upon the prince of
Orange. Though he was now captain-general for one
campaign, the manner in which his elevation to this post
had been wrested as it were from the party of the States
had augmented the feeling against the party and its
leaders. If defeats ensued, internal commotions would
not be absent and the existing government would almost
certainly be overturned, while the young prince, inex-
perienced as he was, would not be able to combine the re-
organisation of the government with the command of the
army in a war with a victorious foe. Then the republic,
torn within itself and assailed by a superior force, would
fall an easy prey into the conqueror's hands — a calculation
which failed at last, although for a time it seemed likely
to be realised. The enemy attacking on the east side
counted upon another cause of dissension, upon the dis-
satisfaction of the Catholics there so numerous with their
condition under the government of the States. He was
deceived in his expectations, but there are traces of the
De Witt's Fall 373
action of this cause in the defeats suffered. After the
peace of Miinster the condition of the Catholics in the re-
public was little changed, although there was no longer
any fear of secret relations with Spain and the Brussels
government. Public worship continued to be prohibited
for the Catholics, but, as before, worship in private was
secured by money paid to the officials. And this privacy
was public, while the Catholics themselves did not com-
plain much of the state of affairs, knowing well that they
were quite otherwise persecuted elsewhere in Protestant
countries and that the Protestants in Catholic countries
were in an infinitely worse condition, so that they had only
to rejoice at the fact that the States gave no attention to
the repeated exhortations of preachers and church coun-
cils to wreak vengeance on them for the violence done
elsewhere to the Protestants. The apostolic vicar Jaco-
bus de la Torre (1651-1661) complained in his Relatio of
1656 to the papal see about his diocese, but his second
successor, Johannes van Neercassel (1663-1686), was
more ready to submit to actual conditions.1 Under the
government of De Witt, who regarded it to the interest
of the republic to allow different religious beliefs to
live in peace, provided they respected the laws of the
state, there was much less reason to complain, and Neer-
cassel's relation of 1668 praises the freedom enjoyed in
Holland, where the building of churches, divine worship, re-
ligious instruction were connived at. Foreign Catholics
of the time testify to the same effect.
In the other provinces, except in Friesland where op-
pression was reported, the situation was about the same as
in Holland, even in Utrecht, whose capital was inhabited by
the violent Voetius, while in Groningen, Drenthe, and
Zealand the small number of Catholics constantly dimin-
ished under the now and then sharp persecution. Most
1 Knuttel, De toestand der Katholieken onder de Republiek, i., pp. 227,
287.
374 History of the Dutch People
of the Catholics lived in the cities of Holland, in Amster-
dam alone 30,000, and in the country of Utrecht and Over-
yssel. In the generality lands, with the majority of the
population Catholic, placards were issued and annoying
measures adopted, but they failed to attain their object.
Under Neercassel's moderate rule the Catholic church
flourished, so that his clergy showed slight inclination to
take part in movements hostile to the States. Besides
about 300 priests and chaplains there were over a hundred
members of religious orders active here, mostly Jesuits.
The old jealousy between them and the secular clergy still
existed, and the Jesuits sought to throw off the supervis-
ion of the vicars. Neercassel went to Rome ini670 to com-
plain of the attitude of the Jesuits and of the brothers of
the orders in general, and his authority was confirmed.
Outside of the ardent champions of the Catholic faith
there were naturally many people who, without wishing
for the victory of the Catholic enemy, would in case of
such a victory be speedily ready to make friends with their
fellow-believers and to submit to their sway. But it was
to be an exception for them to take up arms against the
government of the country, to serve its enemies, or to com-
mit treason by supporting them. It is clear, however, that
under these circumstances the Protestants watched their
Catholic fellow-citizens with suspicion and in the eastern
provinces especially an uncomfortable feeling prevented
their vigorous defence.
Thus the war began.2 The enemy's plan was to avoid
the fortresses of the generality lands, because they could
only be attacked after crossing a w'de Spanish territory
and taking Spanish forts in Brabant and Flanders, while
1 The total number of Catholics is estimated by Neercassel at 400,000,
outside of the generality lands, so that the number of Catholics may safely
be placed at half a million, about one-third of the population of that
time.
2 See Rousset, Histoire de Louvois, i. ; Sypesteyn and De Bordes, De
verdediging van Nederland in i6j2 en i6jj; Knoop, Willem de Derde.
De Witt's Fall 375
then the large rivers would still be in the front. It
seemed better to follow Alva's route of a hundred years
earlier, to make Charleroi the base of operations, to go
through Liege and a small section of Spanish territory
into Cologne, masking Maestricht with a sufficient num-
ber of troops, then to cross the Yssel or the Rhine and to
penetrate quickly to the heart of Holland, while the
German allies were conquering the east and north and
the united fleets were blockading the coasts, possibly
landing troops here and there in Holland. The eight or
nine thousand men in Maestricht would then be isolated,
the army on the Yssel be compelled to retreat on penalty
of being cut off, and the small garrisons be either over-
whelmed or held in check.
Late in April Louis XIV. left his palace, and before
the middle of May his troops moved northwards from
Charleroi and Sedan. Turenne and Chamilly went with
the main army along the Meuse to Vise, where the former
crossed the river on the 24th and directed his course
towards Burik ; Chamilly surrounded Maestricht with a
number of strong posts ; Cond6 marched from Liege
through Cologne territory to Kaiserswerth, where he
crossed the Rhine in the direction of the Lippe. At the
beginning of June, Turenne lay before Burik, Louis him-
self before Rijnberk and Orsoy, Conde before Wesel, all
ready to commence the attack upon those " bulwarks of
the state." De Witt had hoped to anticipate the enemy
by securing possession of Cologne or Neuss before the
French auxiliary troops arrived there. Towards the end
of April, John Maurice, with cavalry and infantry, marched
rapidly in that direction, but he came too late and had to
return to the fortresses of Cleves. Those bulwarks ap-
peared now quite unworthy of the name : they fell like
card houses, badly garrisoned, miserably armed, and
weakly defended as they were. Thus fell Rees and Em-
merich, afterwards Doetinchem and Grol, and the country
376 History of the Dutch People
lay open to the Yssel. The line of the Yssel from Arn-
hem to Deventer offered few chances of better success, as
it could be easily flanked on the north and south. The
enemy moved up from Wesel with his whole force, in
order to attack the line in front, according to Condi's
plan, or, adopting that of the more prudent Turenne, to
force the Rhine at Nimwegen, and thus to turn Prince
William's right flank. The latter was resolved upon, and
on June ioth the French main army came to the Rhine
at Elten, opposite the Tolhuis (Toll-house), where some
troops under Montbas were stationed. Montbas, com-
manding only a few thousand men, asked for reinforce-
ments, but received them not at all or too late, left his
position, and fell back to the main line. An attempt was
made to repair this fault — Montbas was accused of treason,
probably quite unjustly — and infantry and cavalry were
sent again to the Tolhuis, where perhaps a few thousand
men under Wurtz were posted. This small force was in-
sufficient to dispute the enemy's passage, and the crossing
was effected on the 12th under the guidance of De Guiche
and Conde himself. Wurtz was driven back by the
superior force and fled with the cavalry, while his in-
fantry, on the point of surrendering, through a misunder-
standing took up arms again, and after a bloody fight, in
which many French officers fell and Conde himself was
wounded, was destroyed or captured, as was also Aylva's
regiment, hastening to the scene from Nimwegen. This
was the affair that is exaggerated by Louis's courtiers
and later historians to a deed of high renown, but in
reality is of slight significance from a military point of
view.
The French main army now marched towards Doesburg,
while Cond£ planned with all the cavalry to move through
the Betuwe and Utrecht directly upon Amsterdam and
Turenne appeared at Arnhem. The Dutch army on
the Yssel was in danger of being cut off and retreated to
De Witt's Fall 377
Utrecht, where it arrived about the 15th. Condi's plan
was given up on account of his wound and would have
been difficult to execute. The prince's army, diminished
to about 8000 men after the detachment of garrisons to
the Yssel and Rhine cities, stood before Utrecht, which
immediately shut its gates from fear of being exposed to
a siege and of seeing its suburbs burned. It demanded,
nevertheless, a vigorous defence from the prince, but after
negotiation and the positive refusal of Utrecht to allow
its suburbs to be burned the army left this position on the
18th by order of the States-General and fell back to the
frontier of Holland, the famous old water line of Holland.
Gelderland and Utrecht were thus given up within a
month after the enemy had appeared on the border. In
those provinces, outside of the great fortresses on the
Rhine and Yssel, there was nothing to resist the enemy,
who with 4000 cavalry occupied the chief places, on the
2 1st Utrecht, and even penetrated to Naarden, Leerdam,
and Asperen. Muiden also was almost taken, important
on account of its nearness to the sluices in the Vecht, but
Count John Maurice put a garrison there in time.
Meanwhile Overyssel had fallen into the hands of the
Miinster and Cologne forces, which, with the help of a
French corps under Luxembourg, captured the smaller
fortified places and then attacked Deventer and Zwolle.
The former, heavily bombarded, capitulated after a few
days, and Zwolle and Kampen surrendered in a like cow-
ardly manner. It quickly appeared that bribery and trea-
son had here played a great part ; the secretary of the
Estates, many noblemen of Overyssel, many regents seem
to have formed a plot for delivering the province up to the
enemy. Early in July it was shamefully given over
by treaty to Miinster, which through an agreement with
Louis XIV. and Cologne was assured of the undisturbed
possession of the conquered province with Grol, Brede-
voort, Borculoo, and whatever should be taken in Fries-
378 History of the Dutch People
land and Groningen. Deventer alone went to Cologne,
Kampen to Louis who reserved for himself all Gelderland
and Utrecht. Across Drenthe, guarded by Steenwijk and
Coevorden, the garrisons rescued by such faithful officers
as the colonels Bampfield and Ripperda retreated to Fries-
land and Groningen.1 Three provinces lost and the enemy
on the frontiers of Holland, Friesland, and Groningen —
such were the results of the war on land in the first month.
It went better on the sea. Here too the republic en-
countered a superior force. The English and French fleets
numbered together 172 ships with 5<X)Ogunsand 33,000 men,
while the republic possessed 133 ships with 4500 guns and
26,000 men. York and Montague commanded the English
fleet, d'Estr^es and Duquesne the French; the Dutch fleet
was again under De Ruyterwith Van Ghent and Banckers
as subordinate commanders. On the sea De Witt had
wished to anticipate the enemy by an attack upon Brest
and La Rochelle, and by landing on the French coast,
but the English declaration of war had spoiled this plan.
A new expedition to the Thames was now considered for
the purpose of destroying the vessels there fitting out.
But these plans failed in consequence of the delay of Zea-
land's squadron and contrary winds. The two hostile
fleets were able to unite at Portsmouth. De Witt urged
such an enterprise upon De Ruyter and his brother, the
plenipotentiary of the States on the fleet, and Van Ghent
with a squadron of light vessels actually sailed into the
Thames again, but he met with such resistance at Sheer-
ness that he had to turn back. Nothing now remained
but a battle on the open sea, and full of hope the intrepid
leaders resolved to venture this. They sought and found
the enemy on June 7th at Solebay, on the eastern coast of
England. Deeply convinced of the great importance of
a victory, De Ruyter before the engagement summoned
1 Der Kinderen, De Nederlandsche Republiek en Munster i666-i6jq
(Leiden, 1S74), p. 175; Lefevre Pontalis, ii., p. 327.
De Witt's Fall 379
his captains on board his ship, the Seven Provinces, and
earnestly addressed them. The battle was chiefly between
the Dutch and English fleets, as the French took little
part in the fight. York, attacked by De Ruyter him-
self, was repeatedly compelled to change his ship ; Mon-
tague, hard pushed by Van Brakel with a much smaller
vessel, found death in the waves ; the French were made
to retreat by Banckers. The English fleet suffered se-
verely and lost several ships. But there were heavy
losses also on the Dutch side ; Van Ghent perished,
and the dead and wounded were numerous. The Hol-
landers fought like lions. De Ruyter was everywhere
and everything : admiral, captain, steersman, sailor, soldier,
all at once. De Witt stood with calm courage among
his bodyguard of twelve halberdiers in the most danger-
ous place; Van Nes, Banckers, De Liefde, Sweers, Den
Haen, surpassed one another in valour. Although greater
advantages were won by the Dutch side, the victory
remained doubtful, but on the following day the enemy
declined battle and the Dutch fleet alone kept the sea,
returning afterwards to the ports in order to repair
damages. The danger of a landing from the combined
fleets was averted. Of what help was this naval suc-
cess in the hard trials of the war on land ? The States-
General resolved to reduce the fleet considerably, no less
than one-third of the ships being unrigged, and to use
some of the sailors and marines in the land war. Cor-
nelius de Witt returned home sick with rheumatism and
gout. De Ruyter continued in command of the sixty large
ships, which were retained in service, but from now on
had to be content with a more modest task than that of
meeting the enemy on the open sea.
The French were meanwhile masters in Utrecht and
Gelderland. Arnhem surrendered without a blow, the
fort Knodsenburg after a short defence, Schenkenschans
without any resistance, Doesburg after a weak opposition,
380 History of the Dutch People
Zutphen after defending itself four days. More than
twenty-five towns and forts were taken in that month by
the French army. The king himself received at Doesburg
the deputation from the Estates of Utrecht, which came
to deliver the entire province to him, and established him-
self in the castle of the lord of Odyk at Zeist, while he
made a brilliant entry into Utrecht surrounded by his
nobles and the best divisions of his army. Luxembourg
was given the chief command in Utrecht. The king re-
mained at Zeist to examine the offers expected from the
States-General. Those offers were not long absent. A
great panic prevailed in Holland after the disastrous de-
feats. Confidence was slight in the defence of Holland's
water line which extended from Muiden to Gorkum. The
army occupying this line contained scarcely 10,000 men,
and the 1600 Spanish cavalry, sent at the eleventh hour
by the count de Monterey without an actual declaration
of war on France, were of great help. Muiden under
John Maurice, Schoonhoven under Louvignies with the
Spaniards, Gouda under Hoorne, Gorkum under Wurtz
were the main points of defence with the prince's head-
quarters at Nieuwerbrug, where he had 3600 men under
Zuylesteyn. Want of stores and discipline, antiquated
cannon, indefensible walls and retrenchments, distrust of
the leaders' capacity — all combined to justify the fear that
this last line also would give way at the first attack. With
all that, the position behind the water line seemed so
strong that Louis XIV. hesitated to assail it.
This water line, put at the last moment by the Estates
of Holland, at De Witt's entreaty, between that province
and the enemy, appeared for a time to give safety. In the
middle of June Amsterdam consented to let the water
overflow the land in order to repel the invasion, and soon
the fertile country and fine villas lay buried under the
brackish water of river and sea. In some districts, par-
ticularly around Woerden and Gouda, the peasants were
De Witt's Fall 381
with difficulty brought to this sacrifice ; here and there
force had to be used and the sluices were strongly guarded
to prevent them from being secretly closed. By vigorous
measures the prince overcame all opposition, and the
enemy was checked. But the panic within the line was
none the less. "Everybody stood stunned and dumb;
everybody found his house too small and fearsome and
betook himself to the street, where he encountered for his
consolation nothing but lamentation and misery ; every-
body hung his head like a reed ; everybody seemed to
have received his sentence of death; the trades were at a
stand ; the shops were shut ; the courts were closed ; col-
leges and schools took a vacation ; the churches, on the
other hand, were too small for the troubled hearts that
groaned with anguish more than they could pray." '
People hid their valuables and shipped wife and child to
neighbouring countries. The confusion grew worse as
time went on. Disorder and defection were feared among
the Romanists, who sometimes assisted the enemy in the
provinces already conquered. Treason and cowardice
were dreaded on all sides. " The government was with-
out counsel, the people without reason, the country
without rescue." The government securities suddenly
dropped far below their value. A forced loan of uncoined
gold and silver furnished money temporarily, but coin
became ever scarcer. Holland's securities fell quickly
from above par to 30 per cent., those of the East India
Company from 572 to 250. There was a run upon the
Amsterdam bank to withdraw deposits. In July the
state's obligations were quite unsalable.
Under such conditions negotiation with the enemy was
the only salvation, though it might occur merely to win
time and perhaps to find alliances: with Sweden, Den-
mark, Brandenburg, Spain, the emperor, or even England.
The chances for such connections were not entirely
1 Valckenier, '( Verwerde Europa, iii., p. 636.
3§ 2 History of the Dutch People
lost. From Sweden and Denmark little appeared to be
expected, but weak Spain was ready to help, although it
did not venture upon open war with France. More
important was it that the mortal enemy of French pol-
icy in Europe, Lisola, now imperial ambassador at The
Hague, convinced the Vienna court of the dangers threat-
ening the house of Hapsburg from the side of France
and induced the elector of Brandenburg also to maintain
his alliance with the States. Before the end of the
month the certainty was acquired that the emperor and
Brandenburg would soon appear with an army to uphold
the peace of Miinster and to guard the German empire
against losses. On the 13th of June, after the passage at
the Tolhuis, De Witt with an eye to Lisola's diplomatic
activity had proposed to Fagel negotiation with France
and England. First Holland, then the poorly attended
assembly of the States-General, was persuaded to send
two embassies, to Charles II. and to Louis XIV. Van
Weede van Dijkveld and Cornelis Teresteyn van Hale-
wijn, both excellent diplomatists, betook themselves to
England, but the ambassador Boreel still there had to
report that Charles II. would not negotiate without
France. To the house at Keppel near Doesburg, where
Louis remained, went a deputation, headed by Jan van
Ghent and Pieter de Groot and consisting besides of
Eck for Groningen and the prince's cousin Odijk. They
were haughtily repulsed on the 22nd by Pomponne and
Louvois, and De Groot returned immediately to The
Hague for further instructions or for the full powers
which the king had demanded for the negotiators.
At The Hague he found the States under the impres-
sion of an important event, the attempt on the life of
De Witt, against whom the most violent reproaches were
heard after the first defeats. Late in the evening of the
2 1st he was returning from his work, doubly arduous in
these days, with his servant and his clerk along the
De Witt's Fall 383
Vijverberg to his home on the Kneuterdijk, when he was
attacked by the brothers Van der Graeff, sons of the
councillor, and two accomplices and was dangerously
stabbed. One of the assassins, Jacob van der Graeff, was
caught and beheaded on the 29th ; the others escaped
... to the prince's camp.1 An assault on Cornelius de
Witt at Dordrecht a few days later testified again to the
popular hatred of the two brothers, who were regarded
not only as the personal enemies of the beloved prince
but as the artificers of the country's misfortune, and
whose fall seemed the first condition of rescue. That fall
was rapidly approaching, at least the overthrow of the
government, of which they and their friends were the
soul, but which had been unable to save the country
from the disasters now ravaging it.
De Witt in these circumstances was not in a condition to
rise from his bed, and his cousin Vivien had to lead the
Estates of Holland, when De Groot appeared on the 25th
with his message. Opinion favoured the continuation of
the negotiation, but Amsterdam declared its opposition,
unless the representatives made a tour to the towns to
learn their feelings in this important matter. De Groot
advised peace with an offer of Maestricht and the gener-
ality lands, besides payment of the costs of war. Am-
sterdam's deputies resisted firmly, and it was resolved,
after asking instructions, to meet again in the evening of
the 26th. Amsterdam and four other towns remained
absent, while Enkhuizen alone objected to the resolution
to sue for peace, urged by the pensionaries of Leyden
and Gouda, Burgersdyck and Van der Tocht, and adopted
by the members present, which resolution was at once
referred to the States-General. Here also it was weighed
in great haste and with waxing excitement. Zealand and
Friesland wanted first to hear from their Estates ; Utrecht
could not do so and abstained ; Overyssel desired peace
1 Lefevre Pontalis, ii., p. 395.
384 History of the Dutch People
on any terms ; Groningen was absent ; Gelderland and
Holland favoured giving the full powers. But the end
was not yet reached. The president Kann of Friesland
and the presidents of the two preceding weeks refused
to take the resolution ; finally Wassenaer van Duiven-
voorde in the name of Holland put himself in the presi-
dent's chair and accepted the resolution, which after
Fagel had declined was signed by his first clerk. Thus
by two votes and in a very informal way the full powers
were conferred, being limited only by the condition pro-
posed by De Groot himself that they should be valid
with maintenance and restoration of the sovereignty of
the States as they had existed before the war.1 So great
was the anxiety that De Groot was begged to hasten.
Even in the prince of Orange's camp the return of De
Groot was awaited with suspense, and both the princess
dowager and the prince himself sought to obtain from
the king a safeguard for their property. De Groot had
been unwilling to use the safeguard offered him for his
country house. Amsterdam's attitude in these days was
worthy of the great city's traditions in contrast with all
these evidences of cowardice and discouragement. The
municipal council voted unanimously on the 28th to pro-
test against the resolutions adopted by the States and to
arouse the other provinces to defence to the last drop of
blood. Valckenier and De Graeff, Hooft, Hasselaer, the
pensionary Hop, manfully opposed all efforts to save life
and property by humiliation, and the last named in the
meeting of the States reproached vehemently the other
cities for their pusillanimity and neglect of duty. But
De Groot was on the way.
During all this fermentation the revolution in Holland
and Zealand had progressed. On the day of the attack
upon John de Witt the first blow was given to his system
of government. The citizens of Veere acclaimed the
1 Lettres de De Groot a Wicquefort, ed. Kramer, p. 307.
De Witt's Fall 385
prince as stadtholder of Zealand, and the movement in
this province spread speedily from one town to another ;
the magistrates yielded to the popular wish which saw no
other salvation from the impending ruin but Orange.
News of negotiations with the enemy kindled a flame also
in Holland's towns. At Dordrecht, the bulwark of the
De Witts, a movement of the people arose on the 28th
against them and in favour of Orange. "Up with Orange!"
accompanied by "Down with the De Witts!" resounded
upon all the streets. The old council, menaced by the
populace, assembled and invited the prince to come over.
He arrived in the city on the following day, was received
in princely fashion, and after brief opposition by the
magistrates he was, at the demand of the people, declared
stadtholder by the government. But the Perpetual Edict
which he had sworn to ! Cornelius de Witt refused at
first to sign the document, even after the prince had been
solemnly absolved by two preachers from his oath to the
Edict, but he finally gave way to the supplications of his
wife, alarmed at the raging multitude without. Vivien
signed only " as pensionary," as the servant of the city's
regents. What happened in Dordrecht was repeated else-
where. The movement extended from one city to
another, and in a few days the case was decided. The
actual appointment by the States still remained, but what
could they do, especially while De Witt was prevented by
his wounds from appearing in the assembly ?
Just then De Groot returned with the intelligence that
Louis demanded part of Gelderland south of the Lek, for
Cologne Rijnberk with some territory, for Miinster the
greater portion of Overyssel, for England Delfzijl with
the environs ; for himself he would be satisfied with the
cession of a part of the generality lands, Crevecceur,
Bois-le-Duc, and Maestricht ; finally he asked for com-
plete freedom and equality for the Catholics, repeal of all
commercial regulations against France, an advantageous
VOT.. IV. — 25.
386 History of the Dutch People
treaty of commerce, 24 million francs for war expenses,
and the annual presentation by a deputation of a gold
medal in token of gratitude " for having preserved to the
United Provinces the independence which the kings his
predecessors had caused them to acquire." All the efforts
of the ambassadors to reduce these humiliating terms
secured nothing but a limitation of the frontier to the
Waal and a diminution of the war expenses to twenty
million francs. But these demands were much too high,
and on July 1st the ambassadors, not daring to use their
full powers, departed for The Hague, promising to come
back within five days. Those were trying days for the
Estates which still lacked De Witt's trained leadership.
From all sides came reports of tumults and declarations
in favour of Orange ; amid turbulence and war, while the
enemy lay on the border and nobody felt sure of the de-
fence, there must be deliberation concerning a change in
the system of government and concerning the hard con-
ditions of peace at the same time. A Rotterdam burgo-
master ventured to bring up the subject of the stadtholder-
ship; the delegates from Dordrecht alone declined to discuss
it, but the others were ready, and Burgersdyck of Leyden
proposed that the town councils should be consulted. A
postponement of two days was accepted, and all seemed
to depend upon Amsterdam, which under the influence of
Valckenier and Van Beuningen inclined to the abrogation
of the Edict. When the Estates met again on the 3d of
July, the affair was settled : repeal of the oath to the
Edict was granted and Amsterdam proposed the intro-
duction once more of the stadtholdership immediately
and without restriction. Hodie constat, hodie agatur.
Early in the morning of the 4th of July the resolution
went through for offering to the prince the stadtholder-
ship of Holland as his forefathers had possessed it with
the exception only of the appointment to municipal
offices. A stately deputation went to his camp to offer
De Witt's Fall 387
him the dignity, and after being relieved from his oath
the prince accepted it. Zealand had come to the same
resolution two days earlier. On the 8th the States-
General also appointed him captain- and admiral-general
of the Union. What a sudden change for the young
prince ! He received it with calm self-control and was
installed on the 9th without much ceremony, returning
then to the camp of Nieuwerbrug. His grandmother
saw the aim of her life accomplished and wished him the
patience and steadfastness of his renowned grandfather in
the troublous days awaiting him.
Amidst these events the demands of Louis were re-
ceived with vexation and exasperation. On motion of
Amsterdam, which declared for breaking off the negotia-
tion, Holland resolved to refer to the newly elected stadt-
holder, but he pronounced the terms unacceptable and
himself ready to defend Holland's frontiers, provided re-
enforcements were sent him. The French conditions were
then rejected unanimously, though it was desired to have
De Groot continue the negotiation. He asked for new
instructions, calling attention to the expiration of the
time fixed by him at Zeist. Van Beuningen, proposed as
his associate, refused to go and urged the continuation of
the war, as after the prince's elevation a favourable dispo-
sition of the English court and help from Brandenburg
and the emperor might be counted upon. Holland and
afterwards the States-General resolved not to stop the ne-
gotiation, notwithstanding the terms offered were rejected,
but De Groot declined to resume his task, and Van Ghent
now obtained alone the mission. This was equivalent to
breaking off the negotiation with France. That with Eng-
land had little more success. Halewijn and Dijkveld on
arriving there were treated almost like prisoners. But
meanwhile the prince himself,1 after discussing matters
privately with Sylvius who was passing through, had sent
1 See Fruin in Nijh. Bijdr. N. R., iii., p. 287.
388 History of the Dutch People
his trusted servant Van Reede van Schonauwen to Charles
II. to sound him as to the possibilities of peace. The
manner of the reception accorded to the English minis-
ters, Buckingham and Arlington, travelling through Hol-
land on their way to the French headquarters indicated
that much hope was beginning to be felt of England's
mediation. The two English lords visited the prince also
at Bodegraven and consented in his name to offer to Louis
Maestricht and the Rhine fortresses. But the English
government was not at all of a mind to help draw
the republic out of the fire so cheaply. On coming to
Louis XIV., now at Heeswijk, the English ambassadors
(July 16th) concluded a new treaty with him, which bound
the two monarchs closely to one another, and by which
England stipulated for itself Sluis, Walcheren, Cadzand,
Goeree, and Voorne, besides 25 million francs for war ex-
penses, an annual payment for the herring fishery, and
recognition of its pretensions respecting the flag. William
III. was then to become sovereign of the remaining por-
tion of the republic, after the subtraction of what France,
Miinster, and Cologne were to obtain.
The prince had been really disposed to concede pecu-
liarly favourable conditions to England, and Sylvius,having
again returned there, had received promises from him, by
which on his own authority he offered to the king, pro-
vided he would separate from France : recognition of the
demands concerning the flag, 100,000 francs a year for the
herring fishery, cession of Surinam, payment of four million
francs for war expenses, Sluis in pledge, sovereignty
over the seven provinces for the prince. Charles II., how-
ever, rejected these terms, and therewith ended for the
time — and fortunately — this negotiation.1 Arms were
to decide, now under the undaunted lead of the young
1 The letters exchanged in Costerus, Historisch verhael ofte deductie van
zaeken raekende het formerett van de republique in 1372 en van het gebeurde
in 1672 en 1673 (Leiden, 1736). See Schotel, in ATijh. Bijdr. N. R., iv.
P. 7.
De Witt's Fall 389
prince himself, who after this brief hesitation was deter-
mined to die in the last ditch rather than to purchase
peace with dishonour.
The course of affairs in Holland and Zealand had re-
moved the foundations of De Witt's system, but he was
still council pensionary and his friends were everywhere
in the government. During those July days in Holland
the agitation manifested itself in popular risings against
the adherents of the fallen system, and the prince took
no vigorous measures to repress the turbulence. By re-
quest of the States he exhorted to peace, but he refused
to punish the culprits, asserting that the leaders were in
too high places, and that he needed his soldiers on the
border. Evidently he wished the resignation of the chief
statesmen and considered popular agitation as the best
means of obtaining it. The publication of a letter to the
prince from Charles II., in which the latter threw the
whole blame of the war on the enemies of Orange,
poured oil into the fire of popular passion.1 Some facts
already indicated the fate awaiting the partisans of the
States. The severe punishment inflicted on Montbas, deg-
radation and ineligibility for any command, was changed
at the instance of the prince to imprisonment for fifteen
years, but even this penalty appeared insufficient and
Montbas's affair was again examined for the purpose of
condemning him to death. He only escaped the scaf-
fold by flight and sought safety with the enemy. His
fate and the disturbances of every day alarmed De Witt's
followers, and many of them prepared to fly. De Groot
fearing arrest withdrew to the Spanish Netherlands. A re-
port of De Witt's secret flight was spread, but the coun-
cil pensionary was too proud to save himself in that way
and remained quietly at home waiting for his complete
recovery, surrounded by his family and ready to face the
gathering storms, refraining from all opposition to the
1 Lefevre Pontalis, ii., p. 465.
39° History of the Dutch People
prince's growing authority, of which some of his friends
were really guilty. His opponents did not leave him
unmolested. Scandalous pamphlets accused him of im-
proper use of the secret funds, and he deemed it necessary
from his sick-bed to defend himself by disclosing his
private affairs, whereupon he was on July 23d exonerated
from all suspicion by a resolution of the Estates adopted
unanimously. But the prince himself answered with cool
evasion to the great statesman's request for help against
this accusation. It was a bad omen.
His brother Cornelius was the first victim of hatred.
The most shameful accusations were uttered against him
also, and calumny spoke of cowardice and incompetence,
treason and misuse of public money. In a riot at Dord-
recht, his portrait in the city hall was torn to pieces, and
the head was hung on the gallows. He was arrested sud-
denly on the 24th and taken to The Hague, where he
was imprisoned in the Kasteleinij.1 The proceedings
were in deep secrecy, and the council pensionary could
only with difficulty learn that upon the denunciation of
a certain barber, Tichelaer of Piershil, his brother was sus-
pected of complicity in a plot to assassinate the prince.
The barber was a man of ill-repute, and three years
earlier he had been prosecuted in the governor's name
for an attempt at rape, later for perjury and insults to his
judges. The governor was heard on the testimony of
this rogue who related that early in July the governor
had wanted to persuade him to assassinate the prince in
his camp. .In the very first examination he protested
earnestly and asserted that Tichelaer, on the contrary,
had desired to speak to him about an " important affair,"
which might save the country, and that he had been
unwilling to hear anything about it. Neither he nor his
brother felt uneasy over the result. The doubtful feat-
ure of the matter was that the governor without further
1 See Wijnne, Het proces van Cornells de Witt, in Geschiedenis, p. 230.
De Witt's Fall 391
investigation had taken the precaution to warn his wife,
and through her the secretary of the town, Muys van
Holy, through him one of the burgomasters and the
under-sheriff, while it would have been better to inform
the competent authority immediately of Tichelaer's dan-
gerous offer. This was, at the most, a blamable post-
ponement. The Dort deputies, knowing the hostile
disposition of the court towards the governor, who had
many enemies on account of his undeniable pride and
passion, found it necessary to ask the Estates to bring the
matter before a judge of Dordrecht and at least to have
Tichelaer arrested, which had been demanded also by
Jacob de Witt, the aged father of the accused. The
Estates did not venture to displease the prince by releas-
ing immediately the accused and appointed commis-
sioners to investigate. That the prince was ill-affected
towards the governor appeared from his wishing to let the
law take its course. The court imprisoned Tichelaer in
the Gevangenpoort, where the governor was also trans-
ferred, while all efforts to secure his release failed. The
council pensionary did his best to win advocates and to
collect legal opinions in his brother's favour. De Ruyter
declared there was not a word of truth in the accusations
concerning the governor's conduct on the fleet. On the
1st of August, after appearing in church the preceding
day to thank God for his recovery, the council pensionary
visited the prince. The interview was cool, and to De
Witt's offer of his resignation William III. replied with
indifference that De Witt must take it to the Estates.
On the 4th the council pensionary made his last appear-
ance in the Estates, understanding that he could no
longer find a place in the government under the new sys-
tem, and preferring to resign voluntarily rather than to
play an insignificant part or to be dismissed. He an-
nounced his purpose in an appropriate speech, in which
he alluded to his activity of nineteen years, his warnings,
392 History of the Dutch People
his exhortations to prepare for defence, the fateful course
of the war, which naturally had cast the blame for every-
thing on the government and especially on him, the
first servant of the state, who therefore now asked for
his release, expecting that the Estates, in accordance
with their thrice repeated promise, would grant him
the post of councillor in the High Council. The Estates
were willing to relieve him with a warm expression of
thanks in the name of the majority, while Amsterdam
and four other cities wished to give him simply the
release asked for ; they requested from him further a
report on the finances. But next day Haarlem moved
an investigation of his administration particularly with
regard to the prince's army and the secret funds. The
prince did not deny the desirability of this, but advised
he should be discharged merely without the beautiful
formulas of thanks. So it was done, and the excellent
man complained of being misunderstood by his people
who now hated him fiercely. Although the prince ap-
proved of his admission to the High Council, Zealand
managed to postpone it. But with all the complaints
De Witt was satisfied by the conclusion of the affair.
He rejoiced too soon. Five days later Fagel was elected
to his place with instructions corresponding in the main
to those of De Witt, while the latter's offices of keeper of
the great seal and governor of the fiefs went to a member
of the nobility. The prince had approved of the instruc-
tions and chosen Fagel from the list recommended to
him, including Van Beverningh, Van Beuningen, Bur-
gersdyck, and Van Niedeck.
Cornelius de Witt's case was meanwhile undecided, and
the accused awaited his fate calmly during several days,
reading and writing to his wife, whose anxiety about the
result of the trial was quieted by his brother. As no
change came, the governor began to grow uneasy and at
last to dispute the jurisdiction of his judges over him.
De Witt's Fall 393
The unfavourable disposition of some of them was not
improved by this. Some obscure and conflicting answers
of the governor, careless remarks of a political nature,
notwithstanding his further explanations and his convin-
cing attitude toward the accuser, gave the judges occasion
to sentence De Witt to the rack in order by a " sharper
examination " to bring the truth to light, as they said.
On the 17th of August, by four votes to two, he was
handed over to the executioner to be tortured. Horrible
misdeed of these conscienceless judges ! ' He was tor-
tured fearfully on the 19th, but no screwing and beating,
no stretching and bruising could break the steadfastness
of the innocent victim, and amid the most excruciating
pains he proclaimed his innocence to the judges according
to some with the words of Horace about the just and
persevering man, whose proud spirit the rage of his fellow-
citizens and the tyrant's menacing visage cannot stir,
according to others with expressions of faith in the
righteousness of God. But early on the following day
the judges, without using the word "guilty," pronounced
upon the innocent man the sentence of deposition from
all his offices and of banishment from the province — a
sentence justifying Burnet's observation that the purpose
was to remove him rather than to uphold the laws.2
And upon the same day the terrible tragedy was ended.*
The governor had asked his brother to come to him, and
the former council pensionary hesitated not an instant to
accept the invitation, although his family begged him to
stay at home, because frightful reports had been circulat-
ing of new plans for murder, and mobs had repeatedly
assembled before the prison, as the blinded populace
firmly believed in the governor's guilt and in the com-
1 De Bosch Kemper, Staatkundige geschiedenis van Nederland, p. 167.
2 History, ii., p. 491 ; Wijnne, p. 256.
8See Lefevre Pontalis, ii., p. 515 et seq.; Fruin, De schuld van Willem
III. en zijn vrienden aan den moord der gebroeders De Witt, in Gids, 1867, i. ,
p. 201; Wijnne, Geschiedenis, p. 258; Wagenaar, xiv. , p. 157.
394 History of the Dutch People
plicity of his brother, and hated both as enemies of the
prince, traitors, sellers of the country, as the causes of the
republic's great misfortune. He rode in his carriage, with
his clerks following, to the prison which was guarded by
two militiamen. The two brothers conversed, calm and
self-possessed as usual ; the governor wanted to appeal to
the High Council, but John advised against it as illegal
and useless. While they were talking, a turbulent multi-
tude was gathering before the prison. Tichelaer had been
liberated by the court on the same morning and, perhaps
at the instigation of one of the judges, Van Nierop, had
trumpeted around that the governor was only banished
and would thus escape the punishment he deserved. Agi-
tation displayed itself immediately in The Hague, and
people flocked to the Gevangenpoort, incited by the
wretch and his friends, by screaming women, soon also by
some sedate citizens. John's oldest clerk, sent out to
bring the sentence, had a narrow escape from the furious
crowd outside. The second clerk came to warn them
that the carnage was sent away, and the governor urged
his brother to go, but the guard held him back by force
amid threatening shouts of the populace. Returning to
his brother, John de Witt resigned himself to remaining.
The brothers might still have been rescued, if the deputy
councillors had done their duty. On their report of the
prevailing agitation the Estates called to their help the
three companies of cavalry in garrison at The Hague to
keep the peace under the supervision of the deputy
councillors, and to disperse the people, had the " most re-
liable " companies of militia assemble, and warned the
prince at Nieuwerbrug in order to avert a tumult. The
three companies under Count Tilly took a station near
the prison, but nothing was done towards scattering the
vicious rabble. The deputy councillors went no farther;
their president, Van Boetzelaer van Asperen, was an
ardent partisan of the prince and thought enough had
De Witt's Fall 395
been done ; the brothers seemed saved, but the crowd re-
mained and waited. Meanwhile the entire militia to the
number of about iooo men gathered in the neighbourhood
of the prison according to orders. They showed a dispo-
sition very unfavourable to the brothers and mixed with
the multitude ; some militiamen pushed into the prison to
be sure that both were still there ; others climbed with
muskets upon the nearest roofs to prevent their escape.
Tilly, though separated from the prison by the militia,
held the crowd in check merely by his presence, until a
generally believed report of a troop of plundering peasants
marching on The Hague from the Westland caused the
deputy councillors to resolve to send the cavalry to the
entrances of the city to repel this attack. Tilly refused
at first, but then obeyed a written order from Van Asperen
and went away with two of the companies. It was the
death sentence of the brothers.
The field was now clear for the leaders of the turbu-
lent throng, the goldsmith Verhoeff, the alderman Van
Bankhem, the physician Van Baelen, and other citizens,
in general persons unfavourably known. The frightened
government of The Hague attempted to bringto reason Ver-
hoeff, who played the chief part, but he declined to listen to
requests to preserve order and declared that he wished for
the death of the brothers. His company of militia pressed
up to the prison, and the door was shot through with
bullets. Verhoeff threatened to open it with hammers,
when the jailer yielded. It was just four o'clock. The
desperate band poured in and found the brothers calmly
together, Cornelius in bed, John sitting at the foot
of the bed and reading aloud from the Bible. The militia
officers, who had joined them some hours before and
now desired to defend them, were thrust aside, and amid
great clamour John was led off by Verhoeff, Cornelius
roughly thrown down the stairs, beaten on the way and
wounded with blows of clubs and stabs of pikes. The
396 History of the Dutch People
two brothers took each other's hands but were speedily-
separated and knocked down upon the street in the
midst of the loud cries of the furious mob. Cornelius
died first from heavy blows with clubs, and wounds in-
flicted with daggers and hatchets, then John who with
his mantle about his head ran into the ranks of Ver-
hoeff' s company and was first hit by a pistol shot fired
close to him and finished by clubs and musket shots.
At half-past four all was over and the madmen, drunk
with bloodshed, danced on the bodies which were finally
hung up by the feet to the lamp-post on the Groene
Zoodje, horribly mutilated, even cut to pieces by desper-
adoes desirous of a bloody relic. Until late in the even-
ing the rabble shrieked about the abused remains, and it
is whispered that even Cornelis Tromp came with pleas-
ure to look upon the scene of terror; it is certain that the
magistracy of The Hague, overcome with fright, gazed at
the horrible work from the windows of a neighbouring wine
shop, and it is not improbable that a preacher of The
Hague on the following day, a Sunday, praised the murder-
ers from his pulpit. Late in the evening Verhoeff cut the
hearts out of the corpses which were taken down towards
midnight by the faithful servant of the former council
pensionary and carried off to be buried in the New Church
before morning in the presence of a small company.
Thus died the two brothers who had loved their country
and cared for its interests, hie armis maximus, ille toga, as a
medal says with the portrait of both, though different
both of them being integer vitee, scelerisque parns, in truth
nobileparfratrum. The prince was absent and therefore
not responsible, but he did not punish the crime on ac-
count of the number and position of the guilty men !
What is worse, he rewarded the most shameless offenders
and consequently did not hesitate to assume the appear-
ance of approving their actions, even of complicity in
their crime. Tichelaer obtained a pension from the
De Witt's Fall 397
prince's purse and an under-sheriff's post. Van Bank-
hem became sheriff of The Hague and, in spite of all his
later misdeeds, he was protected for years by the prince
until finally, on account of the most disgraceful facts, he
was prosecuted and condemned to death, which sentence
remained unexecuted by reason of his death in prison.
Verhoeff, afterwards a suspected innkeeper and highway-
man, was recommended by Tromp for the enlistment of
volunteers under John Maurice.1 The stadtholder's hard
mind could never forget the humiliation of his youth ;
never would he deny those who had wished to serve
him in this way, although there can be no thought of any
actual complicity upon his part or that of his friends.
The " execrable deed," so characterised by Fagel, was
assuredly no less disapproved of by William III., but
political considerations induced him to let the matter
rest, to guard the doers from punishment, even to re-
ward them.
John de Witt thus fell with his system of govern-
ment, his fine career, which embraces a splendid period
of the Dutch people's existence, ended by one of the
most horrible murders mentioned in history. With indig-
nation the gentle philosopher Spinoza alluded to the
ultimi barbarorum in the letter sent to Leibnitz and announ-
cing the death of the great statesman and scholar who had
also been his benefactor. Christiaan Huygens, hearing of
the event, asked himself if the Epicureans had not been
right in their bitter saying : versari in reptiblica non est sapi-
entis. In the memory of the nation the 20th of August,
1672, is joined as a second "black day" to the 13th of
May, 1619, when another statesman fell a victim of
his system. With sadness the nation remembers the
fate of these two great statesmen, who came out from
its midst. But not sadness alone, gratitude also — fervent
gratitude — inspires it when thinking of what John of Old-
1 Wagenaar, xiv., p. 1S0.
39s History of the Dutch People
4
enbarnevelt and John de Witt were for it. Their names
it puts as those of "heroic and resolute" patriots with the
names of the great princes of Orange who led it in the
days of glory and humiliation. In its recollection it em-
braces the representatives of antagonistic forms of gov-
ernment with equal veneration for great gifts and self-
sacrificing love of country employed in the service of
the same fatherland.
d
CHAPTER XV
THE GREAT WAR
THE generation inhabiting the republic of the United
Netherlands after the peace of Munster was in
many respects of an extraordinary nature. The sons
of three generations, who had passed their days in war,
learned to look at life from the hard side. Little heed
was given to ordinary Christian morality by the inborn
commercial spirit, developed by the fine situation of the
country as a centre of traffic and furthered by the profits
of trade with remote regions. The natural roughness of
a seafaring people was little softened during the long and
bitter war, and not until its last stages, when the enemy
was driven from the country, did the arts and sciences ex-
ercise upon the highest circles their refining influence
which penetrated very slowly to the lower classes. The
predominant faith, strict dogmatic Calvinism, was not cal-
culated to smooth the rough sides and to lead souls to gen-
tleness. Energy, vigilance, marked selfishness, cunning,
ingenuity, tenacity, roughness, inflexibility, hardness, were
some of the most prominent characteristics of the people
at this glorious period, joined to a certain good-nature that
seems not incompatible with suspicion. These qualities
had fortunate results in De Witt's time, and under the
guidance of a series of remarkable men, such as usually
appear in a nation after a hard struggle for existence, they
raised that nation to a high rank in the world. In the
thirty years of William III.'s rule their action remains
plainly visible.
399
400 History of the Dutch People
William III. himself is one of those men of the great
epoch, who may be considered as the best representatives
of the Dutch national type, with individual modification
of some qualities under the influence of personal experi-
ences. Energetic, alert, ambitious, crafty, resourceful, per-
sistent, rough, inflexible, hard, mistrustful, he was all that
and furthermore taciturn and reserved owing to the piti-
ful circumstances of his life during the decisive years
of his youth, owing also to the delicate health which had
impeded his development, — his bodily development at
least, for the coughing youth, to whom the entire nation
now looked up as to its rescuer from dire distress, was in-
tellectually a giant. His acuteness, his clear judgment,
his healthy understanding, his excellent memory, were de-
veloped in an admirable manner notwithstanding the
varying systems of education to which he was subjected.
He was not ideally gifted. His mind was positive,
averse to speculation, a mind of cool deliberation, not
fervent but rational, passionate sometimes, but gener-
ally calm, persevering even to obstinacy. Thus the stadt-
holder went through life, uncommunicative as he had
learned to be in his sombre youth, with a strong will pur-
suing the aims he had set before himself — a grand but
solitary figure, more imposing than attractive. Thus his
tall form appears before us with the oblong face framed by
long locks, with the piercing glance, the long Stuart nose,
the imperious attitude, weakly stooping, simply dressed,
upon his strong horse. Thus he was portrayed by Netsch-
er, by Blooteling, and by the pen of his secretary, the
younger Constantyn Huygens. Thus history knows him,
the great statesman and general of the last quarter of the
seventeenth century. Such was the young man, to whose
rule the state of the United Netherlands was row intrusted.
The condition of this state was perilous in the summer
of 1672, but signs of improvement began to appear. The
enemy's main force under Luxembourg still lay orithe bor-
The Great War 401
ders of Holland, restrained only by the water line. Zealand
was not unmolested. A small French army under de
Nancre" attacked Aardenburg on June 26th, but the little
town was so successfully defended by a handful of sol-
diers and a few hundred citizens commanded by the val-
iant ensign Beeckman that the enemy had to withdraw.
Nimwegen, Grave, and Crevecceur were captured by the
enemy; also Bommel fell, after which Turenne threw him-
self into the territory of Bois-le-Duc, while some of the
French troops went to complete the surrounding of Maes-
tricht. Steenwijk and other places in Overyssel were taken
without much difficulty by the forces of Miinster and Co-
logne, but they did not yet venture to push into Friesland,
defended by Aylva with a few troops and his Frisian mi-
litia. The enemy first turned towards Groningen, where
the frontier forts were captured without a blow besides the
important Bourtange. Coevorden detained the enemy less
than a fortnight, and on July 9th, guided by the traitor
Schuylenburgh, he appeared before the gates of Groningen,
which under command of the brave Rabenhaupt was pre-
pared for a stubborn defence by inundations and excellent
organisation of the troops, numbering with the inclusion
of militia and students between four and five thousand men.
The besieged held out over five weeks, and despite the in-
cessant bombardment and reiterated assaults upon the out-
works they so weakened the enemy that he was compelled
to raise the siege on August 28th. The attacks of the
Miinster forces on the Frisian intrenchments at Heeren-
veen were repulsed and soon the enemy had to evacuate
both provinces, being followed by the Dutch troops who
made themselves masters once more of northwestern
Overyssel and of a large part of Drenthe. The defender
had here become an attacker.
The fleet on the Scheldt and Zuyder Zee prevented
every attempt to disturb the security of these waters.
The privateers, especially those of Zealand where 200 of
VOL. IV. — 25
4Q2 History of the Dutch People
them are said to have been fitted out, inflicted serious
damage on the enemy. In July an Anglo-French fleet
of about ioo ships appeared on the coast, where the Dutch
fleet, only half so strong, was stationed at Goeree. The
enemy wanted to land in the neighbourhood of Texel, but
a violent storm, destroying some of his ships and injuring
others, spoiled these plans.' The enemy's great mistake
was in not making every exertion during June to conquer
Holland instead of waiting to besiege and occupy the forti-
fied places of Gelderland, Utrecht, and Overyssel, where
garrisons had to be put, so that Luxembourg before the
water line was left with only 16,000 men and Turenne on
the Meuse and Rhine with 12,000, while Chamilly sur-
rounded Maestricht with some thousands. Thus William
III. secured an opportunity to strengthen his positions
behind the water line amid the important events and
agitation in Holland. Powerfully aided by Amsterdam,
whose environs were quickly placed in an excellent state
of defence, he made his left flank safe. At threatened
points intrenchments were thrown up and the country
was flooded ; sailors, marines, fugitives from the eastern
garrisons, released prisoners of war, made up for the want
of troops, so that the army was soon increased to 57,000
men; militia and armed peasants were employed for real
service, especially for the batteries on the coast. The
young prince showed himself an able and prudent com-
mander, supported by Van Beverningh as deputy in the
field and by skilful generals, among whom now appeared
George Friedrich, count of Waldeck, as a field marshal and
as the prince's chief adviser.2 In September Holland was
metamorphosed into an impregnable fortress so that the
French dared not attack it vigorously and courage began
to revive in the province.
1 The story of the wonderful double ebb tide is erroneously placed in this
time. See Fruin, in Bijdr. AT. K., x., p. 125.
2 Muller, Wilhelm III. von Oranien und Georg Friedrich von Waldeck,
i-, P- 33.
The Great War 403
The prince took advantage of this to attack. A first
attempt on Naarden failed, but he made a second on Oc-
tober 10th for the conquest of Woerden. This failed also,
Zuylesteyn was killed in Luxembourg's unexpected attack
on his rear, and the force retreated with heavy losses, but
the enterprise proved that the new troops were not so
easily vanquished by the enemy as formerly. Some days
later in a council of war at Alfen the prince proposed a
bold plan — to leave a force sufficient for the defence of
the water line and to move rapidly southwards through
Brabant to Maestricht with 10,000 infantry and almost all
the cavalry, together about 23,000 men, in order with
German and Spanish help to threaten the enemy's com-
munications and to constrain him to retreat from these
provinces. Early in November the troops gathered at
Rozendaal, and on the 8th the army moved from there to
the Meuse near Maestricht, which was relieved some days
later, while the surprised French force under Duras, suc-
ceeding the deceased Chamilly, retreated to the Rhine at
Andernach, where Turenne was awaiting the Brandenburg
and imperial armies. The prince now moved northwards
to the Roer, captured Valkenburg, and menaced Tongres.
But the united German armies remained on the right bank
of the Rhine, being constantly watched by Turenne.
Thus left to himself and again threatened by Duras, the
prince in the middle of December undertook an arduous
expedition along the Meuse to the distant Charleroi, the
repository of the French army stores. Including Spanish
auxiliary troops he had about 30,000 men, but the enter-
prise was a failure. The commander of the city, Montal,
who was in Tongres, threw himself with a small troop of
cavalry into his important fortress and greatly increased
its power of resistance, so that the siege lasted longer than
the prince had expected. A sudden frost prevented the
continuation of the siege works. The prince took Binche,
but then moved away and appeared again on December
404 History of the Dutch People
30th with his reduced army at Alfen in Holland. This
undertaking was also a failure, but it showed what a
formidable foe Louis XIV. had in the young Orange.
Luxembourg was desirous of taking advantage of the
frost to cross over Holland's water line. Hitherto he had
confined himself to expeditions with small results due to
the watchfulness of the Dutch commanders, though many
frontier villages were burned and plundered. On De-
cember 27th he assembled 10,000 men at Woerden and
marched into Holland over the frozen flooded fields along
the Rhine. Count Konigsmarck left the camp at Bode-
graven and fell back to Leyden, whereupon the enemy
took possession of Bodegraven and Zwammerdam and de-
vastated them in a horrible manner. Suddenly it began
to thaw and the only practicable road back was by way of
Nieuwerbrug to Woerden, while the defenders of the
water line, aided by thousands of armed peasants, blocked
the road to Leyden or Gouda. That to Woerden was
also blocked by the intrenchments of Nieuwerbrug, but
the commander, Colonel Pain-et-Vin, seized with a sudden
panic, evacuated them and thus rescued the French army
from certain destruction. He was in consequence se-
verely treated at the prince's instigation and condemned
to death. The sentence was executed in the camp at
Alfen late in January. But Luxembourg reached Woer-
den safely on December 30th, laden with plunder from
the burned villages and farms which never forgot the
" French fury." ' On the day before, Coevorden was
surprised by a column from Groningen under Colonel
Eybergen, guided by the patriotic sexton, Meindert van
Thynen, a great advantage for the country of Drenthe
and Groningen, which was hastily quitted by the enemy.
At the beginning of 1673 the situation was quite changed
from that of a half-year earlier, although three provinces
were still in the enemy's hands. The army had regained
1 Knoop, p. 207.
The Great War 405
confidence under the lead of the young Orange prince
and Waldeck, and it was numerous enough to assume the
offensive. Besides weak Spain there were allies, who in-
deed did not yet accomplish much but kept a part of the
hostile troops busy far away on the Rhine. And the
people plucked up courage, though complaining bitterly
of the heavy taxes, the flooding of their lands, the stop-
page of commerce and industry. That half-year was a
time of storm and stress for Holland. The murder of the
De Witts had given the signal for tumults elsewhere, di-
rected against the adherents of the fallen government and
under the watchword " Up with Orange, " which was
often shamefully abused. Rotterdam, Delft, Leyden,
Gouda, Dordrecht, Haarlem, Amsterdam were not free
from them. The council pensionary Fagel called for meas-
ures against such disturbances, and deputy councillors pro-
posed authority for the prince to investigate the relations
between people and regents and to maintain or change
the municipal governments " without violation of the priv-
ileges." A resolution to this effect was taken on August
28th. The prince acted and replaced various regents by
others of his party. There were great difficulties in Am-
sterdam. Some of the magistrates had desired to make
the prince sovereign. Excitement among the people
seemed about to lead to a riot on September 6th, when the
house of the popular De Ruyter, now suspected as a friend
of the De Witts, ran great danger of being plundered.
A meeting of citizens next day demanded the removal of
the suspected regents, restoration of the " ancient rights "
of the citizens in the election of magistrates, maintenance
of the privileges of the guilds, reform in the government of
the city and militia, all comprised in twelve articles, which
were spread through the city in the form of a petition.
This attempt to introduce a more democratic style of
government was a dismal failure. The city government
finally requested help from the prince and offered its res-
406 History of the Dutch People
ignation, when he answered evasively. Some of the re-
gents here now lost their seats, while Van Beuningen and
Hudde were restored to the burgomastership and in the
following year Valckenier also, who was again considered
as the leader of the Amsterdam government.1 The major-
ity in the Estates of Holland was transposed, and this
speedily brought quiet. In the towns of Zealand changes
were likewise made in the government. A general am-
nesty proclaimed in November put an end to dangerous
agitation, though here and there some persons roused pop-
ular discontent. Even De Ruyter on coming home in
October was assailed and had to be taken under the prince's
particular protection.*
With the beginning of 1673 more vigorous action was
hoped for from the allies.3 The indefatigable Lisola had
convinced the imperial court of Vienna that only a close
alliance of the emperor with the States-General could
prevent the latter from concluding peace with France. It
was not inconceivable that France might give back all its
conquests. The elector of Brandenburg and the count of
Monterey at Brussels promised help and urged the States
to continue the war. In December the Vienna govern-
ment determined to approve definitively of a subsidy
treaty. At last the foundation seemed to be laid for the
great alliance, which, according to Lisola's long cherished
wishes, with the emperor and the States as the centre, was
to oppose the threatened supremacy of France in Europe.
But it soon appeared that much must happen before these
wishes were realised. The imperial government, influ-
enced by the Jesuits, was far from having resolved to
follow the path indicated by Lisola and to declare war
1 Bontemantel, ed. Kernkamp, ii., p. 180. See Kroon, Amsterdam in
1672, and Gebhard, Amsterd. anteekeningen , in Nijh. Bijdr, JV. J?., x.,
P- 139-
2 Wagenaar, xiv. , p. 188.
3 Pribram, Lisola, p. 587; P. L. Muller, Neder lands eerste betrekkingcn
met Oosienrijk, p. 38.
The Great War 407
upon France for the preservation of the strongest Prot-
estant power. The elector of Brandenburg, disappointed
at the course of the previous campaign, withdrew from
the alliance and concluded peace with France in June.
The prince had consequently the greatest difficulty in
holding the peace party of Holland in check, now that
the allies were showing themselves so little reliable.1
The chances of a peaceful solution later, however, be-
came greater. Holland's peace party was supported by
the entreaties of the three provinces still groaning under
the enemy's occupation. Sweden endeavoured to bring
about a peace congress and was listened to by both par-
ties, so that Cologne was chosen as the place of meeting.
In England also the party of peace urged negotiation
with the States. France saw that the German princes had
not been entirely won over and mistrust of its real pur-
poses must be removed. The war party, as whose chiefs
the prince and Fagel in the republic, Monterey at Brussels,
and Lisola might be considered, was compelled to yield
something to the universal desire for peace. Though
nothing came of a proposed truce, negotiations were
opened in Cologne at the end of June under the mediation
of Sweden. Van Beuningen for Holland, De Mauregna ult
for Zealand, Van Haren for Friesland, Ysbrands for City
and Land, Odijk in the name of the prince himself, soon
appeared there as ambassadors of the States-General.
The three provinces occupied by the enemy could not be
admitted to the negotiation, as they were not free. The
prince naturally had the chief management of the affair,
together with the council pensionary, and nearly all the
envoys were their trusted friends. At Cologne appeared
also Pieter de Groot, who had been at Antwerp in the
winter with De la Court and other exiled partisans of De
Witt, and in the negotiations he played a certain part in
1 Pribram, p. 606; Muller, p. 47 ; Wagenaar, xiv., p. 247.
4o3 History of the Dutch People
the interest of peace.1 The negotiations went on lan-
guidly. France's demand for the cession of the generality
lands, that of England concerning the fishery and the sur-
render of some towns on the sea were too high to be seri-
ously considered, and the offer of the States was too low
for the enemy. Sweden continued its action as mediator,
but the demands of the four allied enemies seemed rather
to increase than to diminish, until the war finally began to
turn in favour of the republic and its allies gave more effect-
ual assistance.
While there was negotiation at Cologne, both parties
had resumed war. England was now to act more ener-
getically than in the preceding year, with a landing force
of 20,000 men on the rapidly equipped fleet, the king's
bastard, the duke of Monmouth, accompanying with 8000
men the French army. This last was to move on Holland
again, while some antiquated Dutch fortresses were to be
demolished and the rest were to be strongly garrisoned.
The French army against Holland was to be under Conde
and to number 25,000 men, Turenne was to act on the
Rhine once more, and Louis himself in Flanders and Bra-
bant." It was hoped to draw much of the necessary money
from the conquered provinces themselves, which were pil-
laged in a frightful manner by Luxembourg and the in-
tendant Robert. Heavy taxes, confiscations on a large
scale, systematic plundering, destruction, and burning of
districts already ravaged by water and disease exhausted
the population. When Cond£ replaced Luxembourg in
the spring of 1673 and repeatedly called the attention of
Louvois to the country's miserable condition, the latter
answered cynically that this was just the way to subjugate
the land and to force the Hollanders to peace.
The prince added some regiments to the Dutch army
so that, with Waldeck as chief of staff, he obtained an
1 See his letters to Wicquefort in Kramer's edition, p. 143.
5 Rousset, i., p. 427. «
The Great War 409
army of 28,000 men, while in the north John Maurice had
the general management of affairs. The militia of the
cities and bands of armed peasants helped to occupy the
principal points of Holland's water line, while similar lines
were formed on the borders of Friesland and Groningen.
From fear of a landing of the Anglo-French fleet the
coast was provided with troops. A small force under
Wurtz was stationed in Zealand to defend this province
from attack by sea or land. After the improvements of
the water lines not only Holland and Zealand but Fries-
land and Groningen also were converted into almost im-
pregnable strongholds. Outside of the lines Coevorden
in the summer had to sustain a vigorous assault of the
Miinster forces, which were obliged to break off the siege.
A cavalry combat at Staphorst in July ended in a com-
plete defeat of the Miinster troops, and they also surrend-
ered the intrenchments east of Groningen to Rabenhaupt
and accomplished little after the relief of Coevorden
which fell in October.
Against the water line of Holland Cond6 could do no
more than Luxembourg before him. He tried in vain to
drain off the floods and to capture Muiden, but the water
let in from the sea increased the inundation and the heavy
Dutch artillery compelled him to give up the attack on
Muiden. Better success attended the siege of Maestricht,
which was undertaken by Louis XIV. himself with his main
force of 45,000 men, supported by a part of Turenne's
army, and lasted over three weeks (June 6th -July 1st).
This siege of the city, defended by 6000 men, was unques-
tionably one of the most remarkable events of the whole
war, and in it the talented engineer Vauban distinguished
himself by an excellent use of trenches. After the loss of
the chief outworks the gallant defender Fariaux was com-
pelled to capitulate to superior force by the citizens, whc
expected restoration of the Catholic religion from the
French rule. It now seemed the turn of Bois-le-Duc,
4io History of the Dutch People
and Cond6 left Utrecht to prepare for this siege, while
Luxembourg resumed command of the army before the
water line. Thus Holland continued to be besieged, and
the enemy was still prevented by the water line from con-
quering Holland's cities and from plundering Holland's
country, the richest district of Europe, as he had done to
Utrecht, Gelderland, and Overyssel. Amsterdam and
other cities still held their proud heads above the water,
determined under the prince's lead to resist until the last
redoubt fell or until the allies could be persuaded to wage
war vigorously.
While the war on land remained in the same state until
late in the summer, longer than a year, the war on the sea
was energetically prosecuted. After the battle of Solebay
and the partial dismantling of the fleet, De Ruyter was
not in a condition to venture out. Privateering, at first
prohibited so that the naval crews would not melt away,
was allowed again in July, 1672, and many English and
French merchant vessels were brought as prizes into the
ports of Zealand and Spain. Two shipowners of Middel-
burg declared in September that their captains had over
thirty prizes in the harbours of Biscay, which they would
like to have escorted home by naval vessels.1 But the
fleet was too weak for such an undertaking, and the
only attempt was to send Van Nes in November with a
squadron to Brest to attack the French fleet wintering
there. This enterprise failed on account of contrary
winds, and Van Nes returned quickly. New perils by sea
appeared with the beginning of 1673. England seemed
bent upon putting an end to the commerce and naviga-
tion of its hated competitor. Delenda est Carthago, ex-
claimed the English chancellor Shaftesbury in asking Par-
liament for money on February 14th,2 and Parliament
granted one and a quarter million pounds to attain the
JDe Jonge, ii., p. 337.
2 Ranke, Englische Geschichte, v., p. 114.
The Great War 4 l r
ardently desired end, after the king had recalled his meas-
ures of toleration of the Catholics, though secretly con-
verted to their faith, and after he had assented to the
Test Act which excluded all Catholics and nearly all dis-
senters from public offices. Now these guarantees were
given against the dreaded predominance of Catholicism,
Parliament saw no harm in the alliance with France, al-
though popular opinion was opposed to war with the
republic, the bulwark of Protestantism in Europe. The
duke of York, openly professing Catholicism, could not
command the fleet, so Prince Rupert replaced him, but,
lacking his experience, the English naval force was not so
well equipped as in the preceding year. The Dutch fleet
was brought up by great exertion to about 120 ships, and
crews for all of them were found by prohibiting priva-
teering again and navigation to the Baltic and the north,
so that in May twenty sail could go out under command of
De Ruyter, raised to the rank of lieutenant admiral gen-
eral of Holland, and of lieutenant admiral Banckerts.
Cornelis Tromp, restored by the prince to his dignity of
lieutenant admiral and reconciled with De Ruyter, was
soon to join the fleet with some large vessels. The pur-
pose was neither more nor less than a new expedition to
the Thames, before the English fleet could run out to
unite with the French. A squadron under Van Nes and
Vlugh was already sailing for the Thames to close the
mouth of the river by sinking ships, when it was observed
that the English fleet was on its guard and had detached
vessels to defend the approaches of the river. The
squadron returned and the fleet was ready to receive the
enemy, when Tromp arrived at the end of May. It was
near the banks of Schooneveld, on the coast of Zealand,
when the Anglo-French fleet of nearly 150 sail came to
attack the small force of 100 sail. On the anniversary of
the battle of Solebay, June 7 th, there was a battle, in
which De Ruyter himself dispersed the French squadron
412 History of the Dutch People
of d'Estr£es, broke through the middle division, and went
to the relief of Tromp who was running great danger in a
fight with the vanguard under Prince Rupert. It was on
this occasion that Tromp cried out to his men: " There
is grandfather coming to our help. I too will never de-
sert him so long as I can draw breath." After a hard
struggle darkness fell, but the enemy retreated with great
losses, while those of the Dutch were much less. Seven
days later the same fleet offered battle to the same enemy
not far from the place where victory had been won before.
The Dutch fleet now also repulsed the allied fleets under
Prince Rupert to the English coast, where darkness again
ended the combat, so that De Ruyter returned to his sta-
tion at Schooneveld without being followed by the enemy,
who repaired damages in the Thames and left the sea
to the Dutch for a considerable time. A small Dutch
squadron under rear admiral Den Haen even undertook
an expedition along the English coast near the mouth of
the Thames.
Early in July the Dutch fleet ran out again in search of
the enemy, who was preparing for a third voyage to the
Dutch coasts, but no enemy was to be seen, and the fleet
cruised off the mouth of the Thames until a pestilence com-
pelled its return. Towards the end of the month the hos-
tile fleets appeared with the intention of landing and
forcing the republic to peace. An unusually long ebb
tide on the 2d of August in conjunction with a dense fog
prevented the execution of this plan and gave rise to the
story everywhere believed of the " double ebb " which
saved the endangered republic.1 De Ruyter, desirous
first of protecting Zealand, followed the enemy's strong
fleet only a short time. The latter sailed northwards and
spread terror along the Dutch coast, but no landing was
attempted. The prince now ordered the fleet to leave
Schooneveld and to oppose the enemy. De Ruyter ar
1 Fruin, De dubbele ebbe, in Nijh. Bijdr., N. R., x., p. 129.
The Great War 413
rived off Scheveningen, where the prince excited indescrib-
able enthusiasm by visiting the fleet and considering with
the council of war whether the enemy should be attacked
notwithstanding the inferiority in strength of the Dutch
force. It was resolved to make the venture, and the vis-
itor departed from the fleet amid shouts of — " Long live
the prince ! " So De Ruyter followed the enemy north
and encountered him early in the morning of August 21st
at Kijkduin, wherewith 90 large and small vessels and 22
fire ships he valiantly assailed the allied fleets of over 140
sail, commanded again by Prince Rupert, Spragge, and
d'Estr^es.1 The French van gave way speedily before
the violent attack of Banckerts ; De Ruyter threw himself
on Prince Rupert, who, fighting stoutly, was forced back
and sought to join the rear division under Spragge. At-
tacked by Tromp and severely damaged by his admirably
served guns, Spragge also resisted bravely but lost his life
in a boat on leaving his sinking ship, while Prince Rupert
himself was in great danger of being destroyed by the
united Dutch squadrons. A general attack seemed to
offer some chance of dispersing the Dutch fleet by su-
perior force, but the attack failed, as the French squadron
paid no attention to the repeated signals of the English
commander and did not venture again into the fight.
After sunset the enemy retreated, being pursued by the
Dutch, who returned to the coast a few hours later, while
Prince Rupert went back to the English ports with great
losses in killed and wounded and complaining loudly of
the treacherous behaviour of d'Estr£es. The losses were
severe also on the Dutch side, including the vice admirals
De Liefde and Sweers among the dead. There was no
more talk of a landing, and the harbours were opened for
the returning merchantmen, so that the battle of Kijkduin
may be regarded as a victory. It was celebrated as such,
though this did not prevent Prince Rupert from claiming
1 De Jonge, ii., p. 412.
4H History of the Dutch People
the victory as on the two previous occasions. De Ruyter
and Tromp were honoured as the saviours of the fatherland
from destruction which was threatened by the landing of
the army of 12,000 men under the French general Schom-
berg. In this rescue from danger was seen the hand of
God, who had given victory to the weaker Dutch fleet
and had averted a landing by a rare natural phenomenon
at the right moment.
De Ruyter in September sailed again into the North
Sea for the purpose of threatening the English coast, but
violent storms obliged him to return. The naval war
during the winter was of slight importance. But the vic-
tories of the summer began to have the desired effect.
There arose in England dissatisfaction with the conduct
of the French squadrons, and d'Estrees really appealed to
his sovereign's command not to risk his ships, while he
manifestly suspected the English of desiring to endanger
his fleet. Prince Rupert put himself at the head of the
movement against the French alliance, long disagreeable
to him as a Protestant. The proposed second marriage
of the Catholic successor to the throne, the duke of York,
with the very Catholic princess of Modena aroused an-
tagonism among the English people,1 and the Parliament
meeting in October, to which the king applied for money,
showed itself no longer inclined to act with France. It de-
nied the supremacy of Dutch commerce over that of Eng-
land, opposed York's marriage, demanded the upholding
of the Anglican church against Catholicism, pronounced
against a standing army, and called for the dismissal of
the most hated ministers. A new conflict between crown
and Parliament seemed impending, and only the sudden
prorogation of the latter by advice of the French ambassa-
dor put an apparent end to the dissension. England had
gone so far that the French ambassador interfered in its
1 Fruin, Prins Willem III. in zijn verhouding tot Engeland, p. 34 of the
article reprinted from the Gids, 18S9.
The Great War 415
domestic affairs. Charles II. was playing a desperate
game. He hoped with the booty obtained from Dutch
merchantmen and with Louis XIV.'s aid to find the money
necessary for the war outside of Parliament. The govern-
ment's adversaries were assailed in their positions and in-
comes. Even the chancellor Shaftesbury, to whom York
ascribed the movement against his marriage, was forced to
give up his office. The violent opposition of all classes of
the population brought the king to reflection. He deter-
mined to yield somewhat and to appease the nation by
making public the treaties with France and renewing the
edicts against the Catholics. Then he called Parliament
together in January. But it did not favour the govern-
mental policy and, vigorously incited by Shaftesbury, it
demanded stronger guarantees against Catholicism, com-
plained of the king's ministers, and desired maintenance
of English liberties and the disbanding of the army
standing since 1664. Many eyes were already directed to
the prince of Orange, after York the nearest male blood
relative of the king, as the proper successor to the throne
in case the childless king died and the duke of York as a
Catholic had to be excluded from the succession. Every-
where in England the conviction gained ground that peace
with the republic must be restored, and the sooner the
better.
These events in England made the prince and the States
believe that the dangerous alliance of England and France
was drawing to an end. The prince was in secret communi-
cation with Shaftesbury and other influential members of
the opposition and watched English complications. The
States supported the peace party by a letter to the king
in October affirming that they were ready for a fair peace
and by similar declarations. Under these circumstances
negotiations for peace at Cologne naturally advanced but
little, so long as the republic's allied enemies persisted in
their high demands. But the republic had more reason to
4i 6 History of the Dutch People
look with confidence at the future. Under the influence
of Lisola the fear of French designs on the empire had
increased among Germany's princes and peoples, and
pamphlets and writings on the subject appeared in great
number. The Vienna court regained spirit, and the elector
of Cologne and the bishop of Miinster began to be alarmed
at the FYench lust for conquest, particularly after the fall
of Maestricht. Spain also became more ready to act vig-
orously against France. Spain promised the emperor a
subsidy of 50,000 rix-dollars a month, the States about as
much, and on August 30th, shortly after the battle of
Kijkduin, treaties were concluded at The Hague both with
the emperor and with Spain and Lorraine in opposition to
France. The great alliance desired by Lisola was accom-
plished, and the States soon declared they would only
negotiate in conjunction with their allies. The war of the
republic thus became a European war against France.
In expectation of the imperial army collected in Bohemia
under Montecuculi, which was to move to the Rhine,
William III. in September made a new attack on Naarden
that yielded before Luxembourg could relieve it. This loss
was felt by the French, and they prepared to destroy the
numerous small forts in the conquered provinces so as to
strengthen the larger fortresses and to have more soldiers
for the army in the field.' Before it went so far, there
was a masterly move by the prince, owing to which Lux-
embourg's position had at last to be given up. He left
Waldeck in command of a sufficient force behind the water
line. With 10,000 men he went late in September to
Rozendaal, united in October with a Spanish army of 15,000
men at Lier, and towards the end of the month was near
Cologne. The imperial army came there also, and together
siege was laid to Bonn which fell on November 13th, fol-
lowed by other fortresses in Cologne and Julich territory.
Then the prince returned with his army to the Meuse at
1 Rousset, i., p. 484.
/The Great War 417
Roermond and Venloo.1 This November campaign had
great results. It discouraged wavering Cologne ; the influ-
ence of the Fiirstenbergs on the elector diminished, now
that the latter lost his residence Bruhl and had to seek
refuge in his capital Cologne, which had resisted him so
often. The last stroke was Prince William's arrest of
Count Fiirstenberg, the elector's first minister, though he
was taking part in the congress of Cologne. The elector
and his Miinster ally soon showed themselves ready for
peace. The French commanders saw that they must face
this sudden attack. Conde's army moved largely from
Brabant into Jiilich; Luxembourg left garrisons in the
Utrecht fortresses and stationed himself with 8,000 men at
Mook to defend Gelderland; Turenne was on the Moselle
to oppose Montecuculi. In November and December, for
fear of being cut off from the distant French frontier, by
command of Louvois, though against the opinion of Conde"
and to the disappointment of all France, one fortress after
another in Utrecht and on the Lek and Yssel was evacuated
and immediately occupied by Waideck. By the middle of
December only the places on the Meuse and Rhine were
in French hands, while Luxembourg with 16,000 men was
hoping to reach the French border. The prince, whose
army now was nearly twice as strong as that of the French
general, endeavoured to oppose him and succeeded twice in
making him return to the protection of Maestricht's can-
non. On the approach of winter, however, the prince
broke up his army, and early in January, 1674, Luxem-
bourg moved for the third time, and this time unmolested,
southwards to the vicinity of Charleroi. The last French
garrisons left Gelderland in the spring and fell back upon
Grave and Maestricht. Thus after a year and a half the
siege of the " fortress Holland " was given up, and before
the end of the year the enemy had evacuated the greater
part of the republic's territory.
1 Knoop, i., p. 290.
27
4l% History of the Dutch People
These great advantages, secured by the republic and its
allies, had a decisive influence on opinion in England.
Peace with the republic was urged by Parliament, desirous
in opposition to the crown of breaking the league with
France and strengthened by the attitude of Spain, which
on one side threatened England with war, on the other
influenced members of Parliament with money. Spain
undertook mediation and brought over the offers of the
republic, which intimated cleverly that France had made
offers for a separate peace in the summer of 1673. After
some negotiation and pressure by Parliament and such
statesmen as Temple, who had deplored the war from the
beginning, Charles II. declared his wish for peace, and it
was concluded February 19, 1674, at Westminster. The
terms were in general those of the peace of Breda, although
the flag question was so settled that all Dutch ships and
fleets must thenceforth salute even a single English royal
vessel, bearing the flag, anywhere between Cape Finisterre
and Norway. For war expenses two millions were prom-
ised within three years. Concerning commerce in India,
commissioners were to meet in three months. Surinam
remained Dutch, but New Netherland, which in August,
1673, was captured without much difficulty by a small
squadron sent to the West Indies under Cornells Evertsen
the younger and Captain Binckes, was given back to Eng-
land again. Before long the congress at Cologne ended
in nothing. The French government declared inter-
national law so violated by Fiirstenberg's arrest that it
could not continue negotiations. Lisola managed to per-
suade first Miinster and then Cologne to accept peace on
conditions resembling little those offered previously by the
two spiritual princes. Miinster, menaced by the imperials
and on the other side defeated at Noordhoorn and Nien-
huis by Rabenhaupt, who had succeeded the aged John
Maurice in the conduct of the war in the north, consented
on April 22d to a renewal of the peace of Cleves with a
The Great War 419
return of all the conquered territory and under guarantee
of Spain and the emperor, and on May nth Cologne
followed. Thus the east of the republic was entirely
delivered from the enemy in May, 1674, and France alone
had to be dealt with, possessing still only a few fortresses
in Dutch territory. After a struggle of two years people
breathed again and hoped that those fortresses also might
be recaptured. What a result after the dangers which in
the summer of 1672 had brought the republic to the verge
of destruction, and what sacrifices had been necessary !
With gratitude men thought of the fortunate course of
affairs, freeing them without noteworthy loss of territory
from the enemies who had assailed the republic on all sides.
This success was due largely to the young general and
statesman, who now had the management of the republic
in his hands. In reorganising the disordered state the
definitive regulation of his attitude to the state would
naturally be considered anew. Was the prince now finally
to receive the sovereignty desired by him and the republic
to be changed, wholly or partially, into a monarchy ? The
subject came up in connection with the settlement of affairs
in the three provinces which for a year and a half had been
in the enemy's possession and had ceased to take part
in the common government. The danger of the entire
country in 1672 had lessened the love for the republican
form of government and had raised the question whether
it was not better to bestow upon the real ruler the title as
such.1 It was no secret that many of the chief statesmen
were not averse to such a reform, among others the council
pensionary Fagel, the influential Valckenier, and Van
Beverningh. The districts occupied by the enemy were
terribly treated. The support of the hostile army and
garrisons had ruined cities and country, cattle were killed,
agriculture suffered, requisitions were carried to the ex-
treme under threat of plundering and burning. The inten-
1 Basnage, Annales des Provinces Unies, ii., p. 564.
420 History of the Dutch People
dant Robert made himself notorious in Gelderland and
Utrecht, and we know from his correspondence and that
of Luxembourg and Conde with Louvois ' that his threats
were more than mere form. The border regions of Hol-
land, Utrecht, Friesland, and Groningen were spoiled for
years by the water let in from sea, river, and marsh; the
heavy taxes in the parts remaining free were unbearable ;
and commerce and industry had for a year and a half stood
still. How much had to be restored and improved before
the traces of war could be said to have disappeared !
The first question after the departure of the French
was — should the three provinces be taken into the union
again ? A commission from the States-General discharged
the De Witt government still sitting in Utrecht and sub-
stituted for it a provisional government. The prince, asked
for his opinion by Holland, thought that the three prov-
inces must be admitted into the union with their old
boundaries, Holland giving back the parts of Utrecht taken
possession of during its defence and reserving the right of
flooding the frontier districts and the ownership of the
fortifications built by it on Utrecht territory in the course
of the war. So it was resolved by Holland on February
2, 1674. The plan of keeping Utrecht and the two other
provinces out of the union until they were able to pay their
share of the quotas was rejected by advice of the prince.
On April 20th a resolution was adopted by the generality
providing that the three provinces should be received into
the union again on the old footing; taxes were to be made
uniform; a statement of revenues in all the provinces was
to be drawn up to regulate by it a new distribution of the
quotas ; the debt in arrears of the three provinces must be
paid to the administration; Gelderland must relinquish one
of its two places in the council of state to Groningen;
finally the prince was empowered to change the govern-
1 Rousset, Histoire de Louvois, passim. See also Nijh. Bijdr. Eerste
Reeks, v., p. 204.
The Great War 421
ment in the three provinces. A few days later the prince,
upon whom Utrecht had conferred the stadtholdership in
November, made his stately entrance into the city, where
he was welcomed with great enthusiasm, and on the 25th
he filled the government of city and province with persons
agreeable to himself. A new settlement of the govern-
ment was sworn to on the following day by the new
administration. Arranged by the prince with the chief
men of Utrecht, it put all power into the stadtholder's
hands. His representative there was Van Reede van Rens-
woude, whom he selected for the presidency of the Estates.
A similar fate was appointed for the two other provinces,
but the prince confined himself at first to setting up a
"provisional" government in expectation of the oppor-
tunity to make here also radical changes.
In Holland itself Haarlem on January 23d brought up
the matter of having the stadtholdership hereditary, in-
cited, as is supposed, by the council pensionary.1 It
pointed out the desirability of being sure of the presence
of an " eminent chief " in the state, which could not other-
wise be properly governed. Vox populi, vox Dei: with-
out opposition the resolution was on February 2d adopted
to make the prince hereditary stadtholder, captain and
admiral general ; the right of inheritance was confined to
the " male descendants " of the prince.* It was a Per-
petual Edict, so Delft and Rotterdam affirmed, but of
perpetual " inclusion " of the stadtholdership. Zealand
adopted the same resolution on the same day. The States-
General also made the office of captain and admiral general
of the union hereditary. The prince furthermore was
urged to marry. His income was increased. Amsterdam
proposed to take over for Holland Prince William II. 's
debt to Amsterdam, amounting to two millions, and it
1 Lettres de De Groot, ed. Kramer, p. 289.
2 See Simon van Leeuwen, Bedenkingen over de stadhouderlijke magt, ed.
Fruin, in Bijdr. en Meded. Hist. Gen., xviii., p. 442.
422 History of the Dutch People
was immediately approved. Zealand gave him 30,000
guilders in obligations. The East India Company pre-
sented him ■£§ of all its dividends to the stockholders.
Tokens of gratitude and good feeling flowed in upon the
prince from all sides, and it seemed only to depend upon
his will whether or not he should rise higher. For the
time being nothing was done about it, though all eyes
were directed to the rising sun, and there appeared to be
a rivalry as to who should first come out with a proposi-
tion of this nature.
But before everything else the great war with France
demanded the prince's utmost care, and he had to think
of preparing for the new campaign south of the great
rivers and in conjunction with the Spanish and imperial
generals. In April and May of 1674 there was progress in
freeing Gelderland and Overyssel from the enemy. The
French left the fortresses on the Rhine and Waal. Grave
and Maestricht continued to be occupied as advanced posts
of the army which was collected on the French frontier
and was under Cond6 to invade the Spanish Netherlands.1
In the middle of May Conde began the campaign and
eleven days later he reached the environs of Maestricht,
where he soon had 50,000 men. At the same time Prince
William moved from the north and the imperialists under
De Souches from the Rhine to the Meuse to unite with
the Spanish force stationed at Brussels and Louvain. The
slight cooperation between the armies of the allies and on
the French side Conde's bad health prevented vigorous
action. A small Dutch corps under Rabenhaupt besieged
Grave, and on August nth a bloody battle took place at
Seneffe in Hainaut, in which the stronger armies of the
allies under Prince William, owing to the weak attitude
of the imperial force under De Souches,a did not succeed
in defeating Conde, and the Dutch had to fight the
1 Knoop, ii., p. 27.
3 Temple, Memoirs of his Life, London, 1714, p. 216.
The Great War 423
hardest. Both parties claimed the victory. Among the
allies the stadtholder of twenty-four years of age received
the highest praise for his spirited conduct and undisturbed
composure, and with him the faithful Waldeck, who was
here severely wounded, Prince Henry Casimir of Nassau,
aged seventeen, Nassau-Ouwerkerk, Beverweert's son, and
a number of other officers distinguished themselves greatly.
The heavy losses of the Dutch showed how bravely the
soldiers formed by the prince fought against the best army
of Europe. The battle of Seneffe established the young
stadtholder's fame as a general, and it also restored the
good name of the Dutch army. Although the prince's
enterprise against Oudenarde failed in September in con-
sequence again of the attitude of the imperial troops,
Conde had found in him a worthy adversary.
The navy was energetically managed. De Ruyter en-
deavoured in vain to capture Martinique in the Antilles.
More important was another expedition connected with
plans for a Huguenot uprising in France, especially on the
western coast and in Languedoc and Provence. Tromp
was to support these plans with a fleet carrying a small
landing army. The conspiracy formed by the adventurer
de Sardan and some young Huguenots was less extensive
than was pretended. It was betrayed and resulted in
nothing but a weak naval demonstration on the French
coasts. Tromp landed troops on Belle Isle and Noir-
moutiers and alarmed the entire west coast of France and
later also the Mediterranean coast. That France regarded
the prince as the soul of the alliance was proved by the
peace proposals it made to him after Seneffe for ending
the war on the basis of the treaties of Aix-la-Chapelle and
Munster and with recognition of his supreme place in the
republic. These proposals caused a negotiation at Maes-
tricht, where d'Estrades, the old friend of the republic,
appeared, and where the prince sent the secretary of
Utrecht, De Pesters, to listen to the enemy's offers. From
424 History of the Dutch People
the English side efforts were made by Temple, who had
again come to The Hague as ambassador, and afterwards
by Arlington and Sylvius to persuade the prince to a
separate or a general peace. But an understanding could
not be reached, and the Dutch refused to desert Spain
and the other allies. The prince now continued the siege
of Grave begun by Rabenhaupt, until on the 27th of
October this fortress surrendered after a valiant defence
of three months.
The capture of Grave freed Gelderland from the dreaded
neighbourhood of the enemy, and in the winter of 1674-
1675 the reorganisation of this province and Overyssel
could be taken up. The way the work was begun shows
that William III. hoped for the opportunity to have the
sovereign power conferred upon himself, first in Gelderland,
then in the whole republic. Perhaps a more comprehen-
sive idea was considered, having been discussed since the
war's commencement by Fagel and Van Beuningen in a
general way with the imperial ambassador, the idea of
receiving once more the republic into the German empire
as the Burgundian or Batavian circle. This project, again
spoken of in January, 1675, was quickly given up.1 Nim-
wegen was the place, from which the prince started his
Gelderland plans. After everything was carefully pre-
pared at the end of 1674 and the prince's friends, including
the Bentincks, had worked upon the influential magistrates
and noblemen,2 the provisional government of Nimwegen
requested the prince to allow a discussion of provincial
interests in the provisional governments of the three
quarters of the province. The prince consented naturally
and the quarters met and resolved unanimously on Jan-
uary 29, 1675, to offer him the government of the province
under the ancient title of the duke of Guelders and count
1 Muller, Nederlands betrekkingen met Oostenrijk, p. IOO.
2 See Nijh. Bijdr.,Eerste Reeks, iii., p. 197 ; viii., p. 158 ; Wagenaar, xiv.,
p. 345; Sylvius, Historien, ii., pp. 164, 179, 205.
The Great War 425
of Zutphen. The manner of the prince's reception of the
offer showed that he was not averse to it, but he declared
he could not accept without hearing from the other prov-
inces. He expected to be received as sovereign by them
also, or otherwise to have the offer withdrawn. His court
was already talking of the " count of Holland. " Utrecht
strongly favoured the plan, but Holland and Zealand did
not answer his expectations. Some towns of Holland
were for it, but others, notably Haarlem and Leyden,
opposed it, though not very vigorously. In Zealand at-
tachment was manifested to the republican form of govern-
ment, and the example of Gideon was cited to point out
the right way to the prince. Now, however, the prince
decided finally to give up the plan, and on February 20th
he declared in the provisional assembly of Gelderland
that, thankful for the confidence reposed in him, he de-
clined the offer. His vehement letter to Zealand showed
his resentment at the way the proposal was received there,
and the distrust displayed had insulted him. Without a
sovereign title his influence was great enough for him in
the different provinces, and he feared to displease some
of his own partisans, in particular to anger the Zealanders
jealous of the old freedom by pushing through the affair,
which would have cost him little trouble. Even among
the greatest champions of the house of Orange there were
many who saw no salvation in the prince's elevation to
sovereignty and were devoted to the old form of the state,
under which their fathers had lived. The allies had
watched the affair uneasily, fearing internal dissensions
in the republic and a consequent relaxation of military
operations. Later generations have regretted that at this
favourable moment William III. did not make an end of
the indisputably ambiguous condition of the form of gov-
ernment of the United Provinces, causing the greatest
difficulties even during the rule of the prince himself.
Reforms were now to be made in Gelderland and
426 History of the Dutch People
Overyssel as they had been in Utrecht. The prince
immediately accepted the hereditary stadtholdership in
the first province, to whose chief place, Arnhem, he had
betaken himself, restored the court of Gelderland, and
introduced government regulations, by which was yielded
to him the appointment of councillors, burgomasters,
sheriffs, bailiffs, officers, justices, magistrates, etc., without
nomination or recommendation of any kind; he was to
have unlimited command of the provincial militia, and the
settlement of differences was left to him. Then the prince
went to Overyssel, where on March 2d the government
in cities, villages, and quarters was rendered scarcely less
dependent upon him, while here also he was invested with
the hereditary stadtholdership, and the command of the
military force and the settlement of differences were
conferred on him.
The recovery of the three provinces had a great influence
on church affairs in those provinces, where the Catholic faith
had lifted up its head, as soon as the foreign Catholic ruler
had taken possession of the country. Then it was high tide
for the Catholic church, and in many places it was restored
to honour after long years of oppression and prohibition of
its public worship. But the moderation of the vicar Johan-
nes van Neercassel avoided excesses. Churches held by the
Reformed nearly a century were as a rule not disturbed,
though the Utrecht cathedral and the great church of
Zutphen were of course used by the Catholics. Their
worship was everywhere allowed in the conquered terri-
tory, and processions moved through city and village as
of old. Some zealous Catholics voiced the sentiment —
" Frenchman rather than prince," and occasionally a feel-
ing of relief from the heavy yoke appeared in them. Nat-
urally the Catholic clergy used their influence with the
enemy in favour of their fellow-believers. This was all
changed with the recovery of the three provinces. The
principal churches occupied were stripped of their Catholic
The Great War 427
adornment, Voetius mounted the pulpit of Utrecht again,
and the Catholics were everywhere reminded of the laws
against them. But the alliance with Austria and Spain
prevented vengeance being taken for the " popish bold-
ness " of the time of the occupation, as these two Catholic
powers were known to be interested in the lot of their co-
religionists. In 1675 Neercassel could truthfully testify
that freedom for his church was then greater than before.1
But in the Reformed church itself, both in Holland and
elsewhere, the changes of 1672 to 1675 had important
results. The moderate, Cocceian or Cartesian, even liber-
tine regents of De Witt's time were replaced by the more
Voetian partisans of Orange, who, like the prince, adhered
more closely to the principles of Dort. Here and there
in Holland and Zealand there soon arose between the two
tendencies violent dissension which had also some political
influence.
Thus three provinces had become entirely dependent
upon the prince, and two, Holland and Zealand, were now
more than ever subject to the stadtholder's authority.
In City and Land and Drenthe the young prince of Nassau
was in February raised to the dignity of hereditary stadt-
holder, but Friesland hesitated to take this step. The
northern provinces remained apart as before, and the
arbitrary, passionate character of the young Henry Casimir,
who could not easily submit to the strong will of his cousin
of Orange, was later to occasion great difficulties. At the
siege of Grave the Frisian prince complained of the way in
which William III. treated his quarrel with Rabenhaupt
about the chief command of the Groningen and Drenthe
troops,3 and soon various matters increased the personal
estrangement between the two young princes.
The English government meanwhile did not give up
the hope of persuading the warring powers to peace.
1 Arch, aartsb, Utrecht^ xviii., p. 278.
5 See Van Sypesteyn, Geschiedkundige Bijdragen, iii., p. 13.
428 History of the Dutch People
Temple continued to negotiate with the prince and the
council pensionary, and the evident exhaustion of France
made this power also not unwilling to consider peace seri-
ously, now that a strong party in England wanted to stop
being only half neutral — for English troops under Churchill
still fought in the French army — and to join the allies in
order to thwart thedreaded plans of Louis XIV. for Catholi-
cism and the extension of France. On the other hand the
Catholic party at the English court made efforts to remain
on a friendly footing with France. The question was which
of the two parties would win the unprincipled Charles II.,
and both the prince and Louis XIV. endeavoured secretly
to support their friends, the former by working upon the
Protestant feelings of the English nation, the latter by
lavishing money and promises among the English ministers,
courtiers, and members of Parliament. Connected with
these intrigues was the arrest of Wicquefort in March, 1675,
on account of the discovery of his secret relations with Eng-
lish agents during and after the war, of which he had now
made use to set the prince and his royal uncle against one
another. Wicquefort, under suspicion as an old friend of
John de Witt, was put into the Voorpoort notwithstand-
ing his office of resident for Poland and Liineburg, and
after half a year of confinement he was condemned to
imprisonment for life.1
Towards spring preparations for war began on both
sides, after Waldeck had departed for Vienna in Decem-
ber to consult with the court council of war there about
the cooperation of the allies in the Netherlands. Louis
XIV. himself was to lead an army of 60,000 men against
them in the Spanish Netherlands and set out in May for
the Meuse, where he captured Dinant and Limburg but
could accomplish little more, as the prince of Orange,
still suffering from the effects of the smallpox so danger-
1 He escaped in February, 1679, and died three years later. See Ever-
wijn, Abraham de Wicquefort,
The Great War 429
ous for his family, succeeded with the aid of the Spanish
troops in saving Brabant. A deep impression was made
in France by Turenne's death at the battle of Sasbach
against the imperialists, who were now opposed by Conde"
on the Rhine, while popular tumults in Brittany and
Guyenne showed the disposition of the country. At the
same time war was kindled in the Baltic lands. Bran-
denburg fell out with Sweden and renewed its alliance
with the States which now also declared war on Sweden.
Then Denmark joined them and attacked the duke of Hol-
stein, who was in league with Sweden, while Munster, now
on the side of the allies, invaded the Swedish territory of
Bremen. A general war on land and sea began to be de-
veloped, which stirred up all Europe but did not seem in
the north to be advantageous to France and its allies.
The French government, even before the campaign,
showed a readiness to open negotiations ; the English gov-
ernment offered its services again, and it was soon agreed
that a general peace congress of greater importance than
that of Cologne should be held. Nimwegen was chosen
as the place of the congress, and, after some difficulties
owing to the refusal of the States to allow there the free
exercise of the Catholic religion, the first ambassadors of
the different powers assembled in the spring of 1676.
The Dutch negotiators were the same as at Cologne ;
Temple and Berkeley represented the English ; the chief
personages on the French side were the aged d'Estrades,
Colbert-Croissy, and the able Jean Antoine de Mesmes,
count d Avaux ; the place of imperial ambassador,
Lisola having died in December, 1674, was taken by a
less skilful diplomat. But it was some time before all
the ambassadors, after questions concerning etiquette,
titles, and passports, reached Nimwegen, and it was still
longer before the bases of a general peace could be agreed
upon. The city of the negotiation with its environs was
declared neutral territory.
43Q History of the Dutch People
Meanwhile the war dragged along in the southern
Netherlands, on the Rhine, and in the Baltic regions, on
the water especially in the Baltic and the Mediterranean,
to the great injury of the republic's commercial interests,
its competitor in the world's market, England, making
use of the opportunity to extend trade and boasting
already of not being behind the republic, thanks to the
Navigation Act, which had forced English commerce to
a vigorous development. The army of the republic un-
der William III. could only with difficulty hold out
against the strong French armies under Cond6 and
d'Humieres, as it was supported but feebly by the Span-
iards, while the imperial troops on the Rhine had their
hands full in protecting the territory of the empire. So
the campaign of 1676 became a war of sieges, in which
the French made themselves masters of some small for-
tresses of Hainaut and the prince did not see the siege of
Maestricht crowned with success. When the French
army under Schomberg approached at the end of August
to relieve the besieged fortress, Prince William's army
had to give up the siege on account of its heavy losses.
More discouraging than the failure of the siege of Maes-
tricht was the severe blow inflicted upon the republic by
the death of De Ruyter. The Spanish fleet had been
unable to defend Naples and Sicily against the French
attacks, and the Spanish government therefore requested
the republic to send to its aid a fleet under De Ruyter
himself. With difficulty were the States persuaded to
send the famous admiral so far away. The year before a
similar fleet under Binckes had been dispatched to the
Baltic to help Denmark against Sweden, and in the fol-
lowing year the rear admiral Philips van Almonde went
there with a squadron, while Tromp, becoming tempora-
rily a Danish admiral, fought the Swedes at the head of
the Danish-Dutch fleet. His brilliant victory at Oeland,
June n, 1676, showed the value of his assistance to the
The Great War 431
allies. De Ruyter's expedition was much less successful.
Owing to want of money and to the promise of the
Spaniards to furnish over twenty war ships, his fleet con-
sisted of only eighteen ships and some smaller vessels.
De Ruyter protested against this weak equipment, pointing
out the large French fleet that was to oppose him under
command of the excellent admiral Du Quesne, and having
little confidence in the Spanish ships. His warning
was disregarded and he yielded, saying he would risk
his life where the States trusted their flag,1 though
his health left much to be desired in consequence of a
severe attack of his malady, the gravel. He felt this
would be his last expedition and departed in sadness. In
August, 1675, he sailed to Cadiz, and neither there nor
at Barcelona, Cagliari, Naples, and Milazzo did he find
the expected Spanish fleet. Finally it appeared that this
fleet — "the sea power of the ocean," as the Spaniards
boastingly called it — lay quite unready at Palermo. But
the French fleet was already on the way to relieve be-
sieged Messina, and De Ruyter, reenforced by some
Spanish galleys, determined to seek it. On January 8th,
a battle took place near the island of Stromboli, in which
De Ruyter repulsed Du Quesne's stronger fleet and
forced it to sail around all Sicily to Messina. De Ruyter
now received orders to remain six months longer in these
waters. At Naples his intervention secured the release
of 26 Hungarian preachers from the Spanish galleys.3
He complained again of the weakness of his fleet, after
reenforcement by the small Spanish ships still unequal to
the French force. The States protested to Spain about
one thing and another and offered to build new vessels for
Spanish account, threatening to recall their fleet. Before
it came to this, De Ruyter had returned to Sicily, and he
sailed out from Palermo on March 14th, strengthened by
1 De Jonge, ii., p. 561.
2 Brandt, Leven van De Ruyter, p. gn.
432 History of the Dutch People
ten Spanish ships of war. The fleet went through the strait
of Messina, then southwards, and failed in an attack upon
Agosta. The French fleet now appeared, thirty war ships
with other vessels, to which De Ruyter could only oppose
nineteen smaller ships with some inferior craft. In sight of
Etna the battle began on the afternoon of April 22d, in
which De Ruyter won the victory after an obstinate fight
and put the enemy to flight. But the success was dearly
bought. Besides the many killed and wounded and the
severe damage to the ships, De Ruyter himself was
wounded. His left foot was carried away, while his right
leg was badly hurt. The fleet went to Syracuse, where
his wounds at first gave hope of recovery, until a traumatic
fever on the 29th of April ended his life. Thus died the
"great soldier and good patriot" far from his fatherland.
His body was embalmed and brought home on the fleet
in the following year, being interred at Amsterdam March
16, 1677, and Rombout Verhulst finishing his beautiful
tomb four years later. With De Ruyter disappeared the
second of the great Dutch admirals who have left an im-
mortal name in history. He stands higher than Marten
Tromp in the memory of posterity, which honours in him
the most brilliant period of the Dutch navy, the great sea-
man, the brave, honest, simple lover of his country, the
idol of his men, the "grandfather," whom all recognised
as their superior and loved as their fatherly friend.
His fleet remained for months after his death in Sicilian
waters under command of vice admiral Den Haen.
With the weak Spanish armada he soon went to meet the
enemy. Luck had deserted the fleet. On the 2d of
June he also was killed in a fatal battle at Palermo. His
successor Callenburgh, who was captain of De Ruyter's
ship and still had the famous admiral's body on board,
rescued what was possible and then sailed for Naples at
the risk of being intercepted by the French fleet of quad-
ruple his strength. Philips van Almonde, coming by land
The Great War 433
from the republic, now assumed command and, the
promised great Spanish fleet not appearing, he left these
waters in October to return first to Spain and then to the
fatherland, arriving there in February, 1677.
More fortunate was Almonde in command of the fleet
aiding Denmark against the Swedes in the Baltic, later
also the lieutenant admiral Bastiaense Schepers, while
Tromp repeatedly led to victory the Danish fleet which
he had reformed and manned largely with Dutch crews
under Dutch captains, until the Danish king, weary of the
war, dismissed the valiant admiral from his service. With
the small Brandenburg fleet Tromp now endeavoured to
injure the Swedes and served the elector at the conquest
of Riigen, after which he returned to the republic in Au-
gust, 1678. A sharp contest was waged also in the North
Sea, where the French privateer Jean Bart, who had long
been in the Dutch service, from the old pirates' -nest
Dunkirk inflicted great losses on the mercantile marine
and the fishery. Squadrons under Schepers, Van Nes,
Cornelis Evertsen, Vlugh, were often fitted out to hold
him and other privateers in check, but they did not always
succeed. Other squadrons helped protect Dutch and
Spanish commerce on the ocean and the Mediterranean,
one of them being commanded by the rear admiral Engel
de Ruyter, son of the admiral. Brave deeds were done
by many a captain in this guerrilla warfare against the ris-
ing naval power of France in all parts of the world. After
the battle of Kijkduin the Dutch fleet engaged in no great
battles owing to the increasing difficulty of manoeuvring
with so many heavy ships and because the enemy would
not risk its young navy in one great battle. Small mobile
squadrons were used, and it was easier to find commanders
for them. Notable was the expedition of commander
Jacob Binckes with a squadron to the West Indies, where
he took Cayenne and some of the French Antilles, and
directed his course to Tobago, the Dutch colony planted
vol. rv. — 28
434 History of the Dutch People
there in 1654 having been since often devastated by Eng-
lish and French. D' Estrees with a strong French fleet
soon recaptured Cayenne and went to Tobago, where
Binckes repelled his furious attacks at the cost of nearly
the whole Dutch squadron burned in a battle of March,
1677. A second attempt of d' Estrees met with better
success in December. Binckes himself perished, the
island was lost, the garrison suffered death or capture or
fled. The last years were not fortunate on the sea, and
Evertsen's expedition to Spain in the spring of 1678 fur-
nished little but disappointment on account of the weak
support of the Spaniards. It was hoped that an English
expedition would follow it, but this did not take place.
This hope was not baseless in 1678, because England
was inclined at last to join the alliance against France.
The continuation of the great war showed more and more
that the republic, with the feeble help of Spain and the
emperor and so long as strife lasted in the Baltic countries,
was not in a condition to curb the power of France so
grandly developed under Louis XIV. It had to contend
with difficulties on land as on the sea. Louvois had
again provided a large army for his king who laid siege to
Valenciennes in March, 1677. That city fell and then the
French besieged Cambrai and St. Omer. William III.
and Waldeck attempted to relieve the latter city, but at
Mont-Cassel on April nth the Dutch army was beaten by
the stronger French force under Orleans, and only the
prince's masterly management of the retreat averted dis-
aster, although he lost all his artillery and a third of his
men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The young gen-
eral's imperturbable courage did not desert him. He urged
on the allies and in August ventured to lay siege to
Charleroi, but it had speedily to be stopped, and the
prince with much talent extricated himself from the dan-
ger of being surrounded by a superior French force.
Opinion was not improved by these unsuccessful enter-
The Great War 435
prises. Weary of endless war, people longed eagerly for
peace even without the allies. Heavy war expenses, de-
feats in the Spanish Netherlands, losses at sea, the impos-
sibility of raising up commerce and industry excited a
universal desire for peace, and Amsterdam especially de-
manded it. Fearing a general European coalition under
the lead of the republic, Louis XIV. showed a readiness
to offer favourable conditions, if it would leave the allies to
their fate. In 1676 he consented to send his ambassadors
to Nimwegen and seemed inclined to renounce any ex-
tension of territory at the republic's expense, provided
the stipulations of the peace of the Pyrenees regarding
Spain were not insisted upon, but those of Aix-la-Chapelle
were accepted.1 The French ambassadors at Nimwegen
did their best to convince the Dutch representatives of
their peaceful disposition, declared a willingness to recog-
nise the prince in all his dignities, affirming the bad policy
of DeWitt alone had brought on the war, and promised
to give back to the prince his principality, again seized
upon by Louis XIV., and the property of his family in
Franche Comte. The prince, however, would not hear to
all this. He would only work for peace in cooperation
with the allies and on the basis of the peace of the Pyre-
nees, while he thought a middle course had been found in
the proposal to marry the young king of Spain to the
daughter of the duke of Orleans, the conquered fortresses
of the southern Netherlands becoming her dowry. The
French declined this and the wrangling continued.
In the republic people began to be dissatisfied with the
prince and his thirst for military glory. In Amsterdam
Van den Bosch, formerly secretary of De Witt, became pen-
sionary in 1677. Some pamphlets already appeared against
William III., especially those of the half-crazy visionary
Rothe1, who had long assailed him, had sought refuge
1 See concerning these negotiations Temple's reports and those of
d'Estrades in vol. viii. of his Negotiations.
436 History of the Dutch People
abroad, and now had secretly returned.1 Rothe was ar-
rested and imprisoned for years, and the prince considered
himself strong enough to follow his own line of conduct.
Through Temple and Shaftesbury he hoped to draw Eng-
land into the coalition. Leading English statesmen were
at first averse to such a connection, but Charles II. him-
self, afraid of the secret relations between the prince and
prominent members of the opposition, had formed the
plan of uniting his nephew more closely to his family by a
marriage between William III. and his oldest niece Mary,
the daughter of the Catholic York.3 This matrimonial
plan must have appeared desirable to the prince, for it
opened to him a certain road to the English throne in
case York's second marriage produced no sons. The
king's confidants, Arlington and Ossory, came to offer him
the princess at the end of 1674, but the prince, fearing he
would be implicated in court politics and thus brought
into disfavour with his English friends, evaded the offer
and declared he could not think of marriage in time of
war. Thus matters remained until 1676. Charles II.
took good care not to summon Parliament ; he could
count upon secret subsidies from Louis XIV. as long as
he left his troops in the French service and persisted in
his so-called neutrality ; at the same time he continued to
urge upon the prince and the States through Temple a
separate treaty with France. There came a change in the
spring of 1676. The prince, disappointed in his expecta-
tions of the war, now sought the king's friendship and
asked permission to visit him. But Charles II. and York
were then less amicably disposed. At last Parliament
assembled again in February, 1677, and insisted upon
measures for the rescue of the Netherlands from France,
upon an alliance with the coalition, upon war with France.
After the defeat of Mont-Cassel the prince also showed
1 De Boer, in Tijdschrift voor Gesch,, xv., 4.
9 Fruin, Willem III., p. 43.
The Great War 437
himself less stiff on the subject of the war. Charles II.
and York now assented to his coming, and on October
19th the prince appeared in London, where he speedily-
asked for the hand of his cousin. The application was
favourably received by Charles and his brother, and some
days later the marriage was concluded — an important affair
for the future of the English and Dutch people.
But the prince came not merely for this political mar-
riage. He hoped also to bring about a rupture between
the English court and France. Soon he convinced
Charles II. of the necessity of acting against France and
of compelling it to revert to the peace of the Pyrenees,
though some fortresses might have to be given it on
account of its victories. The prince returned to the
republic in December, and on January 26th Charles II.
made a treaty with it, after the terms of peace agreed
upon with William III. had been rejected by France. A
fleet and an army were to cooperate with those of the
republic as speedily as possible. In England the king's
plans were mistrusted, and it was feared that the prince
had been won over to his policy. In the republic peace
was wanted and not a continuation of the war. Distrust
of the prince's plans arose there also, and the conse-
quences of the previous English marriage in the house of
Orange were remembered with terror, the complications
of 1650 being attributed to it. The mutual lack of confi-
dence hindered the desired cooperation, and it was late
in the summer before the chance of it improved. Mean-
while the French armies were again approaching the
Dutch frontiers, and Maestricht was still occupied by
French troops.1 Must the territory of the state endure
another attack? Faith in the prince's prudence began to
waver. The best statesmen, even the prince's friends,
had moments of discouragement. Fagel spoke for a sep-
arate peace ; Van Beverningh and Van Beuningen wished
1 Knoop and Fruin, De slag van St. Denis ('s Gravenhage, 1881), p. 58.
438 History of the Dutch People
for peace ; Gilles Valckenier and Hooft, leaders of the two
Amsterdam factions, were united in the desire for peace,
and began together to oppose the prince's growing
power1; the new Amsterdam pensionary, Van den Bosch,
carried on a secret correspondence with d'Estrades at
Nimwegen known to him from De Witt's time. It was
no secret that the young stadtholder of Friesland, Henry
Casimir II., was jealous of his cousin of Orange. The
former dissensions of Frederick Henry's days between
the Frisian branch and that of Orange seemed about to
be renewed. Henry Casimir feared the plans now dis.
cussed in the north for placing the entire republic under
the prince of Orange and pushing aside in fact the Frisian
branch.
French diplomacy made a masterly use of all this both
in England and in the republic, strengthened the distrust
of the government at London and half won over Charles
II. to the French side again, augmented the division
in the republic and thus disturbed the prince's plans,
while it was always holding out favourable terms to the
Dutch envoys at Nimwegen to persuade them to the
ardently desired separate peace. At the same time Louis
XIV. prosecuted energetically the war in the Spanish
Netherlands from the early spring of 1678. First he
moved towards Lorraine, but suddenly turned to Flan-
ders, took in March within a few days Ghent and Ypres,
laid the country districts of Flanders and Brabant under
contribution in merciless fashion, and threatened to be-
siege Brussels, after which Luxembourg began slowly to
surround Mons with no less than 50,000 men. This rapid
advance of the French troops started England up at last,
and English troops, now on the side of the allies, occu-
pied Ostend and Bruges, while an English corps under
the king's bastard Monmouth was soon to come to the
1 Fruin in Nijh. Bijdr. jde Jv., v., p. 227, chiefly from Bontemantel, see
ed. Kernkamp, ii., p. 245.
The Great War 439
support of William III., who on his side moved to the
relief of Mons. Mutual distrust between Parliament and
the crown opposed the accomplishment of these promises.
Ghent's capture produced a deep impression in the Neth-
erlands, and the repeated faithlessness of the English
government caused little reliance to be placed on English
help. The old party of the States coming up again de-
termined to avail itself of this feeling; some of its leaders
met privately in March and opened communication with
d'Estrades, who advised they should refuse to the prince
to raise any more taxes for war and should emphatically
inform him that France was quite ready for an advan-
tageous separate peace.1 The prince yielded somewhat
to the storm and offered to consult with England. But
the French negotiators at Nimwegen declined the Eng-
lish mediation and applied directly to the States with the
offer to give back Maestricht, to conclude a commercial
treaty, and to leave Spain a fortified line on the borders
of the Spanish Netherlands. Favourable terms were put
in prospect for the allies also, though France thought of
holding conquered Franche Comt6 and bringing Lorraine
entirely under its sovereignty. These advantageous con-
ditions for the republic excited lively satisfaction there,
and the strong peace party called for their immediate
acceptance, but the slow course of such affairs and the
prince's evident unwillingness made matters drag through
the whole spring. Finally the States asked Louis XIV.
for a truce of six weeks, and it was granted.
The Dutch ambassadors at Nimwegen now endeavoured
to persuade the allies, succeeding readily with Spain which
was dependent upon the republic's aid. The emperor,
however, and the German princes, Brandenburg foremost,
and Denmark, which latter would have to give up their
conquests to Sweden at the peace, refused and complained
bitterly of the faithlessness of the States. Sure of Spain,
1 Fruin, De slag van St. Denis, p. 65.
44° History of the Dutch People
the States reported to the king that they accepted his pro-
posals, and they commissioned their representatives to
sign the peace together with Spain. Peace was concluded
in fact, and the prince reluctantly agreed to it. Luxem-
bourg began to evacuate Brabant ; only the ratification of
the treaty was still necessary. The French troops remained
around Mons, close to the Dutch-Spanish army of the
prince, which was to prevent the surrounding of this im-
portant city. At the last moment a difference arose at
Nimwegen over the time set for the evacuation of the
fortresses occupied by the French, including Maestricht,
which Louis XIV. would not wholly evacuate before
Sweden had recovered its lost possessions — an unreason-
able condition made only because dissension had broken
out again in England between king and Parliament and
Louis felt safe on that side. Peace was not yet signed,
much less ratified, while Mons already suffering from
hunger might yet fall into the hands of Luxembourg, who
objected to the bringing of provisions into the city.
Neither the States nor the Spaniards wanted to leave
Mons for a moment in French hands, because the French
ambassadors at Nimwegen had intimated that they would
give back the city, if it fell after peace was signed and
ratified, not disclosing what they would do, if it fell before
that time. This attitude of France awakened alarm in the
Netherlands and in England. Charles II. sent Temple to
The Hague again to propose to the States that France
should be forced to accept peace, and Holland and Amster-
dam considered themselves threatened by Louis. The
prince returned to the army at the end of July, and both
powers demanded of Louis a withdrawal of his condition
concerning the evacuation before August I Ith, or, in case of
refusal, England would join the coalition. Every day bad
news from Mons was feared, every day an attempt to re-
lieve it was expected, the prince having everything ready.
French diplomacy endeavoured to sow distrust between
The Great War 44 l
England and the States that peace might be postponed
and Mons be played into Luxembourg's possession. The
States realised that this must be prevented at any price, and
the prince, with Waldeck as chief of his staff, moved up on
the loth in order to attack the enemy on the following day,
the end of the time allowed to France.
At the last moment French diplomacy made a masterly
move at Nimwegen. It yielded to the demand for evacua-
tion and persuaded the Dutch ambassadors on the ioth
to sign the peace just before midnight, while that with
Spain could not be made ready, some points requiring to
be formulated. Thus the republic had peace, but next
day the French began making all sorts of difficulties for
Spain in the hope that Mons might fall and be exchanged
for something else. Meanwhile the prince moved closer
to Luxembourg's position. The report of the conclusion
of peace was already noised about the camp. No official
letters came to confirm the rumour, but on the 13th news
was shown in print around the prince giving Van Bever-
ningh's report of the ioth to the States that he was to
sign the peace that same evening. Luxembourg had
heard similar rumours, and on the morning of the 14th
d'Estrades appeared in his camp with the official intelli-
gence. The French general was on the point of informing
the prince of Orange, who had still no report from his
government, and thus of avoiding the battle already offered
him, but he hesitated and believed that the honour of war
obliged him to fight the battle. At St. Denis, an hour's
distance from Mons, the prince attacked him, and the
battle, in which the prince gave proofs of uncommon per-
sonal courage and of a reckless contempt for death, ended
indecisively, but was not renewed on the following day.
Towards noon of the 15th the prince received the report
from the council pensionary and from the Spanish side
and gave up further strife as useless. The enemy moved
away from the neighbourhood of Mons a few days later and
442 History of the Dutch People
the prince returned home. The war was over. After a
month peace between France and Spain was concluded
through Dutch mediation, France keeping Franche Comt6
and a series of important fortresses, including Valenci-
ennes, Cambrai, St. Omer, Ypres, and Maubeuge.1 In the
course of the next year the other allies, one after another,
made separate treaties of peace, loudly complaining of the
faithlessness of the States which had left them in the lurch.
The battle of St. Denis has occasioned a remarkable conten-
tion between Messrs. Knoop and Fruin as to William III.'s
attitude with regard to this battle. The discussion has
shown that the prince had received no official report of the
conclusion of peace and Luxembourg had received such a
report. The accusation may well be denied that William
III. risked the bloody battle, knowing peace was made, in
order to undo that peace.
Thus ended after six years the war that was to destroy
the republic. Under the lead of the great soldier of the
house of Orange and with the help of the allies coming at
the eleventh hour it preserved its independence and terri-
tory. Its way of rewarding those allies must be disap-
proved of, but no one can take from it the glory of having
stood firmly during years for the defence not only of itself
but also of Europe against the conquering lust of the in-
satiable French king, whose sturdiest opponent was con-
stantly shown to be Prince William III.
1 See Actes et n/gociations de lapaix de Nimigue, ii., p. 729, the collection
where all the official documents relating to this peace are to be found.
CHAPTER XVI
PREPARATION OF THE GREAT COALITION
PEACE was now concluded, but from the first moment
the prince understood that this peace was really
nothing more than a truce. There was no sign of an ap-
pearance that France had given up its plans in the Span-
ish Netherlands and the German empire or its desire to
extend its frontiers to the Rhine. Plainly it had wished
for peace merely to avert the threatened European coali-
tion and to be able to wait for a more favourable time.
The prince was resolved to seek the task of his life in the
frustration of those plans, in the maintenance of what was
beginning to be called the " European balance of power."
William III. considered himself called by God to this task
for religious as well as political reasons, because Louis
XIV's course in religious matters showed that the victory
of France would be likewise that of Catholicism. William
regarded himself as appointed by God to defend the polit-
ical and religious liberty of Europe and of the civilised
world.1 And he was determined in this struggle for free-
dom and faith to prove himself the worthy scion of the
great founder of his house, whose device— -je maintiendrai
—was also his cherished motto, his aspirations being best
represented by the — pro religione et libertate. This high
ideal has given to his person and government a peculiar
character, by which his time is distinguished in Dutch
history from the period immediately preceding. The
1 Fruin, Prins Willem III. in zijn verhouding tot Engeland, p. 115. See
P. L. Muller, Wilhelm III. von Oranicn ttnd G. F. von Waldeck, ii., p. 17,
443
444 History of the Dutch People
Cartesian DeWitt, the Catholic Lisola, had merely con-
templated a political contest with France, the former
guided by the particular interest of the republic, the latter
by that of the emperor and empire. What they had be-
gun from their limited point of view William III. took up
with a wider and deeper vision. To his high ideal he
subordinated and sacrificed his own interest, his own per-
son, the interests of his dynasty and of the countries and
peoples intrusted to his rule. He risked his life times
innumerable ; he ventured his domestic happiness in the
service of his policy, when he united himself with the
woman who, not until much later, won his heart by her
self-sacrificing love ; he overcame his personal inclinations
by submitting to the limitation of his royal power in Eng-
land, the necessary condition of his elevation, which as-
sured to him England's help against France. This im-
molation of self, this energetic pursuit of his grand pur-
pose, has given to the outwardly cool, stubborn, weak
man the sympathy of posterity, which honours him higher
than did most of his contemporaries, because it sees in
him the unselfish, tireless champion of the high ideals of
political and religious liberty dear to the present.
His government was not fortunate for the republic in all
respects, not even during the ten and later the five years
of peace, the half of his reign, when it could recover from
the difficulties brought upon it by war. He regarded the
republic more as the implement put by God into his hand
for the attainment of the desired end than as the state
whose interests were committed to his care. He knew
the need of improvement in its faulty form of govern-
ment, but did not take the trouble to strive for its reform.
He was content with the great power given him between
1672 and 1675 and paid slight attention to the way his
creatures used the authority conferred by him on them,
provided they remained the obedient servants of the
policy which he prescribed for them. Not unknown to
Preparation of the Great Coalition 445
him were the actions of his second cousin and favourite
Odijk,1 the rapacious prodigal, whom he appointed in
1668 to the influential dignity of first noble in Zealand.
William knew that his cousin trafficked in the offices of
Zealand in shameless fashion, but he did not end this
business, because he recognised Odijk's personal attach-
ment to himself and Odijk by his brilliant life at The
Hague enhanced the splendour of the court. Under the
patronage of this adventurer, considered by his guests as
a rogue and cheat, official corruption flourished,2 and the
governing cabals in the towns of Zealand, suppressed
after the fall of the De Witt party, were restored in favour
of the other party. Affairs went elsewhere as in Zealand.
At Amsterdam the government of before 1672 was re-
placed by Valckenier's clique, which had great influence3
on the appointments and regarded in the beginning as a
law the recommendation of those who the most " are in
favour with His Highness." The " resolution for har-
mony " of May, 1676, offered by Valckenier to the other
burgomasters, was nothing but a combination aiming to
win over the opposite party in order together to resist the
prince. It was not fully accepted, but, when Hooft be-
came burgomaster again in 1677, he and Valckenier ruled
over the city until the latter's death three years later. In
smaller cities also men entered the government by influ-
ence, intrigue, or gifts, through the favour of His High-
ness, just as earlier through De Witt or his friends. At
Rotterdam a candidate for the town council had to
promise to obey the prince " blindly." In the East India
Company, in church consistories, in all governing boards,
similar abuses were very common at this time, all the
profitable offices being played into the hands of friends
and relatives, and under the prince's protection such
1 See Fruin, Aanteekeningeti op Droste, ii., p. 470.
2 De Witte van Citters, Contracien van Correspondentie, p. xviii.
3 See Bontemantel, ii., p. 208.
446 History of the Dutch People
wrongs were punished less than before. What happened
in Holland and Zealand took place in the other provinces
also on a large scale, so that in this regard William III.'s
period was a time of retrogression rather than of progress.
In Henry Casimir's stadtholderships the evil was little
less extensive.
These affairs were made critical by the circumstance
that the prince could hardly be called particular in the
choice of his instruments. Odijk is not the only one who
had a bad name. The prince's treatment of the chief
personages in the drama of the De Witts does not move
to admiration of his ruling principles, and what the
younger Constantijn Huygens in his journals communi-
cates concerning the chief members of the prince's circle,
though much calumny may be given out for truth, shows
that the mischief was not confined to the municipal gov-
ernment boards or to the anonymous press. The prince's
favourites in general bore a bad reputation, and while
their influence lasted, they used it in every way for their
own profit. " Injustice and desire for higher estate "
were no less general in William III.'s days than in those
of De Witt and were more strikingly displayed, while the
regents of the later time were inferior in ability to those
of the preceding period. This was because the prince
required docility in his creatures rather than ability ;
which often brings independence of judgment, his rule
being much injured by this preference.1 The fame of
the Dutch diplomatists in this period, however, did not
remain far below the height it attained in De Witt's
time. Van Beverningh retired from public affairs at the
age of'65 after the peace of Nimwegen and devoted him-
self, until his death in 1690, to the cultivation of rare and
exotic plants at his villa near Leyden, where he was cura-
tor of the university. De Groot a year after his return
from exile was brought before the court of Holland on
1 Fruin, Willem III. in zijne verhouding tot Engeland, p. 115.
1
Preparation of the Great Coalition 447
account of the discovery of his correspondence with the
condemned De Wicquefort during the negotiations at
Cologne but was acquitted in December, 1676, to the
vexation of the prince ; he died two years later at his
country house near Haarlem. Van Beuningen, the bril-
liant diplomatist, and man of the world, for some years
after the peace of Westminster occupied the important
post of ambassador in London, where he was until 1682
the faithful servant of the new ruler's policy. Then he
began to oppose the prince, resigned his ambassadorship,
was unable to maintain himself as burgomaster in Am-
sterdam, and in a fit of dejection withdrew from poli-
tics to become absorbed in the mystical ideas that had
attracted him of old. Soon he showed signs of mental
derangement, especially after his singular marriage in his
old age ; a few years later he became quite insane and
died so in 1693 almost forgotten. Their place was taken
by eminent noblemen like Godard van Rheede, lord of
Amerongen, who won reputation by negotiating with
Brandenburg, like Everhard van Weede, lord of Dijkveld,
one of the trustiest servants of the prince's policy. Like
them the council pensionary Fagel adhered uncondition-
ally to the prince's views. With Waldeck, who besides
his military talent possessed that also of the diplomatist,
these men were the excellent instruments disposed of by
the prince in conducting foreign affairs, and they could
stand comparison with the diplomatists of De Witt's
time. But they were the tools of the prince's policy
much more than De Witt's statesmen had been his tools,
and this was even more true of such men as the prince's
gentleman of the bedchamber and confidential friend,
Hans Willem baron Bentinck, now and then used in deli-
cate negotiations to reach the great end of a European
coalition against France.
If this end was to be attained, the prince must first of
all have to fear no opposition in the republic itself. Since
448 History of the Dutch People
Amsterdam had antagonised him in 1677 and the Frisian
stadtholder had begun to thwart him, this opposition gave
the prince no rest. It had to be overcome, as was plainly-
shown by events after the peace of Nimwegen. The
way peace was secured had roused the prince's exaspera-
tion against Amsterdam, and its secret cooperation with
the enemy was not unknown to him. With Valckenier
at its head the great commercial city defied the powerful
stadtholder and worked against his anti-French policy.
After Valckenier's death the lead at Amsterdam fell into
the hands of Johan Hudde and Nicolaas Witsen, learned
and excellent men but less able as statesmen. Neither
they nor Van Beuningen, who was burgomaster at Am-
sterdam a few years longer, followed the prince's wishes
entirely, but their opposition was less strong than that of
the energetic Valckenier. French diplomacy availed it-
self cleverly of Amsterdam's disposition. The French
ambassador d'Avaux, who represented his government
here after the peace, always emphasised the fact that he
was ambassador to the States and not to the prince. He
flattered the States as much as possible, and Louvois at
Paris offered the ambassador of the republic an alliance
with great advantages for commerce and navigation and
the promise to let the Spanish Netherlands alone in case
of war. Thus France hoped to vanquish the republic's
resistance. The prince's plans were impeded, though
nothing came of the proposed alliance. Those plans
were directed at Germany and England. Just then
England, where the fear of Catholicism was leading to
persecution, seemed on the right road, and the prince's
influence on the king had never been greater, but there
was slight reliance placed in the permanence of the Eng-
lish policy. Things were not much better in Germany,
although Waldeck on behalf of the prince succeeded in
forming a " union " of various small German princes on
the Rhine with Nassau as its centre. Brandenburg com-
Preparation of the Great Coalition 449
plained still of the peace of Nimwegen and demanded its
unpaid subsidies of the States as did the emperor him-
self, and it was even persuaded into a secret league and
subsidy treaty with France. The rising Hanover showed
the same disposition. Notwithstanding Waldeck's efforts
the Rhenish union was very slow in extending over north
Germany and becoming a union of the upper imperial
circles against France.
This was all in process, when France threw off the mask
by establishing the chambres de reunion, destined to ascer-
tain what parts of the German empire had formerly be-
longed to the fortresses and lands now become French
possessions, while it immediately occupied the duchy of
Luxemburg and moved its troops far into Brabant and
Flanders ostensibly to maintain its rights obtained at
Nimwegen. Great was the indignation on all sides at
these sudden demands. Poor Spain, paralysed by court
cabals and intrigues, looked up anxiously to the republic.
The chief princes of northern and central Germany, in-
cluding some of those " armed " princes who always had
troops ready to sell for subsidies, joined the union owing
to Waldeck's exertions and thus formed the alliance of the
upper imperial circles. But Brandenburg opposed this
movement and tried to keep the emperor out of the
league. The alarm became greater, when France seized
upon Strasburg August 30, 168 1, and began to force Lux-
emburg to surrender by a blockade. In October Sweden
concluded an alliance with the republic for the mainte-
nance of the peace of Miinster and Nimwegen, and it was
hoped that England, the emperor, Denmark, Branden-
burg, and the minor German potentates would join, so
that France must finally come to it. William III. and
Waldeck endeavoured to obtain a union of all the inter-
ested princes in the German empire under the emperor's
lead. This resulted in the treaty of Laxenburg in June,
1682, and then there was a beginning of armed resistance
29
45° History of the Dutch People
on the Rhine. Prince William supported his faithful
Waldeck, his " minister for German affairs," and the ques-
tion was now whether the republic would take up arms
again in case of war and whether England would coope-
rate. But England remained powerless on account of the
division between king and Parliament concerning the ex-
clusion, desired by the latter, of the Catholic York from
the succession or the limitation of his authority in case he
should succeed. The weak Charles II. began again to
hold out his hand to France, while the prince saw his in-
fluence decline and, by a journey to London, convinced
himself of his uncle's unreliability. Soon he deemed all
hope from that side lost.1 England's attitude, coupled
with French intrigues in Amsterdam and elsewhere, de-
termined that of the States. The burgomasters of Am-
sterdam adhered to their resolution to do nothing serious
without England. Help was promised to Spain, but nego-
tiations were to come first, and immediately Louis relin-
quished Luxemburg and thus showed his friendliness to
the republic in order to paralyse the prince's war policy.
Spain, weary of French violence in its Netherlands,
called once more for the help of the republic which, in
accordance with treaties, ought to have sent 8000 troops.
The prince favoured this and proposed to the council
of state an increase of the army by 16,000 men. Am-
sterdam refused to take this road to war and inspired
elsewhere opposition to the prince's plans among the
regents fearful of a new French war. The discovery of
secret relations between the French ambassador and the
Amsterdam magistrates seemed about to break this resist-
ance. The prince reproached them with treason, spoke
like his father of " those Amsterdam rascals," threatened
them with the vengeance of the people, with throwing
''the club into the street " as in 1672, and popular agita-
tion began to arise destined, it was expected, to make it
1 Fruin, Willem III., p. ioo.
I
Preparation of the Great Coalition 45 T
soon appear "whose head was firmest on his shoulders."
Neither remonstrances nor deputations could induce Am-
sterdam to yield. It declined after Spain had declared
war on France and affirmed that it was justified in nego-
tiating with a foreign ambassador like d'Avaux. Civil
war seemed to be threatened as in 1650. There was talk
of possible military measures against the great commercial
city and of its plan to transfer the supreme command
within its walls to the Frisian stadtholder, who was op-
posed to his cousin in the affair of raising more troops.
It was thought that Amsterdam would be supported by
France and Brandenburg, whose ambassador was on good
terms with d'Avaux and was soon aided in his diplomacy
by a special envoy, Paul von Fuchs. But the prince went
to work in another way. On January 31, 1684, he had
the increase of the army adopted in the Estates of Hol-
land by a majority of votes despite the protests of Am-
sterdam and Schiedam. The resolution was offered to
the States-General as coming from Holland. Then ar-
rived the report that the Spanish government of Brussels
had intercepted a packet from d'Avaux, in which a cipher
letter from him to his king mentioned several members of
De Witt's old party as " well-disposed " and seemed es-
pecially to compromise the Amsterdam regents. The
letter was sent from Brussels to the prince, who commu-
nicated it (February 16) to the Estates of Holland in
secret session with closed doors. A violent scene ensued ;
Amsterdam's attitude was sharply disapproved of, while
the papers in its office at the Hague were sealed and a
copy of the intercepted letter was sent to the other munic-
ipal governments. A translation cf the letter appeared
a few days later in print. The affair excited great alarm
now that the chance of a war with France seemed so
near. But d'Avaux and Amsterdam protested against
these things. It rained little blue books again, some for,
others against the prince and his policy. One of them,
45 2 History of the Dutch People
the Missive from a regent in the Estates of Holland by
Philalethes, was attributed to Fagel himself and brought
forth an official Vindication of the conduct of the lords of
Amsterdam. While the affair went off thus in Amsterdam,
the prince attacked his opponents in other cities as well.1
He managed everywhere to establish his authority and
to subject the regents to that authority with a vig-
orous hand. He would not have feared to take meas-
ures against Amsterdam conflicting with its privileges and
customs. The old antagonism between the " monarchic "
and the "aristocratic" government with its consequences
for civil liberty and unity once more appeared.3 The
levy of soldiers encountered opposition in other provinces
in the spring after the deep impression produced by
Louis XIV.'s brutality towards weak Genoa, which he
bombarded into submission in May, 1684, on account of
its building of ships for Spaniards. The fate of the " Hol-
landers of the Mediterranean Sea" was lamented, but the
power of France seemed too great. So the affair had to
be postponed, and Spain continued alone in its war with
France.
That war of course resulted to the advantage of France.
It conquered nearly all Flanders, burned Oudenarde, regu-
larly laid siege to Luxemburg, and took the city after a
brave defence. And the republic sat still, to the vexation of
the prince. The German empire also did nothing, now that
the emperor had to devote all his attention to the Turks,
who had even besieged Vienna in 1683 but were repulsed
with German and Polish help. Brandenburg still worked
into France's hand, and Hanover hesitated what to do.
England's attitude afforded no hope of cooperation. The
discovery of the "Protestant treason," a conspiracy against
the duke of York, in which the king's illegitimate son
1 Wagenaar, xv., p. ^59.
s See the very numerous pamphlets, speeches, and essays concerning this
in the catalogues of pamphlets for this year.
Preparation of the Great Coalition 453
James, duke of Monmouth, and many English noblemen
were implicated, caused a persecution of the enemies of
York and the Romish church. Monmouth fled to Holland
and sought refugee at the prince's court in The Hague,
where he was readily received in spite of the suspicion of a
secret understanding with the conspirators thus incurred
by the prince and princess, already in disfavour with York
and his party. Both prince and States did their best to
please Charles II., and his anger was soon appeased; but
he continued to act secretly with France. The willingness^
with which the sheriff of Leyden, Cornells Paets, delivered
up Thomas Armstrong, one of Monmouth's fugitive
friends, to be soon afterwards beheaded in London, ex-
cited resentment at this deviation from the custom of re-
ceiving political exiles here. There seemed to be no pos-
sibility of a good understanding between England and the
States and of joint action against France. The only thing
left to do was to make some arrangement with France,
which did not seem disinclined now it had what it wanted.
William III. was beaten and endeavoured to save whatever
was possible. A truce of twenty years on the basis of the
status quo was concluded in Ratisbon on August 15, 1684,
and it put temporarily into France's hands everything con-
quered but opened an opportunity, before the definitive
cession of these lands and cities, of organising opposition
to the "general monarchy" desired by France.1 Time
won was well won. But France wanted more than the
"general monarchy," the "supreme power" in Europe,
everywhere spoken of : it wanted also a " general religion,"
Catholicism. The Edict of Nantes "perpetual and irrevo-
cable," which from 1 598 assured a large measure of freedom
to the Huguenots in France, was a thorn in the eye of the
strict Catholics under Louis XIV. Rude hands were
1 On the significance of this treaty see P. L. Muller, in Vers/, en
MeJed. Kon. Akademie,^1' J?., iv., p. 78, in opposition to the opinion of
Fester in his book : Die artnirten Stande und die Reichskriegsvtrfassung.
454 History of the Dutch People
now laid upon what Louis XIII. had maintained, what
Richelieu and Mazarin had been unwilling to touch, what
the young Louis XIV. himself had recognised as law in
1652. About 1660 France numbered more than one mil-
lion Protestants, one twelfth of the entire population,1
from Dauphiny to Brittany and Normandy living along
the edge of the kingdom and particularly numerous among
the manufacturers, merchants, and farmers, with over 600
churches and 700 preachers. But the French clergy, ruled
by the Jesuits, looked askant upon the blooming plant of
heresy and gradually found the king's ear open to their
remonstrances, his Spanish ancestry on the mother's side
manifesting itself in increasing devoutness. It opposed
the building of Protestant churches in places where the
Edict of Nantes did not really apply, and in 1666 the king
declared the Edict should be exactly enforced. This was
the beginning of the official persecution, which had in fact
commenced some years earlier by all sorts of molestations
and insults, so that no worship of the Protestants took
place at Charenton near Paris without disturbance and no
dying man was safe from attacks upon his faith." Not-
withstanding the bitter complaints of the Protestants one
royal declaration after another restricted their liberties ;
finally, family life was reached by the permission to convert
children seven years old to the Catholic religion and to
take them away from their families. No persecution,
however, could do away with Protestantism ; only a few
gave up the struggle and changed their faith or left
the land of their fathers, while active preachers like
Du Bosc, Jurieu, Benoit, Basnage, Bayle kept their
flocks together. Then the system of compulsion began
in 1682. "Compel them to come in" was recommended
to the government as a duty by the Gallican church. A
warning in this spirit was proclaimed, and the king ap-
1 Histoire gdne'rale, ed. Lavisse and Rambaud, vi., p. 281.
2 Journal d'un voyage a Paris, passim.
Preparation of the Great Coalition 455
pointed commissioners to apply these ideas, to remove
Protestant officials, close shops and inns owned by Prot-
estants, demolish churches, and prevent religious worship.
The commissioners obtained soldiers to complete their
task. Hundreds of families were reduced to beggary,
hundreds fled to Switzerland, to the republic, to the
Protestant sections of northern Germany, to England to
escape imprisonment and corporal punishment. It became
even worse with the beginning of 1685. A last protest
of the persecuted was answered by a demand from the
clergy for the abrogation of the Edict, because it could no
longer serve as a general law on account of the modifications
gradually made in it. The king, now under the influence
of Madame de Maintenon and the Jesuits, desired nothing
better. The terrible dragonnades of Beam were imitated
in all the provinces ; dragoons invaded the houses, plun-
dered, abused, tortured the poor Protestants to convert
them on the spot. Hundreds fled, other hundreds submit-
ted, others gave up their lives for their faith or atoned for
their constancy as galley slaves. Every day reports reached
the court of "conversion" by the sword, and the clergy
dared to speak of this " road strewn with flowers," of its
aversion to the executions necessary " to destroy this
hydra."
The revocation of the Edict on October 17, 1685, was
the crown of the work. Not a single right remained to
the " pretended reformed religion "; its adherents might
still dwell in France, but their children must be brought
up as Catholics, and the property of emigrants was con-
fiscated and they themselves were condemned to the gal-
leys for life. Thus Louis earned the praises of his clergy,
the approval of Pope Innocent XL, though the pope had
scruples against the mingling of political and religious mo-
tives and against the conversions by violence in France
and later disapproved often of the persecutions there.1
1 See Fruin, Willem III., p. 145. Also the brief of December 13, 16S5,
456 History of the Dutch People
Thus the king earned the curses of the tens of thousands
who emigrated before the revocation, of the hundreds of
thousands who now left home and hearth to seek else-
where for the freedom which could no longer be theirs in
France. The day of the 17th of October, 1685, cost France
half a million of inhabitants, and they took with them,
according to an eminent French historian of our time,
" treasures of heroism, constancy, self-sacrifice," that could
never be replaced. The free Protestant republic provided
a new fatherland for thousands of these refugees. The
Protestant court of the stadtholder and his wife supported
a number of men and women of all ranks among them ;
the cities of Holland and the other provinces opened wide
their gates to thousands of industrious and educated
people : preachers, officers, merchants, workmen, farmers,
who came streaming in. In 1686 their number was esti-
mated at not less than 75,000, and they continued flocking
to the land of personal freedom, where they could worship
in their own language in the Walloon communities exist-
ing longer than a century.1 The cities endeavoured to
attract the French manufacturers and workmen by privi-
leges, loans, temporary exemption from taxes. Industry,
especially in the cities of Holland, derived the greatest ad-
vantages from them.8 Old branches of industry received
new life from this sudden influx of fresh strength ; new
industries were established, like those of hats, silken stuffs,
gauze, velvet, taffeta, lace. A dark side was the increasing
influence of French education in polite circles, the action
of the French language on the Dutch tongue. This great
immigration was entirely merged into the more numerous
population of the country. In the second or third genera-
cited in Histoire generate, p. 301, as compared with the papal declarations
of 16S8 to De Cock and of 1689 (Ranke, Pap'ste, iii., p. 115). Concerning
the pope's attitude see especially : Immich, Papst Innocenz XI. (Berlin,
1900), p. 64.
1 See d'Avaux, N/gociations, vols. v. and vi.
s Pringsheim, Beilrdge zur wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsgeschichte, p. 33.
Preparation of the Great Coalition 457
tion the mingling with the original Dutch people was so
thorough that the influence of the French element seems to
vanish from the investigator's eye. The descendants of
the French immigrants are now only to be distinguished
from the Netherlanders of older ancestry by their names
and family traditions.
The treatment of the Protestants in Catholic France
had an irritating effect upon the feeling in the Netherlands
against the Catholics.1 The eagerly read stories of the
dragonnades and other abuses ; the poverty of many
refugees ; alarming reports of renewed persecutions of the
Waldenses in Savoy, of the Catholic government in Eng-
land, now that Charles II. had been succeeded in 1685 by
the Catholic York as James II., of the appearance of a
Catholic branch of the princely house in the Palatinate ;
sensational conversions of German Protestants, the em-
peror's victories over the Turks, and the restoration of
Catholicism in Hungary — all this made people believe in
a general Catholic activity in Europe, in a " Great council
of Rome," of which the Jesuits were the soul and Louis
XIV., James II., and Fiirstenberg were the most powerful
tools. Violent pamphlets stirred up the agitation, and it
was not quieted by the circumstance that the Catholics un-
der the guidance of Neercassel refrained from giving of-
fence and even contributed money for the poor refugees.
The States-General discussed a revival of strict regulations
against the Catholics, but Holland managed to postpone
the matter, as the merchants were opposed to any such
severity and the imperial ambassador at The Hague,
Cramprich, who interested himself in the faith of his co-
religionists, had to be favoured on account of the prince's
plans for the great coalition, into which even the pope was
gradually drawn from fear of the predominance of France.
Late in 1687 the expulsion of Jesuits, Franciscans, Do-
minicans, etc., was proposed in Holland, but the proposal
1 Knuttel, De toestand der Katholieken, i., p. 290.
45 8 History of the Dutch People
did not become a law and soon the awakened religious
passions subsided. In Zealand commercial and political
considerations opposed the urgency of the preachers, who
were warned to be calm and to observe " moderation in
the affairs of the papists." In Friesland and Groningen
only were serious measures taken against the Catholics,
and there were persecutions and plunderings of churches.
The persecutions and the revocation of the Edict had
a decided influence on the Great Elector's attitude.1 The
political consequences of his secret league with France,
from which he had expected support against Sweden in
his designs upon Pomerania, had been a failure. When
Louis XIV. showed himself as the champion of Catholi-
cism, the thought of Brandenburg's position in Germany
as the most powerful Protestant state came to the fore,
and the elector's Protestant sympathies made him offer his
country also as a refuge for the persecuted. His good rela-
tions with France suffered from this, although he did not
yet give up the alliance, on account of the subsidies, and
tried to smooth over the reception of the French emigrants
settling especially in Berlin and the taking into his service
of exiled officers, including the famous marshal Schom-
berg. In May, 1685, he sent his trusted counsellor, Paul
von Fuchs, to the republic to restore a good understand-
ing with it and his nephew, the prince of Orange. Fuchs
succeeded in his mission: the alliance, concluded in 1678,
before the peace, was prolonged until 1700, and the dis-
sension between the prince and Amsterdam was settled
by the mediation of Fuchs. The latter cost no less
trouble than the former, because obstinacy on both sides
had long prevented harmony. The chances for it had
risen somewhat in the spring of 1685. Through the me-
diation of the princess of Anhalt, daughter of Frederick
1 P. L. Mullen, Een Brandenburgsche zending in Nederland in i6Sj, in
Nijh. Bijdr. N. R., vi., p. 77, and Nederland en de Groote keurvorst, in
Nijh. Bijdr. N. J?., vi., p. 169.
Preparation of the Great Coalition 459
Henry and mother-in-law of Henry Casimir from 1683,
peace was brought about in March between the two
cousins, and Henry Casimir pledged himself in writing no
longer to oppose but to support the policy of William III.
"in relation to other kingdoms and commonwealths."1
This reconciliation weakened the Amsterdam party, and
the efforts of d'Avaux to bind Amsterdam to France be-
came less effectual. Just at this time Fu'chs appeared as
mediator and in the course of the summer succeeded in
bringing the prince and the burgomasters of Amsterdam
together. Amsterdam agreed that the army should not
be reduced during the current year, assented to the alli-
ance with Brandenburg and the accompanying financial
sacrifice in favour of the elector, and only secured a regu-
lation of the tariff of convoys and licenses to suit itself.
D' Avaux did his best to break this understanding, but
his "artifices" could no longer disturb the "good har-
mony." The retirement of Van Beuningen from the bur-
gomastership established peace more solidly, for Witsen,
Hudde, and the other rulers of Amsterdam were more
tractable, especially since the pensionary Hop had been
gained to the prince's views. The prince triumphed here
also, and the point was found, about which the great co-
alition could be formed. No city in Holland would now
venture to resist his will, and nothing was to be feared
from the other provinces.
There was for a time some hope that England would
play an important part in the coalition. The new king,
James II., was an ardent Catholic, but also a defender of
the balance of power in Europe. He manifested an in-
clination to cooperate with his son-in-law, the prince of
Orange, who was likewise the presumptive successor to
the throne of England. James II. had a much stronger
character than his deceased brother, and England could
be depended upon, if he were once won over to William
1 Sypesteyn, Geschiedk. Bijdr. iii., p. 27.
460 History of the Dutch People
III.'s policy. Negotiations between the king and the
prince aimed to promote an agreement between England
and the republic. Commercial differences were intrusted
to a mixed commission. The king desired that Charles
II. 's bastard son, the young duke of Monmouth, regarded
as the head of the opposition in England, should be ex-
pelled from the republic, that the English emigrants in
general should leave it, that suspected officers in the
English and Scotch regiments of the States should be
discharged, that the republic with England should draw a
line against France. The prince consented to all this.
Harmony did not long endure, because James, influenced
by Monmouth's armed invasion of England, by insurrec-
tions in Scotland, by Protestant agitation in the whole
realm, soon began, like his brother before him, to seek
financial aid from Louis XIV. A year later the king had
entered upon a Catholic reaction, which estranged him
further from his people and made that people look to the
prince of Orange as the saviour of its faith and freedom
from the secret plans of a Catholic king. Apparently no
help for the great coalition was to be expected from Eng-
land under James II., who was secretly in league with
Louis XIV. and at the critical moment would stand with
France, unless a revolution should change the course of
English affairs. Then would come the time for the
prince to exert a decisive influence on England's fortunes.
Not until then might England finally be won for his re-
ligio-political ideal.
While he watched matters in England, he and Waldeck
with Brandenburg's aid were busily organising the party
of opposition to France in the German empire and pre-
paring the coalition upon a broader basis. It was very
slow work to break up the relations between France and
the small German courts, to unravel the net of finely spun
intrigues. The Laxenburg treaty of 1682 remained with-
out much result owing to the war with the Turks and the
Preparation of the Great Coalition 461
attitude of the republic. Waldeck went to Vienna in
July, 1685, to take part in the campaign against the
Turks on the Danube and to induce the German princes
to persist in their union with the emperor for the em-
pire's defence. He succeeded in the latter and supported
the endeavours of the imperial court in place of the ex-
piring Laxenburg treaty to bring about the Augsburg al-
liance (1686), a treaty of less general importance than is
attributed to it and only serving to keep together what
had been brought together. Spain and Sweden as
members of the empire joined the nucleus of the Franco-
nian-Rhenish princes, and Waldeck, under the elector of
Bavaria and the margrave of Baireuth, was to be field
marshal of the army which might be used against France.
This was far from a coalition centred around the mari-
time powers, such as William III. and Waldeck had
imagined. The French understood this, as was shown by
their conduct on the Rhine in occupying several impor-
tant fortresses without any impediment from the side of
the allies. It was often a hard task for the aged Waldeck,
now approaching seventy, but he continued working with
the prince to strengthen the bond between the German
princes and to oppose the French influence in the empire.
In 1688 the crisis suddenly came which was to transform
long preparation into vigorous action. It was brought
about by the course of affairs in England, and Prince
William took advantage of them at the right moment.
Strife there between sovereign and people became ever
more violent both in religious and political matters, while
James II. 's attitude towards France indicated secret
cooperation between the two courts, more dangerous now
than under Charles II. on account of the more obstinate
character of the new monarch, of whom his sceptical
brother had prophesied that he would not sit four years
' See Fester, Die Augsburger Allianz von 16S6, and P. L. Muller, Wil-
helm III. und Waldeck, ii., p. n.
462 History of the Dutch People
upon the throne. The situation was so serious early in
1687 that the prince found it necessary to send his confi-
dential servant Dijkveld as an extraordinary envoy to the
English court, and he prevailed upon the States-General
and the Estates of Holland to consent secretly to this.
The purpose naturally was to investigate the reliability
and the plans of those who were making ready to set up
the prince of Orange against his uncle and father-in-law.
The mission was a complete success, and Dijkveld returned
in summer with many letters fromeminent Englishmen who
desired to enter into relations with the prince. Thence-
forth the prince carried on secret negotiations with them.
The king did not perceive what was going on about him,
and his envoy at the prince's court, the Catholic Ier
D'Albyville, did not see through the designs there. Even
d'Avaux in his letters confessed that he was perplexed,
although he knew what it must all come to in the end.
James cast the warnings of d'Avaux to the winds and
asked the prince and the States for their cooperation in
his measures of toleration for the Catholics. But the
prince did not wish to lose favour with his English friends
and the English people, and refused absolutely to do any-
thing against the interest of his religion, though he was
averse to any religious persecution. The princess agreed
entirely with her husband and would have nothing to do
with the proposals of her father. Living at first coolly and
without mutual love, the husband and wife after ten years
of marriage were brought closer together and learned to
understand and appreciate one another. The gentle and
amiable princess, whose diaries and letters have in large
part come down to us, was able to win the confidence and
love of her husband, hitherto cold and somewhat mistrust-
ful towards her.1 If James II. should die childless, his
successors would assuredly not continue in his course.
This had to be made plain in England to counteract the
1 See concerning her: Kramer, Maria II. Stuart, Utrecht, 1890.
Preparation of the Great Coalition 463
efforts of James and his partisans to show that the prince
and princess approved of his measures. Fagel's noted
letter to the Scottish dissenter Stewart served this pur-
pose, the council pensionary announcing that prince and
princess favoured abolishing penalties for deviation from
the Anglican church, but by no means the admission of
Roman Catholics to all offices. The letter was immedi-
ately printed and thousand of copies1 were distributed over
England, so that it acquired the character of a manifesto
to the English people against the king's policy.
Meanwhile James persisted in his measures to assist the
Catholics and confirm his sovereign authority. He was
treading the path that had led his father to the scaffold
and that was to bring him also to ruin. In May, 1688, he
had seven refractory bishops of the Anglican church im-
prisoned in the Tower and proclaimed anew his "declara-
tion of indulgence." Amid the consequent exasperation a
son was born to him on June 10th, an event which seemed
to assure the future of his dynasty. In the preceding fall
the expected birth had been announced here and there,
and the report was received with great joy by the Cath-
olics, with dismay and suspicion by the Protestants. When
the birth took place a month before the designated time
and was managed at court in a very mysterious fashion,
the presumption gained ground that the young "prince
of Wales" was a supposititious child procured by the
Jesuits, but modern researches have shown this hypothesis
to be baseless. The prince and princess, who had at first
found no reason to doubt and had sent over Zuylesteyn
with their congratulations, were soon of another opinion,
especially when Anne, the only sister of the princess, wrote
to them that she did not consider the so-called prince of
Wales as genuine.3 An end was speedily made in the
1 Extracts in Wagenaar, xv., p. 361, printed among other places in Holt.
Mercurius 1687, p. 92.
2 See relating to the genuineness :Fruin, pp. 171, 177 ; Kramer, p. 159.
464 History of the Dutch People
English chapel of the princess of Orange of the prayers
for her young brother. There was great commotion in
England itself, and the acquittal of the seven bishops in-
creased it. On June 30th some prominent Englishmen
signed an invitation to the prince to come over and rescue
England's religion and liberties from the hands of the ex-
isting government. Admiral Herbert with the document
appeared a few days later at the villa of Honselaarsdijk,
where William III. usually sojourned at this period. The
prince hesitated, consulted with his wife, but soon accepted
the not unexpected proposal that presaged for him a bril-
liant part, as it gave him an opportunity of saving the
religion and freedom of a great nation and might provide
him with means for attaining the coalition against France,
the great purpose ever present to his mind.
The choice by the Cologne chapter of Cardinal Wilhelm
Egon von Fiirstenberg, Louis XIV. 's old friend, as arch-
bishop of Cologne showed to the princes of the empire
their peril from this side. The dead archbishop had pos-
sessed the rights of bishop in Miinsterand Hildesheim,so
that his territory including Liege stretched from the Meuse
to the Weser. If Fiirstenberg united all this under his
sway, Louis XIV. would be a great step in advance, for
he hoped with his adherent's aid to change the truce
of 1684 into a definitive peace giving him permanent
ownership of the lands and cities temporarily occupied.
It was doubtful whether the pope would confirm this
election, but the design of France was evident.
The prince had accepted the English invitation, and
the die was cast. The republic must now decide if it
would furnish him with the means for doing what Eng-
land desired of him and what he ardently wished in the
interest of religion and liberty. The answer was not long
uncertain. The equipment of the fleet, begun in the pre-
ceding autumn, was prosecuted with energy. With the
help of the government and admiralty of Amsterdam, of
Preparation of the Great Coalition 465
Bastiaensze Schepers at Rotterdam, and of Odijk in
Zealand it was resolved in December to fit out 21 ships of
medium size ostensibly against the Algerine corsairs and
on account of complications between Sweden and Den-
mark. From July work went on vigorously in the yards,
while 4000 sailors were enlisted and transports sufficient
for the troops were hired. In October a fleet of 43 war
ships and some fire ships, besides smaller vessels and
about 350 transports, was ready under command of the
lieutenant admiral Cornelis Evertsen and the vice ad-
miral Philips Almonde. Cornelis Tromp, succeeding
De Ruyter as lieutenant admiral general, had dropped
into the background for some years past in consequence
of dissensions with the prince ; besides he would not easily
have consented to yield the chief command to the admiral
Herbert as lieutenant admiral general of the common
fleet, an arrangement made to satisfy English popular
feeling. Naturally one thing and another could not be
kept secret from d' Avaux, and he did not fail to warn
Louis XIV. and James II. of the republic's great arma-
ments, but always without finding a hearing, though he
could now declare that England was aimed at. Measures
concerning the army to go over were taken in deep se-
crecy and with great care. In July and August Bentinck
on behalf of the prince hired several regiments from the
princes of northern Germany; the English and Scotch
regiments in the Dutch service and some of the best
Dutch troops were brought into readiness ; the command
under the prince was given to the marshal Schomberg;
the whole army of 14,000 men was collected at Mook,
supposedly to defend the frontier against an attack from
the side of Cologne. To avoid publicity the necessary
money was scraped together privately from everywhere.
Dijkveld and Fagel in July applied to the Amsterdam
government, particularly to Witsen and Hudde, about it,
but the latter hesitated at first to comply with the prince's
VOL. IV. — 3O.
466 History of the Dutch People
requests.1 The enterprise was spoken of as an attempt
"to play Monmouth," but people were not altogether
averse to it.
Early in September the English and French ambassa-
dors asked the States-General for enlightenment as to the
preparations for war, while the former asserted the peace-
ful disposition of his sovereign and the latter threatened
war, if England or Cologne were attacked. The French
threats had the opposite effect from what d'Avaux ex-
pected. The prince managed to convince the States that
the enterprise against England was the best means of
bringing that kingdom on the side of France's opponents
and that it certainly would succeed, as James could find
no support in his own country. Through the council
pensionary the prince then turned to the Estates of Hol-
land to demonstrate to them the necessity of the under-
taking upon England in the interest of the Protestant
religion, of general policy, and of the republic in particu-
lar. He did not deny that he and his wife were specially
interested, as successors to the throne of England, but he
confidently asked the state's help in winning victory for
his just cause. Nunc aut numquam ! In deep secrecy
everything was considered by the municipal governments,
and "the inclination of the common people and of the
preachers " against France moved those still hesitating to
consent, afraid as they were of a repetition of the war of
1672 with its consequences. Fagel and the prince himself
had long been working upon the preachers and showing
them the peril of Protestantism, so that they would dis-
seminate this idea from the pulpit and in families. On
September 29th the affair was concluded in the Estates of
Holland and on October 8th in a secret session of the
States-General with a larger attendance than usual. The
prince obtained a complete assent to his request, and the
1 Fruin, Willem III., p. 179 ; Wagenaar, xv. , p. 427 ; Gebhard. Nicolaas
Witsen, ii., passim ; d'Avaux, Negotiations, vi., passim.
Preparation of the Great Coalition 46 7
English demand for explanation was answered by declar-
ing that the armament was not directed against king and
people, but that it was hoped to see the troubles in Eng-
land end through the removal of just grievances. The
States desired not to wage open war with the English
government, but to assist the prince with the power of
the state in his enterprise begun on account of those
grievances. Some of the regents looked on with anxiety
but did not venture to oppose.
The prince's diplomacy took all possible precautions
with the European powers. The Great Elector had lately
been working in harmony with the policy of the prince,
but he had died in April and been replaced by his son
Frederick III., who speedily manifested his disposition to
support the United Netherlands.1 Bentinck had a secret
meeting with Fuchs, and the latter in the elector's name
promised troops for the prince's expedition. Brunswick
Liineburg also joined in it secretly as well as Wolfenbuttel
and Hesse. Waldeck directed Bentinck's cautious and
well concealed steps. Everything was arranged in treaties
by the beginning of August. Wtirtemberg furnished
three regiments of cavalry, and Hanover declared its readi-
ness to help repel any attack by France upon the German
empire. I: September Prince William went from Het Loo
to Minder and Rinteln to meet the elector and the land-
grave of Hesse. Waldeck sounded the court of Vienna
and secured the assurance that the emperor would watch
the English expedition with approval. The elector of
Saxony and other German princes were ready to follow
Hanover's example. In September the prince had an
interview with Spain's representative in the southern
Netherlands between Breda and Antwerp and learned of
Spanish satisfaction with the plan. Even the papal govern-
ment, though viewing with apprehension the defeat of
1 Ranke, Englische Geschichte, vi., p. 134; Muller, Wilhelm III. von
Qranien und Waldeck, ii., p. 25.
468 History of the Dutch People
Catholicism in England, interposed no serious obstacles,
because the expedition might break the supremacy of
France, felt oppressively at Rome, and serve to restore
peace in Europe by the humiliation of the ambitious king.1
The chances were still better on this side, when Louis XIV.,
instead of following the advice of Louvois and attacking
the republic, declared war in September on emperor and
pope, and the French troops invaded the empire, which
caused the German princes at once to take up arms for the
defence of the imperial frontiers. Thus the great war
began. Its end depended upon the course of affairs in
England, upon the success or failure of the prince's great
expedition. If it succeeded, England and the republic
would undoubtedly help to defend the German empire >
if it failed, an irretrievable blow was inflicted on the
enemies of France and France's supremacy in Europe was
established.
It succeeded, the expedition of the new Armada that
conquered England a hundred years after the first had so
miserably failed. On October loth appeared the prince's
masterly " declaration," drawn up by Fagel's able hand
and translated into English by the court preacher, Burnet,
concerning the reasons that induced him with arms to re-
store the Protestant religion and the laws and "iberties of
England. At the end of October all was read), the fleet
assembled at Hellevoetsluis, the army conveyed along the
Meuse to that port. With emotion the prince took leave
of the States-General on October 26th, declared he had al-
ways had the welfare of the country in view, appointed
Waldeck to the command of the Dutch army, recom-
mended the princess to their care " if anything mortal
should befall him," and urged to harmony in the troublous
days that might come. He addressed the Estates of Hol-
land also more cordially than usual. Tears stood in the
eyes of the stern men about him, and many accompanied
1 Ranke, Papste, iii.,p. 117 ; Immich, Innocenz XI,, p. 106.
Preparation of the Great Coalition 469
him on his journey to Briel. The same earnest feeling
pervaded the whole country on the day of prayer after the
prince's arrival at Hellevoetsluis. On the 25th he had a
serious talk with his wife, the memory of which is preserved
to us in the journal of the princess,1 the most beautiful page
written by the pious, loving woman, who saw her husband
depart to war against her father. He intimated to her the
possibility of his death during the expedition and the de-
sirability of her marrying again in that case, but not with a
Catholic. Trembling at the thought of his going away, she
said that she hoped not to survive him, but, if this happened
now that she had no child by him, she wished for none,
though it was by an angel. The departure of the prince was
postponed on account of slowness in the preparations for
the fleet. When, on the 30th, he set sail for northern Eng-
land or Scotland, a severe storm drove him back with
great damage to Hellevoetsluis. There was general alarm,
lest this delay of a few days might awaken James II. from
his dream and cause him to take vigorous measures for
defence. Summoned to Briel, the princess could once
more see her hero, but only during a few hours and in deep
anxiety, for which she sought and found consolation in
solitude and prayer. On the next day, November nth,
the fleet put to sea again, Herbert commanding the van,
Bastiaensze Schepers the middle division, and Evertsen
the rear guard, followed by the loving glances of the
princess, who stood gazing from the tower of Briel until
the masts of the shir; 3 had disappeared, followed by the
prayers of the whole republic, united now as seldom before
in wishes for the success of the enterprise. The prince's
flag bore the words Pro religione et libertate and under
them the proud Je maintiendray, the motto of his fathers.
The aim and spirit of the expedition were embodied in
these watchwords. Anxiety regarding the issue lasted
1 Lettres etme'moires, p. 80. From them Fruin, p. 192, and Kramer, p. 169.
47° History of the Dutch People
a month, but all ended well.1 The prince this time directed
his course towards the Channel, without molestation from
the English fleet lying idly in the Thames, more than 400
vessels passing through the strait of Calais with all sails set
and flags fluttering, amid the thundering of cannon and
blare of trumpets. After some trouble with a strong east
wind, which carried the fleet past the harbour, he landed on
the 14th at Torbay on the southern coast of England,
disembarked the troops, and moved on the same day to
Exeter, where he entered upon the actual campaign. Eng-
land hesitated during a few weeks, but then the royal army,
retreating before the slowly advancing prince, began to fall
away, and the defection soon became general. James re-
tired to London, tried at the last moment, when surround-
ed by treason, to rescue his crown by concessions, but fled
from his palace in the night of December 10 to n, after
having sent the queen and their son away. He was
arrested at Sheerness and brought back to London ; then
he was allowed to escape to France, where he arrived on
Christmas.
With the king's flight from London the victory of the
prince was complete, and not until then did he write to
his wife. Now that all was won, discussions could begin
regarding the manner of filling the deserted throne. The
Convention, called together soon after the prince's arrival
in London, declared the throne of England vacant (Jan-
uary 28, 1689). There was a period of uncertainty as to
whether the throne should be occupied by the appoint-
ment of a regent, or by the elevation of Mary alone to be
queen, or by making the prince and princess together
king and queen. Finally, by the wish of both of them,
the last was resolved upon, and William and Mary on
February 13th accepted the crown offered to them. A
week later she also came over from Holland. The " glori-
5 See the fine account of the expedition in Macaulay, History of England.
Preparation of the Great Coalition 47 1
ous revolution " was finished, and " Dutch William " had
saved the religion and liberties of England.
Louis XIV. had contemplated all this with deep vexa-
tion at the conduct of James II., who, disregarding
French warnings and offers of help, had gone on the road
to destruction in his usual stubborn fashion and was now
a fugitive on French soil. The consequences of events
in England were immediately felt by France. Against
Louis XIV. all the powers were now united that had any
reason to complain of him. It was a period of great im-
portance in the history of the world, when pope, emperor,
and empire, in league with the two Protestant maritime
powers, " opposed the concentrated might of the furious
Cock " in order to rescue Europe's freedom.1 That
period of the world's history dawned when the prince,
starting from the republic and relying upon its fleet and
army, mounted the throne of the Stuarts. At Vienna
under the influence of the Jesuits there had been some
reluctance to unite with the maritime powers, but after
the expedition to England Louis in November had finally
declared war upon the States, professedly on account of
the support given his enemies in the affairs of Cologne.
The declaration of war was accepted by the States early
in March, 1689, in a manifesto "for the defence of re-
ligion and liberty " against French violence. Spain fol-
lowed this example in May, and somewhat later England
also declared war on France, as d' Avaux had long before
predicted would happen whenever the prince's expedition
succeeded. All this at last turned the scale in Vienna to
the side of the allies. Jacob Hop, pensionary of Amster-
dam, sent to Vienna in April, was able on May 12th to sign
there the treaty, by which the emperor pledged himself
to the States to aid in restoring the peace of Miinster
and that of the Pyrenees and made an agreement with
them respecting the future of the Spanish monarchy.
1 Ranke, Franzosische Geschichte, iv., p. 30.
472 History of the Dutch People
Spain, England, the German princes soon entered for-
mally into that league which, as the " Grand Alliance of
Vienna," signified the success of the efforts of William
III. and his partisans in uniting all Europe against the
power that threatened them all alike. The great coalition
was in existence, and it was to appear whether it would
really be equal to breaking for good and all the power of
France, now that England had joined the former allies
and had thrown the weight of its navy, army, money, and
commerce into the balance against France. The ideal of
William III. and his statesmen was to be subjected to
proof, and the republic bravely plunged again into the
struggle, which it had given up in discouragement ten
years earlier, roused to enthusiasm for the general cause
by the great warrior and statesman who guided it with a
firm hand and, like his ancestors, made it advance in the
contest for the Protestant religion and the political equi-
librium of Europe, the great principles that ruled his life
until his last breath.
CHAPTER XVII
THE COALITION WAR
IN the time of William III. the history of the Dutch
people starts from a different point than in that of De
Witt. The leaders of the state in De Witt's period
aimed first at the preservation of peace. They hoped,
through peace after the long war for independence, to
keep the prosperity obtained and to open new paths to
commerce and industry ; in the wars forced upon them,
and occupying a third of their administration, the idea of
restoring peace was constantly active with them ; their
domestic policy was chiefly directed to the establishment
of the system of government, from which they expected
happiness for the nation ; abroad they had in view the
nearest material interests of their state and people. It
was otherwise with William III. and his adherents. Al-
though their end too was not war but peace, they were
not ready to purchase this peace at the price of material
profit offered them by France. They put the powers of
the state in the service of a high ideal and subordinated
to it the state's interests ; at home they were content with
'' folding the predominant influence of their master;
Cvside of the country their exertions sought the abase-
' nt of the power striving for supremacy. This abase-
ent could only be secured by a general European war.
nsequently William III.'s period is one of war. The
ace treaties, both that of Nimwegen and that of Rys-
473
474 History of the Dutch People
wick, were nothing more than truces in his eyes, and only
the peace of Utrecht in 171 3 could bring to an end the
series of wars against France, which in the last quarter of
the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eight-
eenth determined the destinies of the state and people
of the United Netherlands.
In the years after William III. became king of England
the state of war, in which the republic existed, was of
great importance to its internal condition. There was
no thought of reforms in the faulty government, now that
the stadtholder's personal ambition seemed satisfied by
his high dignity elsewhere and his dynastic interests were
less strongly felt on account of the childlessness of his
marriage. This lack of children imparted a tinge of sad-
ness to the life of the reconciled pair, awakened in the minds
of both a feeling of loneliness and desolation, was coupled
in the queen with the mournful thought of her father
wandering in exile, and it caused repeated talk of
transferring the succession to one of the related families,
to the Frisian branch of the house of Nassau, or to a
prince of the house of Hohenzollern. But William
III. had only slight sympathy with his Frisian cousin,
who on his side was not very obliging, and after a
short reconciliation withdrew from the army on being
passed over in the choice of a first field marshal at
Waldeck's death in 1692. ' Prince Henry Casimir was even
drawn into secret negotiation with his country's enemy,
Louis XIV., and the serious dissension was not ended
until 1694 through the mediation of the Frisian stadt-
holder's wife. When he died young in March, 1696, and
left a son, the eight-year-old John William Friso, wh^se
godfather was William III., the latter inclined to as:;
the succession to this young prince. After Queen Ma
death he named him as his sole heir by will of Octc
18, 1695. The death of the council pensionary, Fagel
1 See Van Sypesteyn, Geschiedk. Bijdragen, iii., p. 24.
The Coalition War 475
December, 1688, in the midst of the English complica-
tions, was a great loss to William III.1 His place was
taken by Van Hove, pensionary of Haarlem, and, after
his speedy death in May, 1689, and a temporary occupa-
tion, by the pensionary of Delft, Antonie Heinsius, who
had been pensionary since 1679 and had attracted atten-
tion by his sagacity, though he did not at first belong to
the Orange party. The prince had employed him in 1683
on a mission to Paris to defend the interests of the princi-
pality of Orange against French attacks, and Heinsius
had returned from there and later from a mission to Lon-
don a pronounced adherent of the prince's policy against
France.2 He soon became the friend of Fagel, and when
the latter's health began to fail, the prince looked to the
Delft pensionary as his helper in treating foreign affairs.
Fagel was not unwilling, and offered him in 1686 the
office of pensionary of Dordrecht, whose pensionary usu-
ally replaced the council pensionary. But Heinsius,
already forty-five years old, declined, believing that the
employment suited " neither with his humour, nor with his
knowledge, nor with his health." After reiterated en-
treaty, the modest man accepted and soon proved him-
self an excellent aid to William III., less independent and
vigorous, much less enthusiastic and ardent than Fagel,
but exact, zealous, honest, able, clear-sighted, docile, an
invaluable tool in the prince's hand. With Dijkveld and
Hop, he belonged to the best statesmen of the last period
of William III.'s reign.
This period was characterised in domestic affairs by a
strong maintenance of the Orange prince's supremacy in
the republic, where his power was much greater than it
could be in England with the limitations imposed upon
the royal authority after the "glorious revolution." His
elevation was heard of here with great joy ; bonfires were
1 Burnet, History, i., p. 559.
2 Archie f Heinsius, ed. Van der Heim, i., p. lxxiv.
476 History of the Dutch People
kindled, salutes fired, triumphal arches erected on the day
of the coronation ; a day of thanksgiving was observed
over the whole country late in March. Many feared that
the republic's affairs would suffer from lack of attention
or that the prince would find his double dignity too oner-
ous and would lay down the stadtholdership. William
III. never considered this seriously ; on the contrary,
when matters in England did not go as well as he had ex-
pected, when attacks were made on his conduct, his
friends, even his person, he repeatedly meditated resign-
ing his high dignity in England, especially after the
queen's death in 1695. " Crucify him" followed the loud
" Hosanna " in his case also according to his prediction,
and his thoughts often went back to the old fatherland,
to Het Loo, metamorphosed from a hunting castle into a
princely palace, to the faithful love of his former coun-
trymen, to the rural surroundings of The Hague. No-
where was William III. more at home than in the
Netherlands, and the brief periods of his sojourn here
were times of rest in the brilliant exile of Hampton
Court and London, where he lived in a society that did
not please him, in a climate that did not agree with him,
in a strife that vexed him more and more. " Dutch Wil-
liam" remained a foreigner to the English people, though
he was a foreigner to whom that people owed much and
whose name it still venerates. He announced to the
States his elevation in England and his wish that both
powers should go on in " inviolable friendship." Previ-
ous to this letter he had requested the States-General to
send envoys to England to help in regulating the com-
mon action with the ordinary ambassador Van Citters.1
Witsen, Odijk, and Dijkveld were intrusted with the
mission in January, and soon De Wildt and other mem-
bers of the boards of admiralty joined them to settle
mutual maritime interests. The extraordinary embassy
1 Gebhard, Nicolaas Witsen, i., p. 335. See also Wagenaar, xvi., p. 21.
The Coalition War 477
was commissioned further to congratulate the king and
queen of England and to discuss an offensive and defen-
sive alliance. This last encountered opposition from
the Dutch side. Men hesitated " to exhaust themselves
for Great Britain's sake." Witsen and Van Citters were
little inclined to use "the money and people of the
States" on behalf of England. After long delay they
gave way under strong pressure from the king and signed
the treaty of September 3, 1689, for the prevention of
commerce with France and for carrying on war together.
For the time not even the repeal of the Navigation Act
could be obtained, and everything showed that the com-
mercial jeaiousy between the two nations had not disap-
peared. Witsen, returning home with the others in
November, complained that all had been decided in ac-
cordance with the king's opinion and with the desire of
England. Laughingly and insistently William III. had
pushed his will through, regarding everything as subor-
dinate to the great aim of the cooperation of England
with the coalition, which, through the mediation of Hop
going over to England, was really brought about before
the end of the year by England's official accession to the
Grand League of Vienna.
The residence of the stadtholder in England caused
troubles in the government of the republic, which had as
a consequence violent popular movements and no less vi-
olent pamphlets. In the usual election of sheriffs in Am-
sterdam at the end of January the nomination, on account
of the absence of the stadtholder, who had to make the
choice, was sent to the court of Holland for its selection.
The court, fearing the prince, sent the nomination over
to him, and he chose from those nominated, but expressed
his displeasure at Amsterdam's action. Next year the
city would not consent to this treatment of the affair and
appealed to the Estates of Holland for authority to give
the nomination to the court according to its privileges, as
478 History of the Dutch People
otherwise the sheriffs could not be sworn in time. The
king was consulted in writing, but Amsterdam refused to
yield, though the war against France might suffer. The
city said that its privileges were dearer to it than a victory
over the whole world. Very disagreeable to the king was
the strenuous opposition of Amsterdam to the further ad-
mission of Bentinck, who had been created earl of Port-
land in England, as a member of the nobility in the
Estates of Holland. The city asserted that Bentinck had
become an Englishman, had lost his rights as a member
of the Holland nobility, and cited precedents. The
nobility brought up precedents on the other side. In
January, 1690, Amsterdam again handed its nomination
to the court, which resolved to send it back unnoticed.
Meanwhile the old sheriffs remained in service, and the
opposing party asked by what right this was allowed.
The justice administered by the old sheriffs might have
been declared illegal, and the nobility already proposed
a resolution to this effect. Holland resolved to pro-
nounce the continuance in office of the old sheriffs as
illegal and their actions as void notwithstanding the
vehement protest of Amsterdam. The majority of the
Amsterdam council now determined to give way and to
adopt the proposed middle course. The nomination was
delivered to the Estates of Holland, by them sent to
England, and the king made his choice. After discussion
between Witsen, Heinsius, and Bentinck the dissension
was settled in March. Amsterdam thenceforth treated
its nomination in this manner, and Bentinck-Portland re-
mained in the nobility. The stadtholder was once more
victorious, but apparently his absence had no favourable
influence upon the vigour of the government.
The ecclesiastical movements of this time had little con-
nection with politics ; but the States watched them and
the orthodox party hoped for the king's support. Voetians
and Cocceians still opposed one another, even after the
The Coalition War 479
death of Cocceius in 1669 and of Voetius in 1676. The
former did not rest until they had removed from his pro-
fessorship the venerable Heydanus, who had long taught
his moderate Cartesian principles at Leyden, just as they
had driven the moderate Van der Waeyen from Middel-
burg. But Van der Waeyen was taken under the protection
of the Frisian stadtholder and in 1677 became professor in
Franeker, from where he succeeded in defending the Coc-
ceians against their enemies. William III. showed himself
less and less inclined to side with the Voetians in all respects
and endeavoured by a conciliatory attitude to bring the
parties together, which was finally accomplished. The
resolution of the Estates of Holland of 1694, exhorting to
" brotherly harmony," to the choice of preachers " of a
moderate and peaceful disposition," to the treatment of
religious matters at the university not according to " the
rules of philosophy " but according to the " usual doctrine
of the Reformed Churches, contained in the Catechism,
the Confessions, and the rules of the National Synod of
Dordrecht," ' did much to appease the strife, which other-
wise in the opinion of the violent Voetians must inevitably
have led to the new national synod desired by them.
Neither the States nor the prince wanted such a synod,
dreading a repetition of the discords of the time of the
truce. Although here and there traces might appear of a
revival of the ideas of the old party of the States, William
III.'s authority was in the long run energetically upheld,
and there was no more opposition to his foreign policy,
which he held firmly in hand with the aid of Heinsius and
other trusted leaders of the state, much better than was
possible in England.
The instruments of that policy, the army and navy, were
carefully prepared for their difficult task. The army,
trained with the help of Waldeck, Hoorne, Aylva, Ouwer-
kerk, Slangenburg, Van Rheede Ghinckel, and other
1 Res. Holl. iS December, 1694.
480 History of the Dutch People
officers, was not large, scarcely 60,000 men, but formed an
excellent nucleus to be joined by the troops of the allies.
Under command of Vauban's equal, Menno, baron van
Coehoorn, the Dutch engineers were now developed into a
corps fully capable of their work. Waldeck, the foreigner,
had much to overcome in this preparation, especially
during the absence of the prince in England, not only on
account of the opposition of Prince Henry Casimir, who
grudged him the chief command, but also on account of
the difficulties with the council of state and the continual
intrigues of the prince's influential favourites. As soon as
the king placed himself at the head of the army, however,
most of these troubles vanished. To the navy also Wil-
liam devoted his attention in conjunction with Cornells
Tromp, Schepers, Cornelis Evertsen, Job de Wildt, Witsen,
and others. In 1687 by introducing a farming-out of half
of the convoys and licenses the prince managed to improve
the finances of the admiralties and put them in a condition
to meet their engagements better. From 1690 a body of
9000 sailors was enlisted every year. De Wildt, from 1691
the king's commissioner to the admiralties,1 was active, but
many plans remained unexecuted from lack of funds and
want of cooperation. Holland and Zealand worked zeal-
ously, and so between 1682 and 1700 about 170 new vessels
were built, half of them by the Amsterdam admiralty, while
in the same period over eighty millions were spent for
equipment and building over and above the ordinary ap-
propriation for the navy, which rose from nearly six to
nearly eight millions a year. In the last years of the coali-
tion war a fleet of 100 to 1 1 5 fine ships was obtained with
4000 to 5000 cannon and 20,000 to 24,000 men, a force that
may well be compared with that of De Witt's time. The
commanders, though no Tromps or De Ruyters, could
likewise be compared with those of former days. Cornelis
Tromp and Willem Bastiaensze Schepers were too old for
1 De Jonge, iii., p. 109.
The Coalition War 48r
active service — the former died in 1691 and the latter in
1704 — but Almonde, the two younger Evertsens and
Callenburgh, formed in the school of De Ruyter, may be
named among the best. Cooperation with the British
fleets and squadrons, always under command of a British
admiral in accordance with the treaty of 1689, did not in-
crease the fame of the Dutch navy.
At first an attack of the French upon Maestricht was
feared, even during the prince's expedition to England,
but Louis XIV. turned to Germany and had the Palatinate
devastated for the second time in a terrible manner, while
the French army in the Spanish Netherlands under the
marshal d'Humieres acted only defensively against Wal-
deck. With the coalition army composed of Spanish,
English, and Dutch troops the latter moved late in the
summer to the vicinity of Charleroi, where the French
were driven back in a bloody skirmish at Walcourt on
August 25th. The advantage secured was not followed up,
and both sides confined themselves to border raids, with
which the far from brilliant campaign of this year ended.
More profit was derived from the campaign in Cleves and
the Rhine district, Dutch troops under Aylva acting with
the Brandenburgers, and Neuss and Bonn were taken there
besides a number of smaller places. Dutch troops under
Van Rheede Ghinckel fought also in Ireland against
King James together with English and Danes.
Of more importance was the campaign of the following
year, when Luxembourg again took command of the
French forces in the Spanish Netherlands and by superior
strength inflicted a serious defeat upon the aged Waldeck
at Fleuruson July 1st in spite of the exemplary conduct
of the infantry of Holland and Friesland.1 That defeat
did not injure the good name of the Dutch troops, whose
leaders, Aylva, Wibbenum, and others, won renown not-
1 Knoop, Willem III., iii., p. 35 ; Muller, WilheJm III. und Waldeck,
ii., p. 74.
VOL. IV. — 31.
482 History of the Dutch People
withstanding the heavy losses, nearly half of the army
lying dead or wounded on the field of battle. A few days
later, on the 10th, the allies suffered a second "great
disaster " off Beachy Head, where the French admiral
Tourville defeated the Anglo-Dutch fleet under the Eng-
lish admiral Herbert, now Lord Torrington. The Dutch
vanguard, commanded by the lieutenant admiral Cornelis
Evertsen, was especially damaged, and the Dutch captains
complained that the English had left them in the lurch.
Among the numerous dead in this battle was Jan van
Brakel, " the terror of the ocean." An investigation really
proved Torrington's guilt, and, though acquitted, he lost
his position as admiral. Great was the disappointment of
the Dutch at the course of the war, and the deep impres-
sion made by the two defeats was not entirely removed by
the famous victory of the Boyne, on the day after the
battle of Beachy Head, in which the Dutch troops had an
important part. Confidence did not return until the king
himself came over from England in the spring of 1691 to
direct the military operations. The beloved Orange
prince was greeted with great joy: triumphal arches and
bonfires, poems and speeches welcomed him to the capital
after two years and a half of absence. His Majesty re-
plied with expressions of cordiality and of a readiness to
stand by the republic with all the power of England.
Grand plans were at once formed. The allies held a gen-
eral conference at The Hague, where the governor of the
Spanish Netherlands, marquis de Gastanaga, appeared
besides many German princes, and at the urgency of the
king it was resolved to put no less than 220,000 men upon
the different fields of war, of which the republic was to
furnish 35,000, while with England it secured the payment
of considerable subsidies. Suddenly in March a French
army attacked Mons, which after a short defence fell into
the enemy's hands in April. The army of the allies,
hastily assembled by William III., came too late to prevent
1
The Coalition War 483
the city's fall and was content with the protection of
Brabant, where meanwhile the French troops had plun-
dered terribly, especially at Hal, destroyed by Luxem-
bourg in barbarous fashion at the command of Louvois,
as Boufflers did some days later at Liege, where over
3000 houses were burned and pillaged to take vengeance
for the support given to Spain. Even Brussels was
threatened, when William III. left there with his army
for Louvain. These were the last acts of the inhuman
French minister of war, who died soon afterwards. The
large armies arrayed against one another in the southern
Netherlands, each about 60,000 men, accomplished finally
but little, and they went into winter quarters in October.
The two following years furnished more important
military results. On both sides great preparations were
made for 1692. William III. crossed over to the Nether-
lands with numerous English troops to carry on the war
energetically. Louis XIV. planned an attack upon Eng-
land with army and fleet to restore James II. to the
throne, while a large part of the English army was absent
in the Netherlands and was to be kept busy there by a
vigorous assault on Namur. The coasts of Normandy
swarmed with troops, and 20,000 to 30,000 of them were
to be conveyed over to England under escort of the fleet
from Toulon and Brest commanded by Tourville and
d'Estr6es, while there must be a rising of the still numer-
ous adherents of James II. The threatening danger
made the English nation stand up as one man in defence
of the fatherland. A conspiracy against the existing
government was discovered and frustrated ; a large force
was brought together on the southern coast ; the Anglo-
Dutch fleet gathered in the Channel under Russell and
Almonde ; other English and Dutch forces were held
ready in the Netherlands to cross over the North Sea at
the first sign. But the French army did not go over the
Channel. Tourville was detained in Brest by slowness in
434 History of the Dutch People
the equipment and by a contrary wind ; d'Estrees was
delayed by a storm on his voyage from Toulon and could
not unite with the main force in time. Against the 120
ships of all kinds of the allies Tourville had only half as
many, but the French government hoped that the dis-
content prevailing on the English fleet might keep it in
the background as at Beachy Head, so that only the
Dutch would have to be encountered. This calculation
failed. Queen Mary, governing during William III.'s
absence, managed with great tact to restore obedience on
the fleet and to thwart the intrigues of the Jacobites.
Late in May the powerful Anglo-Dutch fleet, with some
7000 cannon and 40,000 men, sailed for the French coast
in search of the enemy. On May 29th it met Tourville off
La Hogue. The valiant admiral did not avoid the un-
equal conflict, however rash such an undertaking might
appear, and his king's command to wait for d'Estrees did
not reach him. Early in the morning Tourville began
the attack and continued it with desperate obstinacy
during the entire day, until darkness gave him an oppor-
tunity to retreat to the French coast with the remnant of
his fleet. This time the battle was principally between
the English and French ships, while Almonde got into
the fight with but a few of his vessels. That Tourville
turned his attention mostly to the English seems due to
his expectation that several English commanders would
desert to his side at the first shot, but this did not occur.
Next day fog and a calm hindered the enemy's flight as
well as the pursuit. A few ships succeeded in reaching
Cherbourg, others took refuge in the bay of La Hogue,
followed by the small vessels of the allies, which chased
the hostile ships among the rocks, assailed them with
armed boats and fire ships, and on the 2d and 3d of
June burned, destroyed, or forced ashore one after the
other of them. Those in the harbour of Cherbourg were
also set on fire. The Dutch took part in this work of
The Coalition War 485
destruction. Almost half of the French fleet, including
its best ships, was lost. For a long time after the battle
of La Hogue France ceased to be a naval power of the
first rank.
The war on the sea dropped into the background after
this battle. Danger was threatened in June, 1693, by the
disaster of Lagos in Portugal, where a large fleet of mer-
chantmen, escorted by an Anglo-Dutch squadron of 23
war ships under Rooke and Van der Goes, sailed un-
expectedly into the midst of a numerous French fleet
commanded by Tourville and suffered heavy losses. An
attack on Brest in 1694 failed ; a bombardment of Dieppe
and Havre de Grace, later of St. Malo, did much damage.
From Dunkirk the brave privateering captain Jean Bart,
now in the royal service, inflicted serious injury upon
Dutch and English commerce and became the terror of
the North Sea. As late as 1697 the waters of Zealand
were far from safe. The great fleets of the allies had for
their chief task to guard the merchantmen against the
French squadrons and privateers but found no opportu-
nity to attack the enemy in naval battles of importance.
The lieutenant admiral Almonde, the vice admiral Callen-
burgh, Cornelis and Geleyn Evertsen, and other intrepid
leaders upheld the good name of the Dutch navy in these
small fights and expeditions.
The result of the long contest depended upon the war
on land. It was carried on with varying fortunes, and the
large armies did not succeed in winning decisive advan-
tages. In June, 1692, Louis XIV. captured the important
Namur, and its citadel after a sturdy resistance was forced
to yield to Vauban's brilliant siege, though it was cleverly
defended by Coehoorn. The battle of Steenkerke
(August 3d), where Luxembourg, fighting against William
III., changed defeat into a victory, altered but little the
situation. The death of Waldeck at the age of 72, after
he had taken part in the battle and had later departed for
486 History of the Dutch People
his own country, at Arolsen in November of that year,
was a great loss to the prince.1 With him disappeared
from the scene an excellent general, a dexterous states-
man, one of the best helpers of the great Orange prince,
who honoured him as his old friend. France lost in him a
persistent opponent, the republic a faithful servant. The
great battle of Neerwinden, where William III. with a
much smaller army suffered defeat at the hands of Lux-
embourg, lost nearly all his artillery, and by a hasty flight
narrowly escaped capture (July 29, 1693), might have had
fatal consequences, if the leader of the allied forces had
not again shown himself a master in retreat. It appeared
that France was still strong enough to make head against
all the allies, unless England cooperated more energeti-
cally in bringing the war in the Spanish Netherlands to a
successful end. Parliament continually thwarted the
king-stadtholder and objected to furnishing the necessary
funds, while the intrigues of the Jacobites in England and
of the partisans of France and the States in the republic
prevented vigorous prosecution of the war, particularly
when the Frisian stadtholder, on account of the appoint-
ment of the duke of Holstein-Plon as field marshal in
place of Waldeck, whose successor he had hoped to be-
come, not merely quitted the army for good, but lowered
himself to secret negotiations with the enemy. A brief
negotiation for peace in the spring of 1694 amounted to
nothing, the French apparently not being in earnest. So
the war was continued. William III. appeared again at
The Hague to deliberate with the representatives of the
allies, and then to lead the campaign, but the French
armies seemed too strong to be expelled from Brabant.
Only Hoey was captured from them, while the talent
of the king-stadtholder prevented Luxembourg from
penetrating farther into Brabant or Flanders. The
1 Ar chief Heinsius, ed. Van der Heim, ii., p. 60; P. L. Muller, Wil-
helm III. und Waldeck, ii., p. 102.
The Coalition War 487
death of Queen Mary (January 7, 1695), although it
struck William III. personally and made him sit down
for weeks in sad despair, brought no change to the state
of affairs, but this loss threatened to diminish the king's
influence in England. Luxembourg's death at this time
was a serious harm to Louis XIV., as he was the last of
the great commanders who had won victories. His suc-
cessor, Villeroy, was more of a courtier than a general.
In 1695 also the French army in the Netherlands re-
mained over 100,000 men strong, but that of William
III. reached about the same figure and enabled him to
operate offensively, with the aid of the excellent leaders
formed in the long war, among whom may be named the
cavalry general Nassau-Ouwerkerk, son of Beverweerd,
the noted Van Rheede Ghinckel, after his Irish victories
earl of Athlone, the generals Fagel, Nassau-Weilburg,
Von Dopff, Van Ittersum, Noyelles. Early in July he
laid siege to Namur, " a hard nut to crack," as he said,
now a fortress of the first rank, fortified by Vauban and
defended by the brave Boufrlers. Coehoorn, now general
of infantry, was soon the leader of the famous siege,
which ended a month later in the surrender of the city.1
The citadel, where the garrison had taken refuge after the
capitulation, had to be separately besieged, while Ville-
roy's army was kept at a distance by that of the allies
under the prince of Vaudemont. The bombardment of
Brussels, by which Villeroy had hoped to break off the
siege of the citadel, could not save the important point,
and on September 5th the citadel of Namur fell before
William III. A large share of the glory of the exploit
was due to Coehoorn and to his admirable use of artillery.
From this time he was regarded as the equal of Vauban,
and even superior to him as a besieger. The garrison
stipulated for marching out with arms and the honours of
war, yet Boufrlers remained for some time a prisoner on
1 Leven van Coehoorn, ed. Van Sypesteyn (Leeuwarden, i860), p. 12.
488 History of the Dutch People
account of the unjust imprisonment of the Dutch garri-
sons of Dixmuiden and Deynse by the French. The fall
of Namur and its citadel is the great event really ending
the important military operations in the Netherlands.
Both armies took the field in the following year and in
the last of the war, but the bombardment of the French
in Givet in 1696 and the capture of Ath by the French
in 1697 had slight influence.
It appeared more and more that both sides were becom-
ing completely exhausted. Neither in the Netherlands,
nor in Germany, Italy, Spain, where the war had been
raging eight years, nor on the sea were any decisive ad-
vantages secured. Furthermore there were alarming re-
ports of the increasing feebleness of the childless king of
Spain, whose heritage the allies were unwilling to see in the
possession of the house of Hapsburg or of that of Bourbon,
while Louis XIV. hoped to make with them some agree-
ment about it. Why should war be waged any longer,
people asked in Paris, now that all hope of the restoration
of James II. in England was lost after the pacification of
Ireland and Scotland by William III. and after the failure
of so many Jacobite conspiracies, and now that French in-
fluence in Germany was every day diminishing ? Why
should the struggle be continued, men asked in England
and the republic, now that the power of France appeared
about equal to that of all the allies ? The Dutch merchants
desired peace in the interest of commerce. The Amster-
dam government began as early as 1693 to make secret
efforts in Paris through the Polish agent Mollo, who now
lived in Amsterdam as an eminent merchant.1 At Brus-
sels French agents offered peace to Dijkveld, and d'Avaux,
France's ambassador in Stockholm, had the mission to
1 ArcJiit f Heinsius, iii., p. xvi. This entire preface is of much impor-
tance for the knowledge of the long secret discussions concerning peace.
See also Legrelle, La diplomatic francaise et la succession d'Espagne, i., p.
392.
The Coalition War 489
announce there Louis XIV.'s willingness to negotiate and
by bribery and persuasion to aim at mediation by Sweden.
Evidently France needed peace and sought to enter into
relations with the court of Vienna, hoping to break the
harmony of the allies and win some of them over to peace,
as had been secretly done with Savoy. France wished this
peace on the basis of the truce of 1684 or of the Nimwegen
peace, while William III. wanted to go back to that of
Miinster, Spain to that of the Pyrenees, and the German
empire hoped at least to recover Strasburg. The recogni-
tion of William as king of England, the return of imperial
lands seized by France, the fate of Luxemburg, the set-
tlement in Italy were the chief points discussed. Sweden
assumed the part of mediator and submitted proposals to
the representatives of the allies meeting in congress for
the common war at The Hague in the spring, while France
remained privately in touch with each of the allies. All
this did not tend to promote a vigorous prosecution of the
war. A plot against the life of the Orange prince, betrayed
in time to Portland, with more Jacobite disturbances and
a new attempt of France to effect a landing in England,
threatened in the spring of 169610 break off negotiations
between France and the two maritime nations. A severe
financial crisis in England brought further complications ;
the defection of Savoy gave an unfavourable look to affairs
in Italy for the allies. But France with Pomponne now
in charge of foreign relations began to strive earnestly for
a treaty, with an eye especially to the reports about the
feeble health of Charles II. of Spain. In August, 1696, it
gave way on different points, and there was talk of ap-
pointing envoys to a peace congress under the mediation
of Sweden. The only opposition came from the imperial
government, which in case of Charles II. 's death wished
to use the war as a support against French claims to the
Spanish inheritance.
William III. was convinced of the absolute necessity of
49° History of the Dutch People
a prompt peace, and Amsterdam wanted, if necessary, to
conclude a separate peace, as had been done at Nimwegen.
In the beginning of 1697 under Swedish mediation the
preliminaries of peace were settled at The Hague in ac-
cordance with agreements privately made with France, in
which the recognition of William III. as king of England
was verbally promised. The treaties of Munster and
Nimwegen were taken as "basis and foundation." The
imperial government objected to carrying on the decisive
negotations at The Hague, where French intrigues might
influence the States-General, and proposed Aix-la-Chapelle,
Mainz, or Frankfort. After some wrangling it was finally
agreed to continue the peace congress in the palace of
Nieuwburg at Ryswick, the property of William III.,
which by its architecture gave an opportunity of keeping
the parties separate from one another. The right wing
was assigned to the allies, the left wing to the French, the
large central hall to the " mediator." ' The etiquette was
carefully regulated on account of the extraordinary im-
portance then attributed to it. On the Dutch side Hein-
sius and Dijkveld, besides the Amsterdam burgomaster
Jacob Boreel and the Frisian nobleman Willem van Haren,
were chosen as negotiators ; England sent Lord Pembroke,
France Harlay and Caillieres, the emperor Kaunitz and
Straatman, Spain De Quiros as chief plenipotentiaries.
On May 9th the Swedish ambassador Lilienrot opened the
peace congress, during which the war continued. Nego-
tiations went on slowly on account of the secret opposition
of the emperor, who won over Spain to his views. Wil-
liam III. let his trusted Portland discuss matters privately
with Boufflers in the Spanish Netherlands, and an agree-
ment between France and the maritime powers was the
result. In August Heinsius declared to the imperial envoys
that England and the republic were unable to keep on
with the war and desired to accept the French conditions.
1 Wagenaar, xvi., p. 348, giving a picture and description of the building.
The Coalition War 491
The imperialists still refused. The time set by France,
September ist, expired, and peace was uncertain to the
deep anxiety of William III., who expected that France
would again take advantage of the opportunity to separate
the allies from one another. He endeavoured without suc-
cess to intimidate Louis by threatening resumption of the
war. Louis knew that the English Parliament and the
States both longed ardently for peace. The inducement
of commercial gains sufficed to strengthen this feeling and
was held out liberally by France. Thus the maritime
powers and Spain resolved on September 20th to sign the
peace; the emperor, being allowed until November ist to
accede to it, consented at the last moment. The peace
was based upon that of Miinster. The treaty with the
States stipulated that Pondicherry should be given back
to the French by the East India Company, and an ad-
vantageous commercial treaty for 25 years was concluded,
as it had existed before the war. In the treaty with Eng.
land William III. was recognised as king ; the principality
of Orange was returned to him. In that with Spain
Luxemburg was given back besides all the places and dis-
tricts appropriated for France by the chambres de reunion
with the exception of 82 cities and villages mentioned by
name. The empire received back the reunions excepting
Strasburg, v/hich remained to France in exchange for
the cession of some small places. Thus peace was con-
cluded. But William III. after the end of the negotiations
in September spoke the prophetic word : " I confess that
the manner of it troubles me not a little for the future."
Louis XIV. gave way to England and the republic and
the empire largely on account of the existence of secret
plans concerning the Spanish succession, which were soon
to agitate Europe anew. In the treaty of peace, however,
that succession was not even mentioned, and this assuredly
did not tranquillise the diplomats on this point, because
that both the French and imperial governments constantly
492 History of the Dutch People
had their eyes upon it could not remain doubtful to any-
one engaged in the discussions. The affair of the Spanish
succession rose in the political heaven like a dark cloud,
intercepting the quickening rays of the sun of peace and
menacing Europe with a new war and new evils.
CHAPTER XVIII
WILLIAM III. S LAST YEARS
THE history of the last years of the king-stadtholder
is dominated by a great political affair, which had
long busied the heads of the statesmen of the
seventeenth century : the affair of the Spanish succession
that, with the sharp antagonism between France and the
other powers, might easily lead to a general European
war. It was not conceivable that the republic could keep
out of such a war. In its close connection with England,
embodied, as it were, in the person of William III., lay
the only chance of breaking the supremacy of France.
It was not to be doubted that Louis XIV. would try to
seize the Spanish Netherlands or in any case to make
them dependent upon France, the aim of his policy dur-
ing his entire reign, the political aim of France for more
than two centuries. The unfortunate "battlefield of
Europe," twice trodden during years by the armies of
both sides, its cities in ruins, its villages in ashes, its roads
unprotected, its fields uncultivated, its impoverished pop-
ulation in despair under Spanish misgovernment,1 would
then once more witness the atrocities of war. Happily
Belgium had now in Maximilian Emanuel, elector of
Bavaria, from 1692 a governor who revived the good times
of Aytona and Castel-Rodrigo. He rebuilt the desolated
Brussels, consulted the States and municipal governments
1 See Lonchay, La rivalitd ' de la France et de VEspagne aux Pays-Bas,
, 340.
493
494 History of the Dutch People
about raising up commerce and industry, made plans for
connecting Antwerp with the sea by a canal and for
establishing an East India Company in Flanders. Like
the archdukes of a hundred years earlier he with his young
wife, the daughter of the Polish king John Sobieski, won
the favour of the people by appearing at popular festivals.
In the approaching catastrophe in Spain he hoped, on
account of his first marriage with the daughter of the
emperor Leopold, from which a son not ten years old was
left to him, to become master of the country with the aid
of France and, at first as his son's guardian, to unite it with
the Bavarian hereditary dominions under his rule. The
population attached to the Burgundian-Hapsburg family
regarded the emperor or one of his sons as heir to the
Spanish claims. France was not unwilling to favour the
elector, provided he did not assert too loudly the Bavarian
pretensions to the rest of the Spanish heritage. Evidently
the elector would not object to this arrangement, while
the formation of a more or less independent Belgium
might not displease the maritime powers. A notable
coolness arose between the governor and the Flemings
and Walloons, who looked to the maritime powers for
protection against French influence, dreaded and hated
for centuries, though they did not forget that such protec-
tion carried with it a certain dependence distasteful to
them, especially when it was on the Hollanders, since the
closing of the Scheldt the worst enemies of commerce
and industry in the southern provinces. England and
the republic had more interests in the fate of the Spanish
monarchy than concerned merely the Spanish Nether-
lands. Both carried on an extensive commerce with
Spain ; for the sake of their commerce with the Levant
and Italy both were indisposed to have the strait of
Gibraltar in the hands of a strong power ; both were
interested in the future of Spain's possessions in America.
It mattered little to them whether a German or French
William III.'s Last Years 495
prince secured the succession, provided he did not depend
upon the emperor or Louis XIV., one of whom
might thus obtain such an increase of power as to
enable him to lay down the law for them and their
commerce.
The heirs to be considered at the speedily expected
demise of Charles II. of Spain were: the Hapsburgs of
Vienna, not only on account of their old relationship to
the Spanish royal house, but also on account of the
marriage of the emperor Leopold with Charles's youngest
sister, from which two sons were born ; then the elector
of Bavaria, the son of this sister's only daughter, conse-
quently the emperor's grandson ; finally, the Bourbons,
by reason of the marriage of Louis XIV. to the oldest
sister of the Spanish king, from which marriage the
dauphin and his three sons were descended.1 Louis XIV.,
furthermore, the son of Philip III.'s oldest daughter, was
undoubtedly the nearest heir in the blood, but both his
mother and his wife had renounced their hereditary
rights ; he appealed to the fact, however, that the Spanish
Cortes had never ratified this renunciation and that the
dowry stipulated in the last renunciation was never paid.
The mother of the electoral prince had also made a re-
nunciation. The emperor's wife alone had not given any
such promise, so that her two sons could without dispute
enter legally into their rights. At the court of Madrid
the French and Austrian parties were in sharp opposi-
tion, but the proud Spanish people and Charles II. wanted
the unity of the kingdom to be preserved, and the king
thought this assured by appointing in 1698 by will his
grandnephew, the young electoral prince, as his heir. The
maritime powers desired to break this unity, in order
that the great power of Spain, over whose territory " the
sun never set," might not rise again under an energetic
1 See concerning all these matters Legrelle's work, which treats fully the
diplomacy of the Spanish succession.
496 History of the Dutch People
monarch. A division among the three pretenders seemed
advisable also to Louis XIV. In 1698 there were ne-
gotiations between France and the maritime powers,
prepared, as before the peace of Ryswick, by secret discus-
sions, in which Dijkveld and Portland took part on
behalf of William III. A French envoy, count de Tal-
lard, came to Het Loo with a definite offer, which, on
October nth, led to the first secret partition treaty con-
cluded at The Hague. The Italian possessions of Spain,
excepting Milan, were to go to the dauphin, who was to
have the part of the Spanish province of Guipuzcoa north
of the Pyrenees ; Milan was to belong to the emperor's
second son, Archduke Charles, and all the rest to the
crown prince. But the secret was not long kept. On its
discovery by the Spanish diplomats Charles II., indignant
at such negotiations without consultation of himself or
Spain, gave the entire heritage to the crown prince. An
unexpected event frustrated this plan. The crown prince
died in March, 1699, of the smallpox, to the deep disap-
pointment of Heinsius and William III. and naturally not
without suspicion that the young man had been removed
by poison, a suspicion from which his notoriously ambitious
father did not wholly escape.
New discussions between the maritime powers and
France followed. Some mistrust of France's real aims
was aroused by intimations that the French faction in
Madrid was working around Charles II. in the interest of
the dauphin's second son, who, it was hoped, would now
obtain the entire heritage. The negotiations produced
the second secret Hague-London agreement of March,
1700, by which the dauphin, besides the Italian posses-
sions, secured for France the long-desired Lorraine, whose
prince was to be transferred to Milan ; all the rest fell to
Archduke Charles, the emperor's second son. There was
dissatisfaction in Madrid and Vienna with this new treaty.
The emperor, who could not endure the loss of the Italian
William III.'s Last Years 497
possessions and the increase of French influence in Italy,
refused roundly to recognise the treaty and prepared for
war. Both parties intrigued at Madrid, where the Austri-
ans in particular were hated and the unity of the kingdom
seemed best attained by the elevation of a French prince.
Theologians and jurists and even the pope recommended
this last to the king, and early in October, 1700, Charles
II. signed a secret will, making Duke Philip of Anjou, the
dauphin's second son, his only heir. Four weeks later
(November 1 st) he died, the last scion of the old Burgundian
race, once raised high and proudly, but during a century
shrinking to a fragile reed that was bent by every breath
in the political atmosphere. Louis XIV. hesitated whether
he should hold to the treaty of March or recognise the
will. The fear of another great war stood opposite the
hope of an extraordinary augmentation of power for
the royal house, not for France itself, which would profit
more by the partition treaty. Who could say that the
new branch of royalty might not oppose France, as the
Burgundians had done despite their descent from the
French royal family? But the king's resolution was
taken on November 16th, and he informed the Spanish
ambassador at Paris that his grandson, now Philip V.,
accepted the crown. " There are no longer any Pyrenees,"
remarked the French Mercure in announcing this impor-
tant resolution.
French diplomacy had the task of appeasing the mari-
time powers. It was not what it had been under Richelieu,
Mazarin, Lionne, Pomponne, and d'Avaux. Tallard
and Torcy could not compare with those great diplomatists,
just as Chamillart, the leader of war and finance, was not
the equal of Louvois, and the new generals, Vendome and
Villars, were in f erior to Turenne, Conde, and Luxembourg.
William III. and Heinsius were not convinced of the good
faith of France or that both crowns of France and Spain
might not be united, especially when Louis XIV. recog-
VOL. IV. — 32
498 History of the Dutch People
nised his grandson's rights to the French crown and with
the aid of the elector-governor placed French garrisons in
some frontier towns of the Spanish Netherlands. The sea
powers hesitated to begin the war. Under the influence of
the Tories England was not disinclined to recognise Philip
V. as king, but the republic, where William III. and Hein-
sius ruled everything, would not consent. The govern-
ments of England and the republic saw the seriousness of
the situation and made ready for all contingencies. Prepa-
rations for war were heard of in both countries, in England
ostensibly on account of France's new plans for landing
there on behalf of the Stuarts. The latter hoped, by reason
of William III. 's childlessness and bad health, to secure the
support of the Tories for their restoration, particularly
after the death of the only son and child of Princess Anne,
James II. 's second daughter, who according to the stipu-
lations of 1689 was to succeed William III. Elsewhere
rumours of war had already developed into actual war.
It seemed as if all Europe would soon be in fire and flame.
Northern Europe in 1700 saw war between Sweden, closely
allied with the maritime powers, and its old enemy Den-
mark with Saxony, Poland, and Russia. The sea powers
vigorously supported Sweden and its young king Charles
XII. A Dutch squadron under Almonde and a Dutch
force under Von Dopff had with English ships and troops
taken part in the hostilities. Almonde helped in the
bombardment of Copenhagen and the Swedish invasion
of Seeland, after which the peace of Travendahl fol-
lowed through the mediation of the maritime powers
between Denmark and Sweden. But Saxony, Po-
land, and Russia continued at war with Sweden,
and Brandenburg appeared about to enter into the
conflict.
The chief statesmen of the republic immediately after
the decision at Paris deliberated under the guidance of
Heinsius about the policy to be adopted. The predomi-
William IIL's Last Years 499
nant influence of France was dreaded, whenever Spanish
America and the entrance to the Mediterranean should
come into hands so closely connected with France, and
commerce would thus be menaced. Was it not better to
venture upon a war with weakened France, which must now
defend also Spain, while the sea powers could count on
the aid of emperor and empire, of the anti-French elements
in Italy? Others asked if England could be brought to
this, now that the Tories had so much to say there. It
was determined to negotiate. The Dutch ambassador in
Paris, Coenraad van Heemskerck, was instructed to declare
that the States hoped the king would adhere to the last
partition treaty and give the emperor an opportunity to
join in it. England presented a similar declaration. But
France seemed averse to upholding the treaty. Louis XIV.
endeavoured to justify his actions, and Philip V. announced
to the States officially his accession to the throne. A
direct answer to both was avoided from the Dutch side.
An agreement seemed not inconceivable, even after France
had made itself master of Milan and with the Bavarian
elector had secured the Spanish Netherlands by suddenly
throwing French garrisons into the farther fortresses, some
of them having had Dutch garrisons since the peace of
Ryswick, so that two sorts of troops were now there to-
gether. The States, fearing their garrisons would be
attacked, withdrew them. They even recognised Philip
V., and this example was followed by England in April,
1 70 1. In negotiations at The Hague, to which the aged
d'Avaux came and from England the earl of Stanhope
appeared, the States and England formulated their
demands for an agreement : evacuation of the Spanish
Netherlands by the French garrisons; placing of Dutch
garrisons in a series of fortresses there ; no cession of any
part of the Spanish inheritance to France ; Ostend and
Nieuwpoort in English hands; territorial indemnity
for the emperor; no reduction of commercial advan-
500 History of the Dutch People
tages for the maritime powers in Spain, America, and
India.1
Louis XIV. would not listen to such terms. He an-
swered shortly that he wished to see the peace of Rys-
wick maintained. This was understood to mean war, and
even the most peaceful among the regents realised that
nothing was to be done but to prepare for it. The fleet
was brought into readiness, exportation of horses pro-
hibited, troops were enlisted, an inundation was arranged
at Lilloo, the fortresses on the southern border were pro-
visioned. England also equipped itself for war. William
III. came over in spring as usual, and d'Avaux at the end
of July left The Hague with a solemn assertion of France's
peaceful disposition. An ample counter representation of
the States aimed to show that a renewal of the great war
was not to be reproached to them but to France, which
had violated the treaties concluded. The manifesto was
printed and circulated everywhere. Thenceforth the con-
viction was established that war was inevitable, and the
devotion of the people could be relied upon in the republic
and England. This was now an imperative necessity in
both countries. It was impossible to wage a war against
the will of Parliament and the States, no matter upon
what good grounds William III. and Heinsius might
desire it. Now that since the elections of 1698 the Whigs
in England again had a majority in Parliament and the
support of commerce was secured in the republic, war was
a certain fact, and it became advisable to array all Europe
in arms against France, preferably by a renewal of the
Grand Alliance with the addition of other powers. On
September 7, 1701, a treaty was signed at The Hague with
England and the emperor, one of the most influential
Whigs, Lord Marlborough, now in high favour with Wil-
liam III., coming over from England, and Count Goes
1 Lamberty, Me'moires pour servir a I ' histoire du XVIII. silcle (2de ed.),
i. p. 403; Legrelle, iv., p. 117.
William III.'s Last Years 50 l
appearing in the emperor's name. The conquest of Milan
and the other Italian territories of Spain was to satisfy the
emperor ; Belgium was to become a " dike, rampart, and
barrier" for the republic, while the Spanish colonies were
indicated as spoils for the republic and England. Frederick
of Brandenburg, now king of Prussia, joined with the
emperor, as did also the dukes of Hanover and Liineburg
and the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, of whom the former,
closely related to the English royal family and the future
successor to the throne of the United Kingdom after
Princess Anne, obtained the long-coveted electoral dignity.
Frederick IV. of Denmark also consented to a subsidy
treaty with the powers. Sweden was too busy with its
northern plans to think seriously of acting against France.
The maritime powers renewed their alliance with one
another. On the other side Louis XIV. could count upon
the cooperation of Spain, of avaricious Savoy, of Bavaria
with a member of its ruling family as bishop of Cologne,
besides upon the benevolent attitude of weak Portugal
and of the neutral Italian states.
The war was already breaking out in Italy, and English
and Dutch fleets were putting to sea to protect the
merchantmen from French privateers and war ships. The
French troops occupied Liege, Rijnberk, Neuss, Bonn,
and other places, while the States sent theirs to Jiilich
and Cologne ; Dutch forces moved to the generality lands
to protect the frontiers. The actual war was not yet
begun, not even when Louis XIV. saluted as king of
England, as James III., the son of James II. who died
in September at St. Germain. Indignation seized upon
the English people ; they demanded vengeance for this
affront, and the Whigs in Parliament, the party of the
Protestant succession in England, showed inclination to
as close a league as possible with the republic. When
William III. returned to England in November as usual,
after settling the state of war for 1702 in the Netherlands,
502 History of the Dutch People
he could continue preparations for war in England with
the hearty cooperation of Parliament and people. Before
the end of 1701 the enemy threatened Maestricht and
Dutch Flanders. The archenemy was to be fought in
Italy, where Prince Eugene of Savoy was to command
the Austrians, in Germany, where Archduke Joseph and
Prince Louis of Baden were to operate on the upper
Rhine, and the Prussians on the lower Rhine, in the
Netherlands, where William himself was to lead the
Anglo-Dutch troops, and at sea, where the combined
fleet was to attempt the capture of Cadiz. William III.
discussed matters with the allies at Het Loo and The
Hague. Marlborough and Heinsius were fully informed
of these plans. William III. himself, the general recog-
nised by all as their superior, was to be the great leader
in the last conflict that was to prevent France from laying
down the law to Europe. But he was not destined to
take part in all this.
His weak constitution had been injured by the hard-
ships of war and the troublesome cares of state, which in
England particularly were coupled with great disappoint-
ments, so that he repeatedly spoke of abdication. In
the Netherlands cares oppressed him less ; his trusted
helpers, with Heinsius at their head, conducted affairs
quite to his liking, and in the last years not a voice was
raised in opposition to the supreme influence of the
king-stadtholder. His weak health had occasioned his
plan for making his young cousin, the son of Henry
Casimir II., Prince John William Friso of Nassau, whom
he had appointed his sole heir, his successor also in his
dignities, especially in the stadtholdership of Holland and
the other provinces. In the summer of 1701 he sounded
the Estates of Holland concerning this, but owing to
their unwillingners to enter into plans that would bring
all the provinces under one stadtholder and thus end in a
monarchy, though the name of a republic might be re-
William Ill's Last Years 503
tained, he reluctantly let the matter drop, warning that
it might some day be too late. He seems really to have
felt very feeble, but this was kept secret by his desire, in
order that political affairs might not suffer from fear of
his death.1 Those nearest him, his best friends, were very
anxious about his condition, and he himself was accu-
rately acquainted with it. There seemed to be some im-
provement in the spring. He took to his beloved pastime
of hunting in the vicinity of his palace of Hampton
Court and to horseback riding usually in the company of
his favourite of these last years, the young baron of Kep-
pel-Pallandt, now Lord Albemarle, who had more and
more acquired the place of his old friend Bentinck-Port-
land, to the latter's vexation. The improvement was
only in appearance. William III. knew from his physi-
cians that his malady was incurable and that he had not
long to live, a certainty that tormented him at the
thought of the troublous times speedily approaching. He
had never felt any fear of death, but now he expressed a
wish to live a little longer for the sake of the high aim
of his life which he hoped finally to reach by this last
great war: the establishment of the European balance
of power and of freedom of worship in Protestant countries.
Then an accident came suddenly to hasten the long-
dreaded crisis and to strike him down, while he was still
restlessly busy with preparation for the war and with
regulation of the domestic conditions of England. Letters
to Heinsius, arrangements with Marlborough, Ouwerkerk,
and Athlone concerning military matters, a message to
Parliament relative to a closer union of England and Scot-
land are the last documents bearing his signature, precious
memorials of the activity of a great mind. On the morn-
ing of March 4, 1702, he was riding in the park of his castle,
when his horse stumbled over a molehill. The king fell
and broke his collar bone. The bone was immediately set,
1 See on his last days the conclusion of Macaulay's masterly work.
504 History of the Dutch People
and the sufferer was taken in a coach to the castle, but the
jolting of the carriage broke the bone again, and in an
exhausted state he came to the chamber which he was
nevermore to leave in life. His enfeebled body could not
stand the shock of the accident insignificant in itself. He
sank during several days, uniting to the very last the trans-
action of affairs of state with pious meditation directed by
Burnet. To the last his strong mind remained clear, his
thoughts devoted to the great purpose of his life. His
deathbed was surrounded by the most influential English
statesmen, and he took leave of them one by one with
friendly words, thanking them for their cooperation and
recommending them to continue his work. Dutch friends
were with him too in these moments, those who were bound
to him by the most intimate ties of personal friendship.
Keppel came back from The Hague just in time to hear
his last instructions ; Ouwerkerk received a last word of
thanks from his lips ; Bentinck, hastening at his request,
felt the last pressure of his hand and heard the last whispers
from the mouth of the old friend who had offered him the
hand of reconciliation on his deathbed. Thus the great
William of Orange died amid his friends on the morning
of the 19th of March. On his breast was found a piece of
silken ribbon containing a gold ring and a lock of hair,
a tender memento of Queen Mary, the faithful wife,
who had lived with him through his most arduous and
successful years — a striking proof of what had really gone
on in that apparently cool mind.
With the death of the last direct male descendant of the
house of Orange ends a period in the history of the Dutch
people, a period of glory and distinction which is surpassed
by no other except by that immediately preceding it.
Upon each page of the history of these two periods stands
the name of one of the two great men, to whose guidance
the Dutch state intrusted itself in those years : John de
Witt and William III., both working in their way for the
William III.'s Last Years 5°5
good of their countrymen, both with firm hand steering
the ship of state through the breakers of political life,
along the rocks of domestic and foreign politics. John de
Witt and William III., the man of the aristocratic form
of government and the man of the monarchy in fact, the
man of the narrower political interest of the republic and
the man of world-embracing political and religious ideals,
have both the highest claim to the gratitude of the Dutch
people, which fought with one for the interests of commerce
and prosperity, with the other for the higher interests of
political and religious liberty, and in both recognises the
representatives of genuine Dutch principles and ideas,
the great statesmen of the most brilliant days it has ever
known. Politics set them against one another as personal
enemies, making one after a fine career fall in the vigour
of his years as the victim of a furious mob, raising the
other to the highest dignities his childhood could have
dreamed of. More than two centuries have passed away,
the parties led by them have disappeared, and the people
of the Netherlands places in its memory the great council
pensionary and the great Orange prince as the representa-
tives of the most glorious portion of its history. What
Prince William, his two excellent sons, and Oldenbarnevelt
prepared was brought to maturity under De Witt and
William III., and the whole world has shown unfeigned
admiration for both. Among the great men of history a
place is allotted to them without hesitation, because they
are notable representatives of a grand period in the history
of their people.
CHAPTER XIX
THE NETHERLANDS AT THE END OF THE SEVENTEENTH
CENTURY
THE period of William III. is generally regarded as
one of decline for the republic, of internal decline
at least, though outwardly the splendour of De Witt's time
seemed preserved or even surpassed, now that William
III., king of England and stadtholder of most of the
provinces of the republic, guided its destiny and made it
act a brilliant part among Europe's powers. In some
respects an unmistakable falling off was to be noted, and
it was due apparently to the disappearance of the genera-
tion steeled by danger, which had fought in the war of
independence or had witnessed it in youth. The thought
of danger to independence had now vanished. For a
long time there was nothing to be feared from the closely
allied England, unless it was the sharp but peaceful rivalry
of commerce ; France was exhausted by Louis XIV.'s
continuous wars and could be held in check by united
Europe, when England no longer supported it directly or
secretly ; Sweden was powerless in consequence of do-
mestic conditions like Denmark ; the emperor had more
need of the republic than it had of him ; the rest of
Europe could not equal it. When it thenceforth had to
wage war, it no longer struggled for its existence, not
even to keep what it had, but only against relatively re-
mote perils of a political or economic nature. The citizen
of the republic could usually be at ease and peacefully
506
At End of Seventeenth Century 507
enjoy his own without troubling himself much about in-
creasing or retaining it. What people does not yield to
such a temptation? What people does not involuntarily
see its energy, its strength, formerly tempered by daily
conflict, decline in days of victory and enjoyment ?
Some decadence may be remarked in art, literature,
science, morals. Every period of course cannot be ex-
pected to furnish men like Rembrandt and Hals, Vondel
and Hooft, Huygens and Heinsius. But how far below
the pupils of Rembrandt and Hals stand De Baen, the
prot6g£ of Prince John Maurice and the Great Elector,
and Arnold Boonen, that of various German princes, the
much patronised and admired portrait painters of the fine
people of the century's last years? How far is Dusart
from his master Ostade and the academic Gerard de
Lairesse, the head of a numerous school of painters, the
once esteemed painter of chimney-pieces and ceilings,
from the talented representatives of the previous genera-
tion ? Yet there are some great names to be mentioned.
Ludolf Backhuysen recalls in his pictures of the sea the
Van de Veldes, the youngest of whom was his famous
contemporary and perhaps the greatest of this family of
marine painters ; Huchtenburgh imitates Wouwerman in
delineating happily the battle scenes of the French wars ;
Rachel Ruysch excels as a painter of flowers and repro-
duces admirably the soft tints of native fruits. But
Willem van Mieris, refining the fine art of his father
Frans, attains an affected style, from which all soul has
disappeared, just as Godfried Schalcken seeks to surpass
Dou's artful lights by still more exaggerated effects, and
Gaspar Netscher's sons also fail to equal their father. In
engraving as in painting it is a time of epigones. Jan
Luyken, as engraver and etcher, is quite the equal of the
preceding period's great artists with the burin and etching
needle ; his numerous drawings and etchings, his exquisite
illustrations for books give evidence of his charming talent.
508 History of the Dutch People
Romein de Hooghe, inaccurate draughtsman, confused in
the presentation of his subject, pornographer and illus-
trator of lampoons, with which he put his pencil in the
service of a political party, is one of the most esteemed
engravers of the period together with Arnold Houbraken,
the many-sided, exact, learned, but not really very artistic
painter, engraver, etcher, literary man. The latter sur-
vives in his Groote Schouburg der Nederlandsche kunst-
schilders en scJiildcressen, which with Lairesse's Groot
Schilderboek, " wherein the art of painting is thoroughly
taught in all its parts and explained by reasoning and the
illustration of prints,'1 testifies to the more erudite than
artistic spirit of the time. So it is in every department
that still had great names before the middle of the cen-
tury. There are no architects, no sculptors of importance,
except the aged Xavery, whose works are possessed by
all sorts of houses and villas of the epoch, especially at
Leyden and Utrecht and on the Vecht. Not that much
frequented art schools could not be shown in nearly all
the cities, or that art in general found no appreciation
among the population. No Holland city of note but it had
its active and popular St. Luke's guild ; no aristocratic
dwelling but its owner wanted to beautify it with art
works of all sorts ; no country house but it had garden
statues, artistically constructed grottoes and arbours, hand-
some water basins to show; no habitation in city or country
but it could display, as formerly, if not original at least
copied works of art ; no gable of a well-to-do city abode
but its considerable number of ornaments in wood or
stone attracted the attention of the passer. This was
only an afterglow of the great time, and art works within
and without the house were characterised by imitation
and overloading, signs of artistic decay.
Thus it was also in literature. The " excellent society
for promoting art " of Amsterdam, Nil Volentibns
Arduum, here swayed tne sceptre more and more under
At End of Seventeenth Century 5°9
the lead of Pels and Meijer, " building up the language "
according to "rules found after long deliberation" and
striving after "sweetly flowing" verses, "polishing"
what seemed to suffer from roughness. " Every word
may be many times improved and scraped, forged,
changed, and the superfluous scratched out," became the
rule in prose and poetry. The drama must exclusively
" lead up " to the virtue of common life and be arranged
after the French model, " edifying, artificial, according to
rule "; the " path found " by the French must show the
way. No " original invention," no " Bible subjects " or
modern situations were to be presented, so that the
province of the church would not be encroached upon,
and the old enemy was reconciled to what took place on
the boards.1 Vondel and Hooft are out of date, Bredero
and Jan Vos are considered " too wild," Oudaen and
Antonides van der Goes find as little favour in the eyes of
the conceited critics and presumptuous pedants. The
French drama was victorious also over the spectacular
pieces of recent times; the stage in the capital and else-
where lived upon translations and imitations of the much
admired plays of Corneille, Racine, and their followers.
It was little better with comedy, although this, of course,
preserved more of the national colour.3 Asselijn's depic-
tions of manners, among which his Jan Klaaszen still at-
tracts audiences, rise above the ordinary standard of the
"ingenious" imitations of Moliere and other French
authors approved by the " academy." It was all over
with lyric and epic poetry after the artificial extinction of
independent talent, though rhymesters shot up like mush-
rooms from the ground in the shadow of the poetical
societies, which — successors of the ancient chambers of
rhetoric and infected with all their faults — were formed
1 jonckbloet, Gesch. der nederl. letterk., XVI Idt eeuw, ii., p. 416.
2 Kalff, Litter aiuur en toneel te Amsterdam in de ijde eeuw, p. 268.
5io History of the Dutch People
in nearly every city ; under these circumstances didactics
alone celebrated its dry triumphs. Almost no poet, no
verse of this latter time has any claim to be mentioned,
when real art is in question. The classically formed cap-
tain Broekhuizen at the end of the century — in Dutch as
well as in Latin verses — gave expression to his uncommon
talent in a language that recalls Hooft, but he ended in
pious and not very poetical meditation. Jan Luyken,
also a poet of fine feeling, published in 1671 a charming
collection of love poems in his Dnytse Her, but he, too,
in later years retired from the world and devoted himself
entirely to edifying reflection and poetry, in which he
was far from reaching the artistic height shown by the
collection mentioned. These are the last poets of the
great period, the last who in the circle of Oudaen and
Vollenhove and Antonides van der Goes had looked ad-
miringly up to the old age of Vondel. The learned
David van Hoogstraten, who as prorector of the Latin
school at Amsterdam had known the older poets and the
youngest poetasters of the last quarter of the century,
had associated with them all and himself made mediocre
verses, has rendered to many of his older and younger
contemporaries the service of collecting their remains
and writing down his recollections of them. As sexton of
the Dutch literature of the flourishing time he has no slight
merits, but he is likewise the pioneer of the scientific
study of the Dutch language which now actually begins
— a phenomenon that is perhaps related to the decline of
literary talent and may be observed in other nations and
periods, as we have noticed it for this time also in paint-
ing and engraving. He stands on the same line with
Lairesse and Houbraken.
It was somewhat better in science. From the gifted
Heinsius and Vossius it was a little descent to Graevius,
Gronovius, and Burmannus, from Voetius and Cocceius to
the younger Jacobus Trigland and Frederik Spanheim,
At End of Seventeenth Century 511
from De Groot to Graswinckel. In theology A Marck,
the author of the comprehensive handbook Merck der
Godgeleerdheid, and the gentle middlemen, Vitringa at
Franeker and Witsius, were prominent. The noted jurist,
Gerard Noodt, received the praise of being the only liter-
ary man among the jurists of the fatherland. The famous
commentator on the Pandects, Johannes Voet, was little
more than an excellent collector of "what was thought
and said before him." Above them both stood indis-
putably the distinguished Franeker professor, Ulric
Huber, dying in 1694, after De Groot the man best in-
formed in political and international law, which he treated
admirably in his work, De jure civitatis. Antonius Mat-
thaeus, the third of the name from an erudite legal fam-
ily, was mainly a collector and editor of documents and
chronicles, a compiler. Jacobus Perizonius, the great
authority on ancient history, to which he adapted an in-
telligent criticism, had given up acute textual criticism.
Leeuwenhoeck, the simple usher of the Delft justices,
prosecuted late in life his studies of the " mysteries of
nature " and excited the astonishment of Europe by his
surprising discoveries about the " invisible created truths "
of the minute animal, vegetable, and mineral world, which
his microscope, the successor of spectacle glasses, enabled
him to make. Christiaan Huygens, summits Hugenius, saw
the last years before his death in 1695 clouded by melan-
choly. In general, however, the time of original geniuses
was past, and that of collectors,1 compilers and, handbook
writers had dawned. This was true also of history, where
Gerard Brandt found his successors in the restlessly col-
lecting antiquarians Cornelis van Alkemade and Pieter
van der Schelling, and the story of the great deeds of
earlier generations gave place to topographical, genealog-
ical, and archaeological treatises. The learned Huguenot
1 See concerning the Dutch collectors of this time the numerous data in
the Merkwtirdige Reysen of the German traveller Uffenbach, Bd. ii. and iii.
5i2 History of the Dutch People
emigrant Basnage, preacher successively at Rotterdam,
Leyden, and The Hague, alone upheld the honour of his-
torical study in a literary form. In medicine Charles
Dreiincourt and Goverd Bidloo were known no less as
learned men than as practising physicians. Groningen
succeeded in connecting the famous Basel mathemati-
cian, Johannes Bernouilli, the inventor of the integral
and differential calculus, from Halle with its university.
Dutch universities still possessed some good teachers,
professors excelling in general knowledge and the scien-
tific spirit, so that in this period also many foreigners came
hither to enjoy the admirable instruction, but the brilli-
ancy of Dutch science had perceptibly paled.
These foreigners were still impressed by the peculiar
traits of the Dutch people, but the slow decline of the na-
tional virtues and customs did not escape them, chiefly in
the higher classes, but also among the prosperous citizens.
Unquestionably French fashions, French dress, French
manners, the French language, were invading the country
more victoriously than ever, partly in consequence of the
settlement of the many refugees. A foreign traveller says
that the nobility especially " strive to imitate the French
in their mien, their clothes, their way of talk, of eating, of
gallantry, or debauchery," ' and a similar tendency was
plainly evident in the army. Simplicity in dress and
dwelling, which had formerly symbolised the nation's
strength in the eyes of foreign travellers, was slowly lost :
men demanded more of life and sought to satisfy these
demands ; the younger generation showed this inclination
more than before. Luxurious France was everywhere the
model to be patterned after.
With the augmentation of the national fortune and the
increase in the number of rich men in the country, who
lived on the capital accumulated by themselves or their
ancestors, this tendency must gradually impair the na-
'A voyage to Holland, in Harleian Miscellany, ix., p. 543.
At End of Seventeenth Century 513
tional strength, although prosperity still remained at a con-
siderable height. That it so remained was due largely to
the flourishing commerce and industry, in which no falling
off was to be observed. A very unfavourable symptom
was the growing traffic in stocks, especially in the shares
of the East and West India Companies, which were more
subject to fluctuations than others by reason of the vary-
ing cargoes brought to Europe. Since the first quarter of
the century speculation had been common in Amsterdam,
and the sharp differences in the prices of government
bonds in 1672 and the following years had much promoted
this. The " Portuguese Jewish nation " at Amsterdam
engaged extensively in this bond and stock business, but
other residents and many foreigners also took part in it.
The stocks went from hand to hand, often for delivery
months afterwards, and every day was to be seen the evil
of speculation in the rapid vicissitudes of fortune, which in
great measure had the same pernicious consequences as in
later times. This stock speculation in Amsterdam was
far from having driven away mercantile trade. A French
writer ' of the last years of the century gives a survey of
the Dutch navigation and commerce of the period, which
shows the immense development it could still boast of in
those years. It might still be said that Dutch commerce
" embraced the whole earth " and formed the basis of the
republic's importance as a power, so disproportionate to
the area of its territory and the number of its citizens.
Only a relatively small part of Dutch commerce consisted
of the direct exportation of Dutch products. In this time
too the Hollanders had the carrying trade for northern
and southern Europe, for South America, western Africa,
southern Asia, and Japan. An English economist of the
1 (P. D. Huet), Memoir es sur ie commerce des hollandais (published in 1716,
but written before the peace of Ryswick). This remarkable little book is
based upon official documents and communications from experienced Dutch
merchants.
VOL. IV. 33
514 History of the Dutch People
present calculates Holland's export trade, i. e., that of do-
mestic or foreign articles exported from Holland, at 144
million guilders a year, which can be nothing but a rough
estimate.1 The commerce extended really over a large
portion of the globe and must be described more in detail.
Commerce with Russia was carried on partly through
Archangel, partly through Livonia. Two squadrons went
every year to Archangel, the first in June of five or six, the
second in July of more than thirty ships from 200 to 400
tons each, in order at the noted Archangel August market
to trade in linen and silk stuffs, cloths, beaver skins, paper,
table furnishings, arms, gunpowder, sulphur, metals, wines,
southern fruits, spices, herrings, white lead, dyestuffs,
perfumes, lace, pearls, gold wire, coined gold and silver.
English and French competition had almost ceased here.
The English came with only four or five ships a year in
consequence of the cleverness of the Hollanders in gain-
ing the Russian noblemen by presents and in adapting
their offerings to the needs of the inhabitants, which they
sought to learn accurately, while they succeeded in mak-
ing their rivals ridiculous by pamphlets and caricatures.
Amsterdam had this commerce almost exclusively. That
through Livonia went generally by way of Reval and
Narva, then still in the possession of Sweden, to Nov-
gorod, the great market of central Russia, and Pskov,
also by way of Riga and Pernau, to which ports about
sixty wood ships sailed annually. Besides wood, particu-
larly wood for masts and casks, corn and hemp were ex-
ported from here, together with Russian hides for fine
leathers, Russian and Siberian fur, caviare, fat, and wax,
which last articles were conveyed in large quantities on
Dutch vessels to France and the countries on the Medi-
terranean, as well as to the Spanish-American colonies,
much being used for ecclesiastical purposes.
In Norway the Hollanders surpassed other nations in
1 Pringsheim, Beitrage, p. 10.
At End of Seventeenth Century 515
the importance of their commerce. They carried there
whatever the poor country needed and brought away
wood, iron, copper, pitch, skins of animals, potash, fat,
dried fish. Over 300 ships of 400 to 500 tons each with ten
to twelve sailors were employed in this trade, of which the
cities and villages of northern Holland and Friesland
were the chief seats, Bergen and Trondhjem being the
Norwegian ports. Denmark's foreign commerce was not
great, but the Hollanders had a considerable trade in corn
on Laaland and in cattle on Jutland, whence the ani-
mals were brought to the fertile pastures of Holland to
be fattened. Seeland's former cultivation of rye had
almost entirely ceased, and the island furnished scarcely
grain enough to support its inhabitants. Much more im-
portant was the commerce with Sweden, where the Hol-
landers conveyed spices, salt, wines, cloths and silks,
sugar, etc., and exported excellent copper, iron, steel,
arms, lead, tar, pitch, wood for masts, especially fine tim-
ber. The Hollanders were quite the masters of the ex-
portation of copper and advanced money to the owners
of the mines, Amsterdam coming to the fore in this busi-
ness. The commercial treaty of 1679 secured the rule
ever desired by the Dutch in their intercourse with other
nations : free ships, free goods, even in time of war. The
other Baltic coasts, from Pomerania to Livonia, supplied
grain, wood, wax, honey, potash, leather, furs, hemp, salt-
petre, fat, wool, linen, etc., which were transported there
along the large rivers, also from Brandenburg, Silesia,
Poland, and Lithuania. All the Baltic ports shared in
this commerce, carried on by the English and Dutch, but
Dantzig, Konigsberg, and Pillau had the most, particu-
larly the first with its enormous grain storehouses which
made it the " granary " of the north. Paper, oil, logwood,
salt, etc., were imported here besides the articles men-
tioned above. Twenty to twenty-five vessels served an-
nually for the Courland trade ; the grain commerce in
516 History of the Dutch People
general always kept 700 or 800 busy ; next in importance
came the trade in wood, because the Hollanders supplied
not only the famous shipyards of the Zaan with wood,
but also those of France, Spain, and Italy, just as they
provided those countries with furs, caviare, honey, wax,
hemp, linen, etc., from these regions. With some ships they
even carried on a direct trade between Archangel and
Leghorn and Venice, just as they took possession of the
carrying trade between the Baltic ports, which was ever
growing less on account of the increasing self-development
of these ports. Generally they made the greatest exer-
tions to keep the northern commerce in their hands, as
appears from the establishment of boards of directors for
the Baltic trade at Amsterdam and Hoorn in 1689, and
especially to prevent the inhabitants of the Baltic coasts
from engaging in this trade themselves. The Dutch rix-
dollar was still the usual money of commerce in the north
and was imported there in considerable quantities.
German commerce went principally along the large
rivers from the Meuse to the Elbe. Busy Hamburg, " little
Amsterdam," had a chief part in it by reason of its admi-
rable situation as the point of export for lower Germany ;
it had enjoyed much prosperity in the great wars, which
had injured the commerce of the republic for years
together, and temporarily had attracted to itself much
of this commerce. But the Dutch were again the most
prominent merchants here and went up the Elbe as far as
Magdeburg. Bremen too had an active trade in wood and
beer, the latter being conveyed by the Hollanders as far
away as India. Emden was the exporting place for East
Frisian cattle and horses, Westphalian hams, wood and
linen from Miinster and Paderborn shipped by Dutch vessels
to the republic. The Rhine trade of the Hollanders was
very considerable * they exported wine, wood, cannons, and
bullets, and supplied all western Germany with spices, her-
rings, sugar, cheese, and the products of all sorts of in-
At End of Seventeenth Century 517
dustry. Cologne and Frankfort were still the chief markets
here, where imports and exports met along the Main and
Moselle as far as Franconia and Lorraine. Trade went by
the Meuse to Liege and Aix-la-Chapelle, where metallic
wares and coal formed the chief articles of exportation and
spices with silks and woollen goods were imported. The
Spanish Netherlands were commercially quite dependent
upon the republic in consequence of the closing of the
Scheldt and the waters leading to Ghent and Bruges.
These two places with Antwerp and Mechlin were the
principal marts for the trade in the articles required by the
south ; the exportation, also entirely in Dutch hands,
was confined to lace, yarns, hemp, tapestry, and Lille cam-
bric. A small independent commerce between Ostend and
Cadiz was the pitiful remnant of the former great com-
mercial movement of this impoverished region.
Since the Navigation Act England had its export and
import trade wholly in its own hands, also that of its
American colonies. Spices alone, of which the East India
Company possessed the monopoly, were still imported
through connivance in Dutch vessels. On the other hand
the English had their cloth and wool staple at Dordrecht
and exported to Amsterdam much lead, tin, and corn be-
sides English colonial goods. The Scotch had their staple
at Veere and brought there coal, wool, and hides. The
Dutch could not change this, because their situation
obliged them to keep friends with the English who domi-
nated the Channel, but the friendly relations of recent
times occasioned some improvement, particularly during
war, when England needed the help of the Hollanders
more than ever. Exports to England amounted in these
years to about 6 millions, imports from England to about
1 8 millions, and considerable smuggling must be taken
into account.
Trade with France once so important had much dimin-
ished since the obstacles placed in its way after 1648 on
518 History of the Dutch People
account of political differences. Before that time the Hol-
landers were the great merchants here ; their ships filled
the French ports ; they imported many necessary goods
and were protected by advantageous treaties. To Nor-
mandy alone 200,000 "quarters" of train oil went every year,
to Rouen 800 lasts of herrings ; soap, refined sugar, salt, cloth,
porcelain were almost exclusively obtained from Holland.
According to the testimony of the ambassador Boreel the
republic about 1658 bought French articles every year to
the value of 35 million livres, particularly clothing, mir-
rors, furniture, wines ; from the district between La Ro-
chelle and Ol^ron cargoes for five or six hundred ships
were annually obtained. In 1662 a commercial treaty
regulated satisfactorily the mutual relations disturbed by a
beginning of difficulties, but five years later the French
government commenced again to impose heavy taxes on
Dutch commerce, which soon caused retaliatory measures
on the Dutch side in duties on French goods, especially
on wine and brandy. Furthermore some branches of
industry passed from France to the republic after the per-
secution of the Huguenots. Both French commerce and
French industry suffered seriously, because the Hollanders
accustomed themselves to receive from elsewhere articles
formerly obtained from France or had less need of French
commodities on account of the establishment of French
industries in their country, such as the manufacture of silk,
brocade, hats, paper. Then came the war of 1672 to 1678,
which destroyed all commerce between the countries. And
after the peace of Nimwegen, as usual, it did not appear
so easy to entice trade back to the old channels, now that
it had formed new ones, so that in 1680 French goods at
Amsterdam brought more loss than profit. In France
there was soon again an inclination to tax Dutch commerce,
but the result was more of a stoppage. Then followed
the new political tension and the war of 1688, which cut
off all commerce with Holland ■ and when finally the peace
At End of Seventeenth Century 5J9
of Ryswick was concluded, it seemed even less easy than
formerly to renew the old relations, particularly when new
difficulties soon increased the chances of a third great
war. Commerce with France consequently was about
1700 of slight significance.
Spain after the peace of Miinster favoured Dutch com-
merce greatly, and the hostile political attitude of this
power towards France made a large part of the Franco-
Spanish trade go into Dutch hands. There were no ports
on the Spanish coast where Dutch ships were not to be
found, while English competition alone had to be con-
tended with. Cadiz was the great commercial port, where
Indian and American goods were imported and immedi-
ately transferred to Dutch and English vessels lying ready.
Gold and silver, pearls and precious stones, dyestuffs and
cinchona, vanilla, tobacco, cochineal, leather, fine wood
from America, were exported from there to all Europe.
Moreover Spain itself furnished fine wool, the fruits of
Malaga, the wines of Jerez, Malaga, and Alicante, the oils
of Seville and Majorca, salt from Cadiz and Iviza, iron and
steel from Biscay and Navarre, soap from Alicante and
Cartagena. How large the interest of the Hollanders in
Spanish trade had become, appears from the fact that
before 1688 only 3000, but in 1691 about 16,000 casks of
Spanish brandy were exported on account of the lack of
French brandy. Navigation to Cadiz and back employed
every year thirty large ships. Negroes for the American
colonies were an important merchandise ; this trade, though
really prohibited to other nations as well as all commerce
with the Spanish colonies, was almost entirely in Dutch hands
and gaveconsiderable profits. The importation into Spain
of spices, cloth, clothing, silks, cutlery, wood, medicinal
herbs, cordage, tar, pitch, paper, herrings, butter, grain, was
likewise accomplished by the Dutch. After the peace with
Portugal in 1661 commerce with that country became
considerable, and the Hollanders quite crowded out the
520 History of the Dutch People
French trade in wine and fruits at Lisbon and Oporto.
Ten or twelve ships were laden here every year with lemons
and oranges. The salt of Setubal was almost wholly
shipped by them, often in vessels returning without cargo
from the Mediterranean, but also in twenty ships designed
for no other purpose.
The commerce of the Dutch on the Mediterranean Sea
since the beginning of the seventeenth century belonged
among the most important branches of their entire busi-
ness. It was first of all Levant trade and was carried on
under the lead and supervision of directors at Amsterdam.
Thirty ships sailed to Turkish lands, distributed into three
or four squadrons on account of piracy, and each was pro-
vided with twenty to twenty-five cannon and sixty to
seventy men, while two large convoy ships accompanied
them. Leghorn was the resting place, where the men re-
freshed themselves for the voyage which found its destina-
tion in Smyrna, to which port the countries of western
Asia as far as Persia sent their products by caravan. Dutch
commerce with Egypt was of slight importance; Alex-
andria and Rosetta were the ports there, and the farthest
point reached was Cairo. Considerable, however, was the
direct trade with Italy, where the great places for exporta-
tion were Genoa, the staple of rich Lombardy, Venice,
Leghorn for central Italy, and Naples and Messina for
southern Italy and Sicily. The Hollanders imported here
all sorts of commodities from the north and India ; they
exported raw silk, silken, velvet, and satin stuffs, fruits,
olive oil, Parmesan cheese, sulphur, rice, turpentine, lacquer
work, marble, Venetian glass, paper, soap ; the excellent
Italian manufacture of silk, satin, velvet, and damask was
famous all over the world and gave great value to this trade.
Many Dutch vessels voyaged from the republic to the
Spanish, French, Italian, and Barbary coasts, from whence
they transported commodities to the Levant and where
on the way back they sold Levant goods, as they were
At End of Seventeenth Century 521
accustomed to do in the Baltic ports ; then they returned
home with a new cargo from those coasts. The Hollanders
in fact shared the Levant commerce only with the English.
The trade of these two nations was very notable in the
woollen and linen fabrics universally used there for cloth-
ing, also that in spices and dyestuffs monopolised by the
Dutch, and that in metals, lead and tin in particular, of
which the English had as good as a monopoly. The
"capitulations" concluded with the Grand Seignior, the
oldest of which dated from the time of Haga, regulated
trade in the Levant and were administered with liberality.
The duties imposed on commerce by the Turks were
moderate — three per cent, for exports, five per cent, for
imports, and they had to be paid once only for all Turkish
ports.
Outside of Europe the commerce of the East India
Company is first worthy of mention. Its power in the
Indies had much increased since Maetsuycker, notwith-
standing the loss of Formosa so well situated for trade
with China and Japan. The conquests from the Portu-
guese in Hither India, the subjection of Macassar in 1669,
the capture of St. Thome in 1675, the cession of Japara and
Cheribon by the prince of Mataram in 1680, established its
authority at the chief points of trade and communication.
The occupation of Bantam in 1682, where a serious com-
petition with Batavia had come up gradually under
England's protection, procured for it important advan-
tages. It now possessed the monopoly in the entire
archipelago, and Batavia flourished greatly as the centre of
the extensive commercial territory exploited by the com-
pany. This territory was not limited to the archipelago
but stretched out along the whole southern coast of Asia
to Japan. As in the Baltic and Mediterranean the Hol-
landers had here also, though not to the same extent and
not at all in China and Japan, the carrying trade in these
regions from Socotra to Tongking. The Arabic gums,
522 History of the Dutch People
perfumes, balsams, and coffee collected on the Arabian
coast from Mocha to Muscat and Basra, the Persian coarse
silk suitable for lace and thread, the pearls and precious
stones sold in Bender Abbas were shipped by the Dutch
in all directions. In the states of the Great Mogul they
bought silks, fine cotton, cotton garments, woven fabrics,
indigo, saltpetre, red and black lacquer, agate, opium,
ginger, etc., and carried them as far away as the Spanish
and Portuguese colonies in America. Surat was the chief
point for this trade. Southwards from the Portuguese
Goa to Cape Comorin lies the pepper coast of Malabar,
where the coarse cinnamon and pepper for Europe were
bought up, in the factory at Cochin especially, by means
of contracts with the small interior princes, who could only
be won at great expense in consequence of the competition
of Arab merchants. The opposite coast of Coromandel
included the great exporting harbours of the rich Golconda,
whence the company in 1663 drew cotton valued at nearly
one and a half million guilders, mainly in the form of
printed cotton or chintz, which nowhere in India was
manufactured more beautifully than in this realm around
Masulipatam. Precious stones were also to be obtained
here in large quantities. The capture of Pondicherry
from the French in 1693 was therefore of great importance.
From Bengal came glossy silk much used in Holland, silken
stuffs, muslins, diamonds, saltpetre, and sugar; yearly the
Dutch secured here 6000 to 7000 bales of silk, the best of
all India ; from Buton came musk and excellent rhubarb.
A fort in Hugh was, with Patna farther up on the Ganges,
the emporium of Dutch trade in these regions. The king-
doms of Pegu, Siam, and Malacca furnished large quantities
of lacquer, gold, silver, precious stones, ivory, rice, tin, lead,
wood. The last place, admirably situated on the strait of
the same name, the old commercial route, was still of some
importance, but had been obliged to yield to Batavia its
great repute as the centre of Indian commerce. Bangkok,
At End of Seventeenth Century 523
the capital of populous Siam, carried on a large indepen-
dent trade with the Arabic merchants in Hither India and
even with Japan. From Tongking came fine Chinese silk
and musk, but the company's commerce here was of little
consequence. Commerce with China, the land of the best
white silk and fine silken fabrics, was ardently desired by
the Dutch and English, and both at this time took much
trouble to get access to it by money and fair words, as the
Portuguese had long had it through their fort at Macao,
but so far these exertions brought slight success,1 while the
Chinese themselves had but a small foreign trade, mostly
the inhabitants of the province of Fokien, who showed
themselves much at Batavia and appeared there to be born
tradesmen. Chinese trade might have been very important
for the company, because thereby it could have supplied
Japan, which obtained nearly all its commodities from
China and had allowed the company a small factory on the
little island of Desima. The restrictions and humiliations,
to which the company's representatives there had to
submit, seemed about to be made good by large profits,
and these profits would have risen incomparably higher,
if the trade from China to Japan could have been secured.
An official of the company estimated for that case that the
profit on silk alone would amount to five millions a year,
representing eighty per cent, of the capital to be invested.
Hitherto silk and silken stuffs, cloth, deerskins, hemp,
linen, wool, quicksilver, spices, sugar, musk, camphor, fine
wood, porcelain, ivory, coral, and all sorts of small wares
were the chief commodities imported into Japan, which in
exchange exported only silver, excellent copper, and lacquer
work, but strictly prohibited the exportation of the here
abundant gold. Tea was brought from here and China to
« Just at this time, however, there was repeatedly some talk of opening
the Chinese ports to all foreigners. English and Portuguese carried on a
considerable secret trade with China, but the company in this business had
little success in its efforts.
524 History of the Dutch People
Europe by the Hollanders and was a costly object of com-
merce, but it suffered much from adulteration with dried
sage which was even exported to China by the Dutch.
The trade of Ceylon and the archipelago was again
wholly in Dutch hands. On Ceylon the Hollanders now
held the entire coast in subjection by the possession of
the fortified places, but in the mountainous interior the
prince of Kandy ruled almost unchecked. The fine cin-
namon cultivated on a small part of the coast and ivory
supplied by the numerous elephants were here the main
articles of trade. Sumatra, where the powerful princes of
Atjeh reigned over a large portion of the interior, stood
through the possession of Malacca and the establishments
at Palembang, Jambi, Padang, and Selidah, where rich
gold mines could be worked, very much under the influ-
ence of the company, which had in its hands by contracts
with the small princes the trade in pepper, gold dust,
camphor, and benzoin and succeeded in overcoming Eng-
lish competition, although the English were able to settle
at Benkoelen owing to Speelman's untimely yielding.
The fine pepper of Sumatra and Java, which was exported
to Persia, Arabia, China, and Japan, gave large profits,
even ioo per cent. The Asiatics could not use the coarse
pepper of Malabar and Ceylon, so it was sold to Europe
and America. The great island of Borneo, inhabited by
a savage population, was little visited ; diamonds, cam-
phor, and gold were brought from there in small quantities
by the natives to Batavia. Celebes, where Macassar oc-
cupied and fortified by the company was its chief place,
furnished small quantities of rice, pepper, and fine wood.
In the Moluccas Ambon was for the whole world the seat
of the clove industry, which was confined to this island
by the Hollanders with great care, by the more or less
regular destruction of the clove trees elsewhere every
year. Thus the small Banda was the seat of the nutmeg,
which was only allowed to grow there. The " little
At End of Seventeenth Century 525
Moluccas," of which Ternate and Tidor are the chief,
were also artificially restricted to the trade in tortoises,
while the spice trees there were destroyed by agreement
with the small princes who received an annual allowance.
The company would not permit free trade with the in-
habitants of these islands from fear for its spice monopoly.
But the rooting out of the spice trees, regarded as super-
fluous for the company's commerce, was not continued as
regularly and energetically as it had been in the middle
of the century by the ruthless governor De Vlaming van
Oudshoorn, and sometimes it was quite neglected. When
at the end of the century orders came from the father-
land to take up this work again with vigour, because the
production of cloves increased to an alarming extent, it
even happened that the governor Schagen refused out-
right to obey this command, and his successor also hesi-
tated to rob the poor population in this manner of its
chief means of existence. The conquest of Macassar,
inhabited by an energetic and enterprising people, was of
great importance for the undisturbed possession and con-
trol of commerce in the Moluccas, which previously main-
tained often secret relations with English and Portuguese
from there. So the monopoly of the spice trade for the
entire world was indisputably in the hands of the Dutch,
especially since, at the peace of Breda, Pularoon, frequently
coveted by the English and occupied by them in 1665,
was finally ceded to the company and the English were
thus driven out of the Moluccas.
The centre of the company's Asiatic commerce was the
now populous and flourishing Batavia. To this capital of
the pepper and rice-cultivating Java flowed the commodi-
ties of the Orient ; from there in December or January
the returning fleets sailed through the strait of Sunda to
the Cape of Good Hope, usually about six large ships,
which were joined at the Cape by some vessels from the
coast of Coromandel, Ceylon, and Bengal. The com-
526 History of the Dutch People
pany's commerce was benefited by the fine climate of the
southern point of Africa, so conducive to recovery from
exhausting tropical heat, and by the growing importance
of the colony settled in and around Cape Town, where
under the worthy commander Simon van der Stel (since
1679) not only a considerable number of Dutch and Ger-
man families were sent out but also after 1688 a hundred
of the French Huguenot families taking refuge in the
republic. Van der Stel established new centres of coloni-
sation in Stellenbosch and Drakenstein, took great pains
to develop agriculture, vineyards, and cattle raising, and
may be regarded as the second founder of the colony,
which gradually broadened out in the direction of the
Karroo and along the coast. The East Indiamen usually
remained here a month, from March to April, and then,
refreshed and supplied with water and provisions, they
steered for the fatherland, where they arrived in July or
August with their rich cargoes.
Maetsuycker was succeeded as governor-general in 1678
by Rycklof van Goens, an excellent soldier and merchant,
who might have upheld the authority of the company in
Java and the Moluccas, but on account of his bad health
he had to be replaced in 168 1 by Cornelis Speelman,
one of the most martial but arbitrary, pompous, and care-
less servants of the company, who had won great renown
by the conquest of Macassar. His rule, though outwardly
brilliant enough, was not characterised by the vigour ex-
pected from it. He died in three years and left affairs in
wretched confusion.1 He was followed by Johannes
Camphuis, a cultivated and scientific but not very ener-
getic man, who wrote a history of the establishment of
Batavia and did much to assist Rumphius, the writer on
the botany of Ambon, and Kampfer, who borrowed his
description of Japan in part from Camphuis himself, the
latter having often been on Desima. Things did not go
1 De Jonge, Opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag, viii., p. I
At End of Seventeenth Century 527
better under him. After him came the able but no more
vigorous Willem van Outhoorn, in whose administration
the coffee plant was introduced into Java and the cultiva-
tion of sugar increased very much. But under Outhoorn
also the company's internal condition appeared much less
favourable than it looked superficially. Even on Java its
authority seemed lax ; neither by stratagem nor by vio-
lence could it overcome its former slave Soerapati, who
after the Bantam war with some revolted Balinese soldiers
had first made the environs of Batavia unsafe, then had
found a refuge with the emperor of Mataram, and soon
established his own kingdom in eastern Java.1 The weak-
ness of the higher government had the result, that the
company's servants, particularly in the remote offices,
could more than formerly enrich themselves with its
possessions and revenues, an evil often complained of in
the reports of the commanders of the returning fleets to
the States-General.11 Investigation of such abuses, like
that of the commissioner-general Van Rheede van Mijd-
recht, who in 1684 was sent from Europe to Hither India
and the Cape, amounted as a rule to little, because under
Van Outhoorn and his son-in-law, the director-general
Van Hoorn, corruption prevailed even in the highest
governmental circles. Prohibited trade of the officials,
smuggling, extortion from the natives, bribery of judges,
arbitrariness, faithlessness in the care of the company's
property increased to a dangerous extent, so that Van
Outhoorn in 1701 had to be dismissed. But his son-in-
law was named as his successor and refused for a long
time to accept the appointment; not until three years
later did the dismissed governor really step out, a proof
again of the degeneration and inner weakness of the
company, however rich were its returns, however high
» Busken Huet, Land van Rembrand, ii., i, p. 223.
8 See especially the important report of the former bookkeeper-general,
Daniel Braems, of 1688 to the States-General (Rijksarchief).
528 History of the Dutch People
were its dividends, which commonly amounted to 20, 25,
30 to 40 per cent., however popular were its shares rising
to. over 500 per cent. All these serious difficulties were
kept as secret as possible, and at the end of this period
the company still shared in the admiration of native and
foreigner. The few communications and pamphlets, which
attempted to throw light upon its true condition, were
discredited by the splendid financial results, and the un-
favourable utterances of the company's advocate Pieter
van Dam in his account of its affairs were carefully sup-
pressed.1 What Van Dam said of the company's serv-
ants in India : " filling the purse, collecting and keeping
together money and property, to become rich in a short
time, is really the business," was hardly less true of the
directors and officials in patria, who made all the profit
possible in fitting out the ships and selling the goods, and
whose appointment led to the most shameful practice of
corruption among the regents on account of the great
advantages accompanying these posts. In judging of
these matters it must not be forgotten that we know
many singularities about the company's actions. If we
could search the books of the merchants, it is to be
feared that we should agree with the opinion of the king,
Charles X. Gustavus of Sweden, who answered the appeal
to religion of a Dutch ambassador: "see here your
religion," showing a rix-dollar that he took from his
pocket, "you serve only your idol which is commerce."8
The West India Company was no better in this respect
and far~ behind the East India Company in its gains.
The old West India Company, dying in 1674 after long
years of slow decline and partly in consequence of the
bad years 1672 and 1673, was immediately replaced by a
new one, which took over the six millions debt of the old
1 Even now his book is only to be found in manuscript in the archives.
3 Wrangel (translated by Mrs. Beets), De betrekkingen tusschen Zweden
en de Nederlanden, p. 9.
At End of Seventeenth Century 529
company at 30 per cent., while the original capital went to
it for 1 5 per cent, with all that remained of the possessions.1
The working capital of the new company, with a charter for
twenty-five years and a board of ten directors, amounted
to over 600,000 guilders. It obtained the commercial
monopoly over only a part of the territory assigned to the
old company : Africa's coast from the Tropic of Cancer to
300 south latitude, Essequibo with St. Eustatius and
Curacao, besides the slave monopoly for Surinam and
Berbice. It had offices at Cape Verde, where it possessed
Goree, and on the Gold Coast, where St. George del Mina
was its chief settlement; gold, ivory, hides, gum, wax,
but slaves above all, were its most important commodities.
In the slave trade the Hollanders were at this time the
first, indeed almost without competition ; the coasts of
Guinea and Angola furnished them thousands of slaves
for the American plantations, mainly in the Spanish
possessions, and the island of Curacao might be called the
staple, although trade with those possessions was really
prohibited. The profit on these commodities, which the
coast negroes bartered for articles of slight value such
as kraals, glass, lace, half-worn clothes, and brandy, was
great, so that the company in 1687 could declare a divi-
dend of 10 per cent., but usually one of 3 to 5 per cent,
and its shares stood at par.a Its trade in the other Dutch
possessions of the West Indies was of small consequence,
except that in Surinam, where the Dutch authority at
first reached little farther than the cannon on the fort,
which had to protect the fifty plantations. This last
territory, in 1667 conquered from the English by Crijnssen
for Zealand and retained at the peace of Breda, was
bought in 1682 by the new West India Company, but in
the following year a third of it was made over to Amster-
dam and a third to the family of Aerssen van Sommels-
1 Groot Placcaatboek, iii., col. 1333.
8 Netscher, Geschiedenis van Essequebo, Demerary en Berbice, p. 86.
34
53° History of the Dutch People
dijk. " The Surinam society " appointed as governor the
arbitrary Cornelis van Aerssen van Sommelsdijk himself,
who had made himself impossible in the republic, but he
was soon in disfavour with the planters and fell in a mutiny
of soldiers five years later. After his death the colony
rapidly became more flourishing, and in the beginning of
the eighteenth century it counted about 200 sugar planta-
tions with more than 12,000 slaves. The emigration of
many Huguenot and Dutch families, including some Jews
and a number of Labadists brought over by the Sommels-
dijk family, had a large share in this growing prosperity.1
The languishing colony of Essequibo began to come up
somewhat under the careful management of Samuel Beek-
man, largely on account of the augmentation of the sugar
plantations. Berbice, after violent dissensions with the
directors and the pretended owners of this colony, the
Van Pere family, came under the company's rule in 1678
and was extended slowly but constantly by the establish-
ment of new sugar plantations, as in Essequibo, mostly by
private individuals.
The industry carried on by the inhabitants of the
republic was still flourishing and had greatly increased
with the cooperation of the large number of Huguenot
tradesmen and manufacturers settling there. Some fine
articles of French make encountered thenceforth serious
competition in the United Netherlands, particularly during
the wars waged by France in the last part of Louis XIV.'s
reign. From the Netherlands also were then to be ob-
tained the marchandises de Paris, as they were called, under
which name belts, feathers, fans, gloves, masks, head-
dresses, clocks, mirrors, etc., were included, fashionable
goods in general, ribbons and laces, trimmings and Rouen
buttons, Norman pins and needles, gold and silver cloth,
silks and velvets of Lyons and Tours, paper of
Auvergne, Poitou, Limoges, and Champagne, and French
1 See Luzac, Hollands rijkdom, ii., p. 159.
At End of Seventeenth Century 531
brandies, and with vexation the French saw the con-
siderable diminution of their sales, of which the causes
were the wars against the republic and the hostile commer-
cial policy with the intolerance towards the Huguenots.
While the French manufacturing cities languished
and their population suffered from want of work and
hunger, the Dutch cities could not find hands enough to
do the work. The hat, silk, gauze, velvet, fine leather,
and trimmings factories in Amsterdam, Haarlem,
Utrecht, and other places, the paper works on the Zaan
and in the Veluwe increased every year, and native Hol-
landers also took part in this industrial development.
The distilleries, where brandy and in the last years of the
century gin too were distilled, belonged among the new
industries that had arisen in the first war against France.
About 1700 the Dutch silk factories were the first in the
world and were helped as much as possible by protective
measures. The growing wholesale industry soon experi-
enced, however, the obstruction of the mediaeval guild
regulations, to which it remained subject. It seems to
have attained its highest point around 1700, and it is not
to be described how many hands, also of women and
children, it kept busy, how much prosperity it diffused in
the cities among the people as well as among the manu-
facturers themselves, what large sums in taxes it poured
into the treasuries, though it might be at the cost of its
own future owing to the high wages and imposts which
were finally to make difficult its competition with for-
eign countries. It was later believed that the silk industry
alone at this time gave work to more hands than the
East India Company itself.
The republic of the seventeenth century was no less a
land of industry than of commerce ; as of old they both
supported one another and stood in the closest connection.
And the land and city governments endeavoured in regu-
lating taxation according to circumstances, giving and
53 2 History of the Dutch People
taking without any definite system, to please both so far
as possible, provided only the necessary money came in
and the old rules and laws were at least ostensibly upheld.
But "trade " still kept the upper hand, and where its in-
terests came into collision with those of industry, the latter
had to give way, for it was still believed that the republic
and the ancient prosperity of the country were founded upon
commerce. An author of this time calculates that between
1688 and 1695 the national wealth of the republic was
augmented by about ninety million guilders,1 which may
certainly be attributed in the first place to the growth of
industry. And it requires no demonstration that the in-
crease of domestic industry, mainly at the expense of the
French industry, increased in its turn the exportation of
the goods made in such quantities. No longer France
but the republic was the country, whence the noble and
wealthy classes of northern Europe and Germany procured
the luxurious articles of fashionable dress. There were
great changes in the industrial conditions of the republic.
The old industry in the home was replaced in the last
thirty years of the century by an extensive wholesale in-
dustry which employed hundreds of workmen and gave
existence to many great factories. The example of the
new industries had also its influence on the old cloth and
woollen industry, which began to throw off the restrictions
of the mediaeval guilds and halls and derived great advan-
tage from the technical skill so highly developed by the
foreigners. It was developed likewise into a wholesale
industry with large factories and a considerable working
population. This was a very notable change that did not
fail to have a powerful effect on the economic condition
of the people. There was a current towards the cities
with a large increase of their population, and many more
workmen joined the guilds, although the bonds of the
mediaeval guilds commenced to be oppressive and caused
« Davenant, Works, i., p. 415.
At End of Seventeenth Century 533
objection to the tyranny of the guild and the arbitrary
action of employers and even led to riots. In and before
the middle of the century some opinions of a socialistic or
communistic tendency were heard of; but by strict pro-
hibitive and penal measures the municipal magistrates
managed to hold in check these isolated opinions which
have been but little investigated. There is no mention of
large collective movements among the labourers at this
time, which is owing to the prosperity general in the land.
The stirring industrial life in the Dutch cities and here
and there in the country attracted universal attention, not
the least in young Russia, whose great ruler, the czar
Peter the Great, in preparing his political and economic
reforms had cast an interested eye upon the small republic's
wonderful development. Thither he directed his steps
across Germany in August, 1697, being influenced also by
the large importance which Dutch commerce and industry
had had for his own realm since the close of the sixteenth
century ; there he remained with his considerable retinue
until early in the following year. His chief object in this
visit was to make himself acquainted with everything con-
cerning navigation and shipbuilding, and he devoted much
of his time to learning about the shipyards at Amsterdam
and on the Zaan, where he worked as a simple mechanic.
Aided especially by Nicolaas Witsen, the influential
burgomaster of Amsterdam, who knew Russia well, he
laid during his visit the foundations for the building of
his new fleet and opened relations with Dutch seamen and
engineers, many of whom followed him to his country. In
the beginning of the next year he went over to England,
from where in the spring of 1698 he returned for a few
weeks to Holland on his journey to Vienna.
Among the old industries, besides the shipbuildingon the
Zaan, which was said to be able to turn out a ship a day for
years together in case of necessity, the fisheries still occupied
a prominent place. The Greenland fishery, no longer the
534 History of the Dutch People
old land fishery at Spitzbergen and Jan Mayen Island or
even the sea fishery farther away in the inhospitable waters
but having become ice fishery, now that the whale and
walrus chased by the Dutch, French, English, Hamburg,
Bremen vessels had retreated higher up in the direction
of the eternal ice, was zealously prosecuted in spite of its
hardships and the vicissitudes of its results. Amsterdam,
Rotterdam, Vlaardingen, Delfshaven, and the Zaan villages
were its seats ; about 200, in some years over 250 ships,
heavier and larger than formerly on account of the more
dangerous ice fishery, sailed out annually and formed the
most excellent navigators. French privateers did much
damage and caused a reduction in the number of outgoing
vessels to far below the half in the years of war, exclusive
of 1672-1674 and 1691 when the fishery was for the time
entirely prohibited, but after the peace of Ryswick the
old height was again reached in some years. From 1675
there was a union of " commissioners of the whale fishery "
for the promotion of the common interests.1 The herring
fishery had some very hard times in the years of war dur-
ing this half of a century. Countless busses were captured
by English, French, especially Dunkirk, Swedish priva-
teers ; repeatedly whole fleets of fishermen were destroyed
by hostile squadrons during the English wars in particular.
These fisheries also were forbidden more than once on ac-
count of the want of sailors for the navy. Notwithstanding
the supervision of the powerful board of the great fishery
the quality of theDutch herrings exported finally left much
to be desired. At the end of the century this fishery had
fallen off very much, and the Scotch fishermen began to
drive the Dutch from the world's market, although the lack
of statistical data makes it impossible to give details.
With all these material interests, which were ever pre-
cious to the Dutch people, it did not forget its spiritual
1 Zorgdrager, Groenlandsche visschcrij, 2de druk, p. 302 ; Beaujon,
Geschiedenis van de nederl. zeevisscherijen, p. 1 25.
At End of Seventeenth Century 535
needs, and the end of the seventeenth century was both
for the Catholic and the Protestant portion of the popu-
lation rich in every species of movements that went to
the heart of the Netherlanders. Among the Protestants
the Voetian and Cocceian opinions in the reformed church
occasioned trouble on both sides, but William III., though
personally favourably inclined to the Voetians, took good
care not to estrange the opposing party and at last turned
to the policy of toleration, which had been followed by
Frederick Henry, and would not consent to the new
national synod desired by the Voetians, as he feared a
revival of the old dissensions of the early part of the
century. Van der Waayen, having retired to Friesland
under the protection of his cousin, now professor at
Franeker, was by him in 1685 also restored to honour and
continued to be the influential leader of the Cocceians with
Van Giffen, the preacher of Leeuwarden and afterwards
of Dordrecht. Both Cocceians and Voetians, however,
gradually laid aside some of the old dogmatic asperity
and devoted themselves more to the care of the spirit-
ual necessities of their congregations than to mutual
strife which was still far from being settled. The prog-
ress of dissension was restrained by the Holland resolu-
tion " for the preservation of quiet and peace in the
churches" (1694), which recommended moderation in
preaching and the calling of ministers of " moderate and
peaceful disposition," although it recalled vividly the reso-
lutions of Arminian times. The learned and moderate
Franeker professor, Campegius Vitringa, the conciliatory
Hermanus Witsius, the mystical Voetian A Brakel,
and his erudite colleague, A Marck of Leyden, were
the principal theologians of this time, who fixed the
attention of their followers more upon Christian life than
upon dogmatic differences.1 Remarkable too was the
1 See Reitsma, Geschiedenis van de Hervorming en de Hervormde Kerk,
Sie druk, p. 294.
536 History of the Dutch People
pietistic tendency revealing itself here in the second half
of the seventeenth century as a reaction against the
dogmatic spirit of the first half. Men like the Teellinck
brothers, like the ascetic preacher of repentance, Jodocus
van Lodenstein, who found a great following at Utrecht
and held mystical meetings there, in which Anna Maria
van Schurman joined, like Willem a Brakel at Rotterdam,
like the wandering opposer of Cartesius, Jacobus Koel-
man, made their appearance teaching and preaching and
had attentive listeners in their conventicles among a large
part of the conscientious Dutch population. The small
number of followers of the fervent French preacher, Jean
de Labadie, who in 1666 was called from Geneva as a
reformer of the church to Middelburg but was speedily
deposed as an unorthodox disturber of the peace and
sought to establish a new evangelical church in Amster-
dam, dwindled away more and more after his removal to
Germany and his death at Altona in 1674. In the follow-
ing year a portion of the remaining Labadists settled at
Wieuwerd in Friesland, soon under the patronage of the
ladies Aerssen van Sommelsdijk, through whose influence
they were able for a time to maintain themselves there
under the protection of the Frisian court, living in a com-
munity of property according to the true principles, as
they believed, of ancient Christianity. Their weak estab-
lishment, constantly molested by the Frisian preachers,
reduced by the departure of some to Surinam and New
York, gradually shrank away, especially after the com-
munity of property was given up in 1688. Other mystical
sects like the Brothers of the Angels, disciples of the
German theosophist Gichtel, like the Hebrews, led by
the Walcheren catechist Verschoor, for a time gathered a
small following, which melted away in the long run under
the opposition of the great church. They prove the ex-
tensive diffusion of mystical ideas at this time, of which
the Collegiants still living in Rijnsburg and some Dutch
At End of Seventeenth Century 537
cities furnished the strongest type with their spirit of
Christian brotherhood. Related to them was the gentle
Pontiaan van Hattem, preacher at St. Philipsland on
Tholen, deposed in 1683 on account of his unorthodoxy,
who could not escape the accusation of Spinozism. Until
his death he continued to exhort his followers found also
in Holland, the " Hattemists," and to persuade them to
a fervent religious life. He and other " freethinkers,"
such as the plain Amsterdam citizen Deurhof, had always
to contend with the persecution of the ruling church,
which endeavoured with a heavy hand to suppress these
" sectarian " movements but succeeded only incompletely.
The genuine Protestant feeling for free research was here
too deeply rooted.
Cartesian and Spinozistic opinions, the former particu-
larly, had not lost their importance in spite of all the
controversial writing, refutation, and opposition. Van der
Waayen and the disputatious Hermanus Alexander Roell,
both professors at Franeker, were in this period the fore-
most champions of the Cartesian doctrine, which was
sharply condemned by various provincial synods, in ortho-
dox Zealand especially, where their propositions had to be
abjured with " detestation " by all preachers. Roell, pupil
of Burman and Heydanus, who vigorously upheld the right
of speech in religious matters, aroused the most violent
indignation but was able to retain his place under the pro-
tection of the noble Albertina Agnes of Orange and the
stadtholder's court at Leeuwarden, although the Frisian
Estates often wanted to end his dispute with Huber and
Vitringa. Much more stir was caused by the Cartesian
principles of the learned and many-sided Frisian preacher,
Dr. Balthasar Bekker, whose Vaste spyze der volmaakten
in 1670 gave rise to sharp complaints of the ecclesiastical
authorities, to prohibitive measures of the secular magis-
trates, to many pamphlets. Finally he had to leave Fries-
land in consequence of the agitation, and he became
538 History of the Dutch People
minister at Weesp and later at Amsterdam. His Examina-
tion of the significance of comets (1683) disputed in a happy-
manner the prevailing ancient superstition concerning them.
A still deeper impression was produced by his contestation
on scientific grounds of the universal belief in ghosts and
sorcery in the famous book the Betoverde Wereld (1691),
that went too far for such men even as Van der Waayen
and occasioned vehement writings1 and general alarm. By
the North Holland synod of the following year the author
was deposed and put out of the church community by the
Amsterdam consistory, but under protection of the ever
moderate government of Amsterdam he continued to re-
side there until his death in 1698 ; his book went through
several editions and, to the great advantage of the good
cause which it defended in an intelligent and popular way,
it was read by thousands in the country, years also after
its writer had closed his eyes. The adherents of Spinoza
have made less noise in the world, in accordance with the
spirit of the great, quiet thinker, who had been their hon-
oured leader and had died at The Hague in 1677 almost
unnoticed, as he wished ; only a few noble thinkers, who
had formed his small circle, remained faithful to his doc-
trine until their death and cultivated it in the stillness of
the study. The influence of his ideas, however, is not to
be mistaken here and there outside of this circle, his name
lasted in the memory of the ignorant multitude as that of
an outcast, whose pernicious opinions must be rooted out,
and the reformed church saw in him one of its bitterest
and most dangerous foes. Not until our own time did
his philosophy awake again from its sleep of a century and
a half to bear fruit anew for thinking humanity and to
win followers anew for the philosophical meditation of the
" Being, that only is to be."
While agitation and disturbance prevailed in the ruling
1 Van der Linde's bibliography numbers no less than 230 titles of books
by, for, and against him.
At End of Seventeenth Century 539
church, this was no less the case with the Catholics of this
time, among whom the dissension of almost a century be-
tween regulars and seculars, between brothers of the orders
and secular priests, finally came to a crisis. In other re-
spects it was a restless time for them. The persecutions
of the Huguenots and of the Waldenses in Piedmont, later
the revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the arrival in
the country of hundreds of refugees had occasioned a
strong anti-Catholic movement among the Protestants of
the republic ; the important events in England, the dreaded
Catholic propaganda in the Palatinate caused new uneasi-
ness. Riots against the Catholics, vehement complaints of
synods and consistories, calls in different provinces for the
enforcement of the placards, were the unavoidable conse-
quences of the aroused hostility. For a time the condition
of the Catholics in 1685 began to be threatening; their
meetings were dispersed, their houses menaced with pillage,
their priests imprisoned. But the moderation of the re-
gents, no less that of Neercassel and his friends,1 the caution
of the Catholics themselves, who collected money to
alleviate the sufferings of the refugees, soon made the
agitation diminish, and although there was repeatedly talk
of the expulsion of the Jesuits, who were regarded as the
instigators, the leaders of the persecutions in France and
elsewhere, and the States-General deliberated upon it
seriously, it was not brought about in order also not to
embitter the allies Austria and Spain. The internal dis-
turbances in the Catholic Church were no less serious and
of more lasting effect. The gentle Neercassel, who by the
publication of his Amor poenitens had incurred an accusa-
tion of heterodoxy and had seen his book prohibited by
the Inquisition, died in June, 1686, and now the question
was who was to obtain the office of apostolic vicar. The
chapters of Utrecht and Haarlem, the only ones still in
existence, although the government did not recognise
1 Knuttel,Z?<? toestand der Nederl. Katholieken, i., p. 289.
54° History of the Dutch People
them, nominated the learned Van Heussen. But the
Jesuits did not want Van Heussen, had one of his books
condemned as heterodox, and endeavoured to push
through the appointment of a candidate favourable to them-
selves by the commission of cardinals at Rome charged
with the affair. The chapters now proposed three to the
pope, Petrus Codde, provicar, being the first, and sent one
of their number, Theodorus de Cock, pastor at Leyden, to
Rome to secure an election acceptable to themselves.
This succeeded finally in spite of all kinds of intrigues,
and in September, 1688, Codde was by the pope appointed
the successor of Neercassel. Codde was a moderate and
careful man, but he quickly fell into strife with the Jesuits,
and was suspected by them and their friends of inclining
to Jansenism. De Cock too belonged soon to his bitterest
enemies and accused the vicar at Rome in 1694, but this
time the latter won the victory and was acquitted of all
guilt, though the Jesuits opposed him strenuously, even
blaming him for a movement among the Catholics in the
republic to favour the plans for expelling their order from
the country. Codde did not fail to answer, but complained
on his side of the violent and imprudent action of the
order and of the general manner in which they took up
their task in the republic. The adversaries replied with a
Breve memoriale de statu et progressu Jansenismi in Hol-
landia (1697), in which violent little book Codde and his
secular priesthood were sharply assailed. This work,
branded by Codde and his friends as scandalous and re-
futed with indignation, made so much impression at Rome,
however, that in 1699 Codde was deposed by the cardinals
assembled again and De Cock was put in his place. On
account of the expected opposition this resolution was
kept secret until the vicar should come to Rome for the
celebration of the jubilee year. He came and then the
contest began anew; at first acquitted by the aid of a
document in his defence sent in by 300 of his own priests,
At End of Seventeenth Century 541
he was detained in Rome and finally in May, 1702, sus-
pended by papal decree with the appointment of De Cock
as his successor. Evidently this was destined to cause a
great disturbance among the Dutch Catholics ; a small
minority of them, about twenty and some of those not of
the best elements, supported De Cock and the Jesuits, but
the large majority espoused the cause of the apostolic
vicar. Though some of them submitted to the definitive
papal decision, others continued in opposition and brought
down upon themselves again the accusation of inclining
toward or even of having gone over to Jansenism — an
accusation that seemed to find some ground in the sojourn
of the great French Jansenist Arnauld in the country in
1681 and 1682. The accused indignantly repelled this
complaint, which stamped them as heretics and apostates.
The posthumous book printed in 1640 on St. Augustine
by the Louvain professor, Jansen, from whom the sect was
named, was condemned in general in 1643 but most
strongly in 1653 by Pope Innocent X. on account of the
Augustinian doctrine of grace defended in it, from which
Luther also had first started out, while Pope Alexan-
der VII. had required of every ecclesiastic in service the
rejection of five propositions attributed to Jansen. But
the numerous followers of Jansen in France and Belgium
denied that these propositions were to be read in his book,
and the Dutch ecclesiastics, faithfully supported by a large
number of laymen, disclaimed all thought of any such
tendencies. Thus at the beginning of the eighteenth cen-
tury from the old opposition between the secular priests
and the members of the orders arose a sharp dispute re-
garding adherence to dogmas branded as heretical by the
church among a clergy, which was fully convinced that it
might call itself Catholic and was averse to Protestant
sentiments — a dispute that must be considered as of the
highest importance to the Catholic church in the Nether-
lands on account partly of its relation to the Protestant
542 History of the Dutch People
government of the country, which might perhaps find a
reason for interfering in the matter as soon as these
dissensions should seem to threaten the public peace.
Such was the condition of the country and the people
of the Netherlands, when was suddenly taken away the
strong hand of the great stadtholder, who had guided the
republic during thirty years amid the most serious perils.
Was it to continue to play the part that it had filled
through almost the entire century? Was it to be inspired
to a new development of strength in the arduous circum-
stances that might be the result of the new great war, in
which it was about to engage ? Or was it, satisfied with
the wealth obtained, to rest upon its laurels and yield itself
to the seductive voice of enjoyment in peace and domes-
ticity? Both possibilities were open. Which was to
become a reality? That was the question to be solved in
the years immediately following. But to him, who was
acquainted with the nature of the Dutch people and its
regents, who knew with what difficulties William III. had
always been obliged to contend, it was not doubtful what
would happen, now that the motive force of the great
general and statesman was wanting and for the time there
was nobody to take his vacant place.
APPENDIX
SOURCES OF NETHERLAND HISTORY, 1621-1702
FOR the period after the Truce we possess the Gedenk-
schriften of the Gelderland nobleman Alexander van
der Capellen (2 vols., Utrecht, 1777), beginning with 1621
and continued to 1632, the second volume containing notes
on important events, in which the author took part to 1654,
and fragmentary observations on other happenings. Con-
stantly in the highest governmental bodies, he had an oppor-
tunity to hear and see much ; as a trusted counsellor of
Frederick Henry his information is of great value. Of more
importance is the extensive work of the Frisian statesman
Lieuwe (Leo) van Aitzema, born in 1600 at Dokkum of a
good family, which had already given to the state an excellent
diplomat in his uncle Foppe van Aitzema, through whose
influence the nephew became resident of the Hanse cities at
The Hague. As such he had occasion to watch the political
development of the young republic, while his relations with
French and English statesmen and the small courts of northern
Germany afforded him a deeper insight into the secret ways
of European politics. Little scrupulous in his methods of
securing important documents,1 he collected a very consider-
able number of them and incorporated them in his great com-
pilation, the Saeke7i van Staet en Oorlogh in ende omtrent de
Vereenigde Nederlanden (15 vols., 's Gravenhage, 1655 ; 7 vols.,
tbid.y 1669-71), an inestimable authority for Dutch history
from 162 1 to 1668, a magazine of important documents and
information. The work, like that of Bor, is more a loosely
1 See Fruin in Nijh. Bijdr., JV. R., iii., p. 218.
543
544 History of the Dutch People
connected compilation than a real historical relation, though
the more personal tone of the author and his larger knowledge
of the events described assure to his text greater interest for
the reader, notwithstanding his occasional coldness and
cynicism.
Other notable sources for the history of this time are the
" reports " or " current news " appearing regularly in print
after the Truce, which were not yet concerned with affairs of
state but served to diffuse political and military intelligence
from the prince's camp in particular.1 Similar was the work
of the learned Amsterdam physician, Nicolaas van Wassenaer,
the Historisch Verhaal alter gedenkwaardigste geschiedenissen,
die hier en daer in Europe . . . voorgevallen syn (21 vols.,
Amsterdam, 1622 et seq.), beginning with 162 1 and continued
to 1632 by his colleague Barend Lampe. Of much more im-
portance is the long series of thousands of pamphlets, which
commented on the events of the day for the public or circu-
lated official documents in print. They are most completely
gathered in the great collections of the Royal Library at The
Hague (Duncaniana Collection), of the Bibliotheca Thysiana
in Leyden, of the University Library at Ghent (Meulman
Collection), and through the printed catalogues of Tiele (2
vols., Amsterdam, 1856-61), Rogge (2 vols., Amsterdam, 1863-
65), Van der Wulp (3 vols., Amsterdam, 1866-68), Petit (2
vols., Leiden, 1882-84), and Knuttel ('s Gravenhage, 1889 et
seq.) they have become more widely known as invaluable
authorities, though to be used with caution, for the history of
this time in its full extent, especially for the political, ecclesi-
astical, and economic history. Historical prints also, partly
contained in the larger illustrated historical works of the time,
partly produced separately, may be regarded as an important
source for the knowledge of events, persons, and customs.2
1 See Fruin, Over de oudste couranten in Nederland ( Volksalmanak v. h.
Nut, 1S63, p. 86).
s See Muller, Beredeneerde beschrijving van Nederl. historieprenten (4
vols., Amst., 1863-82) with Nalezmg by Ch. Dozy (Rott., 1888); Fr.
Muller, Catalogus van 7000 portretten (Amst., 1853), continued by Van
Someren (3 vols., Amst., 1888).
Appendix 545
The collections of them in the Royal Museum and elsewhere
have hitherto been used more for the history of art than from
the point of view of general history. Among the later pub-
lications in this department deserve mention that on Amster-
dam in de iyde eeuw1 and in a more popular form P. L. Muller's
Gouden Eeuw (3 vols., Leiden, 1896-98), both works of general
importance. Further there are historic medals, among other
places contained in the Royal Cabinet of Coins and Medals
at The Hague and admirably described in Van Loon's standard
work : Beschrijving der Nederlandsche Historipenningen (4
vols., 's Gravenhage, 1723-31; continuation, Amsterdam, 1821-
69), from 1555 101714, afterwards continued by the Royal
Academy of Sciences. The awakening of interest in Dutch
art during the last quarter of the nineteenth century caused
the publication of many contributions to the history of art,
particularly in the magazine Oud-Holland (Amsterdam, 1882-),
in other periodicals of local and provincial character, and in
larger works." Publications relating to the history of econom-
ics and law for this period are less numerous. In economics
there are only small productions, notably in the last volumes
of the Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het Historisch Genoot-
schap te Utrecht, in the journals of provincial societies, and
appended to other works.3 The history of law is limited
principally to the older books of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. The interest of the present generation is confined
almost entirely to the history of the oolitical law of this
period, though some activity is shown by the new issue of De
Groot's Inleiding tot de rechtsgeleerdheid (ed. Fockema Andreae,
2 vols., Arnhem, 1895), the Bijdragen tot de Nederl. rechts-
1 By Meijer, Kernkamp, Brugmans, Kalff, Rogge, etc. ('s Gravenh., 1897,
etc.).
2 See Galland, Geschichte der holl. Baukunst unci Bildnerei (Frankf.,
1890); Bredius, Meisterwerke des Rijksmuseums und der Kon. Gemdlde-
gallerie (Munchen, 1890); Bode, Rembrandt (Paris, 1897); Michel, Rem-
brandt (Paris, 1895).
3 See Luzac, Holland's Rijkdom, 4 vols., 17S0 ; Pringsheim, Beilrdge zur
wirtschaftlichen Geschichte der Niederl. (Leipzig, 1893); Klerk de Reus,
Geschichtlicher Ueberblick der Geschichte der O. I. Comp. (Bat., 1894) ; Van
Rees, Geschiedenis der Staathuishondkunde in Nederland ; etc.
546 History of the Dutch People
geschiedenis of Fockema Andreae (Haarlem, 1889-), some
publications of the Vereeniging voor de uitgave der bronnen van
het oude vaderlandsche recht, and a few dissertations appearing,
at Leyden. For the history of the East India Company and
its possessions, in addition to the old Valentyn, to Laspeyres
and Saalfeld, we can now refer to Klerk de Reus' Geschicht-
licher Ueberblick, and above all to the admirable compilation,
begun by J. K. J. de Jonge, continued by Tiele, Van Deventer,
and Heeres : De Opkomst van het Nederlandsche gezag in Oost-
Indie (Amsterdam and den Haag, 1862-), comprising an im-
portant series of documents relating to the history of these
regions and of the East India Company, and further to the
Daghregister ('s Gravenh., 1887-) kept in the citadel of
Batavia. For the West India Company we must help our-
selves, besides with Jan de Laet's celebrated book mainly
with the appendixes to the excellent works of Netscher,
O'Callaghan, and others.
The important period between 1648 and 1702 is rich in
authorities, but a large part of them is still lying in archives
and libraries and has not yet become common property,
though much of this material has been consulted often and
advantageously. First to be remembered are the corre-
spondence of John de Witt, preserved in the Royal Archives at
The Hague, and that of William III. and his friends, particu-
larly after 1688, the point at which the publication of Groen's
Archives stops ; further the notes of members of the Estates
of Holland, which are almost unknown, the reports of the
English and French ambassadors, who watched the republic's
history so close at hand and took part in it ; finally the pam-
phlet literature very abundant for this period but still little
used. Lefevre Pontalis consulted John de Witt's correspond-
ence diligently, and now there is a prospect that we shall
soon be in possession of the ample extracts from it made by
Fruin for a book on De Witt often proposed but never written.
The publication is not probable of the letters and reports
concerning the later time of William III. from the queen's
private archives. In recent years there has been talk of col-
lecting the notes from the Estates of Holland so influential
Appendix 547
at this time. Various publications have called attention to
the importance of the French and English archives.1 The
carefully edited catalogues of the pamphlets in several great
collections give an opportunity to learn of the wealth of the
pamphlet literature. *
Among the printed sources the publications of official docu-
ments deserve first to be mentioned. Of the great publication
of the Resolution en Secrete Resolution der Staten van Holland
en Westfriesland there exist for a part of this time (1653-1668)
separate editions, also of the Resolutions of 1672 and 1709, of
the Secret Resolutions of 1717; furthermore the Resolutions " of
consideration " of John de Witt's time (1653-1668) have been
published in one volume, 1672, at The Hague, and in 1706 at
Utrecht. The Resolutions of the States-General for this period
have only very incompletely survived in print ; they remain
in manuscript in the Royal Archives. To these collections
may be joined the Letters exchanged between John de Witt and
the plenipotentiaries of the state abroad (6 vols., 's Gravenhage,
1723-1725), which are not complete but afford a good view of
the foreign policy in De Witt's time. A complement to them
is to be found in Combes, Correspondance francaise de Jean de
Witt, in the first volume of his Mdanges historiques (Paris, 187 3).
The ponderous tomes of Aitzema may be regarded as semi-
official works for this period also, filled as they are with official
documents, the questionable way in which they often came into
his possession appearing only after his death in 1669. The
Dordrecht conrector Lambert van den Bos (Silvius) continued
his book with much less talent ; the passion, with which in
his Historien onses tijds behelzende Saken van Staet en Oorlogh,
1669-1679 (3 vols., Amst., 1685) he comes out against the De
Witts, particularly against Cornelius de Witt, diminishes very
1 Besides in my Verslagen over archivalia betreffende de geschiedenis van
Nederland in Engeland en te Parijs, and other places, in the dissertations
of Japikse, De verwikkelingen ins sc ken de Republiek en Engeland, 1660-
1665 (Leiden, 1900) and Haye, De geheime correspondentie van Abraham
de Wicquefort ('s Gravenhage, 1901).
9 See especially the Calalogus van de pamfletten der Kon. Bib,, ed.
Knuttel, vols. 2 and 3.
548 History of the Dutch People
much the value of this continuation, which like Aitzema's
work itself connects important public documents by a concise
relation. His Toned des oorlogs from 1669 (4 vols., Amst.,
1675) is no more valuable than his Leven en Bedrijf van
Willem III. (1694).
Of a similar origin, though not of the same character, is
the important book of Abraham de Wicquefort, Histoire des
Provinces Unies des Pays-Pas, running from 1648 and con-
tinued by the author to 1674.1 Wicquefort was a man like
Aitzema, a diplomat of inferior rank, easy of conscience, dis-
solute in life, extremely able, but even less reliable than he ;
only towards De Witt, his constant protector, he showed him-
self a faithful and attached friend. He was born of a mer-
cantile family2 in 1606, at Amsterdam, studied in Leyden, and
then went to seek his fortune in Paris, where he lived for
years in ambiguous relations, and had access to all sorts of
society. In 1646 he became Brandenburg's resident in Paris,
but he continued in this position his life of shameless deceit
and intrigue, until Mazarin, who also paid for his services,
imprisoned him in 1659 and then banished him. Later he
still kept up his connection with the French government, and
for years was one of its paid correspondents at The Hague,
where he was permanently settled from 1662. He entered
the service of De Witt as a translator and writer of state
documents. He became also the resident for Poland and
Brunswick-Liineburg, and carried on a political correspond-
ence with other small German princes and countries. His
admirable French style and uncommon acquaintance with polit-
ical matters induced De Witt in 1667 to have the Estates of
Holland commission him to write a history of the republic from
1648 in favour of the ruling party. The book, remarkable for its
striving after moderation in judging the opposing party, was
» First edition, 4 vols., La Haye, 1719-1745, suspended. Second edition
by Lenting and Chais van Buren, 4 vols., Amsterdam, 1861-1874 (under
the patronage of the Prov. Utr. Genootschap).
2 See concerning him Wickevoort Crommelin in Nijh. Bijdr. Vierde
Reeks, i., p. 237 ; Lenting in the biography at the beginning of vol. i. of
his edition.
Appendix 549
carefully revised by De Witt and Van Wimmenum, but was not
yet printed, though partly in press, when the events of 1672
caused the plan to be suspended. Three years later (March,
1675) he was incarcerated for treason, first in the Voorpoort at
The Hague, then in Loevestein ; sentenced to imprison-
ment for life with confiscation of his property, he escaped in
February, 1679, and fled to Celle in Brunswick, where he
died in 1682. He continued his book in prison and later.
He wrote also the noted work, V ambassadeur et sesfonctions,
an important handbook for the diplomats of the time, and
later the Me'moire iouchant les atnbassadeurs, in which are com-
municated many details of diplomacy as then practised.
His confiscated papers, including the proofs of his book,
remained in the custody of the court of Holland, until the
publishers after much difficulty were able in 1719 to print
the first four books, but the printing was suspended with the
tenth book in 1745 not to be resumed before our own time.
Long after Wicquefort's death the completion of his work
was committed to another person, to the French preacher
Jacques Basnage of The Hague, exiled to the republic in
1684, who was to continue the work to the peace of
Utrecht. After seeing Wicquefort's manuscript Basnage
advised against its publication. Basnage himself, a fine scholar
and a great friend of the council pensionary Heinsius, who
employed him as a mediator in the peace negotiations of
Utrecht, was now in his turn entrusted with the task, and
wrote his Annates des Provinces Unies, 1648-1667 (2 vols., La
Kaye, 1719-1726), a production in many respects to be
praised, which in form and impartiality stands far above
Wicquefort's book but not in insight and knowledge of
affairs. Less high stands the work of the celebrated and
voluminous writer Jean Leclerc of Geneva, who in 1684 had
become a professor in the Remonstrant seminary at Amster-
dam, and died there at an advanced age in 1734. His im-
mense literary output includes the Histoire des Provinces Unies
des Pays-Pas, 1560-17 16, ' a meritorious compilation illus-
trated with reproductions of medals.
1 Three vols. Amst., 1723-1728 ; also translated into Dutch, id., 1730 and
55° History of the Dutch People
Above all in this time stands Jan Wagenaar, the worthy
Amsterdam historian, ever aiming for impartiality, though
favouring De Witt. In his volumes dealing with this period
he had at his disposal many important documents and memo-
randa of eminent statesmen as well as personal communica-
tions of all sorts, which made it possible for him in his dryness
to write a reliable account of events, belonging, so far as the
substance is concerned, to the best productions of the older
Dutch historiography. He is undoubtedly surpassed in literary
talent by Geraert Brandt, poet and clockmaker, afterwards
Remonstrant preacher in Hoorn and Amsterdam, the young
friend of Hooft and his later father-in-law Van Baerle, the ad-
mirer, not always the friend, also of Vondel. Hooft was his
model in style and conception. He imitated him, less in his
important but partisan Historie der Reformatie than in his
Leven en bedrijf van den heere Michiel de Ruiter (Amst., 1687)
and in his admirable biographies of Hooft and Vondel for the
publication of the Nederlandsche Historien and of Vondel's
Poezy. His life of De Ruyter remains his masterpiece, and in
it he excels Hooft in simplicity and clearness of style. Under
the fresh impression of the events, which brought the father-
land to the verge of destruction, Pieter Valckenier, agent of
the States in Switzerland and a partisan of Orange, wrote his
Verwerd Europa ofte polityke en historische beschrijvinge der
waare fundamenten en oorsaken van de oorlogen en revolutien in
Europa, voornamelijk in en omtrent de Nederlanden sedert den
jare 1664 (Amst., 1688), to which is joined a continuation to
1675, authentic documents being appended, without literary
talent and plainly showing the purpose to put William III.'s
policy in the best light. Thus Tobias van Donselaer of
Amsterdam, besides his notable Beschrijvinge van Amsterdam,
composed the work Het ontroerde Nederlandt (2 vols., Amst.,
1674-1676) under the influence of what he had experienced
without any pretension to literary value. Both books are of
importance on account of the documents and evidence of
1738, under the title: Geschiedenissen der Vereenigde Nederlanden (to
171 5). See concerning him the excellent article in Van der Aa, Biograph-
isch Woordenbcek.
Appendix 551
eyewitnesses contained in them. Donselaer's work found a
continuer in Brandt's younger son, also named Geraert, for
the years 1674 and 1675, covered by his Tweejarige geschiede-
nissen. For style and contents these works are little superior
to the journalistic production, the Hollantse Mercurius, the
continuation of the old chronicles of the time and collected
in 40 volumes from 1650 to 1690, originally appearing weekly
and composed of exchange and newspaper reports of general
interest. This Mercurius, followed in 1690 by the Europische
Mercurius, gives a good picture of the immediate impression
of events upon the public and is therefore indispensable for
the history of the time. In the seventeenth as well as in the
eighteenth century the republic was the seat of journalism,
which in French translation spread the fruits of the pen over
a large part of Europe and was a formidable power in the
world.1 The Gazette de Hollande was the proverbial political
newspaper of those days, the Gazette d ' Amsterdam, the trans-
lated Amsterdam journal, was with the Leyden, Haarlem, and
Utrecht journals the source of all kinds of newspapers even in
Paris. The writers hid themselves under the mask of anonymity,
which led frequently to great abuses and diplomatic difficul-
ties. The French government in the years of peace after
1679 complained repeatedly of the utterances of the French
press in the republic often inspired by French refugees ; but
the States themselves sometimes had to act vigorously against
mendacious, indecent, or indiscreet newspaper reports.2 The
Mercure historique et politique, founded in 1686 by Sandras de
Courtilz and appearing every month, was during almost a
century the most widely circulated of these newspapers.
In the way of memoirs, sources for the Dutch history
of this time appear in the letters and writings of the foreign
ambassadors and agents at The Hague, particularly those of
France and England. D'Estrades and d'Avaux with Temple
and Burnet are prominent among them. D'Estrades' Lettres,
me'moires et negotiations* give a good insight into the relations be-
1 Hatin, Les Gazettes de Hollande, Paris, 1865.
* Sautijn Kluit, Nagelaten geschriften, i., p. 108.
* First edition, 5 vols., Brux., 1709, better that of 1743 ingvols., London.
552 History of the Dutch People
tween the French court and De Witt, also into the internal con-
dition of the republic before 1672 ; the publication of his
works, however, is far from complete and accurate, as appears
from a comparison with the material preserved in the archives
of Foreign Affairs at Paris.1 Equally valuable for the period
1679-1688 are the Negotiations en Hollande of Jean Antoine
de Mesme, count d' Avaux (6 vols., Paris, 1752 and 1754),
who was in closer relations than d' Estrades with the regents
of Holland and Friesland. Sir William Temple's works are
important for the latter part of De Witt's time and the early
period of William III., and he had an open eye for economic
affairs in the republic as well as for the political situation.
His Letters and Memoirs {Letters written by Temple and other
ministers 0/ state, 3 vols., London, 1 700-1 703) and his Observa-
tions (1672) and Miscellanea (2 vols., London, 1680-1690) have
been translated into French and Dutch and are much read.
Burnet's History of my own time ( 6 vols., London, 1725-1734 )
affords a good view of Prince William III.'s attitude towards
England and towards his wife, who had great confidence in
her court preacher, but it must be used with careful criticism.
The remarkable Lettres et me'moires of Queen Mary herself
(ed. Mechth. Bentinck, La Haye, 1880), besides the mostly
English Memoirs and letters ( ed. Doebner, Leipzig, 1886),
furnish an excellent picture of the noble princess and her
innermost sentiments. The Journalen of the younger Con-
stantijn Huygens,2 though often descending to trifles, are
of consequence for the environment of the prince ; the notes
and observations of his father 3 give us a glimpse of the con-
dition of the house of Orange during the solitary youth of
the Orange prince. The attitude of the prince towards his
Frisian cousin, Henry Casimir IL, is best studied in the latter's
published correspondence.4 The prince's political ideas and
1 Rogge, De diplomatieke correspondentie van d' Estrades in Versl. en
Meded. der Kon. Akad., Vierde Reeks, vol. i., p. 198.
1 Werken Hist. Gen. te Utrecht, N. S., No. 23, 25, 32, 46.
3 M '/moires de Const. Huygens, ed. Jorissen, La Haye, 1873.
4 Van Sypesteyn, Geschiedkundige bijdragen, vol. iii.,'s Gravenhage,
1865, besides the Archives of Groen van Prinsterer, vol. v. of the second
series.
Appendix 553
the difficulties with which he had to contend, in his domestic
and foreign policy as well as in his military career, are
shown in his correspondence with his faithful friend Waldeck1
and in the valuable papers of the council pensionary Heinsius,2
both his trusted helpers in the work of his life.
Mignet's important work, Negotiations relatives a la succession
d'Espagne (4 vols., Paris, 1835-1842), is of great service for
the study of foreign politics in this entire period, and with it
now goes Legrelle's book, La diplomatic fran^aise et la succes-
sion d'Espagne? The great treaties are to be found in the
Corps universel diplomatique of Du Mont (8 vols., Amst. and La
Haye, 1726-1731). For the internal political conditions the
notes of the Amsterdam justice Bontemantel4 are of great
value. Not without weight for domestic and foreign politics
are the letters of Pieter de Groot to Abraham de Wicquefort
of the later time6 and the correspondence between the Van der
Goes brothers,6 but the latter gives little else than the impres-
sion of known events upon a respectable citizen of the republic
not holding office. The rhymed Geheugchenis of the former
official Coenraet Droste derives its interest mainly from the
notes added to it by Fruin.7 Smaller sections of this period
are treated in Wijnne's book, De geschillen over de afdanking
van het krijgsvolk, 1649-16508; in Gardiner's Documents on the
First Dutch War (London, 1899), notable for the history
of the Dutch navy, which has also found an admirable historian
for this time in De Jonge; in vols. 1 and 2 of Van Sypesteyn's
1 P. L. Muller, Wilhelm III. von Oranien und Georg Fr. von Waldeck,
2 vols., 's Gravenhage, 1873-1880.
1 Arc kief van den raadpensionaris Heinsius, ed. Van der Heim, 3 vols.,
's Gravenhage, 1 867-1 880.
3 Two vols., Paris, 1891. See also Sirtema de Grovestins, Guillaume
III. et Louis XIV. 8 vols., Paris, 1868.
4 De regeeringe van Amsterdam, ed. Kernkamp, in Werken Hist. Gen.,
Derde Serie, No. 7 and 8.
5 Lettres, ed. Kramer, ib., No. 5.
4 Ed. Gonnet, ib., No. 13.
'Ed. Fruin, 2 vols., Leiden, 1879.
8 Werken Hist. Gen., N. S., No. 41.
554 History of the Dutch People
jBi/dragen, in which unpublished documents are given concern-
ing the time of De Witt and referring especially to the Frisian
stadtholder William Frederick; in Thurloe's StatePapers, 1638-
1660 (7 vols., London, 1742), and other papers of contem-
porary English statesmen as Arlington, Shaftesbury, etc., of
importance particularly for Dutch relations with England and
for the most part described in the Reports of the Historical Com-
mission ox in separate publications; in the numberless appen-
dixes of books and studies on the epoch appearing in the Nether-
lands; in the annotations of such works as those of Geddes and
Lefevre Pontalis on John de Witt, as the publication of
Wicquefort's Histoire, in the French memoirs of the time,
among which are particularly valuable for Dutch history
the Memoires du comte de Guiche* who went through the first
Munster and the second English war on the Dutch side and
fought on the French side in the war of 1672, and the memoirs
of the prince of Taranto (Liege, 1767), who lived at the court
of Frederick Henry and William II. and was one of the prin-
cipal generals of the Dutch army until shortly before the great
French war. The seventeenth century is the " Golden Age "
of the history of the Netherlands, and it has in our time
especially attracted many investigators and brought forth
countless studies large and small on all sorts of subjects.
1 Ed. as supplement to d'Estrades, 1744.
INDEX
Aardenburg, attack on, by the
French, June 26, 1672, 401
Academie des Sciences, estab-
lished in Paris, 1666, 281
Achterhoek, a large part of,
taken September, 1665, 323
Act of Exclusion, the, 215;
passed April 28, 1654, 216
Administration of the Royal
navy, 198
Adolphus, Gustavus, mentioned,
5
Aerssen, Cornelis van, lord of
Sommelsdijk, 155
Aitzema, opinion of, on the
Netherlands, 1653, 211
Aix-la-Chapelle, the peace of,
346
Albertina, Agnes, 315
Alliance of the two Nether-
lands, 1632, 105
Alliance with France, February
8, 1635, 113
Almonde, Philips van, rear ad-
miral, 430
Amalia, Princess, in Holland,
182; the relations between
Charles II. and, 301
Ambon, the so-called "massa-
cre" at, 214
Ambon affair, the, 34
Amor pcenitens the, by Neer-
cassel, 539
Amsterdam, the opposition of, to
the wishes of Prince William,
168; the operation against,
170; the city of , in 1660, 248
ff. ; the Bourse, at, 269; the
patriotism of, 1672, 384; the
powerful aid of, 1672, 402
Anglican church, the, bishops of,
1688, 463
Anglo-Dutch fleet, the, under
Russell, 483
Anhalt, princess, daughter of
Frederick Henry, 458
Anjou, Duke Philip of, proposed
heir to Charles II. of Spain,
October, 1700, 497
Annexation of the Southern
Netherlands to France dis-
cussed, 293
Appleton's British squadron, the
destruction of, March 13,
1652, 205
Architecture, the development
of, 96
Architecture in Holland, 254 ff.
Aremberg, Philip, duke of
Aerschot, refusal of, to
participate against Spain,
54
Army of Holland reduced, July
30, 1648, 161
Army of United Netherlands,
inactivity of, in 1624, 16;
at Nimwegen, 17
Arnauld, Jansenist, 1681-1682,
54i
Art in Holland, 1660, 283
Ath, the capture of, 1697, 488
Atlas belgicce libertatis, the,
192
Augsburg alliance, the, 1686,
461
Austria, alliance with, 427
Aylva, Ernst Sicco van, leader
of the opposition of the
partisans, 352
Ayscue, Vice Admiral, sum-
moned from the West Indies,
199
555
556
Index
B
Backhuysen, Ludolf, the pic-
tures of the sea by, 507
Baltic, the peace in the, 241
Banda Islands, the conquest of,
in 1621, 6
Bankhem, van, leadership of,
against De Witt, 395
Beachy Head, the second "great
disaster" off, July io, 1690,
482
Bekker, Dr. Balthasar, 1670,
537
Bentinck, August, several regi-
ments hired by, July 1684,
465; created earl of Portland,
478
Bergen op Zoom, the attack
upon, in 1628, 44
Betoverde Wereld, the, by Bek-
ker, 1691, 538
Beuningen, van, ambassador to
France, 291; the Dutch am-
bassador at Paris, 1667, 341;
election of, as burgomaster,
355; the influences of, in Am-
sterdam, 386
Beverningh, Hieronymus van,
of Gonda, envoy to England,
1652, 207; negotiations with,
1654, 212; retirement of, to
London, 213; retirement of,
446
Bicker, Cornelis, burgomaster
of Amsterdam, 164
Bidloo, Goverd, prominence of,
as a physician, 512
Binckes, Jacob, expedition of,
to the West Indies, 1678, 433
Blake, Admiral, attack of, on
the Dutch ships, 197
Bodegraven, the capture of, 404
Bohemia, the queen of, 64
Bois-le-Duc, the assault on,
1629, 45; the capitulation of,
September 14, 1629, 49
Bonn, the capture of, Novem-
ber 13, 1673, 416
Boreel, Willem, ambassador to
England, 1670, 358
Boy, Admiral, of Dunkirk, 52
Brakel, Willem a, 536
Brasset, consulted by Prince
William, 174
Brazil, necessity of the loss of,
by the West India Company,
241
Breda, the surrender of, May,
1625, 22; menaced by the
prince of Orange, August,
1633, 108; the surrender of,
October 10, 1637, 116; the
peace of, May 10, 1667, 338
Brederode, Johan Wolfert van,
commander at Utrecht, 47;
marshal, 176
Briel, the journey of William III.
to, 469
Bromsebro, the treaty of, 86
Brun, Antoine, requested not to
visit The Hague, 141
Brunswick-Liineburg, the alli-
ance with, concluded, 322
Brussels, the States-General of,
loss of the importance of,
109
Cabo Corso, the capture of, by
Holmes, 307
Cadiz, navigation at, 1700, 519
Calvinistic ministers, the intoler-
ance of the, 79
Campaign of 1646, the, 134
of 1676, 430
Casimir, Count Ernest, seizes
Oldenzaal, 24
Count Henry, death of,
1640, 61; succession of, to
the stadtholdership, October
31, 1664, 315; opposition of,
to Prince William, 438; recon-
ciliation of, with William III.,
459
Castel-Rodrigo, opposition of, to
^ De Witt, 356
Catholic republic, a suggestion
to establish, in the south,
294
Catholics in the United Nether-
lands, one third of the popu-
lation, 124
Cats, Jacob, pensionary of
Dordrecht, 30
Ceylon, the coast of, held by
the Hollanders, 524
Characteristics of the Hollanders
250 ff-
Index
557
Charles I., of England, refusal
of aid for, by Holland, 131;
the execution of , 1649, J52
II., the return of, to
England, 296
of Spain, the feeble
health of, 489
Charnace\ Hercule de, sent into
the Netherlands by Richelieu,
1633, 107
Chigi, the papal nuncio, 127
China, the trade with, 1700,
523
Christian IV., King, 83
Civil war threatened, 1681, 451
Clant, Egbert, 353
Clarendon, Lord, the leader of
the peace party in England,
1662, 303
Coalition, the preparation of
the great, 443 ff.
War, the 473 ff-
Cocceius, the death of, 1669, 479
Codde, Petrus, succeeds Neer-
cassel, September, 1688, 540
Coen, as governor-general in
October, 1624, 15
Cologne, the alliance of, 365;
negotiations opened at, 1673,
407
Commerce, throughout the world
in 1630, 39; great increase of,
1652-1642, 88 ; of England and
the Netherlands, 190; in Hol-
land, at the highest point,
1660, 264
Commercial interests of Hol-
land, 1640, 84 ff.
Company of Commerce estab-
lished in 1624, 41
"Complaint,'' the, of 1650,
against Amsterdam, 183
Conde\ assumption of command
by, 1673, 408
Conditions in the Netherlands
in 1630, 39 . .
Copenhagen, negotiations at, in
1644, 83
Copper, exportation of, 1679-
1700. 5*5
Costumes, in 1660, 261 ff.
Council pensionary, the, at the
head of the state, 220 ff. ;
recognised leader of the re-
public, 243
Court at The Hague, the princely,
1640, 63
Court, De la, the noted work
of, on Holland, 1660, 221
Pieter de la, 263
Coutinho, Francisco de Sousa,
Portuguese ambassador at
The Hague, 1649, 159
Coxinga, the enterprising Chi-
nese, 268
Cromwell, Oliver, in England,
153; as dictator of England,
April 30, 1652, 205 ff.; con-
cludes peace with Holland,
1654, 218
Crynssen, Abraham, Surinam,
captured, by February 28,
1667, 33&
Curators of Leyden imported
to Holland, 1656, 230
D
D'Albyville, Ier, 402
Dam, Pieter van, 528
"Declaration," the, of Prince
William III., October 10, 1688,
468
Declaration of war, the, between
England and the Nether-
lands, March 4, 1665, 310
Defence of the Netherlands,
1672, 372
De Groot, escape of, from Loe-
vestein, 2 ; opinion of, on the
inactivity of the army, 26;
death of, 1645, 33
De Knuyt suspected by the
French representatives at
Munster, 136
Delff, Willem Jacobszoon, 286
"Delf shaven terror of the sea,"
42
Delft beer, the consumption of,
258
Denmark, hostile attitude of,
toward England, 202
De Ruyter, Admiral, detention
of, at home, 1664, 305; sails
for Africa, 306; the return of,
after a year of war with Eng-
land, 321
Descartes, Rene, in Holland,
1629-1649, 101 ff.
558
Index
Devolution law, the so-called,
295
DeWitt, Cornells, death ot,
— — John, in the Baltic, 85,
domestic matters managed
cleverly by, 1651, 228 ff.;
death of the wife of, July
1, 1668, 349; the fall of, 366
ff.; the loss of power of, 389;
fall of, 392; death of, 396
Diemen, Anthony van, ad-
ministration of, in the East
India Company, 1636, 76
Dieren, death of the Prince of
Orange at, November 6, 1651,
175
Dijkveld, van Weede van, am-
bassador to England, 382
Dinant, the capture of, 1675,
428 .
Disputes between Gronmgen and
the Ommelands, 67
Dividends of the East India
Company, 35
Doesburg, the approach of the
French army near, 1672, 376
Domestic happiness, the, of
William III., 444
Dominium Maris the question
of, with England, 186
Don Juan of Austria, 124
Doreslaer, Dr. Isaac, appear-
ance of, at The Hague, 1648,
157
Dort principles, the, to be con-
served, 181
Dover, the battle of , 197 ; a secret
treaty at, with France, Decem-
ber 31, 1670, 359
Downs, the Spanish fleet in the,
119; defeat of the Spanish
fleet, October 21, 1639, 120
Drelincourt, Charles, prominence
of, as a physician, 512
Drenthe, the famine at, 1621, 94
Dunkirk, the truce of, 40; the,
conquest of planned, 51; cap-
ture of, in 1646, 126
privateers, the menace
of 1631-1637, 43 .. ,
Dutch Flanders, the peril ot,
from French invasion, 502
literature, the powerful
genius of, 97
Dutch merchantmen annoyed
by English battleships, 187
provinces, indignation of,
1635. i33 .
Renaissance, the genuine
style of, 1640, 287
representative at Miin-
ster, January n, 1646, 131
sea power, the decline of,
41
Dylerschans, the capture of,
December, 1663, 312
E
East India Company, patent
of, renewed, 4'. dividends of,
in 1642, 77
Edict, the revocation of the,
October 17, 1685, 455
Emanuel, Maximilian, governor
of Belgium, 493
Embassy, the, to England, 1652,
194
England, dissensions with, 1623,
14; the throne of, declared
vacant January 28, 1689, 470
English preparations for war
with Holland, 195
war, the first, 186 ff.; the
second, 317 ff.
Ernest, Count, capture of Bra-
brant by, 48
Estates of Holland, the attempt
of, to prevent financial failures
92 ; the resolution of, Septem-
ber 30, 1656, 230
Etna, the battle of, April 22,
1676, 432 , .
European coalition feared by
Louis XIV., 1676, 435
"European balance of power
the beginning of the, 443
Evertsen, Cornells, of Zealand,
326; death of, 328
Exclusion, the Act of, 215;
passed April 28, 1654, 216
Export trade of Holland m
1700, 514
Fagel, the council pensionary
in 1672, 405
Index
559
Finance in Holland, 1650, man-
aged by DeWitt, 233
Financial measures the, of John
deWitt, 220
Fisheries, the deterioration of,
203
Flanders conquered by the
French, 452
an attack on, 1643, 125
Floriszoon, Pieter, raised to
rank of vice admiral, 211
Foreign affairs of the Nether-
lands in 1626, 25
France, attitude of, toward the
Netherlands, 1670, 357; co-
operation of, with England,
1670— 1671, 367
Frederick, Count William of
Nassau, 46; suggestion of, for
reduction of the army of Hol-
land, 1649, 162; moved from
Abcoude, 171
Prince William, the em-
peror, 1654, 223
III., succession of, in
Sweden, 158
Freedom of worship, the, in
Holland, 275
French alliance, the, 103 ff. ; the
unpopularity of, 1673, 415;
diplomacy concerning the
siege of Mons, 1677, 441
Friedrich, George, count of
Waldeck, as field marshal,
1672, 402
Friesland, soldiers sent into, by
the states-general, in 1634, 68
Fuchs, Paul von, the special
envoy, 451
Fiirstenberg, Count, the arrest
of, 1673, 4i7
Cardinal Wilhelm Egon
von, archbishop of Cologne,
464
Galen, Jan Van, on the Tuscan
coast, 200
Gallican church, the, in T682,
454
Gardie, de la, the chancellor of
Sweden, 342
Generality lands, the, of 1670,
374
Goes, Van der, disaster to, June,
1693, 485
Gold Coast, the possessions of
Holland on the, 529
Golden Age, the, for the Nether-
lands, 1640, 74
Goyen, Jan van, landscape
painter, 95
Graeff, Andries de, the death
of, 347
Jacob van der, attack of,
on De Witt, 383
Grand alliance of Vienna, the,
472
Grave, the fortress of besieged,
1674, 422
Great Assembly, the resolutions
of the, 184
Mogul, the states of the,
522
war, the, 399/7
Greenland fishery, the, 273
Groningen, disputes of, 67
Guiche, the count de, Memoirs
of, 366
Gustavus, Charles, possession
secured by, of Elbing and
Brandenburg, December, 165 5,
237
H
Haarlem, connected with Ley-
den, 1667, by a canal, 249
Haersolte, the party of, 1671,
35i
Hague, The, the treaty of Sep-
tember 7, 1 701, signed at,
500
Halewijn, Cornelis Teresteyn
van, 382
Hapsburgs, the, of Vienna,
495
Harmony, the passage of, March
20, 1670, 354
Harwich, the attack on, July,
1666, 337
Heemskerck, Coenraad vary
Dutch ambassador to Paris,
499
Heinsius, Antoine, pensionary
since 1679, 475
Henry, Prince Frederick, made
captain-general, April 4, 1625,
18; the beginning of, 20 ff. ;
560
Index
Henry, Prince Frederick (Cont.)
diplomatic talent of 21; cau-
tion of , 32 ; the military affairs
of 43; the brilliant cam-
paign of, 59; the height of the
power of, 60 ff. ; decoration of,
with the "municipal crown,
60; decline of influence of, 69;
no longer a friend of Mazann,
163; death of, March 14.
1647. 139
Heyn, Pieter Pieterzoon, vice-
admiral for West India Com-
pany, 36; lieutenant-admiral
of Holland in 1629, 42; death
of, 42 ,
Histoire de Louvois by Rousset,
360 .
Holland, the wide fame of, m
1648, 150; the ambassadors,
permission granted to, to send
the Act of Exclusion to The
Hague, 217; the most import-
ant of the states, 245". Sit-
uation in, 1672, 368
"Holland's pilot," 28
Holmes, admiral, of the Eng-
lish navy, 1661, 302
Sir Robert assault of,
on the Smyrna fleet, 364
Holstein conquered by the
Swedes, 84
"Homer" the painting en-
titled, by Rembrandt, 1663,
284
Hooghe, Romein de, 508
Hoorn, two hundred ships at,
in 1618, 89
Hop, Jacob, pensionary of Am-
sterdam, 471
Houbraken Arnold, painter, en-
graver, etcher, and literary
man, 1700, 508
Hudde, Jan, a member of the
Amsterdam government, 280;
Amsterdam under, 448
Huguenots, of La Rochelle,
treaty with, 23; intolerance
toward the, 531
Hulst captured by the Prince
of Orange, November 5,
1643. 126 . . r
Huygens, Christian opinion ot,
on death of DeWitt, 397
Constantijn, 315
Industries, national of Holland,
ttl6 2 74.
Innocent XL, Pope, 455
Interest van Holland, the, 244
Interior of Dutch houses, the,
256 /?■
International law, the new rules
of, 196
Isabella, Archduchess, the, death
of, December 1, 1633, 104
James, duke of Monmouth, 453
King, the death of, 22
III. saluted as king of
England, 501
Jan Klaaszen, the drama ot,
by Asselijn, 509
Japan, commerce with, 75;
secured by the East India
Company, 75
Jeannin, death of, 1622, n
Jesuits, the expulsion of the,
1687, 457
John, count of Nassau, the cap-
ture of, at Wesel, 50
Julich, the surrender of, Febru-
ary, 1622, 3
Juntas, the two, 44
Jutland, conquered by the
Swedes, 84
K
Kerkhoven, Prince, Johan van
der, 62
Kievit, Johan, leader of the
Orange party, 1666, 332
Kijkduin, the battle of, August
21, 1673, 413 TT ,,
Kitchen, the, in Holland, 1660,
Knuyt, Johan de, of Zealand,
influential friend of Prince
Henry, 66 ,,.,*„+
Kodde, van de, the family of, at
Rijnsburg, 231
Kostelick Mai, the, by Huygens,
260
Index
56'
La Hogue, the naval battle off.
May 29, 1691, 484
Land, the question of, 1660,
244 ft.
Letters, the transportation of,
between Amsterdam and
Hamburg, 1661, 311
Levant, the commerce of in 1640,
87
Leyden, lords of, agree to
Prince William's demands, 166
Liefde, de, the death of, August
31, 1673, 413
Lier, Willem van, lord of Oos-
terwijk, in Paris, 1635, 114
Lijn, Cornelis van de, the
governor general, 266
Lisola, the work of, in Vienna,
1673, 406
Literary life in Holland, 99
"Loevestein faction" the new
attack of the, 222
Loncq, Admiral, conquers Olin-
da in 1630, 37
London, the terrible fire of
1665 in, 329
Louis XIII., treaty at Com-
piegne, with, 13; negotiations
of, with the Netherlands, 1633,
112
XIV. , king of France, 151;
alliance of, with the Nether-
lands, 292; .the attitude of,
toward the Netherlands, 167 1,
362; declaration of war by,
April 6, 1672, 363; invasion
of the Netherlands by, 1672,
375
Louis, William, 165
Lowestoft, the battle of, 319
Lucifer, the, by Vondel, 1654,
288
Lutzen, the death of the king
of Sweden at, November,
1632, 106
Luxembourg, the retreat of, 404
Luyken, Jan, author of Duytse-
lier, 1671, 510
M
Macassar, the subjection of,
1669, 521
36
Maestricht, the siege of, 56; the
capitulation of, 57 ; the siege of
1633, in; the arrival ofPra-
del at, November 10, 1665,
324, occupation by French
troops of, 437
Magistrates, the, of Leyden and
Utrecht, 252
Magnus Inter cur sus, the, of 1495,
298
Maintenon, Madame de, the
influence of, 455
Manhattan Island, the pur-
chase of, in 1626, 38
Marck A., author of Merck der
Godgeleerdheid, 511
Marie de M^dicis, visit of, to the
Netherlands, 1638, 120
Mary, Queen, the will of, Octo-
ber, 18, 1695, 474; the death
of, January 7, 1695, 487
Maurice, John, the departure
of, from Brazil, 80; governor
of Cleves, 160
Mazarin, in power in France,
122; the felix quinquennium
of, 125
Mazarinades, the large number
of, in France, 156
Mechlin, Margaret of, 19
Mediterranean Sea, navigation
on, 39
Meijer, Dr. Lodewijk, effect of,
on Dutch literature, 1669,
289
Merlin, the English yacht,
361
Messen, Johan van, the treach-
ery of, 225
Meuse, trade and travel on the,
1700, 517
Minden, Prince William III., at,
467
Molenaer, Jan Mieuse, 285
Monk, General, offer of, to re-
store Charles II., 242
Monmouth, the duke of, 460
Mons, the relief of, 439
Montecuculi, count, 47
Moura - Cortereal, Manuel de,
minister to the Netherlands,
1644, 123
Muiden, the capture of, 1672,
377; attack on, abandoned,
1673, 409
562
Index
Miinster, the peace of, 123 ff. ;
negotiations at, 1647, 127 ff. ;
the peace of, concluded 148;
the bishop of, the treaty of,
with England, June 13, 1665,
313; the campaign against,
1666, 330
Musch, Cornells, clerk of the
States-General, 1628, 65
N
Naarden, failure of the first at-
tack on, 403
Namur, the capture of, June,
1692, 485
Nassau, Louis of, lord of Bever-
weert, 172
Nassau-Saarbruck, commissary
general, 371
Naval engagements in the
British Channel in 1639, 118;
1673, 412; expedition of 1666,
333
Navigation Act of Parliament,
the, October 9, 1651, 191 ; dis-
cussion of the repeal of, 334
Navy, the strength of the Dutch,
Nederhorst, accused of bribery,
1646, 145; death of, 146
Neercassel, Johannes van, 278;
the leadership of, 457
Neerwinden, the battle of, July
29, 1693, 486
Negotiations at The Hague, the
failure of , 1663, no; at Miin-
ster, 127 ff.; after the death
of Prince William of Orange,
180; of July, 1652, 204
Nes, Van, admiral, in the Eng-
lish Channel, 1673, 411
Netherlands, the "bad life" of,
6 ; the critical condition of,
in 1625, 25; position of, in
Java, 1632, 35; condition of,
in 1672, 400; at the end of
17th century, 506 ff.; condi-
tion of, in 1700, 542
New Netherland, the colony of,
.37
Nieuwburg, the peace conference
in the palace of, 490 ; the peace
of, 491
Nieuwpoort, the battle of, June
12, 1652, 206
Nimwegen, the army at, 17;
May, 1632, 55; the departure
of William III., from, 424;
disputes at, concerning evacu-
ation, 440
North Foreland, the battle of,
June, n 1665, 327
Northern Company, the, the
decline of, in 163 3- 164 2, 81 ;
the fall of the, 1642, 272
O
Odijk, second cousin to William
HI-, 445
Oeland, the victory of, June
n, 1676, 430
Oldenbarnevelt, Prince, 1 ; the
policy of, 505
Ommeland, the disputes of the,
67
Orange, the House of, the rise
of power of, 62 ff. ; one of the
most powerful in Europe, 63 ;
the condition of, in 1664, 316;
Prince William of, 72; men-
aced at Breda, 108; at Dieren,
173 ; taken sick at Dieren, 175;
death of, November 6, 1651,
176; William Henry of, 177;
power of increased, 219; a
member of the council of state,
369; preparations of, for de-
fence, 387
party, the, adroit man-
agement of, 299
Oudaen, Frans, the Rotterdam
baker, in 1660, 231
Oudshoorn, de Vlaming van,
525
Outhoorn, William van, 527
Overyssel the domestic diffi-
culties of, 350
William III. at, March 2,
1674, 426
Pamphlets for and against Spain
at the conference of Miinster,
i35
Pappenheim repulsed in reliev-
ing Maestricht, 57
Index
563
Parliament, assembly of, Febru-
ary, 1677, 436
Pauw, Adriaan, appointed to
council pensionary, 32; de-
parture of, from The Hague,
October 16, 1647, 143
Peace, with Spain, discussed, 73 ;
the first years of, 151 ff. ; in
Holland, 290 ff.
Penaranda, the correspondence
of, in 1647, 138
Pennington, Admiral, the at-
titude of, 119
People, the, of Holland, 1660,
244 ff-
Perpetual Edict, the, 370; in
1672, 385; the repeal of , 386
Perre, Zealander Van de, on the
embassy to England, 193; the
death of, 213
Philip III., the death of, 7
IV., leader of the Catholic
reaction, 8 ; the Company of
Commerce established in 1624,
by 41
-of Spain, the death of,
September, 1665, 325
Pirates of Dunkirk, the, 71
"Plan of Harmony" the, by
De Witt, 348
Portland, the battle of, Febru-
ary 28, 1653, 201 ; the victory
of, 204
Portugal, commerce with, 89;
opposition of, to the West
India Company, 152; the
treaty with, signed August
6, 1661, 241
"Portuguese Jewish nation" at
Amsterdam, 1672, 513
Prosperity, the remarkable, in
Holland, 1660, 262 ff.
Protestant commercial alliance,
the suggestion of a great, 209
"Public prayer" the, of 1657,
302
Pyrenees, the Peace of the,
November, 1659, 234
R
Raalte, the meeting at, October
1, 1657; order restored in the
province by, 226
Ratisbon, the truce of, August
15, 1684, 453
Recife, the surrender of, to
Portugal, 270
Reinierszoon, Carel, as governor
general, 267
Reformed Church, the, privi-
leged above all, 276
Remonstrants, at Amsterdam,
in 1626, 27; the, in control at
Rotterdam, 1630, 31; semi-
nary for, at Amsterdam, 1634,
33
Renesse, Rene de, count of
Warfusee, president of the
council of finance, 54
Renswoude of Utrecht, member
of Prince William's deputation
to the cities of Holland, 167
Revolt against Spain, the great,
70
Revolutionary epoch in Eng-
land, the, 290
Rheede, Godard van, 447
Rhine, the league of, concluded
August, 1658, 236
Richelieu, the powerful, 23
Richelieu, Cardinal, the difficul-
ties of, 103; the death of,
December, 1642, 121
Rijnberk, the capture of, 1633,
108
Rippenda, bailiff of Twente, the
death of, October 1653, 224
Rixdollar, the Dutch, the money
of commerce, 1689-1700, 516
Rocroy, the defeat of, May 19,
1643, I23
Roeskilde, the peace of, main-
tained, 240
Roman Catholics, the placards
against, 93
Romanists, the disorder among,
381
Roose, Pieter, president of the
privy council of Brussels, 44
Rothe, Johannes, the herald of
the "fifth monarchy, " 232
Rotterdam, the rebellious dis-
position at, 1652, 208; called
"the second Venice," 1660,
246
Royal African Company, the,
disputes of, with the West
India Company, 304
564
Index
Royal Charles, the capture of,
336
Rubens, the artist, visit of, to The
Hague, 163 1, S3
Rupert, Prince, commander in
the English navy, 1665, 317
Ruyter de, the death of, April
29, 1676, 432
Ryswick, the treaty of, 473
Salamanca, Dom Miguel de, 130
Sardan, de, attempt of, to raise
Huguenot revolution in France
1674, 423
Schenkenschans, the recapture
of, April, 1636, 115
Schepers, Willem Bastiaensze,
480
Scheveningen, the departure of
Charles II. from, June 2, 1660,
297
Schonauwen, Van Reede van,
388
Schuerman, Anna Maria van,
282
Science, the, of Leyden, 100
Scilly Islands, one of the, oc-
cupied by Tromp, 189
Scotch fishermen, 167 5-1 700,
534
"Secret Works" the introduc-
tion of, June, 1663, 306
Setubal, exportation of, the salt
of, 1700, 520
Seven Provinces, the, commanded
by De Ruyter, 379
Shaftesbury, the English chan-
cellor, 410
Shares of the East India Com-
pany sold for 500 per cent., 77
Silk, the manufacture of, 518
Smout expelled from Amster-
dam, January, 1630, 30
Sobieski, John, king of Poland,
494
Society, the, of Holland, 253
Solebay, the battle off, June 7,
1672, 378
Sommelsdijk, Cornells van, Aers-
sen van, 530
Spain, treaty with, in 1646,
137; influence o'f, in the
Netherlands, 1681, 450
Spanish brandy, the exportation
of, 1688, 519
fleet destroyed off Zea-
land, 52 ; defeated in the
Downs, October 21, 1639, 120
-Netherlands, plan to cede,
by Mazarin, 132
succession, the affair of,
492
Specx, Jacques, repulsed the
enemy, 35
Speult, Henry van, the governor
of Moluccas, 14
Stadtholder, the power of the,
265
Stadtholdership, the question
of heredity in, 1674, 421
States-General, assembly of, at
Brussels, 58; the, of Holland,
1650, 163
St. Denis, the battle of, 442
Stel, Simon van der, commander
at Cape Town, 1679, 526
St. Germain en Laye, the terms
of peace at, 345
St. John, Oliver, Lord Chief
Justice, 188
Strasburg, the seizure of, August
30, 1681, 449
Stromboli, the battle of, 431
Stuarts, the, allowed in the
Netherlands, 235
Stuyvesant, Peter, governor of
New Netherlands in 1647, 271
Styrum, Count van, 46
Sweden , necessary to curb the
power of, 239
Summa doctrince de jcedere et
testamento Dei, the, by Cocce-
jus, 279
"Surinam Society," the, 530
Tallard, Count de, at Het Loo,
1698, 496
Taverns, the closing at 10 p.m.
of the, 259
Temple, Sir William, opposition
of, to France, 343
Texel, the council pensionary at,
320
Textile industries, the flourish-
ing condition of, from 1580,
90
Index
565
Thames, naval operations in the,
1666, 335
Tichelaer of Piershil, 390; the
arrest of, 391
Tilly, Count, the victorious army
of, 12, 394
Torbay, the landing of William
III. at, 470
Tories, the, in England, 1689-
1700, 498 ff.
Torre, Jacobus de la, vicar of
the diocese of Utrecht, 1656.
229 ; the apostolic vicar, 1651-
1661,373
Torture inflicted on Jacob de
Witt, 393
Trade in the West Indies, 1625-
1627, 36
Traite des droits de la Reine, the,
of 1667, 340
Treaty, the, of September 3,
1689, 477
Triple Alliance, the completion
of, January 26, 1668, 344
Tromp, Martin Harpertszoon,
the victory of, before Dun-
kirk, February, 1639, 117
Truce, the first years after the,
iff-
Tulipomania, the, of 1636, 255
Turenne, the death of, 429
U
United Netherlands, under Old-
enbarnevelt, 1 ; policy toward,
12; in 1640, 74 ff. ; relation to
France in 1633, no ff.; a
powerful nation, in 1643, 123;
at the summit of their power,
339 ff-
United Provinces, called respub-
lic<z federates, 185; the ambig-
uous condition of government
in 1674, 425
Utrecht, the treaty of, signed
May 15, 1648, 144; results of,
147 ff. ; return to the Union
of, 1674, 420; the peace of,
1713. 474
Valenciennes, the capture of,
March, 1677, 434
Van der Kemp, Maurits van
Nassau by, 19
Van Petersom, a secret emissary
from Brabant, 1623, 10
Venetian glass, importation of,
520
Voetians, dependence of, on the
partisans of Orange, 277
Voetius, the death of, 1676, 479
Vries, Tjerk Hiddes de, from
Friesland, 326; death of, 328
W
Waayen, Van der, protection of,
by Frisian stadtholder, 1677,
479; restored to honour, 1685,
535 , .
Walcourt, the battle of, August
25, 1689, 481
Wallenstein and the Nether-
lands, 25
War declared against Spain,
May, 1635, 114
party in England, the
supremacy of, 309
-with Spain, the last years
of, 123 ff.
Warendorp, a popular rising led
by, at Groningen, 227
Warnaer and Frederick, the Dia-
logue between, written April 1 7 ,
1648, 146
Wassenaer, Jacob van, lord of
Obdam, elected lieutenant
admiral, 210; the Dutch fleet
under, 318
Water line, the defence of the,
1672, 380
Wealth of the Republic, 1688-
1695, 532
West India Company, charter of
June 3, 1621, 3; decline of, 78
Westminster, the peace of, Feb-
ruary 19, 1674, 418
Whale fisheries, the importance
of, to the Netherlands, in 1640,
82
Wildervanck, Adriaan.the lead-
ership of, 247
Wildt, de, on the board of ad-
miralty, 476
William, Archduke Leopold,
governor of the Southern
Netherlands, 154
566
Index
William Frederick, in Groningen,
March 14, 1663, 314
William, son of Frederick Henry,
born May 26, 1626, 21
William I., Prince of Orange, the
debts of, 149
II., of Orange, 140; at-
tempt of, to keep up the war,
142; displeasure of, at treaty
of Utrecht, 147
-III., of Orange, residence
of, at Breda, 245; the educa-
tion of , 300; the thirty years'
rule of, 399; the personality
of, 400 ; the growing popularity
of, 1674, 419; the sturdiest
opponent to Louis XIV., 442 ;
interest of, in English crown,
466 ; the last years of, 493 ff. ;
collar bone of, broken, March
4, 1702, 503; as king of Eng-
land, 506; death of, March 19,
1702, 504
With, Witte Corneliszoon de,
vice-admiral, 71
Witsen, Nicolaas, the burgo-
master of Amsterdam, 1697,
533
Witt, Jacob de, of Dordrecht,
punishment of, 169
John de, as instructor to
the Prince of Orange, 1666,
33*
Woolen industries, the, 1630, 91
York, the duke of, presentation
to, of Manhattan, March 22,
1663, 308; opposition to the
marriage of, 1673, 414
Zaan, the shipyards of the, 516
Zealand, a proposed attack upon
5i
Zevecote, Fleming van, poetry
by, 98
Zoutelande, Madame, the mem-
oirs of, 251
Zuid-Polsbroek, Cornells de
Graeff van, consulted by
De Witt, 238
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